In the volatile landscape of South Asian countries around India, the military’s role in internal crises is both constitutionally defined and politically sensitive. The summer of 2024 and 2025 presented critical moments to test the civil-military frameworks that define democratic governance. Recent events in Bangladesh and Nepal-confronted with massive Gen Z-driven protests-have exposed a troubling trend: armies that hesitate to act when ordered, allowing unrest to escalate and civilian authority to erode. This stands in stark contrast to the Indian Army, which has consistently upheld its apolitical ethos, professional conduct and constitutional mandate, even in the most politically charged situations.

In Bangladesh, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government faced the “Job Quota” protests since early July 2024 that spiralled into anti-government uprising. The army was formally deployed at midnight July 19. Despite being deployed on July 19, the Bangladesh army exhibited considerable reluctance to take effective measures in the initial stages to bring the situation under control and prevent the protesters from marching towards Dhaka. Widespread violence led to attacks on minorities, wrecking of public property, including Indira Gandhi Cultural Centre in Dhaka, ransacking business establishments, destruction of the Banglabandhu museum besides others. This allowed the situation to become uncontrollable.

In a significant development, on the evening of August 3, over two weeks after the initial deployment, the Army Chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman held a meeting with his generals and made a pivotal decision: the military would not open fire on civilians to enforce the curfew that Prime Minister Hasina had called for. This represented the military effectively disobeying civilian authority by deciding which orders to follow and which to refuse. While the Army’s humanitarian concern of collateral civilian deaths was understandable, inaction violated a fundamental principle of civil-military relations: once a civilian government orders military deployment, the military executes that order or resigns in protest. It does not selectively comply. The consequence was that Hasina, losing military support, was forced to resign on August 5, not because her order was unconstitutional, but because the military refused to enforce it. This represents a subtle coup d’état, where the military effectively vetoed civilian authority by refusing orders. Whether Hasina was autocratic or her policies were parochial become irrelevant; the mechanism through which she was removed-military refusal to obey civilian orders-violated democratic principles of civil-military relations.

Nepal’s experience in 2025 mirrored Bangladesh’s trajectory. Protests erupted over digital censorship, evolving into broader anti-corruption demonstrations again led by Gen G. The youth was frustrated with unemployment, economic inequality, and endemic corruption. Again these protests engulfed the whole country. As demonstrations intensified, Prime Minister Oli’s government faltered. The government in Nepal called out the army to maintain law and order sometimes on the night of September 8-9. On the morning of September 9, the Army Chief with other top civilian functionaries met at the Prime Minister’s residence. During this crucial meeting Oli was informed that the situation had spiralled beyond control. Reports indicate that the Army Chief Sigdel advised Oli to resign, stating that the military could only stabilize the country if the Prime Minister relinquished power. Initially reluctant, Oli eventually agreed to step down. By early afternoon on September 9, protesters had vandalized the Parliament building, other public and private property. The army had several units located within walking distance of critical government buildings but hesitated to intervene to protect the Parliament, Supreme Court, and other important and historical structures from being set ablaze.

In both cases, Bangladesh and Nepal, the consequences were predictable: loss of control, regime collapse, and a vacuum of authority. The constitutions and statutes of Bangladesh and Nepal clearly define the military’s secondary task: to assist civil authorities in times of crisis. This mandate is not discretionary-it is binding. The military’s failure to act decisively when ordered undermined democratic stability and emboldened agitators. The core issue in Bangladesh and Nepal was not lack of capability-it was the exercise of discretion where none was warranted. Armies are not courts. Their role is not to adjudicate the correctness of government orders but to execute them within the bounds of legality and national interest. When armies begin to weigh the political implications of orders, they risk becoming political actors themselves. This undermines civilian supremacy, erodes public trust, and destabilizes democratic institutions. This is particularly dangerous in fragile democracies, where institutional checks are weak and public sentiment volatile. Military hesitation can embolden agitators, weaken governance, and invite external interference

India’s experience offers a compelling counterpoint. The Indian army has long been recognized for its secular, apolitical conduct and disciplined execution of government directives. During Operation Blue Star in 1984, the army was ordered to clear Sikh separatists from the Golden Temple, a mission fraught with religious and political sensitivities. The army did not hesitate. It acted swiftly, fulfilling its constitutional duty without passing judgment on the political context. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Godhra riots in 2002, the Indian army was deployed to restore public order. It moved decisively, securing affected areas and preventing further violence. In both cases, the army did not sit in judgment-it acted as the stabilizing force it was meant to be. Once a government order is given within constitutional parameters, the military’s professional obligation is execution with discipline and competence. The events in Bangladesh and Nepal underscore the urgent need to reaffirm civil-military boundaries. Democracies must ensure clear protocols for military deployment in internal crises, training and doctrine that reinforce apolitical conduct. India’s model, despite its own challenges, offers valuable lessons. The Indian army’s disciplined recognition of supremacy of civilian authority has helped preserve democratic stability even in moments of deep national crisis. When armies hesitate, nations falter.

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Shringla, a former Indian High Commissioner to Dhaka, was in Bangladesh on his first visit to the country. He was addressing a seminar at the Bangladesh Institute for International Studies (BIISS)., Shringla said Bangladesh has become India’s largest development partner in the world and India’s largest trade partner in the region.

Shringla said India also welcomes the opportunity for Indian officers to train at premier military institutions of Bangladesh, just as the Indian side is ready to open military training institutes at all levels – from officer cadet training to specialised higher command training – to Bangladesh.

India’s advanced air defence system AKASH has great potential for export to friendly countries.

Logistics Bases

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) is looking at setting up logistics bases in Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Sri Lanka as part of initiatives to woo the countries to buy India’s light combat aircraft Tejas and military helicopters.

Chairman and Managing Director of HAL R Madhavan said, on 9 March, that the HAL was considering to build logistics bases in the four countries as they use a number of Russian-origin military aircraft and choppers whose serviceability is “very poor”. He said the HAL is now seriously focusing on boosting exports in sync with the government’s priority and identified South East Asia, West Asia and North Africa to sell key platforms like Tejas, attack helicopter Rudra and advanced light helicopter Dhruv.

Without divulging details, Madhavan said a number of countries in West Asia are also in touch with the HAL for possible procurement of its key products.

The combat jets are classified under various generations depending on their avionics, capability and weapons systems. The current fleet of fighter jets with the IAF range from three-and-half generation to the fourth generation.

South Korea

A Roadmap for Defence Industries Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was exchanged during a bilateral meeting between defence minister Rajnath Singh and Republic of Korea (ROK) defence minister Jeong Kyeong-Doo, on 4 February 2020.

This Roadmap lists a number of possible areas of cooperation in land systems, naval systems, aero systems, guided weapon systems including research and development cooperation, collaboration regarding testing, certification and quality assurance. The roadmap aims to facilitate defence industries in participation and collaboration on Make in India initiatives of Government of India.

This Roadmap also aims to promote investment and technology transfer in Defence Industrial Corridors in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.

ROK companies wishing to invest in India are envisaged to receive support from both Defence Investor Cell and Korea Plus Centre. Several Indian companies are involved in the manufacturing of various defence spare parts in India.

Uganda

Ugandan & Indian officials at the handover event. In the background is the fleet gifted

Uganda has received a fleet of eighty eight (88) motor vehicles including executive buses, ambulances, water trucks and utility lorries donated by the government of India. The fleet also includes a consignment of 44 military trucks to be used by the national army, Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF).

The vehicles were officially handed over, on 3 March, by the Indian high commissioner to Uganda to Uganda’s minister of foreign affairs.

The donation is a follow-up of pledges made by the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi during his official visit to Uganda in July 2018. The visit was part of a wider African tour aimed at deepening India’s ties with Africa.

Nepal

Nepal is working with Russia on payment options for an unspecified number Mi-17 V-5 helicopters, as dollar transactions have been made difficult by US sanctions against Russia. Russia has switched over to payments in national currencies with countries such as India, China and Indonesia as sanctioned Russian entities cannot use the SWIFT international payments system.

The payment in dollars could be made through China or India.

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The Act

The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (CAA) has amended Section 2 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, which defines “illegal migrants” by adding a proviso – Section 2 (1)(b) – according to which any person belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian communities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan, and who have been exempted by the Central Government under the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 or the Foreigners Act, 1946, shall not be treated as “illegal migrant”. Further, any proceeding pending against such persons shall abate allowing them to be eligible to apply for citizenship by naturalisation, which is laid down under Section 6 of the 1955 Act.

The absence of the Muslim community from the proviso is conspicuous and was the subject of intense debate among parliamentarians in the past few days.

It does not automatically confer citizenship on a person from Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan. They have to apply for citizenship and possess the qualifications laid down under the Citizenship Act. The amendments will not affect a person who is already a citizen of India.

The Act also does not exclude Muslims as a whole, as Muslims, including from the three countries specified in the proviso, can become Indian citizens by following the procedure laid down in the act. The prohibition is only if they are “illegal migrants”: those who travel without valid passport and documents, or those with valid documents who stay in India beyond the permitted time period.

There are Muslim communities facing discrimination in Muslim majority countries, such as the Rohingya Muslims who are a persecuted community in Myanmar. The amendment disregards this by classifying Muslims as one homogenous group. Thus, Muslim illegal migrants, as a whole, are denied a benefit irrespective of whether they are persecuted in their home country or not.

Non-Muslim illegal migrants from other countries will not get the benefit of this exemption.

Opposition to the Act

The Citizenship Amendment Act is opposed by Opposition parties and many civil rights activists on the ground that it discriminates against Muslims. They say that such discrimination is unconstitutional under Article 14.

Rights under Article 14 are absolute. These two fundamental rights are not exclusive to the citizens of India but to “any person”. In this backdrop, the Opposition parties and activists have accused the BJP of signaling out the Muslims to further its “hidden agenda”.

Beyond the political arena, civil society and discerning citizenry have vehemently expressed their disagreement with the new national law. More than 720 jurists, writers, actors, activists and citizens had issued a statement against the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill and the National Register of Citizens, describing these as “misguided” and, worse, “unconstitutional”.

Protests Against the Act

Even before Lok Sabha cleared the Bill, protesters, majority of them being students took to streets in Guwahati to rally against the Bill on 10 December 2019. Hundreds poured into the streets responding to a shut down call by the North East Student’s Organization. However, the protests went out of control when public infrastructures and vehicles were vandalized and the police resorted to baton charges and firing of teargas. Soon the Army was deployed to contain the situation and the nature of protests turned absolutely violent resulting in the killing of 2 people during firing by the security forces. This also resulted in the cancelation of the annual India-Japan Summit scheduled for 15-17 December 2019 in Guwahati.  However, these agitations remained confined to the North East.

What changed the extend and the momentum of these protests to acquire a pan Indian character started in Jamia Milia Islamia (JMI) University, New Delhi.

Protesters took to violence in West Bengal which started on 13 December 2019. In Lucknow, students of Darul Uloom Nadwatul Seminary gathered in large numbers to protests but the police did not allow them to leave the campus.

Pinched by the brutal police action on students from Jamia and AMU, students from IIT-Madras, TISS, Mumbai, Maulana Azad National Urdu University (MANUU), Hyderabad, Jadavpur University and different cities such as Chennai, Puducherry, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Lucknow, Varanasi, Kolkata and took to streets in solidarity on 16 December against CAA and brutal Police action inside Jamia campus.

Protests against the Act started as a student’s protests but in no time assumed a political character where political parties as well as people holding political offices participated in these protests.

The protests spread to Delhi University (DU), where students organized peaceful demonstrations and boycotted the semester exams.

Although, these protests started as a student’s protests but in no time it assumed a political character where political parties as well as people holding political offices participated in these protests. Mamata Banerjee addressed a rally in Kolkata, while in Delhi the congress organized Bharat Bachao rally to address a variety of issues including CAA. Meanwhile in Kerala, the ruling Left Democratic Front (LDF) joined hands with the opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) to protests against CAA. Protesters gathered in Mysore, Bangalore, Manglore, Thiruvanthapuram, Kochi, Chennai, Aurangabad and many more districts. 

The protests acquiring a political nature robbed these protests of their original essence, innocence and purpose. These protests that were initially seen as dissenting voice of an empowered youth of the country would have greatly contributed to enhance India’s image as a well functioning democracy. Political party as catalysts to students resorting to violence cannot be denied.

CAA and NRC in Assam

Home minister Amit Shah claimed that this law had nothing to do with Indian Muslims or other Indian citizens. Oddly, in the same speech in the Lok Sabha, he promised a nationwide National Register of Citizens (NRC) and then attempted to defend the CAB in isolation of that announcement. The law is a perfect example of the maxim, post hoc ergo propter hoc (after it, therefore, because of it). The CAB follows an Assam NRC which backfired and was denounced by the BJP’s own state leadership. The government is yet to publish the religion-wise breakdown of those 1.9 million excluded, but the CAB (Section 6B) seeks to abate proceedings against the Hindus in that list (singling out only Muslims as migrants). The CAB is, thus, a twisted solution to a botched NRC in Assam, and also a pre-emptive precursor to the nationwide NRC, which Shah has declared to be an inevitability. If this nationwide NRC is as badly conducted as the Assam NRC (whose first list identified over four million as immigrants), it will have an error rate of over 50%. The CAB is, therefore, a pre-emptive remedy to save all (but the Muslims) who are left out, something deliberately ignored by this government.

The Implications

Though the amendment does not automatically confer citizenship to Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan, it removes the tag of “illegal migrant” which is a roadblock for acquiring citizenship by naturalisation.

Further, it also relaxes the condition to acquire citizenship by naturalisation. As per the current requirement, a person should have 11 years of residence in India or service of government in India. The amendment reduces this to a period of five years.

Muslim illegal migrants from these three countries cannot apply for citizenship and will continue to remain illegal migrants.

The number of Bangladeshis living illegally in India was put at 2 crore by Union minister Kiren Rijiju in the Rajya Sabha in 2016. He did not get into numbers for specific states.

Ever since India became independent there has been an uncontrolled inflow of illegal immigrants for a variety of reasons from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan — many in search of greener pastures while many others are fleeing from religious persecution. Illegal immigration into India is a punishable offence —as it is in every other country. However, when the number of such illegal immigrants is as huge as it is, prosecuting the offenders may not always practicable.

There are at present in different parts of India an unascertained number of such immigrants living as refugees — many are subject to exploitation as cheap labour in several establishments. These illegal immigrants consist of, among others, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians — all minorities in the specified Islamic countries; and also a large number of Muslims who could be safely presumed to have migrated for reasons other than religious persecution.

The Constitution of India specifies who are citizens of this country. It also recognises Parliament’s power to make laws relating to citizenship. Accordingly, the Citizenship Act of 1955 was enacted. That law has been amended several times to meet the needs of the time.

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