Turkey’s Fiasco in the Caucasus
On 27 September morning, Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, launched a large-scale offensive operation in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Overnight, it became one of the hottest topics around the world. After 14 days and hundreds of casualties on both sides, a ceasefire was brokered in Moscow under Russian pressure. Strangely or not, the new status quo did not differ from the situation before that. Ankara, even when it was not officially part of the conflict, hastily expressed its disappointment with the peace agreement reached. If nothing changed, then what was the issue?
The only logical answer is – because they did not achieve what they had hoped for and the premature peace was a failed end-conflict state.
Access to Oil & Gas Fields
The Caspian Sea has several functioning oil and gas fields, the products of which go to the European and international energy markets. These pipelines pass north of the troubled region through Georgia and reach Turkish ports and then head to Europe.
Turkey must have planned to clear the area south of Nagorno Karabakh in order to build another pipeline and allow for its secure operation. However, to link it to Nakhchevan, there had to be a second step, so that Turkey and Azerbaijan could gain access into certain territories of south Armenia, viz:
• Either the valley north of Arevik National Park – everything along the 80 km Tegh-Goris-Balak road, or
• Manage to separate a 20 km long piece of land connecting the Betschenagsku Pass next to Shahbuz National Reserve with the border facing the Minkend village, or
• Surround Armenia and pressurise them into some sort of cooperation for such a project.
This way they could control the entire transportation from the massive Shah Deniz field and its neighboring sites completely ignoring Russian or US pressure and becoming a major supplier for the EU and other markets, where they could set the terms.
Existing Oil and Gas Routes
Currently, all the oil and gas pipelines connecting the massive fields of Caspian region with the distribution depot in Erzurum in Turkey and the international markets follow the route of the trade between Asia and Europe. Azerbaijan is the only choice for overland trade if Russia and Iran are to be avoided. Azerbaijan offers only one option – a narrow 40 to 90 km wide flatland valley, known as the “Ganja Gap”, named after the largest city in the area.
North of it is Caucasus, with steep alpine hills reaching altitudes of over 3,200 metres (10,500 ft) and south of it is Lesser Caucasus, a flatter mountainous area, but still having ridges between 2,000 and 3,000 metres (6,500-9,800 ft) altitude. The terrain is hard and just traversing it is not for beginner trekkers or climbers. Any construction going through the mountains would require immense amount of effort and risk, which is why the Ganja Gap has no alternative to date.
The only other valley, which has some basic infrastructure is the valley on the Aras river. It serves as the border between Nahkhchivan province, Armenia and Azerbaijan on the north and Iran on the south. The problem with that valley in Azerbaijan is that the villages in it are at the foot of the mountain and are inhabited by ethnic Armenians, so the Azerbaijani state has little or no control. If an important and expensive project is built through it, it can easily be sabotaged as the distance between it and the settlements and military batteries in the mountain would be less than 20 km and there would be direct visibility.
The Ganja Gap, on the other hand, is naturally protected from the areas of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh by the uninhabited Murovdag range, which is the highest range in Lesser Caucasus and with ridges at 3,200 metres (10,500 ft) altitude or more, is practically unpassable.
Reasons for Nagorno Karabakh Stalemate
The birth of the animosity between the ethnic Armenians in the area and the Azeri could be traced back to the policies of Stalin of taking and giving regions for achieving desired results within the newly created and growing USSR and with its neighbors – warming the relations with the stronger and secular Turkey and creating a buffer with Iran. Even though the area has been inhabited predominantly by Armenians for over 2,000 years, it was governed as Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). The conflict die out under Moscow’s strict control for the next few decades, but escalated immediately after the fall of the USSR.
During this war, Russia supplied the majority of the arms to both sides as the military leadership there was intimately familiar with it – they had been part of the same system not long ago. The defensive batteries built on higher ground by the Armenians have allowed for very effective defence against Azeri army attempts over the years and as a result Nagorno-Karabakh, together with several surrounding territories, is now de jure Azerbaijani, but de facto independently run by Armenians with a local government. It is important to note that the Republic of Artsakh, the Amernian name of Nagorno Karabakh, has not been recognized by any country in the UN.
The situation throws up many questions about the repeated calls by President Aliyev and President Erdogan that Armenia should stop its occupation. If the region is part of Azerbaijan and nobody has recognized it as a separate body, then how can they get it back? On the other hand, if they do not have control over it and, in fact, they have never had control over it, then is it really theirs? It is similar to claiming outside territories for the sheer desire to add territories rather than considering historical facts and population composition. The later is possible, but it is called invasion and requires greater preparation and superiority to achieve success as the locals are likely to retaliate.
Potential Scenarios
• Turkey is the least content party with the agreement. They will try to disrupt this one way or another as peace with the current status quo is their worst scenario. However, they will have to step in themselves, because of the low morale in the Azerbaijan army (numerous reports of alcohol abuse among Azeri officers and demotivated mercenaries from Syria, who are sent as human shields against the Armenian forces). Additionally, the only settlements, which the Azeri army managed to clear (as per the Azerbaijan defence ministry) after two weeks of intensive fighting are 12 small villages, located in the flat lands at 300-400 metres (1,000-1,300 ft) altitude. It is unclear how they intend to capture bigger towns at 1,000-1,600 m (3,300-5,200 ft) altitude and the surrounding mountains where guerrilla warfare will likely ensure.
At the time of writing, the press secretary of the minister of defence of Armenia, announced on 13 October, that the enemy had resumed offensive operations.
• is possible that Israel is pressed unofficially by the US to offer Armenia a solution to the Azeri attacks, as their weaponry seems to be providing a big advantage so far. This will, however, trigger Russian response as they are already unsettled from the recent sale to Georgia of Israeli air defense system.
• If Turkey intervenes directly, it is possible that Russia will intervene as well and use the chance to increase its influence in the region. Miscalculated strategy by Turkey could become a major threat to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
Turkey’s Position
Turkey’s course has shifted significantly in recent years and its foreign policy can be described as highly controversial, to say the least. Turkey has been the most vocal party in the conflict, even if it was not directly involved in it. It immediately expressed disagreement with the peace accord when the spokesperson of the president, Ibrahim Kalin, announced, on the day of the ceasefire, that the root cause of the problem was the Armenian occupation of Azeri lands and if that did not change, peace could not be a solution.
It is clear that Turkey, rather than Azerbaijan, has greater motivation in the elimination of the unwanted presence there. The Azeri rhetoric has been repetitive of the statements by Ankara or unfounded and grave threats, such as the possible targeting of the Mitsamor nuclear power plant. The statement was baseless, because a possible Chernobyl-like scenario would mean at least as much or more damage to Azerbaijan or Turkey due to a number of factors – proximity of Turkey (15km from it), weather conditions this time of the year/ Coriolis effect of the atmosphere and the resultant direction of the potential radioactive clouds and so on.
Turkey’s major problem is that it is often dependent on various superpowers and has to consider number of geopolitical realities. Until a few years ago they had to just juggle between US and Russian interests, while now China seems to be the biggest player. In 2009, President Erdogan said, with regards to the Uighur policy in Xinjiang, “the incidents in China are, simply put, a genocide” and followed it with domestic policy for safe haven for the Uighur diaspora.
That changed in 2016, when Turkey arrested a prominent Uighur political activist, who had been living and residing in the country for the last 15 years. That continued with hundreds of similar arrests and extraditions. Since then, the two countries have signed 10 bilateral agreements and China has become Turkey’s second largest import partner, investing $3 billion between 2016 and 2019 and promising to double that by the end of 2020. Last year, China’s central bank secured a $1 billion swap and helped salvage various poorly managed projects or take majority stakes in other multi-billion projects, that could be part of the Belt and Road Initiative – ultimately allowing access to the Mediterranean.
The economic crisis from the coronavirus pandemic pushed Turkey to search for investment alternatives other than with their usual partners. Completing all local Chinese funded projects would mean empowering China in the mid to long term, which would mean that Turkey will have to make some hard choices very soon, including possibly leaving NATO and, thus, decreasing its US and EU pressure.
Georgia’s Position
Georgia tried to remain silent as long as possible. They currently benefit from the pipelines going through their territory. Politically, Georgia’s position could always be risky, because they can theoretically shift between being Western/US or Russia oriented foreign policy and a shift towards the Islamic world is impossible. None of that, however, is in line with Turkey’s orientation in the last few years, which could be the reason why Erdogan might pursue an alternative for the oil and gas transportation.
Russia’s Position
Russia’s position is one of the most complex as it is the real heavyweight in the region. Both Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s leaders had close ties with Russia due to the common past as part of the USSR. Currently, both countries are looking elsewhere – Armenia is oriented towards the West, but is dependent on Russia for energy and Azerbaijan is aligned with Turkey. Russia sells arms to both sides, which theoretically means that they want to have the conflict continue as long as possible.
However, there are other interests as well. The Hajiqabul-Mozdok gas pipeline is operational and Russia imports 175 billion cubic feet per year. Additionally, the Baku-Novorossyisk (Northern Route Export) oil pipeline imports at 105,000 barrels per day.
Third, and most important aspect, is the regional influence that Russia can have. Countries like Georgia and Armenia can serve as a buffer between Russia and Turkey. Considering that Turkey has been warming up its relations with China significantly and Iran is already under Beijing’s heavy influence, it would be imperative for Russia to have a safe zone of countries, which are not likely to be advancing up north anytime in the future, as Russia will have to take care of its own 4,209 km border with China. The chance that Turkey or Iran could be spreading Jihadist influence through marginalized Islamic groups should not be neglected as well. Finally, Russia has to act in a such way, that there will be less motivation for the US or the West to affect the region.
It is possible, that the Russian strategists saw that Azerbaijan’s new equipment -Israeli missiles and drones – might quickly erase the advantages of the highlands that the Armenians had for decades and, for the first time, genuinely threaten the whole existence of the enclave. This way, their best move would be to intervene fast and press for a peace agreement. Which is what happened on 11 October in Moscow, when Vladimir Putin insisted that both sides reach peaceful agreement and Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov mediated over 10 hrs of peace talks.
Israel’s position
Currently, drones, which Israel sold to Azerbaijan, are known to be Harop and Orbiter 1K. The former, made by state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), is able to carry a 25 kg warhead.
Additionally, there were reports that Azerbaijan used Israeli rockets LORA, also produced by the state IAI. This is the first conflict where these modern missiles were used. These hypersonic rockets have a range of 400 km and CEP of 10 metres and can be launched from a standard intermodal container (standard cargo looking containers) on a ship or land launched. They could be easily transported to any point without raising suspicion by observers and can be fired off from anywhere in Azerbaijan and reach their target in Nagorno Karabakh.
Israel’s strategy to sell weapons to Azerbaijan is very complex as it has to reflect on their opportunities, but most importantly – major geopolitical risks and threats. Obviously, the defence industry has to have clients. However, the possible threats are far more important. Even though Azerbaijan is allied with Turkey, President Aliyev is viewed as a potential friend in case of future hostilities with Iran, one of the biggest threats to Israel’s existence. Azerbaijan has a tense relationship with Tehran because of the marginalization of ethnic Azerbaijanis, who make up roughly a fifth of Iran’s population.
American Position
The US have been relatively silent. Until several years ago they had no share in the LNG import of Turkey, now they are responsible for about 10% of them. Additionally, Erdogan announced on 8 October that Trump and he had set a goal to increase their bilateral trade to $100 billion. The US also has one of its largest air bases in Incirlik, which is strategically important for the regional influence in the Middle East.
However, the US will not want to increase Russian influence in Caucasus, which means that they will try to stop Turkey, directly or indirectly, from achieving their Caucasus agenda.
The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is highly complex and very important. If a remote mountainous area of 4,400 sq km with population of 150,000, a barely functional local economy, which attracts below 10,000 tourists per year in its few monasteries, with no ties to any major movements or well known terrorist groups, attracts so much attention, we should ask ourselves why and analyze each potential party’s stake in it. So far, Turkey stands to win the most should the conflict be resolved the way they want – Armenians leave the occupied territory. Considering this has not happened in the last 2,000 years even after numerous genocides in the region and one of the superpowers has a lot to lose in such scenario, the future events can turn out to be extremely interesting and important.
