Student movements have played a defining role in India’s political and social evolution. From the freedom struggle to the Nav Nirman Movement in Gujarat, the JP Movement, the anti-Mandal protests, and more recent agitations over education, employment and citizenship, students have periodically emerged as The Nav Nirman Movement (1973–74) in Gujarat, which began over hostel food charges and corruption before contributing to the fall of the state government, the Bihar student movement that evolved into Jayaprakash Narayan’s ‘Total Revolution’, the anti-Mandal agitations of 1990, and later protests over university autonomy, citizenship legislation and examination irregularities demonstrate how campus issues can sometimes evolve into national political movements. an influential force capable of shaping public discourse.

At the same time, the vast majority of Indian students remain focused on education, employment and personal advancement. Consequently, large-scale student unrest is neither inevitable nor impossible; it emerges only when specific political, economic and social conditions converge.

The challenge for governments and educational institutions is, therefore, not merely to respond to protests, but to understand the conditions under which localized discontent can escalate into a nationwide movement.

1.  Triggering Issues

Large-scale student movements generally begin with a grievance that is perceived as legitimate and widely shared. The trigger itself may be relatively small, but it resonates because it reflects broader concerns.

Common triggering issues include:

• Employment and recruitment: Recent protests over examination paper leaks, delays in recruitment examinations and alleged irregularities in recruitment processes in states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan illustrate how employment-related grievances can unite students across institutions. Delays in government recruitment, cancellation of examinations, alleged paper leaks, or perceived unfairness in selection processes.
• Educational policies: The Jawaharlal Nehru University fee-hike protests (2019) demonstrated how educational policy decisions can rapidly mobilize campus opinion. Fee hikes, changes in admission policies, scholarship reductions, hostel regulations or examination reforms.
• Perceived injustice: The death of Rohith Vemula at the University of Hyderabad (2016) generated nationwide student protests because many perceived the issue as extending beyond one individual to questions of institutional fairness and social justice. Disciplinary action against students, allegations of discrimination, or incidents viewed as violations of fairness.
• Economic pressures: Rising unemployment, inflation affecting student households, or reduced economic opportunities.
• Political or constitutional issues: The Citizenship (Amendment) Act protests (2019–20), particularly at Jamia Millia Islamia, Aligarh Muslim University and JNU, illustrated how broader political issues can mobilize students. Policies perceived to affect democratic rights, academic freedom or civil liberties.
• Catalytic incidents: Police entry into Jamia Millia Islamia in December 2019 transformed localized protests into a national issue by becoming a widely discussed symbolic event. A single event, such as a controversial administrative action or an incident involving use of force, can transform localized dissatisfaction into a wider movement if it is viewed as symbolic of a larger problem.

Importantly, a trigger succeeds only when it reflects an existing reservoir of dissatisfaction. Most isolated incidents do not develop into sustained protests.

2.  Stabilizing Factors

India today possesses several structural factors that reduce the likelihood of prolonged nationwide student unrest.

Career-oriented aspirations. Today’s students are considerably more focused on education, competitive examinations, professional qualifications and employment than previous generations. The opportunity cost of prolonged agitation is therefore much higher.

Fear of legal and disciplinary consequences. Students increasingly recognize that criminal cases, university disciplinary proceedings or prolonged arrests may affect future employment, higher education opportunities, passports and government service. This acts as a significant deterrent against sustained confrontation.

Majority of students remain law-abiding. Most students prefer peaceful academic environments and have little interest in prolonged political activism. Historically, only a relatively small proportion of students actively participate in demonstrations.

Awareness of political exploitation. Many students across ideological lines have become increasingly cautious about being used by political parties for electoral or partisan purposes. This skepticism often limits long-term mobilization.

Presence of organized student bodies. Organizations such as the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), along with other student organizations representing diverse ideological perspectives, provide structured channels for student participation. Their presence often moderates spontaneous mobilization by encouraging organized engagement.

Public confidence in political leadership. Confidence in national or state leadership can reduce the willingness of students to assume that institutional mechanisms have completely failed. While political preferences vary considerably across regions and campuses, confidence in elected institutions can contribute to overall stability.

Administrative coordination. Where governments maintain effective coordination between educational institutions, civil administration and law enforcement, isolated incidents are less likely to spread across multiple campuses.

Reservation policies. The anti-Mandal protests of 1990 simultaneously demonstrated how reservation policy itself can become a powerful mobilizing issue among sections of students. India’s reservation system addresses historical inequities and provides educational opportunities to large sections of society. While reservation remains a subject of political debate and can itself generate grievances among different groups, it also contributes to social inclusion for many beneficiaries.

3.  Additional Stabilizing Factors

Several broader social changes further reduce the probability of nationwide student mobilization.

• Increasing enrolment in private universities with relatively different campus cultures.
• Highly competitive examination and coaching ecosystem.
• Strong parental emphasis on career success.
• Digital lifestyles that diffuse attention across multiple interests.
• Diverse educational pathways, making it difficult to unite students around a single issue.
• Availability of online grievance mechanisms in many institutions.
• Expanding private-sector employment opportunities outside traditional government careers.

Collectively, these factors create a society in which students often perceive greater personal benefit from academic progress than from prolonged political activism.

4.  Factors That Can Produce Large-Scale Student Unrest

Despite these stabilizing influences, certain structural conditions can still generate widespread mobilization.

Youth unemployment. Growing concern over employment opportunities has featured prominently in protests relating to railway recruitment and government vacancies. When educated young people perceive diminishing employment opportunities despite significant educational investment, frustration can accumulate across campuses.

Examination and recruitment controversies. Repeated controversies involving examination paper leaks, including recruitment and entrance examinations in several states, have increasingly become flashpoints capable of generating cross-state mobilisation. Repeated examination cancellations, paper leaks, delayed results or recruitment irregularities directly affect millions of students simultaneously and can become powerful unifying issues.

Loss of institutional trust. During the anti-corruption movement of 2011, although not exclusively student-led, large numbers of students joined because many believed conventional institutions were failing to address corruption effectively. Student unrest often intensifies when students conclude that universities, examination authorities or governments are unwilling or unable to address legitimate grievances.

Broad-based policy impact. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act protests illustrated how a policy perceived to have nationwide implications could generate mobilisation across geographically dispersed campuses. Policies affecting students irrespective of region, caste, language or political affiliation are more likely to generate nationwide responses.

Economic distress. Inflation, declining household income and reduced affordability of education can intensify existing dissatisfaction.

Perceived injustice. Students frequently mobilize more readily around issues of fairness than around purely ideological questions. Perceived unequal treatment or arbitrary decisions often generate stronger emotional responses.

Symbolic incidents. The death of Rohith Vemula and the police action at Jamia Millia Islamia became symbolic events that continued to influence public discourse long after the immediate incidents. Certain events become symbols that extend beyond the immediate issue, representing larger concerns about governance, accountability or justice.

5.  Sustaining (or Fuelling) Factors

While triggers initiate movements, different factors determine whether protests remain localized or evolve into sustained campaigns.

Narrative continuity. The JP Movement sustained itself by linking local student grievances with a larger narrative of corruption, governance reform and democratic renewal. A movement gains momentum when participants consistently connect individual incidents to a broader shared narrative.

Public legitimacy. The Nav Nirman Movement gained momentum because public support quickly extended beyond students to the middle classes, traders and civil society. When wider society—including parents, academics, alumni or professional bodies—views student concerns as reasonable, protests tend to receive greater support.

Institutional response. Government and university responses often influence the trajectory of movements. Transparent communication, credible grievance mechanisms and timely engagement can reduce tensions, while delayed or inconsistent responses may increase perceptions of institutional indifference.

Leadership. The emergence of Jayaprakash Narayan during the Bihar student movement transformed a regional agitation into a national political campaign. Recognized student representatives capable of articulating clear demands often provide coherence to movements. Conversely, the absence of credible leadership can lead to fragmentation.

Media attention. Television amplified the anti-Mandal protests in 1990, while social media became a major force multiplier during the 2019–20 university protests. Extensive traditional and social media coverage can elevate local issues into national debates, increasing public awareness and pressure for resolution.

Persistence of the underlying grievance. Movements usually continue when participants believe that the original issue remains unresolved despite repeated representations.

6.  Early Warning and Prevention

Governments and educational institutions should focus on identifying conditions that precede large-scale unrest rather than reacting only after demonstrations occur.

Important indicators include: Historical movements suggest that nationwide student unrest rarely develops suddenly. The Nav Nirman Movement, the JP Movement, the anti-Mandal protests and the CAA-related campus protests all progressed through identifiable stages—from localized grievance to wider public mobilisation.

• Similar grievances emerging simultaneously across multiple campuses.
• Increasing petitions, memoranda and representations on the same issue.
• Growing public discussion among students, faculty and alumni.
• Evidence that localized concerns are acquiring national attention.
• Declining confidence in grievance redressal mechanisms.
• Expansion of peaceful protests to multiple institutions within a short period.
• Increasing polarization between student groups.

Prevention is generally more effective than enforcement.

Effective preventive measures include:

• Responsive grievance redressal systems.
• Transparent communication.
• Timely clarification of policies.
• Independent inquiry into disputed incidents.
• Constructive dialogue with student representatives.
• Consistent application of institutional rules.
• Avoiding unnecessary escalation while maintaining public order.

The objective should be to preserve both institutional authority and public confidence.

Lessons from the “Cockroach Janta Party” Protests

The so-called “Cockroach Janta Party” protests illustrate several broader lessons relevant to governments confronting emerging student-led or youth-driven movements.

First, governments should avoid dismissing apparently small or symbolic protests as insignificant. Symbolic campaigns can resonate if they reflect deeper public anxieties.

Second, rapid and credible communication is often more effective than allowing rumours, speculation or misinformation to fill an information vacuum.

Third, understanding the underlying grievance is more important than focusing solely on visible manifestations such as slogans, demonstrations or online campaigns.

Fourth, maintaining proportionality in administrative and policing responses helps preserve public confidence. Responses perceived as fair, transparent and consistent are less likely to generate wider sympathy for protesters.

Fifth, governments should distinguish between genuine student grievances and attempts by external actors to amplify or exploit them. Durable protests usually succeed only when they resonate with authentic concerns shared by students.

Sixth, governments benefit from continuous engagement with students, educational institutions and civil society, even during periods of relative calm. Trust established before a crisis often proves more valuable than communication initiated after tensions have escalated.

Finally, effective governance requires balancing the protection of democratic freedoms—including peaceful expression and lawful protest—with the responsibility to maintain public order and ensure the uninterrupted functioning of educational institutions.

Conclusion

Student unrest should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated. Contemporary India possesses multiple structural stabilizers—including strong career aspirations, diverse student interests, institutional deterrence and greater economic opportunity—that reduce the likelihood of nationwide student movements. Nevertheless, history demonstrates Since 1970, India’s experience—from Nav Nirman and the JP Movement to the anti-Mandal agitation, the University of Hyderabad protests, the JNU fee protests and the CAA-related campus demonstrations—shows that while the issues vary, the dynamics of escalation remain remarkably consistent.

Nevertheless, history demonstrates that widespread unrest can still emerge when broad-based grievances coincide with declining institutional trust and emotionally resonant catalytic events. The most effective governmental strategy is therefore not simply strong enforcement, but responsive governance. Institutions that communicate transparently, resolve grievances promptly, maintain public confidence and engage constructively with students are significantly better positioned to prevent localized discontent from evolving into sustained national movements. Understanding the interaction between triggers, stabilizing influences, sustaining factors and early warning indicators enables policymakers to anticipate challenges before they become crises, thereby safeguarding both democratic participation and social stability.

The post Understanding Student Unrest in India appeared first on IMR.

The Allocations were as follows:

Rs 31,772.23 crore – Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).

Rs 24,771.28 crore – Border Security Force (BSF).

Rs 13,214.68 crore – Central Industrial Security Force (CISF).

Rs 8,096.89 crore – Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).

Rs 8,329.10 crore – Seema Suraksha Bal (SSB).

Rs 7,052.46 crore – Assam Rifles (AR).

Rs 1,286.54 crore – National Security Guard (NSG)

Total Rs 1.27 lakh crore earmarked for paramilitary forces.

The allocations made to the ministry, headed by Union Home Minister Amit Shah, according to the Budget document, is higher by over Rs 10,000 crore, as in the Budget for 2022-23, it was pegged at Rs 1,85,776.55 crore.

The bulk of the amount allocated to the MHA, Rs 1,27,756.74 crore, has been earmarked for the CAPFs in comparison to Rs 1,19,070.36 crore in 2022-23.

Among the CAPFs, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), mostly responsible for internal security duties and fighting militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, has been allocated Rs 31,772.23 crore in comparison to Rs 31,495.88 crore given in 2022-23.

The Border Security Force (BSF), which guards India’s border with Pakistan and Bangladesh, besides handling internal security assignments, has been given Rs 24,771.28 crore in comparison to Rs 23,557.51 crore given in the current financial year.

The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which protects vital installations such as nuclear projects, airports and metro networks, has been given Rs 13,214.68 crore in comparison to Rs 12,293.23 crore allocated in 2022-23.

The Shashastra Seema Bal (SSB), which guards India’s borders with Nepal and Bhutan, has been allocated Rs 8,329.10 crore in comparison to Rs 8,019.78 crore given in 2022-23.

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), which guards India’s borders with China, got Rs 8,096.89 crore in comparison to Rs 7,626.38 crore given in the current fiscal.

The Assam Rifles, which is deployed along the India-Myanmar border and for anti-insurgency duties in the North-East, has been allocated Rs 7,052.46 crore in comparison to Rs 6,561.33 crore given in the current financial year.

The National Security Guard (NSG), the elite commando force to tackle any emergency security situation, has been allocated Rs 1,286.54 crore in comparison to Rs 1,183.80 crore given in 2022-23.

Expectations

What the CAPFs expected from the 2023 Union budget was funds for infrastructure development in border areas, better equipment with latest technology for disaster management, training and operations and a robust communication system.

Each year funds for the CAPFs see only a marginal increase, most of which goes into salaries, allowances and other wages, with only a little left over for the development and modernisation of the organisation.

Although a separate fund is also earmarked for modernisation of the forces, focus on infrastructure development and better training and equipment, is often ignored owing to lack of funds.

In the previous budget, in 2022, the Ministry of Home Affairs was allocated Rs 1,85,776.55 crore – a more than 11 per cent increase over the Rs 1,66,547 crore allotted in the previous fiscal year.

Last year, as a new feature, funds were allocated for the modernisation of the CAPF, to equip the forces with modern, state-of-the-art weapons and equipment, according to their operational requirement, keeping in view their deployment pattern in different sectors. Besides, upgraded IT solutions were also to be provided to CAPF. The plan announced a total financial outlay of Rs.1,523 crore between 1 February 2022 and 31 March 2026.

The National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) and Delhi Police, both of which also roll up to the Ministry of Home Affairs, also had similar expectations from the budget.

With climate change there has been an increase in episodes of natural disasters, which requires the latest technology relief operations and the next budget should focus on that.

The post MHA Gets Rs 1.96 lakh crore for Police and Paramilitary appeared first on IMR.

The use of Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers (RPG) in the Mohali terror attack, on 9 May, and the smuggling in of US military hardware abandoned in Afghanistan into Kashmir expands the horizon of Pakistan’s proxy war against India.

The arrest of gangster Lawrence Bishnoi, the masterminded behind the May 29 murder of Punjabi rapper Sidhu Moosewala and his gang members unravelled many conspiracies Bishnoi is partly responsible for a flurry of activity that has begun on the diplomatic and security front.

The unassuming Bishnoi heads a transnational network of criminals that spreads from Moga in Punjab to safe-houses in Pakistan, all the way up to Canada. According to the Punjab Police, he runs an international extortion racket, headed by Satinderjit Singh alias Goldy Brar in Canada and Harjot Singh Gill in the US.

The Bishnoi gang, though, is just one piece of the foreign-based gangster puzzle. A common link between the gangsters in India and those in Canada and the west is Harwinder Singh Sandhu, aka Rinda—a Pakistan-based gangster-turned-terrorist who allegedly masterminded the RPG attack on the Punjab Police’s intelligence headquarters in Mohali.

Rinda is wanted by the Punjab Police in 22 cases and by the Maharashtra Police in two. He is said to be in Pakistan now, under a fake identity with an Indian passport, reportedly sheltered by Pakistan-based terrorist groups and the Inter-Services Intelligence.

With all this coming to light, security officials say that the old Khalistan-ISI nexus is far from dead; only the original leadership, nurtured by the ISI, has grown old, and a new team had to be created. This new group consists of at least 34 new faces—including Bishnoi and Brar—who are based in the US, the UK, Canada, Germany and some other European countries. The new set has stylish branding and westernised names like Brothers Keepers, Hell’s Angels and Red Scorpions.

According to investigators, the Bishnoi gang, Rinda and the Canadian gangsters have several meeting points.

Hardeep Singh Nijjar of the Khalistan Tiger Force—against whom there are at least 10 FIRs in Punjab and Haryana, and who is on the National Investigation Agency’s wanted list—is learnt to be living in Surrey, British Columbia, on a Canadian passport.

The Indian government has reportedly sent dossiers to different countries with proof against these men, but they are yet to consider extradition.

Veteran Canadian Broadcasting Corporation journalist Terry Milewski said his country does not see the Khalistani-terrorist nexus as a serious problem. The gangster activities are dealt with as “routine police problems”.

In Canada, certain politicians are against defining the [Khalistan] problem as a national security threat. That does not match Delhi’s expectations. But the fact remains that Canada safeguards freedom of speech and, legally, the country is correct to say that merely advocating a separate Sikh state and shouting ‘Khalistan Zindabad’ is not a crime.”

Most gangsters on India’s wanted list are Canadian citizens and, unless they commit a crime on Indian soil, Indian authorities cannot ask for their deportation or extradition. Western countries have also quoted their privacy laws for not sharing any information about citizens in their countries, even if they have links in Punjab. The other problem is the vast legal paperwork that comes into play, in each case, to prove the identity of the accused. Many have taken political asylum with new identities

But when some stray bullets hit people of the host country, a crackdown becomes inevitable. The July killing of Ripudaman Malik—who was acquitted in the 1985 Air India terror bombing case—has caught the attention of the Canadian police. Malik, a Canadian citizen, was keen on exposing the nexus between the ISI and Khalistani groups. He was unguarded as he enjoyed the freedom Canada was offering him. Days later, on July 24, Brothers Keepers member Meninder Dhaliwal and his friend Sat Gill were shot dead in a police encounter.

Though pro-Khalistani elements account for only a fraction of the Indian community in Canada, they have an outsized influence in community affairs. They gain legitimacy by acting as vote banks in various foreign countries, and remain a potent force that is being tapped by anti-India elements.

There was just a minuscule lot that demands a separate Khalistan today. The Khalistan Referendum by Sikhs for Justice has been an utter failure in India and abroad. So, the issue has completely failed as a geopolitical matter.

The need is for strategic and diplomatic cooperation to weed out the criminal elements, funded by global terror groups, who are trying to disturb the social fabric of all countries involved.

Also, with Indian intelligence now claiming that the gangster-terror groups have co-opted the human trafficking and narcotics networks—thereby adding more money and muscle power—it is a wake-up call for all parties involved.

The post ISI-Khalistan Nexus is Alive; Links Abroad appeared first on IMR.

In early-2020, Delhi saw a spate of communal clashes in which nearly 53 people were killed . As many as 200 sustained severe injuries primarily from bullets and gunshots.

Many wondered how the gang leaders and miscreants managed to lay their hands on deadly guns so easily. The average Indian is completely ignorant of the hows and where-abouts of getting an illegal weapon.

Just two weeks after the Election Commission’s Model Code of Conduct (MCC) for the Delhi polls kicked in on 6 January, the police registering an average of 10 cases everyday against those carrying pistols, carbines, revolvers and live cartridges in public places without the requisite permits. It was found that rackets spanning from Meerut to Madhya Pradesh had stepped up manufacturing and supplies to Delhi, anticipating a surge in demand around the 8 February polling date.

The arms are used to display muscle power and intimidate voters and a  hired muscleman is not intimidating enough without a gun in his armoury.

Between the 6 and 25 January 2020, 252 first information reports (FIR) had been lodged under the Arms Act, 273 people arrested, besides 335 weapons and 383 cartridges seized by the Delhi Police. These cases pertained to arms trafficking as well as seizures from dreaded gangsters and notorious criminals.

According to Delhi Police figures, more than 2,100 illegal arms were seized up to 15 September 2019. This is quite high as compared to 1,399 weapons seized till 15 September 2018. More than 559 cases had also been registered under the Arms Act up to 15 September 2019.

The menace or burgeoning of illegal weapons is not just limited to the capital though. In November 2019, Qadian in Gurdaspur district saw a shoot-out between two groups of students which resulted in the death of a woman and left the residents of the area in a state of shock. Being a border state that has lived through fractious days of militancy, as also being of an agrarian bent of economy, there is a justifiable call for protecting the land and its produce and the resulting need for possessing arms is, thereby, understandable. But what is of concern is the arguably unchequered access to illegal arms.

According to the National Crime Records Bureau, only 14 percent of the victims of gun violence in India in 2019 were killed by licensed guns. The rest were killed by illegal weapons, largely prevalent in the hinterlands and rural outlying areas. These are indeed worrying statistics.

The Firearms Trail

Production of illegal firearms in India, though a serious issue, does not receive due attention from the government and law enforcement officials. Indigenous weapons come at a far cheaper price compared to their market counterparts and even though their accuracy is suspect, they are highly destructive and impossible to trace back to their owners using ballistic fingerprinting.

Law and order system in the country has played a role in the flourishing illegal factories for many years now. This is not a recent phenomenon but was so even in colonial times. Since Independence, it has flourished and the volume has burgeoned.

Largely, this manufacturing had been ascribed to the states of UP and Bihar. UP is the undisputed leader when it comes to manufacturing of illegal firearms, followed closely by Bihar. In UP, large urban centres like Muzzaffarnagar, Ghaziabad, Rampur, Meerut, Etah, Azamgarh, Bulandshahar and areas near Loni on the Delhi-UP border have been identified as big trade centres for illicit guns. There are reports dating back to 2004 of a unit in Loni that used to sell over 30 firearms on an average every month and earn about Rs 50,000. Conflating it with the existing inflation figures, this statistic would have easily mounted to at least Rs 10 lakh per month, today.

Munger, a small town 250 km southeast of Patna is the capital of country-made weapons as well as the service centre of all illegal weapons produced in the country. Illegal gun-making is part of historical lore here. Skilled workers have been manufacturing these since before Independence. On custom orders, Munger can produce carved, ornate pieces apart from the usual crude ones. Over the years, Munger’s gun-makers have further perfected their skills. Today, the artisans and gunsmiths boast of having the ability to produce copies of such intricate weapons like the Beretta, the famed weapon of choice for James Bond as well as the feared AK-47 on demand.

In 2014, when an alleged Hizbul Mujahideen arms courier Ravesh Islam was arrested from Pathankot railway station, two pistols recovered from him were marked “Only for Army use” and “Made in US” respectively. They, in fact, came from factories in Munger. How did Munger earn its notorious moniker? Arms manufacturing began here in the early 18th Century when Mir Qasim, the then Nawab of Bengal commanded the artisans to make guns to fight the British.

Bundelkhand’s Jhansi and Madhya Pradesh’s Dhar, Burhanpur, Khargone are also known for being hubs for illegal arms manufacturing units.

The factories make every part, from side covers to butts, barrels and triggers using hand-powered drills, grinding and welding machines. The most commonly produced illegal models in India include the homegrown katas and tamanchas, duplicate pistols, Berettas, their more advanced counterparts such as the AK-47 and AK-57 models, as well as 10 and 12 bore shotguns and rifles.

Police officers across the country scoff at the term ‘country-made gun’. The original katta had a barrel and a basic trigger mechanism. The barrel would often get damaged after it was used a few times. In 90% of cases, these weapons would be unusable after they fired a few rounds. But today’s country-made guns are far superior. They are made in factories now. These guns can be made using a simple drilling machine. Over the years, illegal gun manufacturers have used the latest technological know-how to make revolvers and pistols with magazines that have high tension springs and can hold as many as nine rounds. These kattas do not require any paperwork and can be delivered hassle-free to your doorstep.

The hubs of illegal gun trade in India churn out these kattas for only Rs 2,500-3,000 rupees, and replicas of famed international models like Smith & Wesson, Webley and Scott revolvers, Benelli and Beretta pistols can be bought for Rs 40,000 to Rs 75,000. A 9mm or 7.65mm pistol (replicas of their German, Italian or Chinese counterparts) goes for about Rs 25,000 whereas the original can be got for 40000. Local traders say a .315 rifle is available for Rs 35,000 at these factories.

Gun Laws In India

India already has some of the strictest gun laws in the world, a vestige of British colonial rule, which aimed to weaken its subjects by disarming them. Indian law allows citizens to own and carry guns, but it is not a right enshrined in the Constitution (like in the US and other Western countries). Getting a gun license in India is a difficult task that can often take years.

As the threat of small arms’ proliferation and the dangers inherent in their indiscriminate use came to global attention, the government has made the laws even stricter. It introduced the landmark Arms (Amendment) Act of 2019, which reduced the number of licensed weapons allowed from three to two, in a move that brought a howl of protests from UP, Bihar, Punjab and other states. The Act also increased the punishment for illegal manufacture, procurement and distribution of weapons and made it a punishable offence to fire weapons at ‘celebratory’ events. It recognized the burgeoning threat of organised crime and has made snatching of firearms from the police punishable.

Comments

In the present rapidly evolving political scene, religious fanatics can venture out and get an illegal firearm from the market. There is a growing fear in the citizenry of the country that firearms-led wars would manifest in several other states of the country because of caste, class and religious animosities. The warring groups do not demonstrate any responsibility towards administrative, political and economic issues of the region and certainly not towards the Indian Union. An atmosphere of hatred, violence and terror corrodes the spirit of mutual existence, which is the basic strength of a civil society. The processes of negotiations and dialogue, long upheld to be intrinsic parts of democratic conduct, are totally subverted due to the presence of arms.

The police were never meant to be a fighting force. Their mandate was to uphold the law and defend only. But with a lot of guns around, the police have no option but to arm themselves and this sometimes leads to disastrous ends.

Policymakers need to understand this simple fact. A proliferation of guns of any kind, licensed or unlicensed, means that the State’s ability to control a situation will become eroded. It also means that it makes it that much easier for your enemies, from within or outside, to light that match to an already inflamed situation.

From Manufacture to Delivery

• Weapons are made in Munger’s gun mills. Steel is sourced from railway workshops.
• Buyers call the weapons suppliers or their agents, who in turn, contact the manufacturers.
• Payment is made by depositing money into an account after which the weapon is delivered. Couriers have no contact with the manufacturer or supplier.
• Weapons are rarely dispatched fully assembled. Components – the barrel, body, slide, trigger, firing pin and spring – are usually sent through separate couriers. Women and children are used a couriers. Cargo also transported in oil containers to escape detection.
• Once delivered in Jharkhand, the manufacturer’s man there reassembles the guns before delivery.

Price List
Country-made pistol      Rs 1,500-2,000.
Sixer revolver               Rs 5,000 to 25,000
9mm, .38 Pistol            Rs35,000 to 1 lakh.
(Beretta, Colt copy)
AK-47                          Rs 60,000 to 5 lakh

Legal and Illegal Bores
Prohibited bores:          9mm, .30mm, 9X19mm, 7.62mm (AK-47 s), 5.56mm (AK 56), 5.65mm (AK-74 ).
Non-prohibited bores:  .22mm, .32mm, .30-06 and .315mm.

The post HOMELAND SECURITY : Proliferation of Illegal Weapons appeared first on IMR.

According to the dossier, the PFI had been actively operating through its various front affiliations such as Rehab Foundation, the Indian Social Forum and Indian Fraternity Forum. These organisations are suspected of propagating Islamic fundamentalism and have known to have raised funds in Dubai to be sent to PFI in India.

“The Indian Fraternity Forum in Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is also involved in raising funds for it” it was stated in the dossier.

A newspaper quoted a government official involved, who alleged that “Senior PFI leaders visit these countries and urge members to facilitate in jobs to Indian Muslims so that the base of the organisation expands along with the funds flow”. The dossier concluded a large network has been established by the PFI “with at least 80,000 cadres and a presence in 24 Indian states.”

Since the arrest of 25 PFI members by the UP police, on 19 December 2019, for their active role in stirring violence in anti-CAA protests, a call for a ban on the organization has been initiated.

In another case, the Lisari Gate police in Meerut arrested Anees Khalifa, a PFI member. He was accused for inciting violence during the anti-CAA protests in UP on 20 December 2019.Anees Khalifa was arrested for opening fire on the police and for supplying weapons and ammunition to the participants of the protest.

The Union Law Minister, Ravi Shankar Prasad, claimed the possibility of active presence of PFI in the violence surrounding the anti-CAA protests and said that his ministry would consider taking action against the organisation based on evidence. He also highlighted the links between the PFI and the banned Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Mohsin Raza, UP Minister of state for minority welfare also released a statement accusing PFI of misleading the Muslim youths and for spreading Islamic radicalisation in India. He, too, refereed to PFI as a “front for SIMI” and claimed that the organisation “received its funding from Pakistan’s intelligence wing ISI”.

With the tumultuous situation in UP after the declaration of CAA, the UP government sought a ban on PFI with the home ministry. This was followed by the governments of Assam and Karnataka as well. Delhi’s Lt Governor Anil Baijal permitted the Delhi Police to detain people under the NSA (National Security Act, 1980) from 19 January 2020 to April 18, 2020. The National Executive Council of PFI condemned his order to impose National Security Act (NSA) in Delhi, calling it a “draconian law” which “legalizes denial of Constitutional rights in the name of national security”. PFI claimed the order to be a desperate action to contain the anti-CAA protests in areas such as Jamia Millia Islamia, Jama Masjid, Shaheen Bagh and Jantar Mantar.

PFI and its functionaries are infamously known for their extremist and militant activities based on the narrative of Islam. They openly profess their purpose is to “Establish an egalitarian society in which freedom and justice is enjoyed by all”. The mission statement itself raises many questions about the PFI, given that they are inhibitors of anti-CAA protests, where the slogans of “Azadi, Bharat tere tukde honge” and the threats of “raktabhan kataaron se katana” for those who oppose them, has proved to be in contradiction to its own claimed purpose.

Affiliations and Network

Since its formation, the goal of the front was clear – to exercise inordinate influence using the channel of human rights movements and protests by aligning itself with civil rights groups and various minority groups to gain the popular demographic acknowledgment.

The organisation has freely advocated its anti-Imperialist and anti-Zionist ideologies, which were seen in the pro-Palestine protests in various parts of the country in November 2012. Later, in 2014, they fashioned the campaign “I am Gaza.” In 2015, the Popular Front also protested against the capital punishment given to an elected leader, Mohamed Morsi and his followers in front of the Egyptian embassy in New Delhi. It is evident that the PFI has aspired to gain networks and influence nationally and internationally with the several campaigns and activities it has undertaken and which are not limited to Indian matters.

Through its founder E. Abubacker, PFI has managed to build a pan-India network. He was the founder President of Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), Founder Chairman of National Development Front (NDF), part of the All India Milli Council (2005), State President for Students Islamic Movement of India (1982), founding Member of All India Muslim Personal Law Board and Managing Editor for Thejas Daily newspaper and India Next Hindi magazine.

The organization was born as a successor to the NDF in 2006 in Kerala. It strengthened its multi-state dimensional influence by merging with Manitha Neethi Pasarai, Karnataka Forum for Dignity and many other similar ideology-based organisations. Retired Lt Gen PC Katoch has pointed out the existing link between the PFI and Pakistan’s ISI network. In his article “PFI to The Fore”, he highlighted the Assam riots in 2012, which were triggered due to the hate campaign launched in South India against the people of the North East. The happening was linked to the affiliates of Manita Neeti Pasaraj and Karnataka Forum for Dignity. There was a large exchange of messages, which were also uploaded from Pakistan simultaneously.

By 2009, it merged with Goa’s Citizen’s Forum, Rajasthan’s Community Social and Educational Society, West Bengal’s Nagarik Adhikar Suraksha Samiti, Manipur’s Lilong Social Forum and Andhra Pradesh’s Association of Social Justice. PFI has built a network of sister affiliations such as Rehab India Foundation, Indian Fraternity Forum, Confederation of Muslim Institutions in India, Muslim Relief Network (MRN) and Sathya Sarini. These auxiliary branches operate as the front groups, which collect the funds internationally. The group, while maintaining its image as a non-profit organisation, also claimed to have strong ties with the National Confederation of Human Rights Organisations.

Along similar lines as Mishra Commission (National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities), PFI claims it addresses the discrimination and the inequality faced by Muslims in India. In the past, PFI has conducted many protests against the use of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act [UAPA] to detain citizens they considered innocent.

Apart from the internal radicalisation permeating from areas of the south, the growing influence of ISIS, AL Qaeda and ISI-LeT must also be monitored in Malidives and Sri Lanka, given its close proximity to India and the ties these groups share with PFI.

Connection with Khalistanis

PFI’s deep connection and vested interest in forming a Sikh- Muslim communal alliance is now being reflected in the call for Khalistani Referendum 2020.

The Front (along with its Khalistani alliance partner) has jointly acted on matters such as the Anti-Sikh riots in 1982 and Babri Masjid demolition of 1992. There has been a symbiotic relation of the PFI-Sikh alliance which has been also seen post the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and post CAA promulgation. With the anti-CAA protests erupting in the country, the call for Khalistan referendum 2020 has also simultaneously been pushed at the precise moment. Various online applications have found their way into Google store such as Punjab Referendum 2020, Register to Vote 2020 Khalistan and Justice for Sikhs. What is intriguing is that the timing of the launch of the applications coincides with the civil unrest conducted by the anti-CAA lobbies in which the PFI is involved. Also to be noted, the apps on registration provides a strict warning to the applicant, dissuading the registration if the person is a part of the NIA, RAW, CBI or any other Intelligence Agency of India.

Regardless of the Muslim-Khalistani alliance promoted by the PFI, it is intriguing to note how two communal groups would commence parallel plays at the specific time when the country faces turmoil in face of violent anti-CAA protests.

Past Anti-National Activities

Apart from the reputation the PFI tries to maintain, it has been accused of various notorious, anarchist and anti-national activities. Since its inception it is has been accused of having links with certain Islamic terror outfits, possessing arms, running kidnapping rackets, murders, promoting Love Jihad, funding and organising riots against the government, promotion of hate speech against the non-Muslims and for various other religious extremist activities. The PFI is well known for running Da`wa centres as well, which focuson the forced conversions of non-Muslims to Islam as reported by the NIA. It is believed to have a strong connection with Sathya Sarini in Malapurram, which has been carrying the “forced conversions.”

In 2010, the members of the Front were linked with the brutal assault on Prof. TJ Joseph, who published a controversial paper, supposedly insulting the Prophet Muhammad. The charges were denied by the organisation, which further claimed to be fabricated as a ploy to malign the name of the organisation.

The Front has centres which ply as efficient cogs in a “well-oiled machinery”, consisting of squads, experts in bomb makings and IEDS and intelligence units. These centres are known to provide martial arts training to its members and to also conduct special training in indoctrination.

In 2012, the Government of Kerala in its argument to ban PFI`s Independence Day programme “Freedom Parade” notified the KeralaHigh Court that PFI was “a resurrection of the banned outfit Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) in another form.” Even though the High Court dismissed the Government’s stand, the ban was imposed by the State Government. In July 2010, the Kerala Police had recovered improvised explosive devices (IED), arms, CDs and documents containing Taliban and Al-Qaeda propagandafrom PFI activists. PFI, in its defence, regarded these raids by the police as “undemocratic” and “unconstitutional.” However, in raids conducted by the Kerala police on the PFI centres in North Kerala in April 2013, the police seized “lethal weapons, foreign currency, human shooting targets, bombs, explosive raw materials, gunpowder, swords, among other things”. The Kerala Police believed that the recovered evidence would be sufficient to unmask the “terror face” of the PFI.

Based on the reports shared by Intelligence agencies, PFI was involved in the 2011 Mumbai bombings, 2012 Pune bombings and 2013 Hyderabad blasts. These claims have been denied by the PFI.

In a video release of a PFI representative in an anti-CAA gathering in Calicut, the leader of the Front was heard saying “we will decide whether there should be peace in India or not.”

Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI),a political wing of the PFI has already garnered a significant following in Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. On the basis of the PFI’s campaign to provide “total empowerment” for Muslims, Dalits, Adivasis and other Hindu Backward classes, many organisations such as the Bhim Army have extended support to PFI.

While several law enforcement, intelligence agencies and state governments are in unison about the proscription of the PFI, the counter threats have come from Asom United Democratic Front (AUDF), Maulana Badruddin Ajmal, who have declared solidarity with the PFI. It is not surprising that many smaller groups and PFI affiliations have acted in solidarity with the PFI, condemning any action taken by the government to limit their propaganda.

With the cyber and psychological war waged against India by ISI and its coordinated affiliates, it is surprising that the call to ban PFI had not come sooner. The cadre strength of the PFI has not been precisely determined but it is certain that it is expanding. South India has become a hot bed for terror infestations from the land and sea borders.

India must deal firmly with PFI and it’s affiliates with a heavy hand and proscribe the organisation as a terror outfit, given the accelerated growth of a pan-India PFI and its affiliates. It seems to be part of a sinister programme of destabilisation in India and is trying to rope in all disgruntled elements within the Leftists, Khalistanis and Dalits to create a coalition of anti-national forces.

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Amarinder Singh (Punjab), Mamata Banerjee (West Bengal) and Pinarayi Vijayan (Kerala) -have announced that they will not implement the legislation in their respective states. Kamal Nath (Madhya Pradesh) and Bhupesh Baghel (Chhattisgarh) expressed reservations against it. Baghelsaid that he would oppose the law. “Our stand won’t be different from what is being taken by the All India Congress Committee (AICC) on the Citizenship Amendment Act.”

The Central government insisted that grant of citizenship was the exclusive domain of the Centre as per the Constitution, with the role of states limited to physical verification of documents to be submitted directly to the home ministry via an online portal.

While campaigning in Jharkhand, defence minister Rajnath Singh said, “There is no option for states other than to implement the legislation. There are set rules, which they will have to follow. The federal structure of the country has to be respected by all stakeholders. Any state government can’t be driven by its agenda while implementing a legislation through Constitutional amendment with presidential assent.” He said asserting that due legal process will be followed to enforce implementation of CAA in all states once rules are drafted.

Constitutional Provisions

There are three lists under the seventh schedule – union, concurrent and state. Centre has exclusive domain to frame laws on matters falling under the union list and citizenship is one such subject. States have no discretion to say they will not implement it. But, states can delay verification of documents, citing law and order problems. Law and order is a state subject, which means the state administration has complete control over its police and public order. States can turn around and say they will conduct not any enumeration exercise as a precautionary measure to maintain public order.

The 97 subjects under the Union List of Schedule VII includes matters like defence, external affairs, railways, citizenship and naturalisation-the matters that will have a bearing on the people across the nation irrespective of government and ideology.

‘Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens’ constituted Item No.17 in ‘List 1’ or ‘Union list’ under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Centre has the exclusive right to legislate on subjects in the Union list. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 was enacted under the Union List of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. Also, Article 256 of the Constitution makes it binding on states to exercise executive power so as to ensure compliance with laws made by Parliament. The executive power of the Union extends to giving directions to a state as government of India deems necessary for the purpose.

Still, while the Constitution gives the Central Government exclusive powers to frame legislation on citizenship, states can refuse to participate in the enumeration exercise or delay it, citing law and order issues, rendering the law ineffective, according to constitutional experts.

Procedural Delay

While an application for citizenship by naturalisation may be filed via the ministry of home affairs (MHA) foreigners’ division portal and the supporting documents uploaded, physical verification of the documents would be carried out at the level of the Foreigners Registration Office (FRO), a charge usually held by the district superintendent of police. The district administration would relay its report to the home ministry which will take the final decision.

At most, the FRO or district administration can prolong the verification process. But in case this becomes a state-wide tactic, the Centre would be within its rights to issue instructions under Article 256 asking the defaulting state to comply with the provisions. The state would then be legally bound to do so.

A key document likely to be sought is one that proves that the applicants belonging to minorities in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh migrated on or before December 31, 2014, and have fulfilled the condition of minimum five-year stay in India. Sources said the applicants may be also be asked to upload an affidavit along with their application, declaring that they had migrated to India due to religious persecution or fear of religious persecution.

Electoral Implications

The clarification has political ramifications too with BJP leaders pointing out that the amended Act and the proposed National Register of Indian Citizens will be central to electoral battlegrounds like West Bengal where Trinamool Congress chief Mamata Banerjee has opposed the measures. The state may drag its feet but may not be able to prevent the Centre from issuing relevant certificates to eligible refugees.

Legal Challenge

Senior advocate Sanjay Hegde said states can voice their opposition against the law by challenging CAA in the Supreme Court. “There is no precedent yet but the Constitution permits the state to approach the top court,” he said. States have, in the past, filed civil suits against the Centre for relief in matters such as boundary reorganization or water disputes.

“Centre has the power to frame rules under the law but to determine whether people are foreigners or not is the state government’s job,” Hegde explained.

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The Act

The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (CAA) has amended Section 2 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, which defines “illegal migrants” by adding a proviso – Section 2 (1)(b) – according to which any person belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian communities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan, and who have been exempted by the Central Government under the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 or the Foreigners Act, 1946, shall not be treated as “illegal migrant”. Further, any proceeding pending against such persons shall abate allowing them to be eligible to apply for citizenship by naturalisation, which is laid down under Section 6 of the 1955 Act.

The absence of the Muslim community from the proviso is conspicuous and was the subject of intense debate among parliamentarians in the past few days.

It does not automatically confer citizenship on a person from Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan. They have to apply for citizenship and possess the qualifications laid down under the Citizenship Act. The amendments will not affect a person who is already a citizen of India.

The Act also does not exclude Muslims as a whole, as Muslims, including from the three countries specified in the proviso, can become Indian citizens by following the procedure laid down in the act. The prohibition is only if they are “illegal migrants”: those who travel without valid passport and documents, or those with valid documents who stay in India beyond the permitted time period.

There are Muslim communities facing discrimination in Muslim majority countries, such as the Rohingya Muslims who are a persecuted community in Myanmar. The amendment disregards this by classifying Muslims as one homogenous group. Thus, Muslim illegal migrants, as a whole, are denied a benefit irrespective of whether they are persecuted in their home country or not.

Non-Muslim illegal migrants from other countries will not get the benefit of this exemption.

Opposition to the Act

The Citizenship Amendment Act is opposed by Opposition parties and many civil rights activists on the ground that it discriminates against Muslims. They say that such discrimination is unconstitutional under Article 14.

Rights under Article 14 are absolute. These two fundamental rights are not exclusive to the citizens of India but to “any person”. In this backdrop, the Opposition parties and activists have accused the BJP of signaling out the Muslims to further its “hidden agenda”.

Beyond the political arena, civil society and discerning citizenry have vehemently expressed their disagreement with the new national law. More than 720 jurists, writers, actors, activists and citizens had issued a statement against the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill and the National Register of Citizens, describing these as “misguided” and, worse, “unconstitutional”.

Protests Against the Act

Even before Lok Sabha cleared the Bill, protesters, majority of them being students took to streets in Guwahati to rally against the Bill on 10 December 2019. Hundreds poured into the streets responding to a shut down call by the North East Student’s Organization. However, the protests went out of control when public infrastructures and vehicles were vandalized and the police resorted to baton charges and firing of teargas. Soon the Army was deployed to contain the situation and the nature of protests turned absolutely violent resulting in the killing of 2 people during firing by the security forces. This also resulted in the cancelation of the annual India-Japan Summit scheduled for 15-17 December 2019 in Guwahati.  However, these agitations remained confined to the North East.

What changed the extend and the momentum of these protests to acquire a pan Indian character started in Jamia Milia Islamia (JMI) University, New Delhi.

Protesters took to violence in West Bengal which started on 13 December 2019. In Lucknow, students of Darul Uloom Nadwatul Seminary gathered in large numbers to protests but the police did not allow them to leave the campus.

Pinched by the brutal police action on students from Jamia and AMU, students from IIT-Madras, TISS, Mumbai, Maulana Azad National Urdu University (MANUU), Hyderabad, Jadavpur University and different cities such as Chennai, Puducherry, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Lucknow, Varanasi, Kolkata and took to streets in solidarity on 16 December against CAA and brutal Police action inside Jamia campus.

Protests against the Act started as a student’s protests but in no time assumed a political character where political parties as well as people holding political offices participated in these protests.

The protests spread to Delhi University (DU), where students organized peaceful demonstrations and boycotted the semester exams.

Although, these protests started as a student’s protests but in no time it assumed a political character where political parties as well as people holding political offices participated in these protests. Mamata Banerjee addressed a rally in Kolkata, while in Delhi the congress organized Bharat Bachao rally to address a variety of issues including CAA. Meanwhile in Kerala, the ruling Left Democratic Front (LDF) joined hands with the opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) to protests against CAA. Protesters gathered in Mysore, Bangalore, Manglore, Thiruvanthapuram, Kochi, Chennai, Aurangabad and many more districts. 

The protests acquiring a political nature robbed these protests of their original essence, innocence and purpose. These protests that were initially seen as dissenting voice of an empowered youth of the country would have greatly contributed to enhance India’s image as a well functioning democracy. Political party as catalysts to students resorting to violence cannot be denied.

CAA and NRC in Assam

Home minister Amit Shah claimed that this law had nothing to do with Indian Muslims or other Indian citizens. Oddly, in the same speech in the Lok Sabha, he promised a nationwide National Register of Citizens (NRC) and then attempted to defend the CAB in isolation of that announcement. The law is a perfect example of the maxim, post hoc ergo propter hoc (after it, therefore, because of it). The CAB follows an Assam NRC which backfired and was denounced by the BJP’s own state leadership. The government is yet to publish the religion-wise breakdown of those 1.9 million excluded, but the CAB (Section 6B) seeks to abate proceedings against the Hindus in that list (singling out only Muslims as migrants). The CAB is, thus, a twisted solution to a botched NRC in Assam, and also a pre-emptive precursor to the nationwide NRC, which Shah has declared to be an inevitability. If this nationwide NRC is as badly conducted as the Assam NRC (whose first list identified over four million as immigrants), it will have an error rate of over 50%. The CAB is, therefore, a pre-emptive remedy to save all (but the Muslims) who are left out, something deliberately ignored by this government.

The Implications

Though the amendment does not automatically confer citizenship to Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan, it removes the tag of “illegal migrant” which is a roadblock for acquiring citizenship by naturalisation.

Further, it also relaxes the condition to acquire citizenship by naturalisation. As per the current requirement, a person should have 11 years of residence in India or service of government in India. The amendment reduces this to a period of five years.

Muslim illegal migrants from these three countries cannot apply for citizenship and will continue to remain illegal migrants.

The number of Bangladeshis living illegally in India was put at 2 crore by Union minister Kiren Rijiju in the Rajya Sabha in 2016. He did not get into numbers for specific states.

Ever since India became independent there has been an uncontrolled inflow of illegal immigrants for a variety of reasons from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan — many in search of greener pastures while many others are fleeing from religious persecution. Illegal immigration into India is a punishable offence —as it is in every other country. However, when the number of such illegal immigrants is as huge as it is, prosecuting the offenders may not always practicable.

There are at present in different parts of India an unascertained number of such immigrants living as refugees — many are subject to exploitation as cheap labour in several establishments. These illegal immigrants consist of, among others, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians — all minorities in the specified Islamic countries; and also a large number of Muslims who could be safely presumed to have migrated for reasons other than religious persecution.

The Constitution of India specifies who are citizens of this country. It also recognises Parliament’s power to make laws relating to citizenship. Accordingly, the Citizenship Act of 1955 was enacted. That law has been amended several times to meet the needs of the time.

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