Thwarting Kremlin Aggression Today For Constructive Relations Tomorrow
The Atlantic Council published a paper titled “Thwarting Kremlin Aggression Today For Constructive Relations Tomorrow” authored by Anders Åslund, John E. Herbst, David J. Kramer, Alexander Vershbow and Brian Whitmore in February 2022, as part of its series of papers on Global Strategy 2022, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The paper offers a comprehensive strategy to manage and develop US relations with Russia over the next twenty years. This strategy seeks to thwart current Kremlin efforts to undermine the international system that the United States helped create after World War II and revise after the Cold War; to cooperate in the short and medium term on issues of mutual interest, in particular arms control; and to establish in the long term a broad cooperative relationship once Moscow recognizes that its own security and prosperity are best realized in partnership with the United States and the West.
Here is the Executive Summary
After the end of World War II, the United States, its allies, and partners built a rules-based international system that ushered in peace, prosperity, and freedom in many parts of the world. The system has come under fire from revisionist powers, mainly China and Russia, seeking to fundamentally change the established international order. This paper seeks to address how to manage the multifaceted challenges Russia poses.
There are broadly two views of the threat posed by Russia. One maintains that Russia is a revisionist power that uses all means of state power, including military aggression, to impose its will on its neighborhood and to undermine US, NATO, and the European Union’s (EU’s) interests in an effort to revise the international order. The second view does not deny Kremlin misbehavior but contends that NATO and the EU have not been sensitive to traditional Russian interests, especially in the post-Soviet space, and have responded too strongly to Kremlin provocations with sanctions, military support to Ukraine, and enhancing NATO’s military presence on its eastern flank.
This paper leans toward the first view but seeks to transcend the debate by laying out a vision for a long-term and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia. In brief, Russia is a historic great power with talented people and great natural resources. Unfortunately, within a decade of the fall of the Soviet Union, an authoritarian system formed in Russia with strong state control of the economy that directed resources to the leadership and privileged insiders, and its leader launched an aggressive foreign policy. In sum, for more than a decade, Kremlin policies have not been good for Russia, its neighbors, or the West.
Washington should seek to build a relationship with Russia in the long run—likely, but not necessarily, post-Putin—based on mutual respect, respect for international law, and respect for the international order that emerged after World War II and the Cold War. This is a Russia with which the United States would cooperate on many political issues, and with which there would be substantial economic cooperation. It would also be a Russia whose people would prosper.
A peaceful, prosperous Russia is a distinct possibility if we approach US policy realistically, and that starts with a clear-eyed look at the global system and Russia today.
The Russia challenge is evident in the economic, diplomatic, governance, and security domains.
The list of Kremlin provocations is long and includes military action notably in Georgia and Ukraine and changing borders by force, relentless and ongoing cyberattacks, electoral interference in the United States and numerous other democratic countries, assassinations abroad, disinformation campaigns, coup attempts, and efforts to buck up dictators. There is also evidence that Moscow is likely behind some of the directed energy attacks on US officials that produce the Havana Syndrome. Russian President Vladimir Putin presides over these active measures and malign activities in his quest to destabilize the international order that the Kremlin calculates works against its interests.
All of this is a sign of fear of and opposition to democracy, especially in Russia’s neighborhood. While the Biden administration evaluates the Chinese threat to US interests as its top priority, the Russian threat to the rules-based order, in the short term at least, has been more aggressive and persistent.1 The United States does not have the luxury of focusing only on China.
The strategy outlines the following overarching short, medium, and long-term goals.
Short term: Thwart and deter the Kremlin’s revisionist foreign policy, which seeks to weaken NATO, the EU, and their respective principal states, especially the United States, and to restore Russian hegemony in Eurasia. Push back against Kremlin repression at home.
Short and medium term: Seek areas of cooperation where US and Russian interests may overlap: arms control, counterterrorism in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, reduced military confrontations, and an effective response to climate change. It also includes dialogue with Russian elites on possible future cooperation and outreach to the Russian people.
Longer term: Describe in clear terms the cooperative relationship that would emerge with a prosperous, powerful Russia that plays a constructive role in the rules-based international order. While this is a long-term objective, it should immediately be enshrined in US policy.
The strategy consists of four major elements.
1) WORK WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS TO COUNTER IMMEDIATE DANGER FROM MOSCOW: The first element of the strategy is to ensure that US allies and partners understand the danger coming from Moscow and work together to counter it. The United States should:
Maintain and strengthen NATO’s defense and deterrence posture, both conventional and nuclear.
• Enhance the already significant forward presence on NATO’s northeastern flank.
• Establish a comprehensive Black Sea strategy. To do this the United States should:
• Work with NATO to establish a stronger and more regular NATO naval presence in the Black Sea.
• Enhance cooperation with and defense support for NATO partners Georgia and Ukraine in the Black Sea.
• Establish mutual understanding with the EU on the danger from Moscow and how to meet it.
• Build on the first Summit for Democracy to highlight Moscow’s aggressive policies in Ukraine and Georgia and show staunch support for the democratic movements in Belarus and Venezuela.
2) ESTABLISH CLEAR REDLINES ON MOSCOW’S BEHAVIOR: The second element of the strategy is to thwart Kremlin aggression and provocations against US interests and the international liberal order. The United States must establish clear redlines as a deterrent and be prepared to act swiftly when Moscow threatens or crosses them. Ukraine is the current center of Moscow’s revisionist foreign policy and needs the self-defense capabilities to deter further aggression. Frustrating Kremlin aggression in Ukraine reduces the risk of Kremlin provocations against the United States’ Eastern European NATO allies and may well prove the key to persuading it to change policy course. The US policy response should involve military, economic, and diplomatic tools, specifically to:
• Encourage Ukraine’s military to become completely interoperable with NATO.
• Increase US military aid to Ukraine to $1 billion per year and encourage additional assistance from other NATO members. Make Ukraine’s defense to a NATO objective.
• Provide Ukraine with anti-ship missiles, naval drones, and air defense systems.
• Maintain and strengthen the current sanctions regime. Impose new sanctions promptly the next time that Moscow either escalates its military operation in Ukraine or commits a major new provocation there. In concert with the EU, impose progressively tighter sanctions as Moscow continues its current operation in the Donbas. The sanctions for new escalation should be stronger than those for ongoing aggression.
• Impose proportionate sanctions for Moscow’s ongoing, under-the-radar aggression in Georgia, and consider sanctions on Moscow for its efforts to extort geopolitical concessions from Moldova for gas supplies.
• Focus on the most effective sanctions, financial sanctions and personal sanctions, on Kremlin oligarchs.
• Maintain public attention on Moscow’s occupation of Crimea, the Donbas, and Georgia.
• Take a more active role in the Minsk peace process and consult with the parties to ensure that Ukraine is not pressured to make undue concessions to Moscow. Prepare to enter negotiations fully when Moscow is ready to negotiate its withdrawal from the Donbas.
Equally important, the United States should respond forcefully to Kremlin provocations against itself, as well as its allies and partners globally:
• Respond to Kremlin election interference, cyber operations, and assassinations abroad promptly with public diplomacy, sanctions, and, in the case of cyberattacks, counter operations.
• Support the democratic movements in Belarus and Venezuela.
• Provide strong support to the current reformist Moldovan government so that its reforms can succeed in spite of a Russian gas embargo.
Take advantage of Kremlin weaknesses in countering and deterring provocations:
• Uncover and publicize in English and Russian information about the corruption of the Russian regime and order US intelligence to establish the financial holdings of Putin, top Kremlin officials, and Putin cronies in the West. The appropriate classified information on this should be declassified, published, and publicized in English and Russian.
• Enact and enforce strong and transparent laws against money laundering and other hidden channels, including requirements for shell companies to disclose beneficial owners, that corrupt Putin cronies and Kremlin-associated actors use to further Russian state interests or their own.
• Implement the Corporate Transparency Act of 2020 rigorously.
• Significantly increase funding to Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and use other means, including the use of the Russian diaspora, to provide information to the Russian people.
• Pay consistent but low-key attention to points of friction in the Russia-China relationship and particularly Chinese territorial claims in Russia.
• Support Russian political figures, civil society activists, and influencers facing repression and highlight election practices in Russia that prevent the Russian people from fairly choosing their political leaders.
• Counter the Kremlin narrative that the United States and the West seek to encircle and weaken Russia; make clear that the United States looks forward to a closer, mutually beneficial partnership with a democratic Russia that respects the sovereignty of its neighbors.
3) WORK TOGETHER WHERE POSSIBLE. The third element of the strategy is to work with Moscow to reduce the dangers of competition and to explore cooperation in areas where interests may overlap. This starts with mitigating nuclear confrontation and reducing the risk of escalation of military incidents, but not at the expense of strong pushback against Kremlin provocations.
• Encourage NATO to maintain a mix of strategic and tactical nuclear options to dissuade the Russians from believing they can succeed with their “escalate to deescalate” strategy.
• Be open to maintaining and negotiating verifiable nuclear arms control agreements with Russia that also address nonstrategic systems and other destabilizing technologies.
• Regulate interactions between Russian and US warships and warplanes that risk escalating into confrontation. Reestablish the Open Skies Treaty.
• Cooperate with the Russian government on shared threats, including counterterrorism, counter-narcotics efforts, COVID-19, and climate change.
• Work to prevent the spread of Islamic extremism into Central Asia.
4) LAY OUT A VISION FOR CLOSE FUTURE RELATIONS WITH A PROSPEROUS RUSSIA. The fourth element of the strategy is to pursue a multiple-track policy designed to promote a significant improvement in relations with Russia once Moscow turns away from a revisionist foreign policy. While this policy is part of the long game, it should begin now because it will take time to have an impact. The purpose is to start to condition the Russian government, elites, and people that US intentions toward Russia are not hostile and that good relations with the United States and the West and an opening of the political and economic system would lead to both prosperity and security. As part of this, Washington should:
• Establish a framework for more interaction now with the Russian people and better relations with a future Russian government.
• Engage with all major segments of Russian society simultaneously, including various levels of Russian government, the general Russian public, elites, and involved members of the global Russian diaspora.
• Maintain and increase support for the “non-systemic” Russian opposition.2
• Sanction officials (and their spouses and children) who order and implement repressive measures.
• Increase the transparency of offshore funds and freeze and hold the assets of senior Kremlin officials and their associates in a trust fund for return to the Russian people when a Russian government that respects the rule of law is established. This would require new legislation to allow the transfer of funds.
• Impose strict reciprocity in the treatment of state media in Russia and the United States, respectively. If Russia expels RFE/RL, the United States should expel Sputnik and RT.
• Increase support for US-Russia educational and cultural exchange programs, especially for high school and college students.
• Propose track 1.5 or track 2 dialogues on alternative futures for the US-Russia relationship.
• Establish a similar dialogue with representatives of the non-systemic opposition and with the Russian diaspora.
