Student movements have played a defining role in India’s political and social evolution. From the freedom struggle to the Nav Nirman Movement in Gujarat, the JP Movement, the anti-Mandal protests, and more recent agitations over education, employment and citizenship, students have periodically emerged as The Nav Nirman Movement (1973–74) in Gujarat, which began over hostel food charges and corruption before contributing to the fall of the state government, the Bihar student movement that evolved into Jayaprakash Narayan’s ‘Total Revolution’, the anti-Mandal agitations of 1990, and later protests over university autonomy, citizenship legislation and examination irregularities demonstrate how campus issues can sometimes evolve into national political movements. an influential force capable of shaping public discourse.

At the same time, the vast majority of Indian students remain focused on education, employment and personal advancement. Consequently, large-scale student unrest is neither inevitable nor impossible; it emerges only when specific political, economic and social conditions converge.

The challenge for governments and educational institutions is, therefore, not merely to respond to protests, but to understand the conditions under which localized discontent can escalate into a nationwide movement.

1.  Triggering Issues

Large-scale student movements generally begin with a grievance that is perceived as legitimate and widely shared. The trigger itself may be relatively small, but it resonates because it reflects broader concerns.

Common triggering issues include:

• Employment and recruitment: Recent protests over examination paper leaks, delays in recruitment examinations and alleged irregularities in recruitment processes in states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan illustrate how employment-related grievances can unite students across institutions. Delays in government recruitment, cancellation of examinations, alleged paper leaks, or perceived unfairness in selection processes.
• Educational policies: The Jawaharlal Nehru University fee-hike protests (2019) demonstrated how educational policy decisions can rapidly mobilize campus opinion. Fee hikes, changes in admission policies, scholarship reductions, hostel regulations or examination reforms.
• Perceived injustice: The death of Rohith Vemula at the University of Hyderabad (2016) generated nationwide student protests because many perceived the issue as extending beyond one individual to questions of institutional fairness and social justice. Disciplinary action against students, allegations of discrimination, or incidents viewed as violations of fairness.
• Economic pressures: Rising unemployment, inflation affecting student households, or reduced economic opportunities.
• Political or constitutional issues: The Citizenship (Amendment) Act protests (2019–20), particularly at Jamia Millia Islamia, Aligarh Muslim University and JNU, illustrated how broader political issues can mobilize students. Policies perceived to affect democratic rights, academic freedom or civil liberties.
• Catalytic incidents: Police entry into Jamia Millia Islamia in December 2019 transformed localized protests into a national issue by becoming a widely discussed symbolic event. A single event, such as a controversial administrative action or an incident involving use of force, can transform localized dissatisfaction into a wider movement if it is viewed as symbolic of a larger problem.

Importantly, a trigger succeeds only when it reflects an existing reservoir of dissatisfaction. Most isolated incidents do not develop into sustained protests.

2.  Stabilizing Factors

India today possesses several structural factors that reduce the likelihood of prolonged nationwide student unrest.

Career-oriented aspirations. Today’s students are considerably more focused on education, competitive examinations, professional qualifications and employment than previous generations. The opportunity cost of prolonged agitation is therefore much higher.

Fear of legal and disciplinary consequences. Students increasingly recognize that criminal cases, university disciplinary proceedings or prolonged arrests may affect future employment, higher education opportunities, passports and government service. This acts as a significant deterrent against sustained confrontation.

Majority of students remain law-abiding. Most students prefer peaceful academic environments and have little interest in prolonged political activism. Historically, only a relatively small proportion of students actively participate in demonstrations.

Awareness of political exploitation. Many students across ideological lines have become increasingly cautious about being used by political parties for electoral or partisan purposes. This skepticism often limits long-term mobilization.

Presence of organized student bodies. Organizations such as the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), along with other student organizations representing diverse ideological perspectives, provide structured channels for student participation. Their presence often moderates spontaneous mobilization by encouraging organized engagement.

Public confidence in political leadership. Confidence in national or state leadership can reduce the willingness of students to assume that institutional mechanisms have completely failed. While political preferences vary considerably across regions and campuses, confidence in elected institutions can contribute to overall stability.

Administrative coordination. Where governments maintain effective coordination between educational institutions, civil administration and law enforcement, isolated incidents are less likely to spread across multiple campuses.

Reservation policies. The anti-Mandal protests of 1990 simultaneously demonstrated how reservation policy itself can become a powerful mobilizing issue among sections of students. India’s reservation system addresses historical inequities and provides educational opportunities to large sections of society. While reservation remains a subject of political debate and can itself generate grievances among different groups, it also contributes to social inclusion for many beneficiaries.

3.  Additional Stabilizing Factors

Several broader social changes further reduce the probability of nationwide student mobilization.

• Increasing enrolment in private universities with relatively different campus cultures.
• Highly competitive examination and coaching ecosystem.
• Strong parental emphasis on career success.
• Digital lifestyles that diffuse attention across multiple interests.
• Diverse educational pathways, making it difficult to unite students around a single issue.
• Availability of online grievance mechanisms in many institutions.
• Expanding private-sector employment opportunities outside traditional government careers.

Collectively, these factors create a society in which students often perceive greater personal benefit from academic progress than from prolonged political activism.

4.  Factors That Can Produce Large-Scale Student Unrest

Despite these stabilizing influences, certain structural conditions can still generate widespread mobilization.

Youth unemployment. Growing concern over employment opportunities has featured prominently in protests relating to railway recruitment and government vacancies. When educated young people perceive diminishing employment opportunities despite significant educational investment, frustration can accumulate across campuses.

Examination and recruitment controversies. Repeated controversies involving examination paper leaks, including recruitment and entrance examinations in several states, have increasingly become flashpoints capable of generating cross-state mobilisation. Repeated examination cancellations, paper leaks, delayed results or recruitment irregularities directly affect millions of students simultaneously and can become powerful unifying issues.

Loss of institutional trust. During the anti-corruption movement of 2011, although not exclusively student-led, large numbers of students joined because many believed conventional institutions were failing to address corruption effectively. Student unrest often intensifies when students conclude that universities, examination authorities or governments are unwilling or unable to address legitimate grievances.

Broad-based policy impact. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act protests illustrated how a policy perceived to have nationwide implications could generate mobilisation across geographically dispersed campuses. Policies affecting students irrespective of region, caste, language or political affiliation are more likely to generate nationwide responses.

Economic distress. Inflation, declining household income and reduced affordability of education can intensify existing dissatisfaction.

Perceived injustice. Students frequently mobilize more readily around issues of fairness than around purely ideological questions. Perceived unequal treatment or arbitrary decisions often generate stronger emotional responses.

Symbolic incidents. The death of Rohith Vemula and the police action at Jamia Millia Islamia became symbolic events that continued to influence public discourse long after the immediate incidents. Certain events become symbols that extend beyond the immediate issue, representing larger concerns about governance, accountability or justice.

5.  Sustaining (or Fuelling) Factors

While triggers initiate movements, different factors determine whether protests remain localized or evolve into sustained campaigns.

Narrative continuity. The JP Movement sustained itself by linking local student grievances with a larger narrative of corruption, governance reform and democratic renewal. A movement gains momentum when participants consistently connect individual incidents to a broader shared narrative.

Public legitimacy. The Nav Nirman Movement gained momentum because public support quickly extended beyond students to the middle classes, traders and civil society. When wider society—including parents, academics, alumni or professional bodies—views student concerns as reasonable, protests tend to receive greater support.

Institutional response. Government and university responses often influence the trajectory of movements. Transparent communication, credible grievance mechanisms and timely engagement can reduce tensions, while delayed or inconsistent responses may increase perceptions of institutional indifference.

Leadership. The emergence of Jayaprakash Narayan during the Bihar student movement transformed a regional agitation into a national political campaign. Recognized student representatives capable of articulating clear demands often provide coherence to movements. Conversely, the absence of credible leadership can lead to fragmentation.

Media attention. Television amplified the anti-Mandal protests in 1990, while social media became a major force multiplier during the 2019–20 university protests. Extensive traditional and social media coverage can elevate local issues into national debates, increasing public awareness and pressure for resolution.

Persistence of the underlying grievance. Movements usually continue when participants believe that the original issue remains unresolved despite repeated representations.

6.  Early Warning and Prevention

Governments and educational institutions should focus on identifying conditions that precede large-scale unrest rather than reacting only after demonstrations occur.

Important indicators include: Historical movements suggest that nationwide student unrest rarely develops suddenly. The Nav Nirman Movement, the JP Movement, the anti-Mandal protests and the CAA-related campus protests all progressed through identifiable stages—from localized grievance to wider public mobilisation.

• Similar grievances emerging simultaneously across multiple campuses.
• Increasing petitions, memoranda and representations on the same issue.
• Growing public discussion among students, faculty and alumni.
• Evidence that localized concerns are acquiring national attention.
• Declining confidence in grievance redressal mechanisms.
• Expansion of peaceful protests to multiple institutions within a short period.
• Increasing polarization between student groups.

Prevention is generally more effective than enforcement.

Effective preventive measures include:

• Responsive grievance redressal systems.
• Transparent communication.
• Timely clarification of policies.
• Independent inquiry into disputed incidents.
• Constructive dialogue with student representatives.
• Consistent application of institutional rules.
• Avoiding unnecessary escalation while maintaining public order.

The objective should be to preserve both institutional authority and public confidence.

Lessons from the “Cockroach Janta Party” Protests

The so-called “Cockroach Janta Party” protests illustrate several broader lessons relevant to governments confronting emerging student-led or youth-driven movements.

First, governments should avoid dismissing apparently small or symbolic protests as insignificant. Symbolic campaigns can resonate if they reflect deeper public anxieties.

Second, rapid and credible communication is often more effective than allowing rumours, speculation or misinformation to fill an information vacuum.

Third, understanding the underlying grievance is more important than focusing solely on visible manifestations such as slogans, demonstrations or online campaigns.

Fourth, maintaining proportionality in administrative and policing responses helps preserve public confidence. Responses perceived as fair, transparent and consistent are less likely to generate wider sympathy for protesters.

Fifth, governments should distinguish between genuine student grievances and attempts by external actors to amplify or exploit them. Durable protests usually succeed only when they resonate with authentic concerns shared by students.

Sixth, governments benefit from continuous engagement with students, educational institutions and civil society, even during periods of relative calm. Trust established before a crisis often proves more valuable than communication initiated after tensions have escalated.

Finally, effective governance requires balancing the protection of democratic freedoms—including peaceful expression and lawful protest—with the responsibility to maintain public order and ensure the uninterrupted functioning of educational institutions.

Conclusion

Student unrest should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated. Contemporary India possesses multiple structural stabilizers—including strong career aspirations, diverse student interests, institutional deterrence and greater economic opportunity—that reduce the likelihood of nationwide student movements. Nevertheless, history demonstrates Since 1970, India’s experience—from Nav Nirman and the JP Movement to the anti-Mandal agitation, the University of Hyderabad protests, the JNU fee protests and the CAA-related campus demonstrations—shows that while the issues vary, the dynamics of escalation remain remarkably consistent.

Nevertheless, history demonstrates that widespread unrest can still emerge when broad-based grievances coincide with declining institutional trust and emotionally resonant catalytic events. The most effective governmental strategy is therefore not simply strong enforcement, but responsive governance. Institutions that communicate transparently, resolve grievances promptly, maintain public confidence and engage constructively with students are significantly better positioned to prevent localized discontent from evolving into sustained national movements. Understanding the interaction between triggers, stabilizing influences, sustaining factors and early warning indicators enables policymakers to anticipate challenges before they become crises, thereby safeguarding both democratic participation and social stability.

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After a long hiatus marked by minimal diplomatic interactions, Pakistan and the US have witnessed a significant renewal in their engagement over the past few months. This discernible reset in US-Pakistan relations is characterized by enhanced defence cooperation, economic agreements, and high-level symbolism. Pakistan’s Army Chief has made two official visits to the US in as many months, reflecting a change in the approach of the US. Unprecedented invitations to a private White House lunch with President Donald Trump and the change of command at CENTCOM highlight the reestablishment of close military-to-military and diplomatic ties. The Trump administration has also recalibrated its approach to Pakistan, unveiling a “massive” oil exploration and development deal, and discussing broader cooperation in critical minerals, trade, technology, and counterterrorism. Although several factors have contributed to this shift, media coverage has particularly emphasized Pakistan’s endorsement of Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize as a personal glorification, along with the signing of a deal with World Liberty Financial, a cryptocurrency firm connected to the US President’s family. Underlying strategic reasons include possible future assistance in addressing Iran if required, changing regional dynamics marked by rising US-India trade tensions, new US tariffs on Indian goods, and Washington’s growing frustration with India over its increasing purchases of Russian oil and arms. Unlike in the past, Pakistan is positioning itself as a multidimensional partner of the US to enhance its leverage, not just as a security enabler.

The use of terrorism against India as an instrument of state policy by Pakistan began in 1989. Pakistan’s importance to Washington has fluctuated—peaking during periods such as the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, US military engagement in Afghanistan post-9/11, and more recently when Pakistan has been viewed as a facilitator in the Afghan peace process. Historically, terrorist activities in J&K have tended to increase whenever Pakistan’s strategic utility to the United States has risen. Relying on US support as a shield, Islamabad has perceived greater latitude to support proxy war operations with reduced fear of international repercussions and strong punitive measures. During these periods, Pakistan has benefited from increased political leverage and aid flows, while militant groups operating in J&K have often found greater freedom of action. The highest numbers of terrorist killings in J&K occurred during the 1990s and early 2000s, which were the peak years of militancy. During this period, a large portion of the overall casualties—estimated at around 41,000 deaths, including civilians, security personnel, and terrorists—took place. In the 2010s, escalations in terror attacks like the 2016 Uri attack and the 2019 Pulwama attack coincided with critical moments in US-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan. Therefore, empirically, the Kargil conflict of 1999 and other surges in violence occurred during or just after periods of intense US-Pakistan cooperation. However, despite periods of global anti-terror pressure, infrastructure and support for militants have persisted in Pakistan, with the involvement of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in training, arming, and financing these groups.

Operation Sindoor, initiated on May 7, 2025, in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack that claimed the lives of 26 innocent civilians, achieved its strategic and military objectives decisively. These objectives were to punish the perpetrators and planners of terror, destroy their infrastructure, demonstrate resolve, raise costs, impose caution on Pakistan, and thus restore deterrence that had waned since the Balakot air strikes five years ago. India has also adopted a declaratory policy on May 10, stating that any future act of terror will be considered an act of war against the country and will be responded to accordingly. This being an inflection point, the India-Pakistan equation has changed permanently by introducing the certainty of retaliation to every attack. However, it is important to distinguish between high-profile terrorist attacks like Mumbai, Uri, Pulwama, and Pahalgam, and localized, low-intensity terrorist incidents in J&K, which has been suffering from militancy abetted by Pakistan since the late 1980s. These low-intensity attacks, which have been occurring in J&K regularly, cannot be construed as a loss of deterrence.

Now, with Pakistan’s utility to the US having surged, it will be emboldened to continue the proxy war against India and keep tensions simmering. Therefore, terrorist actions below the tolerance threshold—restricted to J&K, targeted killings of migrants, tactical actions on the Line of Control (LC), and trans-LC firing—are likely to continue. The current estimated number of active terrorists in J&K, according to police and intelligence reports, is around 120, with 61 being foreign terrorists. Therefore, to make up numbers, a spike in infiltration of terrorists across the borders in J&K is very likely in the next few months before winter snows make passage across the LC in Kashmir difficult. Murmurs of statehood being restored in J&K are also likely to build pressure on Pakistan to direct terrorist handlers to initiate incidents to demonstrate that it is a disputed territory. These efforts will be complemented by increased narcotics smuggling—especially using drones—incitement of communal violence, and the smuggling of fake Indian currency notes, among other activities aimed at destabilizing India.

This can be related to recent media reports and intelligence inputs alluding to Pakistan having reactivated and rebuilt over 15 terrorist training camps and launch pads within the last 90 days in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), following India’s Operation Sindoor. Pakistan’s ISI and other government agencies are reportedly providing substantial funding—estimated at more than PKR100 crore—and logistical support to rebuild these camps. The reconstructed camps are smaller in size to avoid detection and are equipped with advanced technological counter-surveillance measures such as radar camouflage, satellite masking, and drone usage. These camps are located across various places in POK, including Kel, Shardi, Dudhniyal, Athmuqam, Jura, Leepa Valley, Tandpani, Nayyali, Jankot, Chakothi, and others. Additionally, four launch pads along the International Border in the Jammu region have also been reactivated. The terrorists are apparently using lessons from Operation Sindoor by employing smaller camps of about two dozen militants and dispersing locations to evade Indian intelligence and military forces. The rebuilt infrastructure efficiently supports recruitment, training, and operational planning for attacks in J&K.

Until US interests shift and Pakistan feels greater pressure to curb such activities again, the security forces need to retain and sustain a robust counter-infiltration posture on the LC, as well as an extensive counter-terrorism grid in the depth areas of J&K, irrespective of overall violence levels. At present, there is no room for complacency or lowering the guard, given the improved security situation in J&K. The gains made by the security forces should not be squandered at this stage.

The author is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff

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In alignment with the Government’s strategic vision for Digital Armed Forces, a contract was signed between Ministry of Defence and Telecommunications Consultants India Limited, worth at a total cost of Rs 588.68 crore, for the acquisition of Digital Coast Guard (DCG) project, under the Buy (Indian) category. The DCG Project will unfold a comprehensive narrative of technological progression, encompassing the construction of an advanced Data Centre, the establishment of a robust Disaster Recovery Data Centre, amplification of connectivity across ICG sites, and the development of the ERP system. The project also leverages secured MPLS/VSAT connectivity, propelling itself to the forefront of cutting-edge defence technology. The project is estimated to generate about one and a half lakh man-days over a span of five years, fostering active participation from diverse sectors of Indian industries, thus significantly contributing to the Government’s efforts to achieve ‘Aatmanirbharta’ in defence.

Coast Guard Fast Patrol Vessels

Defence Secretary Giridhar Aramane laid the keel of four Coast Guard Fast Patrol vessels at Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL). These vessels designed by GSL is a medium range weapon fitted surface vessel with length of 51.43 mtrs, and breadth 8 mtrs. The ship is propelled with twin engine and has maximum speed of 27 Knots. Displacement of the vessel is approx. 320 Tons, and it is capable of operating in rough sea conditions. These vessels will be fitted with most modern and technologically advanced machinery and computerized controls systems, making these state-of-the-art Fast Patrol Vessels.

Cyclonic Storm ‘BIPORJOY’

Consequent to issuance of warning by IMD regarding Cyclonic Storm ‘BIPORJOY’ formed in Arabian Sea from 6 June, 2023, ICG initiated various proactive & preventive measures to ensure safety of fishermen. ICG ensured immediate evacuation of 50 crew from the rig ‘Key Singapore’.

Cyclonic Storm Hamoon

ICG assets, including aircraft, were deployed during Cyclonic Storm Hamoon for SAR and Disaster Response. ICG also monitored towing operation of distressed Research Vessel Samudra Kaustubh (25 crew including 06 Scientists). During the entire period, constant positive, liaison was maintained with all stakeholders including State administration.

MoU with Philippines

Indian Coast Guard signed an MoU with Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) on enhanced maritime cooperation. The MoU seeks to enhance the professional linkage between the two Coast Guards in the domain of Maritime Law Enforcement.

Rescue of pilgrims

ICG undertook 15 sorties and rescued a total of 511 pilgrims from two ferry vessels (MV Lochamati and MV Agramati) in distress. Both the ferry vessels were reported to be aground near 01 nautical mile South off Ghoramara Island. ICG Hovercrafts from Haldia and Frazerganj were deployed immediately.

Seizure of Gold

ICG seized a combined total of 50.617 kgs of gold from the apprehension of IFB ‘Star NS’ & IFB ‘Black Pearl’. The estimated commercial value of the consignments was approximately Rs 31 crore.

Seizure of Tendu Leaves

ICG seized a total of 267 kgs of Tendu Leaves from suspicious packages. The combined estimated commercial value of the consignments is approximately Rs 19 lakh.

Seizure of Narcotics

ICGS Meera Behn apprehended Iranian boat with five crew and seized 61 packets of suspected narcotics substance. Apprehended boat was subsequently brought to Okha harbour and handed over to Marine Police.

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The judgement inflamed these tensions, and led to protests and clashes between the Meitei community and the hill tribes, which resulted in at least 73 deaths. The Supreme Court stepped in and stayed the Manipur High Court’s judgement, but the violence continued.

The Meitei community has long sought to be included in the Scheduled Tribes list, which would give them a number of benefits, including reservations in government jobs and educational institutions. However, the hill tribes have opposed this move, arguing that the Meiteis are not a tribal community and that their inclusion in the list would unfairly disadvantage them.

Underlying Factors

There are a number of reasons for the strife in Manipur today. Among them are political tensions, economic problems, drug trafficking, religious conversion and inter-tribal rivalry.

Manipur is a state with a long history of political instability. There are a number of different ethnic groups in the state, and there is often tension between them. This tension has been exacerbated by the fact that Manipur is a border state, and it is often caught up in the conflicts between India and its neighbors.

Manipur is a poor state, and there is a lot of poverty and unemployment. This has led to frustration and anger among the people, which has been exploited by some groups who are trying to incite violence.

Manipur is a major transit point for drug trafficking from Southeast Asia to India. This has led to the growth of drug addiction and crime in the state, which has further exacerbated the tensions.

Religious conversion is one of the factors. Manipur is predominantly Hindu. A number of groups in Manipur are opposed to Christianity and conversions in the state. These include some Hindu groups who argue that Christianity is a foreign religion that is incompatible with Manipuri culture, Meitei Inpi a socio-cultural organization that represents the Meitei community, and the United Naga Council, which represents the Naga people, the majority ethnic group in the hill districts of Manipur.

Tribal Rivalries

The rivalry between Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas in Manipur is a complex and long-standing one. Land disputes, political and cultural differences have contributed to the rivalry. In 1992-1994, there was a major outbreak of violence between Kukis and Nagas that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people. There have also been smaller-scale incidents of violence between the groups in recent years.

The Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas all have competing claims to land in Manipur. This has led to conflict over land ownership and resources. They have different political goals. The Kukis want to create a separate Kuki state, the Meiteis want to maintain the status quo, and the Nagas want to create a greater Nagalim state that would include parts of Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh.

The Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas have different cultures and customs. This has led to misunderstandings and mistrust between the groups.

The Kuki people are an ethnic group native to Northeast India and Burma (Myanmar). They are one of the largest ethnic groups in Manipur, accounting for about 20% of the state’s population. They are believed to have migrated to the area from the Chin Hills of Burma in the 16th or 17th century. In the 18th century, the Kuki people were forced to flee their homes in Burma due to persecution. They migrated to Manipur and other parts of Northeast India. In the 1990s, there was a major conflict between Kukis and Nagas in Manipur. The conflict was caused by land disputes and political differences. The Kuki people have long demanded a separate Kuki state.

The Kukis were originally animists, but they were converted to Christianity by British missionaries in the 19th century.

In 1901, the Kuki population in Manipur was 150,000, accounting for about 25% of the state’s population. By 1941 it was 250,000, (30%). In 2011, it was 600,000 (20%) and by 2022 it was estimated to be around 750,000 (22%).

The Meitei population has also grown in the last 100 years, but not as significantly as the Kuki population, due to lower birth rate, out-migration of Meiteis to other parts of India and Conversion to Hinduism and Islam.

The Meitei population has remained at about 60% of the state’s population.

Drugs Trade

The cultivation of poppy is illegal in India, but poppy plant is a major source of income for many people in Manipur. The poppy plant is a key ingredient in the production of heroin. The drug trade in Manipur is controlled by a number of criminal gangs and mafias. These gangs are often armed and violent.

The drug trade has a number of negative impacts on the Manipur society. It has led to an increase in crime in Manipur and degradation of the social fabric in Manipur because drug addiction can lead to family breakdown, unemployment, and poverty.

Kuki militant groups, Rohingya refugees and Manipuri gangs are involved in the drug trade. Kuki militants are often forced into the drug trade by traffickers who offer them money or weapons in exchange for their involvement. Rohingya refugees are often forced into the drug trade by traffickers who take advantage of their vulnerability through threat of deportation. Manipuri gangs are often involved in the cultivation and production of poppy, as well as the trafficking of heroin.

The Manipur government has taken a number of steps to stop poppy cultivation and limit the drug trade in Manipur. These include law enforcement, social programmes and economic development.

In 2019, the Manipur Narcotics and Affairs of Border (NAB) department reported that 963 drug traffickers, including 768 men and 195 women, were detained under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act. Law enforcement agencies have also destroyed large swathes of poppy cultivation. In 2020 and February 2021, law enforcement agencies destroyed 1,420 acres of poppy plantation.

In 2019, the Manipur government reported that the area under poppy cultivation had decreased by 20% compared to the previous year. However, the drug trade remains a serious problem in Manipur.

In 2021, the Manipur government rewarded total cash of Rs 10 lakh to a village in Ukhrul district for voluntarily destroying poppy plants grown in the village. In 2022, the Manipur government launched a “War on Drugs” campaign, which aims to destroy poppy cultivation and bring drug traffickers to justice. As of March 2023, the Manipur government has arrested over 2,500 people for drug-related offenses and has destroyed over 15,496 acres of poppy cultivation.

Religious Conversions

Manipur has a history of missionaries working for conversions since 1900. The first missionaries to arrive in Manipur were from the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society (ABFMS), who began their work in the state in 1894. The ABFMS missionaries were initially focused on providing education and medical care to the people of Manipur, but they soon began to evangelize as well.

In the early 1900s, the ABFMS missionaries were joined by missionaries from other Christian denominations, including the Church of England, the Salvation Army, and the Presbyterian Church. These missionaries also focused on education and medical care, but they were also more aggressive in their evangelism efforts.

As a result of the work of these missionaries, the number of Christians in Manipur grew steadily in the early 20th century. By the 1950s, Christians made up about 20% of the population of Manipur.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the number of conversions to Christianity in Manipur accelerated. This was due in part to the work of indigenous Christian leaders, who began to organize their own evangelistic campaigns. It was also due to the fact that the Indian government began to provide financial support to Christian missionary organizations.

In the 1970s, only about 30% of the population of Manipur was Christian. However, by 2011, this number had risen to 45%. This growth has been particularly rapid among the Meitei community, who are the majority ethnic group in Manipur.

The perceived threat that Christianity poses to the traditional culture and values of Manipur, has come to the fore in Manipur recently. Some people have accused missionaries of using coercion and financial inducement to convert people to Christianity, and this has led to anger and resentment among some Hindu groups.

In 2014, the Manipur government passed a law that made it illegal to convert people by force or inducement. However, the law has been criticized by some for being too vague and for not doing enough to protect religious freedom.

Peace Measures

The central government and the state government has taken a number of steps to bring normalcy in Manipur in the last two months. These include deploying additional security forces to help restore law and order, initiating dialogue with the Kuki and Meitei communities, providing relief to the affected people and launching a peace campaign

Comments

There is a need for greater understanding and dialogue between the different religious communities in the state, in order to find a way to live together peacefully and respectfully.

The drug trade in Manipur is a complex issue with no easy solutions. The drug trade has also damaged the social fabric of the state and has made it more difficult to address other problems, such as the conflict between Kuki and Naga groups.

In order to address the problem, it is important to address the root causes of the involvement of these groups, such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunity.

It is important to take a comprehensive approach that includes law enforcement, social programs, and economic development. Law enforcement needs to be strengthened to crack down on the drug trade and to bring traffickers to justice. Social programs need to be implemented to help people who are addicted to drugs and to prevent people from becoming addicted in the first place. Economic development needs to be promoted to create jobs and opportunities for people, so that they do not feel the need to turn to crime or the drug trade to make a living.

The rivalry between Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas is a serious problem that has had a negative impact on the state of Manipur. It has led to displacement, loss of life, and a general atmosphere of fear and mistrust. There is no easy solution to the rivalry, but it is important for the different groups to find ways to live together peacefully and respectfully.

The growing Kuki population has been a source of tension in Manipur. Some Meiteis have expressed concerns about the Kuki population growth, and there have been some incidents of violence between the two groups. However, it is important to note that the vast majority of Kukis and Meiteis live peacefully together.

The Indian government and the Manipur government have made some progress in bringing normalcy to Manipur. However, the situation remains tense, and there is a risk that violence could break out again. It is important for the two governments to continue their efforts to resolve the underlying tensions between the Kuki and Meitei communities.

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The clashes began on May 3, 2023, after a Manipur High Court verdict directed the state government to make a decision on whether to grant the Meitei people Scheduled Tribe status. The tribal communities, who are already classified as Scheduled Tribes, protested the Meitei demand, arguing that it would give them an unfair advantage.

The violence quickly escalated, with both sides resorted to arson, looting, and violence. The Indian Army, Assam Rifles, and the Manipur Police were deployed to restore order, but the clashes continued.

The violence has had a devastating impact on Manipur. The economy has been crippled, and schools and businesses have been forced to close. Thousands of people have been displaced from their homes, and many have lost their livelihoods.

The central government called for an end to the violence, and the Manipur government announced a series of measures to address the grievances of the tribal communities. However, sporadic incidents of violence continued.

Historical Causes for Enmity

The enmity between the Meitei and Kuki people in Manipur has a long and complex history. There are a number of factors that have contributed to the conflict, including:

Land and resource disputes. The Meitei people are the majority ethnic group in Manipur, and they have traditionally controlled the most fertile land and other resources. The Kuki people are a tribal group, and they have often been displaced from their traditional lands by the Meitei. This has led to resentment and conflict between the two groups.

Political and economic marginalization. The Kuki people have often felt marginalized by the Meitei-dominated government of Manipur. They have argued that they have been denied their fair share of political representation and economic opportunities. This has led to further resentment and conflict.

Cultural differences. The Meitei and Kuki people have different cultures and customs. This has sometimes led to misunderstandings and conflict between the two groups. For example, the Meitei people are Hindu, while the Kuki people are mostly Christian. This has led to clashes over religious issues.

Historical grievances. The Meitei and Kuki people have a history of conflict, dating back to the 19th century. In 1917, the Kuki people rebelled against the British Raj, which was then ruling Manipur. The rebellion was suppressed, but it left a legacy of bitterness between the two groups.

Recent Events

Some more recent events contributed to the tensions between the Meitei and Kuki people. In 2015, there were a series of clashes between the two groups in Churachandpur district. These clashes were sparked by a land dispute, but they also highlighted the deep-seated mistrust and resentment that exists between the two groups.

The immediate causes of the violence between the Meitei and Kuki communities in Manipur are complex and multifaceted. However, some of the most significant factors include:

The Manipur High Court’s order directing the state government to make a decision on whether to grant the Meitei people Scheduled Tribe status mentioned above.

The Tribal Solidarity March organized by the All Tribal Students’ Union Manipur (ATSUM) in the ten Hill Districts of Manipur on 3 May 2023. The march was in protest against the Manipur High Court’s order and the Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status.

The spread of misinformation and rumors on social media. Misinformation and rumors about the Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status spread rapidly on social media, fueling tensions between the two communities.

The failure of the state government to address the grievances of the Kuki people. The Kuki people have long felt marginalized by the Meitei-dominated government of Manipur. They have argued that they have been denied their fair share of political representation and economic opportunities. This has led to further resentment and conflict.

Mitigating Measures

The state and central governments took a number of actions to control the situation in Manipur, including:

Deploying security forces. The Indian Army, Assam Rifles, and the Manipur Police have been deployed to the state to restore order and protect civilians.

Imposing curfews. Curfews have been imposed in some parts of the state to prevent further violence.

Prohibiting public gatherings. Public gatherings have been prohibited in some parts of the state to prevent further violence.

Launching investigations. The state government has launched investigations into the violence to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice.

Providing relief to victims. The state government has provided relief to the victims of the violence, including food, shelter, and medical care.

Appointing a mediator. The central government has appointed a mediator to help the two communities reach a peaceful resolution.

The state and central governments have also taken steps to address the grievances of the Kuki people, including:

Setting up a committee to look into the grievances of the Kuki people.The committee will be headed by a retired judge and will have representatives from both the Meitei and Kuki communities.

Providing more political representation to the Kuki people. The state government has said that it will increase the number of seats reserved for Kukis in the Manipur Legislative Assembly.

Promoting economic development in the Kuki-dominated areas. The state government has said that it will invest in infrastructure and other development projects in the Kuki-dominated areas.

It is too early to say whether these measures will be enough to end the violence and restore peace to Manipur.

Long Term Solutions

Some of the important steps that need to be taken for the long-term include:

Addressing the root causes of the conflict. This includes addressing issues such as land and resource disputes, political and economic marginalization, cultural differences, and historical grievances.

Building trust and understanding between the two communities. This can be done through dialogue, education, and cultural exchange.

Creating a more equitable and just society. This includes ensuring that all communities have equal access to political representation, economic opportunities, and social services.

Promoting peace and reconciliation. This includes supporting initiatives that promote forgiveness, healing, and coexistence.

Here are some additional suggestions for long-term solutions to the conflict:

Establishing a truth and reconciliation commission. This would be a body that would investigate the violence and its causes, and would recommend measures to promote healing and reconciliation.

Creating a more decentralized government. This would give more power to local communities, and would help to address the feeling of marginalization that many Kuki people feel.

Promoting inter-community dialogue and understanding. This could be done through education, cultural exchange, and other initiatives.

Ensuring that all communities have access to justice. This would include ensuring that the police and judiciary are fair and impartial, and that victims of violence have access to compensation and other forms of redress.

Recommendations

For a peaceful resolution to the conflict:

The state government should take steps to address the grievances of the Kuki people. This includes providing more political representation to the Kuki people, promoting economic development in the Kuki-dominated areas, and ensuring that the Kuki people have access to justice.

The central government should appoint a mediator to help the two communities reach a peaceful resolution. The mediator should be someone who is respected by both communities and who has the skills and experience necessary to help them find a mutually agreeable solution.

The media should be more responsible in reporting on the conflict. The media should avoid spreading misinformation and rumors, and should focus on reporting the facts in a balanced and objective way.

Comments

There have been a number of political controversies that have erupted in preventing a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Some political parties have used the conflict to their advantage, stoking tensions between the two communities in order to gain votes.

Peacebuilding is a long-term process. The violence in Manipur is a reminder of the deep-seated ethnic tensions that exist in the state. It is also a reminder of the challenges that the Indian government faces in maintaining peace and order in its northeastern states.

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Events in Manipur

May 3, 2023: Clashes broke out between Meitei and Kuki communities in Churachandpur district.

May 4, 2023: The Indian Army was deployed to Manipur to restore order.

May 5, 2023: The Manipur government imposed a curfew in Churachandpur district.

May 6, 2023: The violence spreads to other parts of Manipur.

May 7, 2023: The central government announced a compensation package for the victims of the violence.

May 8, 2023: The Manipur government announced a series of measures to address the grievances of the tribal communities.

June 1, 2023: The violence subsided, but sporadic incidents continued.

July 14, 2023: The situation in Manipur remained tense, but there were no major incidents of violence.

The post Violence in Manipur appeared first on IMR.

The Allocations were as follows:

Rs 31,772.23 crore – Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).

Rs 24,771.28 crore – Border Security Force (BSF).

Rs 13,214.68 crore – Central Industrial Security Force (CISF).

Rs 8,096.89 crore – Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).

Rs 8,329.10 crore – Seema Suraksha Bal (SSB).

Rs 7,052.46 crore – Assam Rifles (AR).

Rs 1,286.54 crore – National Security Guard (NSG)

Total Rs 1.27 lakh crore earmarked for paramilitary forces.

The allocations made to the ministry, headed by Union Home Minister Amit Shah, according to the Budget document, is higher by over Rs 10,000 crore, as in the Budget for 2022-23, it was pegged at Rs 1,85,776.55 crore.

The bulk of the amount allocated to the MHA, Rs 1,27,756.74 crore, has been earmarked for the CAPFs in comparison to Rs 1,19,070.36 crore in 2022-23.

Among the CAPFs, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), mostly responsible for internal security duties and fighting militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, has been allocated Rs 31,772.23 crore in comparison to Rs 31,495.88 crore given in 2022-23.

The Border Security Force (BSF), which guards India’s border with Pakistan and Bangladesh, besides handling internal security assignments, has been given Rs 24,771.28 crore in comparison to Rs 23,557.51 crore given in the current financial year.

The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which protects vital installations such as nuclear projects, airports and metro networks, has been given Rs 13,214.68 crore in comparison to Rs 12,293.23 crore allocated in 2022-23.

The Shashastra Seema Bal (SSB), which guards India’s borders with Nepal and Bhutan, has been allocated Rs 8,329.10 crore in comparison to Rs 8,019.78 crore given in 2022-23.

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), which guards India’s borders with China, got Rs 8,096.89 crore in comparison to Rs 7,626.38 crore given in the current fiscal.

The Assam Rifles, which is deployed along the India-Myanmar border and for anti-insurgency duties in the North-East, has been allocated Rs 7,052.46 crore in comparison to Rs 6,561.33 crore given in the current financial year.

The National Security Guard (NSG), the elite commando force to tackle any emergency security situation, has been allocated Rs 1,286.54 crore in comparison to Rs 1,183.80 crore given in 2022-23.

Expectations

What the CAPFs expected from the 2023 Union budget was funds for infrastructure development in border areas, better equipment with latest technology for disaster management, training and operations and a robust communication system.

Each year funds for the CAPFs see only a marginal increase, most of which goes into salaries, allowances and other wages, with only a little left over for the development and modernisation of the organisation.

Although a separate fund is also earmarked for modernisation of the forces, focus on infrastructure development and better training and equipment, is often ignored owing to lack of funds.

In the previous budget, in 2022, the Ministry of Home Affairs was allocated Rs 1,85,776.55 crore – a more than 11 per cent increase over the Rs 1,66,547 crore allotted in the previous fiscal year.

Last year, as a new feature, funds were allocated for the modernisation of the CAPF, to equip the forces with modern, state-of-the-art weapons and equipment, according to their operational requirement, keeping in view their deployment pattern in different sectors. Besides, upgraded IT solutions were also to be provided to CAPF. The plan announced a total financial outlay of Rs.1,523 crore between 1 February 2022 and 31 March 2026.

The National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) and Delhi Police, both of which also roll up to the Ministry of Home Affairs, also had similar expectations from the budget.

With climate change there has been an increase in episodes of natural disasters, which requires the latest technology relief operations and the next budget should focus on that.

The post MHA Gets Rs 1.96 lakh crore for Police and Paramilitary appeared first on IMR.

Pakistan is paying the price of soft-peddling on terror. Arming and funding terror outfits against India in the past may have played dividends at one time, but today it is bleeding Pakistan.

The expansion of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) clout is entirely Pakistan’s fault because it hosted, armed, and supported Taliban leaders and cadres on its land, while turning a blind eye to its misdeeds. In Kabul, a few of these leaders now have ministerial roles.

With the Taliban’s presence in Kabul, Pakistan had previously justified its backing for the Taliban by asserting that it provided greater “strategic depth” against India. The Taliban and ISI had worked together to hijack IC 814 flight to Kabul in 1999. Although New Delhi has not legally recognised the Taliban, it has developed a working relationship with the Taliban leadership in order to provide medical care and other forms of support to the Afghan people as well as to keep a presence in Kabul.

Islamic terror groups across the region were reinvigorated after the Afghan Taliban’s victory over the US. The fact that the Taliban could win against the world’s most powerful army was a morale booster. The TTP now felt that it was only a matter of time before the Pakistan forces could also be overrun.

Background

The Pakistani Taliban share a common ideology with the Afghan Taliban and have assisted them in the ––2001-2021 war, but the two groups have separate operation and command structures.

The TTP’s aim is to overthrow the government of Pakistan by waging a terrorist campaign against the Pakistan armed forces and the state. The TTP depends on the tribal belt along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, from which it draws its recruits. The TTP receives ideological guidance from and maintains ties with al-Qaeda.

After the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan was unable to persuade the Afghan Taliban to crack down on the TTP.

Ever since a ceasefire with TTP expired on 10 December 2021, it has increased attacks on Pakistani security forces from sanctuaries inside Afghanistan.

Apparently with US encouragement and cooperation, Pakistan is now threatening to attack TTP militants residing in its Pashtun-dominated tribal regions as well as across the border in Afghanistan. As a result, Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line might band together to fight the Pakistani army. While Pakistani attacks against TTP and Taliban bases may be welcomed by the US, the Taliban will not remain silent if its people are attacked.

The rise of the TTP could potentially trigger a conflict within the organisation itself with the international terrorist organisation ISIS, which is also vying for control of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

Rising Casualties

Pakistan’s security forces, including troops, ISI personnel, police, and regular civilians, have become targets of the TTP militants’ increasingly violent attacks.

282 personnel of the security forces were killed in terrorist and insurgent attacks in Pakistan in 2022, according to statistics released by the non-governmental Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), which has its headquarters in Islamabad. According to the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), situated in Delhi, this nuamber is six times more than the number of Indian security officers (47).

In 2022, the TTP perpetrated 376 terrorist incidents, resulting in 533 fatalities and 832 injuries. Among them, 374 Pakistani security officers and 365 TTP fighters are thought to have perished in fighting in the previous year.

The deadliest month in more than ten years – December 2022 – saw 56 fatalities as a result of the deteriorating ISI-TTP relationship.

Since the middle of November, there have been over 100 attacks. The TTP’s 18 December attack on the Counter Terrorism Department in Bannu was the most notable of these events

TTP’s Demands

Delegitimization of Pakistan’s claim to a region bordering Afghanistan is one of the TTP’s demands. This entails restoring FATA’s status as a semi-governed region.

The Afghan Taliban also wholeheartedly supports the removal of border fencing and barriers. The only long-term, but currently improbable, option is to foster goodwill, give up using force, and manage boundaries.

The TTP wants to impose Afghan-style Sharia in FATA before extending the system across Pakistan. This include ending female education, instituting limb-chopping justice, replacing democracy with a shura system run by an amirul momineen, and sealing Pakistan off from the outside world. This is grotesque to non-Muslims, Shi’ites, (Sunni) Barelvis, and modern-minded Muslims. On the other hand, backward regions and radicalised segments of urban Pakistani society favour this interpretation of Sharia.

TTP vehemently rejects both disarming and adhering to Pakistan’s Constitution. Instead, it is adding new demands that no sovereign state could ever agree to.

Pakistan’s readiness to negotiate with TTP militants and caving in to their demands has considerably boosted their confidence. Top TTP members, like Muslim Khan and Ehsanullah Ehsan before him, were surreptitiously released, as an example.

Pakistan in a Cleft Stick

The government is under pressure to take strong action against the TTP. Similar to a patron-client relationship gone sour, the confrontation between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban is getting worse. Pakistan is currently going through a complex crisis that may be its worst since 1971, when it split up as a result of the Bangladesh conflict. The crisis in Pakistan is overwhelming, and there is a pervasive sense of being lost among the political and military elite.

The TTP and the Afghan Taliban have crossed across to Pakistan on the northern front. The Taliban’s win in Afghanistan was seen by the ISI as a chance to rule Kabul, giving Pakistan a substantial amount of “strategic depth.” Once the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Islamabad might have thought that by setting up an allied force in Kabul, it had achieved its planned strategic objectives. Pakistan anticipated that it would be better able to manage the TTP situation. Yet, it appears that the Taliban started to object to Pakistan interfering with its internal affairs. Now that the client is openly biting its patron, Islamabad has no choice except to combat the TTP.

Dangers for India

The establishment of fidayeen (suicide) camps in Gilgit-Baltistan regions of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and TTP’s declaration of a shadow government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the neighbouring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region could have an impact on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

The TTP has between 12,000 and 14,000 fighters and suicide bombers stationed in POK. To solidify their authority in the area, the Pakistani security forces are planning a significant operation that will include airstrikes. This might potentially trigger a humanitarian crisis that would affect India, notably in J&K.

Pakistani Army Proxies

With the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and other anti-State jihadists on the rise, Pakistan is once more grooming the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM0 as devoted proxies. Evidence of the Lashkar’s infrastructure continuing to function and the group’s ability to mobilise resources and cadre has been seen for months.

Ever since General Pervez Musharraf’s split from the jihadist movement in 2001, which led thousands of people to join anti-regime groups like the TTP and al-Qaeda, the need for obedient, submissive proxies like the Jaish and Lashkar has gotten even stronger.

The TTP has decided to strike the Pakistani Army as well as State-Patronized Terrorist (SPT) organisations including the JeM) and LeT. Both The leader of the JeM, Maulana Masood Azhar, has been ill for a while and is unable to take on the TTP’s challenge.

The LeT and the JeM have taken a direct part in terrorist activities in J&K and the hinterland of India.

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