The Historical Background of the Houthis

In the late 1990s, the Houthi family in northern Yemen established a religious revival movement for the Zaydi sect of Shi’ite Islam, which had formerly governed Yemen but whose northern region had become destitute and marginalized.

As tensions with the government in the capital Sanaa escalated, they engaged in a series of guerrilla warfare campaigns against the national army and a brief border confrontation with Sunni Muslim Saudi Arabia.

Abdul Malik al-Houthi established a formidable force contesting global powers from a contingent of unrefined mountain combatants in sandals. Al-Houthi garnered a reputation as a formidable war commander prior to ascending as the leader of the Houthi organization.

Under al-Houthi’s leadership, who is in his 40s, the group has evolved into an army including tens of thousands of combatants and amassed a substantial stockpile of armed drones and ballistic missiles. Saudi Arabia and Western nations assert that the arms originate from Iran, however Tehran refutes this claim.

Al-Houthi is recognized for seldom remaining in one location, for consistently avoiding media interactions, and for exhibiting a pronounced hesitance to engage in prearranged public appearances.

A civil war commenced in Yemen in late 2014 after the Houthis captured Sanaa. Concerned by the expanding power of Shi’ite Iran along its border, Saudi Arabia spearheaded a Western-supported coalition in March 2015 to intervene in favor of the Saudi-backed administration.

The Houthis gained dominance over significant portions of the north and other major urban centers, but the internationally recognized government situated itself in the harbor city of Aden.

Yemen experienced a phase of relative tranquility during a U.N.-facilitated peace initiative; however, a significant rise in regional tensions following the onset of the Gaza war has heightened the likelihood of further violence between the militia and Riyadh.

What is the rationale behind targeting attack ships?

The Houthis have engaged in the Gaza conflict by targeting trade lines in the Red Sea to demonstrate their support for the Palestinians and Hamas, the Islamist organization governing Gaza.

They have also asserted that assaults on vessels purportedly associated with Israel have occurred in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea.

The Houthi assaults have impeded global shipping, compelling companies to divert to lengthier and costlier routes around southern Africa.

Although the militia claims to have targeted mainly vessels associated with Israel, the United States, and Britain, sources inside the shipping industry indicate that all ships were at risk.

The United States and Britain executed air strikes against the Houthis as part of global initiatives to reestablish the unobstructed flow of commerce along a crucial route between Europe and Asia, which constitutes around 15% of the world’s shipping traffic.

Connections between the Houthis and Iran

The Houthis constitute a faction within the “Axis of Resistance,” an anti-Israel and anti-Western coalition of regional militants, which includes Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, supported by Iran.

The slogan of the Houthis is “Death to America, Death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory to Islam.”

The Saudi-led coalition alleges that Tehran is providing arms and training to the Houthis, a claim that both parties refute. The alliance asserts that Hezbollah, supported by Iran in Lebanon, is assisting the Houthis, a claim they refute.

Although Iran supports the Houthis, the Houthis refute claims of being Iranian puppets, and Yemen specialists assert that their motivations are predominantly domestic.

Strategy of the Houthis

On 14 March, Yemen’s Houthis executed a missile assault on the US aircraft carrier Eisenhower in the Red Sea, as stated by Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree, in retaliation for US and British airstrikes on Yemen.

Engaging Large Vessels

The Houthis’ strategic objective may involve targeting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier or submarine. This objective might be accomplished asymmetrically, as exemplified by the USS Cole (DDG-67), or by directly seizing and colliding a gas tanker with an aircraft carrier, resulting in an event involving a nuclear-powered vessel.

The remark is to the 2000 assault on the USS Cole, during which a suicide vessel collided with the American warship in the harbor of Aden, executed by Al-Qaeda, highlighting their propensity for asymmetric strategies to exert considerable influence on maritime security and geopolitics.

This would significantly alter the dynamics for the Houthis and the Special Unit of the IRGC Navy, which is equipped and trained to undertake this operation with plausible deniability.

The Houthis have demonstrated a strategic intent to strike naval assets vital to the United States and its allies in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz.

The proposal for a frontal assault on a nuclear-powered vessel signifies an intensification of hostility and the Houthis’ readiness to employ drastic actions to fulfill their strategic aims.

Significant Houthi Assaults

The Yemeni Houthi insurgents, affiliated with the Ansar Allah movement, have executed numerous significant assaults in the Red Sea and Gulf area, specifically aiming at maritime routes, petroleum infrastructure, and military resources. Below is a summary of several significant attacks:

1. Focusing on maritime operations in the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The Red Sea serves as a vital international shipping corridor, with the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which divides Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea, acting as a critical chokepoint for global oil transportation. The Houthis have consistently assaulted vessels in the Red Sea with various armaments, such as drones, missiles, and naval mines.

The Houthis targeted commercial ships and Saudi-led coalition vessels in the Red Sea. In July 2018, a Houthi missile struck a Saudi Arabian oil tanker. In 2019, the Houthis asserted accountability for a sequence of assaults on vessels traversing the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, alleging foreign intervention in Yemen’s domestic matters.

The Houthis have employed sea mines to obstruct maritime lanes, so disrupting global trade and jeopardizing the safety of merchant vessels and their crews.

2. Assaults on the Oil Infrastructure of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. A fundamental element of the Houthis’ military plan has been the targeting of the oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as these countries are crucial participants in the conflict and significantly dependent on oil exports.

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In September 2019, the Houthis asserted accountability for a significant drone assault on Saudi Aramco’s oil installations, encompassing the Khurais oil field and the Abqaiq processing complex. This assault temporarily incapacitated almost fifty percent of Saudi Arabia’s oil production capacity, leading to a notable surge in global oil prices and underscoring the vulnerabilities within the region’s oil infrastructure.

From 2020 forward, the Houthis persisted in assaulting Saudi oil infrastructure, encompassing refineries, pipelines, and shipping routes, employing a mix of drones and ballistic missiles.

3. Missile and Drone Assaults on the UAE. In January 2022, the Houthis initiated a sequence of missile and drone assaults on the UAE, culminating in a lethal attack on Abu Dhabi International Airport. These assaults were in reprisal for the UAE’s engagement in Yemen, where it backed factions against the Houthi insurgents. The assaults aimed at both civilian and military facilities, indicating the Houthis’ escalating capabilities and readiness to penetrate further into the Gulf.

4. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Assaults on Airports and Military Installations. The Houthis have deployed drones to attack military and civilian installations throughout the Gulf area, inflicting considerable damage on airports, military sites, and air defense systems.

The Houthis asserted accountability for a drone assault on King Khalid International Airport in 2019, a pivotal installation for Saudi Arabian military endeavors.

In 2020, the Houthis persisted in their drone strike campaign targeting Saudi and UAE military assets, encompassing airbases and radar systems, as a component of their overarching aim to weaken the coalition’s military capabilities.

5.Targeting the Military and Air Defense Systems of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthis have executed many ballistic missile strikes against targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, encompassing military installations and air defense systems. These missiles are frequently intercepted; nonetheless, several have successfully struck their objectives, underscoring the group’s advancing missile capability.

In February 2021, a significant assault was directed at the UAE’s al-Dhafra Air Base, which accommodates U.S. military forces. The assault underscored the Houthis’ advancing missile and drone capabilities, enabling them to target locations deep within Gulf nations.

6. Regional Tensions and Their Impact. The Houthis’ activities in the Red Sea and Gulf region have produced significant geopolitical ramifications, particularly impacting global oil prices and international commerce. Their assaults have escalated tensions among regional powers, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, as Tehran is widely perceived to assist the Houthis, despite its denial of direct involvement.

The recurrent assaults in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and Red Sea have heightened apprehensions regarding the security of international shipping routes, as the Houthis have demonstrated a capacity to impede global commerce, particularly oil transport. # Escalated Global Tensions: These attacks have further strained relations between Gulf nations and Western powers, notably the U.S. and European countries, which have engaged in endeavors to facilitate peace negotiations and safeguard international trade corridors.

Final Assessment

The Yemeni Houthi rebels pose a substantial danger to regional stability in the Red Sea and Gulf areas, demonstrating the capability to strike vital infrastructure, including shipping lanes and oil installations, with an array of weaponry such as drones, missiles, and sea mines. Their assaults have interrupted global commerce and oil markets, involved foreign armed forces, and exacerbated the intricate proxy dynamics of the ongoing Yemeni Civil War.

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Qatar has served as a crucial mediator in the discussions for the release of Israeli hostages detained by Hamas since 7 October 2023. Utilizing its distinct status as an impartial entity with accessible communication to both Hamas and Western nations, Qatar has enabled discussions that have resulted in notable advancements.

In December 2024 and January 2025, Qatar, in conjunction with Egypt and the U.S., facilitated ceasefire discussions that culminated in the release of multiple captives. The arrangement encompassed the exchange of Palestinian prisoners and facilitated the influx of humanitarian aid into Gaza. Qatar’s diplomatic initiatives have been important in sustaining dialogue between the parties, especially amid increased tensions.

Qatar’s capacity for mediation arises from its enduring strategy of engaging with various regional parties, including entities such as Hamas. This method, however occasionally contentious, has established Qatar as a proficient mediator in addressing intricate disputes.

Perceptions Regarding Qatar

There is a belief that Qatar maintains strong ties with specific Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. It arises from a combination of accusations, geopolitical factors, and Qatar’s foreign policy strategy.

Qatar has been accused of permitting individuals and organizations within its territory to sponsor parties such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Certain sources indicate that affluent benefactors in Qatar have financed extremist organizations in the area.

Qatar has sustained open lines of communication with entities such as Hamas and the Taliban, which are designated as terrorist organizations by certain nations. Qatar contends that these affiliations are integral to its approach for conflict mediation and dialogue facilitation.

The impression is further exacerbated by regional rivalries, notably with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These nations have condemned Qatar’s foreign policy, alleging it has contributed to regional destabilization, culminating in the 2017 Gulf diplomatic crisis.

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar

In a September 2018 television interview organized by the Council on Foreign Relations, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir asserted that Qatar finances and shelters terrorist organizations, disseminates hatred, and endeavors to destabilize regimes in the Gulf states.

Al-Jubeir stated that Qatar has been supporting and enabling terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda, the Nusra Front, Iraqi Hizbullah, and Hizbullah in Lebanon. Al-Jubeir asserted that Qatar shelters terrorists and the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, permitting Islamic academics to disseminate hate through its media outlets, including the endorsement of suicide bombers. He asserted that Qatar aims to destabilize the governments of Gulf nations such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE.

The Qataris have been funding radicals since the mid-1990s. They have been instigating individuals. They have established a foundation for the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is the progenitor of Takfir wal-Hijra, which subsequently led to the emergence of Al-Qaeda, and in turn, Al-Nusra.

The Qatari authorities permit its prominent religious clerics to appear on television and rationalize suicide attacks. That is unacceptable. The Qataris provide refuge and support to terrorists. That is not unacceptable. Abd Al-Rahim In 2000, Al-Nashiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, entered Saudi Arabia with a Qatari passport. We apprehended Al-Qaeda operatives entering Saudi Arabia using Qatari passports. The Qataris are aware of this, as are the Americans. This is universally acknowledged. The Qataris are financing dissidents in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. To instigate difficulties for those governments and to engender instability. What is the rationale behind this action?

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The Qatari government pays ransom to terrorist organizations, including $500 million to Hezbollah in Iraq. Fifty million dollars to Qassem Soleimani, Commander of the IRGC Qods Force, as indicated by text messages exchanged between the Qatari Ambassador in Iraq and the Iraqi Foreign Minister. Including, I am uncertain of the amount allocated to Hizbullah in Lebanon. Is that permissible? Providing one dollar to Hizbullah in Iraq would result in legal action against us in a nearby court.

The Qataris utilize their media outlets to disseminate animosity. The Qataris supply arms to militias connected with Al-Qaeda in Libya. The Qatari Emir was conspiring with Muammar Qaddafi to orchestrate the overthrow of Saudi Arabia. The Qataris linked Qaddafi to a Saudi dissident in London, whom they financially supported, who in turn facilitated connections between the Libyans and a group in Mecca with the intent of assassinating the then-Crown Prince, who subsequently became King of Saudi Arabia. Is this permissible?

“We possess telephone conversations provided by the Libyans following their overthrow of Qaddafi.” The former Emir of Qatar is informing Qaddafi about his recruitment of princes, tribal leaders, military commanders, and royal family members to incite unrest and destabilize Saudi Arabia. It was forecasted that within a decade, the royal dynasty of Saudi Arabia would cease to exist. Is this permissible? They perform identical actions in Bahrain, Kuwait, and the Emirates.

In 2012, we severed relations with those countries, and a year later, they returned and consented to terminate all of this absurdity. They executed an agreement, although no action ensued. This time, we decided not to engage with you. We will not permit you unless you undergo a transformation.

The United States and the United Nations publish a list of terror financiers, many of whom reside openly in Qatar, soliciting funds and distributing them to nefarious individuals. Is this permissible? It should not be. Why do the Qataris evade accountability? People perceive a nascent nation with youthful leadership. They acquire opulent structures; they possess a reputable airline, and they perceive, ‘Indeed, these individuals are quite contemporary.’ However, we must confront the negative aspects that I have just elucidated. Consequently, we stated: ‘Unless you implement changes, we will not engage with you.’

Qatar has implemented measures to mitigate these issues, including the enactment of anti-terrorism legislation and collaboration with global counterterrorism initiatives. It also accommodates a significant U.S. military base, highlighting its strategic alliance with the West.

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The Islamic Republic of Iran is nearing the development of a nuclear weapon. Iran refutes allegations of pursuing a nuclear weapon; nonetheless, the IAEA, the United Nations’ nuclear regulatory body, cautioned on 15 March 2025, as the global community anticipated Tehran’s reply to Donald Trump’s proposition of either nuclear negotiations or potential airstrikes on its nuclear facilities.

The IAEA has previously contended that there is no plausible civilian application for uranium enriched to 60%, which is a mere increment from weapons-grade 90% enriched fissile material.

Rafael Mariano Grossi, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stated that Iran had a highly ambitious and comprehensive nuclear program, wherein it is enriching uranium to near weapons-grade levels.

Grossi stated that Iran’s nuclear problem is currently relatively contained. Nevertheless, he cautioned that it is perilously near the nuclear threshold, indicating the possibility of acquiring atomic weapons.

US President Donald Trump dispatched a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei proposing negotiations regarding its nuclear program, while cautioning that the alternative may be military intervention.

Khamenei stated on 12 March that Trump’s previous pullout from the 2015 nuclear agreement renders all diplomatic engagement with him futile and pledged severe punishment against any assault by the United States or its supporters.

Iran’s nuclear aspirations have consistently raised international apprehension, especially concerning its capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Although Iran has consistently asserted that its nuclear program serves peaceful objectives, including energy generation and medicinal uses, other nations, especially the United States and its allies, have voiced skepticism. The proximity of Iran to acquiring nuclear weapons is contingent upon various circumstances, including its technological capabilities, the political environment, and foreign diplomatic initiatives.

A Historical Overview of Iran’s Nuclear Program

Iran’s nuclear program originated in the 1950s, initiated with support from the United States through the Atoms for Peace initiative. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran’s nuclear aspirations were temporarily suspended; nevertheless, they recommenced in the mid-1980s, concentrating on uranium enrichment. By the early 2000s, sources indicated that Iran was advancing its nuclear program, including the development of technology applicable to weapons manufacturing. These findings raised apprehensions regarding Iran’s capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

The international world, notably via the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has enacted sanctions and urged Iran to cease its nuclear program. The United States, specifically, advocated for diplomatic initiatives to restrict Iran’s nuclear endeavors via the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also referred to as the Iran nuclear deal, which was executed in 2015.

Advancements in Technology and Uranium Enrichment. Iran’s nuclear program predominantly focuses on uranium enrichment, an essential process for generating the fissile material necessary for nuclear weaponry. Iran manages multiple uranium enrichment facilities, notably the Natanz and Fordow sites, where uranium is enriched to different degrees. According to the provisions of the 2015 JCPOA, Iran consented to restrict its enrichment capabilities, diminishing both the stockpile of enriched uranium and the quantity of operational centrifuges. International sanctions against Iran were lifted in return.

In 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally exited the JCPOA, prompting Iran to reduce its obligations under the accord. Since that time, Iran has progressively reinstated uranium enrichment, incorporating the advancement of more sophisticated centrifuges that enhance the speed of uranium enrichment. Currently, Iran has allegedly enriched uranium to around 60%, significantly exceeding the 3.67% threshold established by the JCPOA. The 90% enrichment level is classified as weapons-grade; nevertheless, Iran asserts that its program is intended for peaceful purposes.

The Potential for Weaponization. Although Iran has advanced its enrichment capabilities considerably, there remains no conclusive proof that it is actively pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. Experts have identified essential stages in Iran’s weaponization process, which include the design of a nuclear warhead and the development of delivery mechanisms, such as ballistic missiles or other long-range systems. Iran has progressed in missile technology; nonetheless, the development of a functional nuclear warhead necessitates additional proficiency in nuclear engineering and weapon design.

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The IAEA has monitored Iran’s nuclear program and conducted inspections of its facilities. The IAEA has determined that Iran is enriching uranium beyond the JCPOA restrictions, however it has not uncovered definitive evidence of Iran diverting its nuclear program towards weaponization. The IAEA’s reports frequently emphasize apprehensions regarding Iran’s insufficient transparency and cooperation in specific domains, particularly concerning the historical potential military dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear endeavors prior to 2003.

Political and Diplomatic Considerations. The advancement of Iran’s nuclear weapons capability is also affected by political and diplomatic considerations. The Iranian leadership has not openly stated a goal to develop nuclear weapons; however, its regional competition with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Israel has prompted speculation that nuclear weapons would function as a deterrent. Israel perceives Iran’s nuclear aspirations as an imminent threat to its security and has openly discussed the potential for military intervention to thwart Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The resumption of negotiations, particularly under the Biden administration, has generated optimism for a revitalized nuclear accord that may limit Iran’s nuclear advancements. Negotiations have repeatedly stalled, and there is an increasing urgency among Western nations to prevent Iran from attaining the key threshold for producing a nuclear weapon within months.

Nuclear Armament Installations

Numerous essential nuclear facilities significantly contribute to Iran’s nuclear aspirations, with some being vital for the prospective development of nuclear weapons. The following are the principal nuclear facilities and their respective locations.

Natanz Nuclear Installation. The Natanz plant, situated in central Iran, is a pivotal site in the nation’s nuclear program. Located in a secluded region of Isfahan province, Natanz is Iran’s primary uranium enrichment facility. The complex comprises two primary components: the above-ground facility and the subterranean facility, which is extensively buried to safeguard it from possible aerial assaults. Natanz has consistently hosted uranium enrichment operations, with Iran progressively augmenting its enrichment capability, notably through the advancement of sophisticated centrifuges such as the IR-2m and IR-6 types, which can enrich uranium at significantly higher rates than their predecessors.

The facility’s principal function has been to enrich uranium to low levels for civilian use; but, in recent years, Iran has beyond the thresholds established by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has watched Iran’s activities in Natanz, which continues to be a pivotal location in Iran’s nuclear ambitions. If Iran were to augment its enrichment activities, Natanz might play a pivotal role in generating uranium enriched to weapons-grade levels, rendering it a crucial location in the prospective creation of nuclear armaments.

Fordow Nuclear Installation. The Fordow facility is a notable nuclear complex situated near the city of Qom in northern Iran. Fordow was initially constructed as a uranium enrichment facility, with Iran asserting that it would be utilized to generate low-enriched uranium for civilian reactors. Nonetheless, its subterranean location has elicited apprehensions regarding its military capabilities. Iran disclosed the existence of Fordow in 2009, after to its construction having commenced several years prior.

The facility contains centrifuges akin to those at Natanz and has been utilized to generate both low-enriched uranium and, in certain instances, uranium enriched to elevated levels. In recent years, Iran has recommenced enrichment operations at Fordow, contravening the JCPOA. Due to its subterranean position and Iran’s progress in enrichment technologies, Fordow is pivotal in Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium to levels approaching those required for nuclear armaments.

Arak Heavy Water Reactor. The Arak heavy water reactor, situated in Arak, central Iran, is a significant component of Iran’s nuclear program. The reactor was constructed to generate plutonium, a substitute fissile substance for nuclear armaments. The Arak facility is a heavy water reactor that utilizes deuterium oxide as both a coolant and moderator. Heavy water reactors are very proficient in generating plutonium-239, which is applicable in nuclear armaments.

According to the 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA), Iran consented to redesign and reconstruct the Arak reactor to inhibit the production of weapons-grade plutonium. Since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran has recommenced specific operations at the Arak plant. Operating the reactor in its original configuration might substantially enhance Iran’s capacity to generate plutonium, which, similar to uranium, can be utilized for the fabrication of nuclear bombs.

Parchin Military Facility. Parchin, situated in eastern Tehran, is a military installation associated with prospective nuclear weapons development. Parchin, although not a nuclear reactor or enrichment facility, is suspected of engaging in the testing of explosives and other components essential for nuclear weapons. The IAEA has expressed apprehensions regarding the facility’s potential engagement in weaponization efforts, notwithstanding Iran’s denial of such actions. Satellite images and intelligence assessments indicate that Parchin has been utilized for activities aligned with the production of nuclear warheads.

Iran’s hesitance to grant the IAEA comprehensive access to the site has exacerbated doubts regarding Parchin’s involvement in its nuclear weapons program. Despite Iran’s assertion that the facility serves conventional military functions, its engagement in possible weaponization efforts renders it a crucial site for comprehending the wider context of Iran’s nuclear aspirations.

Bushehr Nuclear Power Facility. The Bushehr facility is Iran’s inaugural operating nuclear power reactor, situated on the southern coastline of Iran adjacent to the Persian Gulf. The facility, constructed with Russian support, has mostly concentrated on energy generation. Although its intent is civilian, the technology and expertise acquired from managing a nuclear power station could assist Iran in advancing its nuclear capabilities. The management of nuclear fuel and reactor technology at Bushehr, while not directly associated with weaponization, equips Iran with the infrastructure and expertise that might be utilized for future weapons development.

Final Assessment

Although Iran has achieved significant advancements in its nuclear program, it has not yet reached the capability to deploy a nuclear weapon. The nation has established the technological infrastructure for uranium enrichment, and its missile programs are sophisticated; but, the final stages of weaponization-namely warhead development and delivery systems-pose considerable challenges.

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Strategic Challenges
India, with its intricate web of relations with both countries, finds itself in a complex and delicate position, balancing its defense and security partnerships with Israel and Iran. This delicate balance is exemplified by the India-Israel Innovation Initiative (I2U2), a joint investment plan in critical sectors. Over the past decade, deepening defense and security partnerships with Israel have been a strategic move for India. Simultaneously, India has maintained its relationship with Iran, particularly regarding economic and energy interests. The Chabahar port project mainly showcases India’s efforts to bypass Pakistan and secure access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Likewise, there are blooming concerns regarding the advancement of the India-Middle-East Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was publicized during the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, would facilitate trade between India and the Middle East, and a rail link was envisaged from the Arabian Sea ports to Haifa port in Israel. However, the ongoing conflict threatens to disrupt this delicate balance, potentially leading to a complete reevaluation and even dissolution of India’s strategic partnerships and connectivity projects.

Energy & Economic Instability
India has vast and significant energy reliance and interests concerning the Gulf region and, at this time, faces an immediate threat due to its heavy dependence on oil imports. Iran’s geographical position grants it leverage over vital maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which is also known as the Gate of Tears which is crucial for various energy, LNG, crude oil, and trade with Africa and Europe. The Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, is a gateway for oil shipments from significant producers such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. The narrow strategic passages are controlled by Iran, which is essential for India’s trade. Indian cargo shipments passing through these routes may face heightened risks due to regional instability arising from regional conflicts. Because of this, the shipping companies would opt for other routes and ways that might be longer, which would not just disrupt the trading activities and supply chains but also be expensive, increasing the operational costs for India. In addition, Iran’s ability to disrupt or block this crucial maritime route directly threatens India’s energy security, potentially leading to severe and immediate supply shortages and price fluctuations in the domestic market. Given that India imports over 80% of its crude oil from West Asia, any escalation in the conflict could exacerbate India’s energy security concerns, increasing oil prices and creating economic instability. Any disruption or challenges around these chokepoints could severely and immediately impact India’s energy security and financial stability, posing a grave and immediate risk that cannot be ignored.

Security Concerns
That said, this war could heighten India’s security concerns as well because it will increase hostility and destabilize the Middle Eastern region. This could not just pose direct threats to Indian nationals in Iran and Israel but also to India’s need to reevaluate its security strategies, considering the instability in the region, which could impact India’s security. War could draw in other major powers, and the involvement of the major powers creates more instability. The US has traditionally supported Israel, while Iran has closer ties with China and Russia, and this conflict could add more intricacies to the region, which could spill over into neighboring areas, including South Asia, affecting India’s security environment. It is also important to note that war has often accelerated the rise of extremism and terrorism, which could have long-term potential spillover effects as groups aligned with either Iran or Israel could target India because of the discontent with the Indian stance in the crisis.

Diplomatic Issues
Lastly, India has maintained good relationships with both Iran and Israel; however, it could be severely tested at this time. The continuing hostility and war could force India to take sides. This could affect regional alliances and power structures, impacting India’s long-term diplomatic relations. India has significant relationships and interests associated with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). With the presence of ongoing war, India is in a difficult position because India’s steps, actions, or choices could strain India’s relationship with either party, which could severely impact its defense, security, strategic, economic, or geopolitical interests. Hence, maintaining interest while maintaining the balance is a diplomatic challenge for India.

Policy Recommendations
Though numerous challenges exist on multiple fronts, India’s diplomatic stance is essential in navigating those challenges while maintaining a stable relationship with all parties. Currently, India is actively engaging with both Iran and Israel, expressing its concerns over the escalation of hostilities and emphasizing the importance of immediate de-escalation. The various Indian interests in the region underscore the need for careful diplomacy to safeguard its national interests. It is necessary to mitigate the risks and uphold its national interests amidst escalating tensions. The Ministry of External Affairs has expressed grave concern over the escalation of hostilities and emphasized the importance of immediate de-escalation. The various Indian interests in the region underscore the need for careful diplomacy to safeguard its national interests.

Engagement with Regional Stakeholders
With its track record of mediation and conflict resolution, India could facilitate talks between conflicting parties while navigating some essential interests. Strengthening its strategic partnerships with key regional players and engaging in collaborative efforts with Gulf countries and other regional stakeholders could bolster India’s resilience in overcoming potential challenges in multifaceted domains. Maintaining open communication for mediation and negotiation could significantly reduce regional tensions. In addition, multilateral forums such as the United Nations, Arab Council for Regional Integration, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which is often involved in resolving conflicts disputes in Muslim work, can work together with India for resolution and adherence to international law.

Energy Diversification
Given the instability in the Middle East region and the immediate threat to India’s energy security, India must accelerate its efforts to diversify its energy sources and reduce its dependence on oil and energy imports. Investing in renewable energy projects and energy efficiency with alternative suppliers can secure India’s energy interests, maintain the trading stream, and increase resilience to external shocks. This is not just a long-term strategy but an urgent necessity to mitigate the immediate risks of the Middle Eastern crisis.

In conclusion, the Middle Eastern conflict poses a significant challenge to India’s interests, peace, stability, and the rest of the world. It is an opportunity for India to actively act as a mediator to foster stability and dialogue in the Middle Eastern region and assert its leadership on the global stage. This can safeguard India’s economic interests, strategic agility, diplomatic understanding as well as the collective security of the international community. However, the road ahead remains uncertain, requiring India to tread carefully while staying true to its principles and interests.

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Hamas launched at least one Ayyash 250 rocket — a two-year-old weapon believed to be the longest-range rocket that the militant group has with an operational range of 155 miles — at Israel from the Gaza Strip.

Unlike, the mobile Iron Dome, David’s Sling is stationary and can protect the entirety of Israel from its permanent location. The IAF received the defense system from the Defense Ministry in July 2017.

David’s Sling’s advanced, multi-mission interceptor, also known as the Stunne or the SkyCeptor, a joint endeavor of Rafael & Raytheon, two world leaders in advanced weapons system development, offer interceptor as lethal, flexible and affordable hit to-kill to defeat mass raids of  threats.

David’s Sling system is modular, scalable, and flexible to tailor-fit the area and topology to be defended.

The David’s Sling interceptor (Stunner/ SkyCeptor ) delivers superior kinematics, maneuverability and lethality by combining novel innovative steering control, multi-pulse propulsion and a next-generation seeker into a lightweight airframe.

Benefits

It is designed for “plug and play” insertion into fielded air and missile defence systems with open architecture. It has a Next-gen multi-sensor seeker. With  large interception envelope, it can effectively intercept threats during saturation attack.

The launcher carries up to 12 stunner interceptors, launched in a near-vertical orientation. It has multi-pulse propulsion and precision hit-to-kill aim point selection in the terminal phase.

Israel’s Air Defence Architecture

David’s Sling is the middle part of Israel’s sophisticated and multi-layer air-defense network. It strengthens the anti-missile defence already provided by the Iron Dome, Arrow 2, and Arrow 3.

Israel’s air defence systems are stationed throughout the country and are prepared to respond 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

David’s Sling is the middle layer of Israel’s sophisticated air-defense network and is complemented by the Iron Dome and the Arrow systems, for smaller and larger threats, respectively. Together, these protect Israel and its nearly 9,000 square miles of territory from artillery, drones, rockets, and missiles of all sorts.

According to Israel’s foreign ministry, many of the initiatives that fall under the country’s Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) operate in close collaboration with the US and receive joint funding. The three aforementioned weapons systems, for example, were developed as a result of cooperation between the two countries.

Iron Dome

First developed in 2011 and widely considered to be one of the most advanced air-defense systems in the world, the Iron Dome is designed to intercept short-range rockets and artillery.

It consists of batteries that have multiple launchers, each of which can hold up 20 Tamir interceptors. The batteries — consisting of a radar and a battle management system — are scattered around Israel and can defend nearly 60-square miles. Interceptors are capable of engaging projectiles from 40 miles away.

The Iron Dome is the most well-known of Israel’s air-defense systems and has been put to serious work since fierce fighting broke out between Israel and Hamas over the weekend.

The IDF said that as of 13 October 2023, Hamas had fired over 6,000 rockets at Israel, keeping the Iron Dome busy as it works to defend civilian the country’s centers.

David’s Sling

David’s Sling is the next layer of Israel’s air-defense network, and its deployment on Friday marks one of only a few times that the system has been used since it became operational in 2017. Also known as the Magic Wand, it fires an interceptor called the Stunner (which doesn’t have a warhead) to defeat medium- to long-range rockets and missiles at a range of up to 185 miles.

The David’s Sling system includes a missile firing unit, a fire control radar, a battle management station, and the interceptor.

Arrow

The upper layer of Israel’s air-defense network consists of Arrow systems. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, Arrow-2 was first deployed in 2000 and was later followed by Arrow-3 in 2017.

Both types of systems use two-stage solid-fueled interceptors to engage targets like short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the upper atmosphere, and they each include a launcher, radar, and battle management system.

Arrow-3 serves as the top layer of Israel’s defense array. Its interceptor is a world-class missile that, together with the Arrow-2, significantly expands the State of Israel’s defense capabilities. The Arrow-3 system’s capabilities enable longer range, higher altitude (exo-atmospheric), and more precise ballistic missile engagements.

Patriot

Outside of those defense systems, Israel is also one of nearly 20 countries that operates the MIM-104 Patriot missile defense battery, which is a US-made truck-mounted surface-to-air missile system.

The Patriot is a top US air and missile defense system and is capable of engaging ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, drones, and loitering munitions. One battery consists of eight launchers that are armed with four interceptor missiles, each of which can eliminate targets at at altitude of nearly 80,000 feet.

MANPADS

The basic air defence system with the IDF are the notorious Stinger man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). The Stinger, fired from the shoulders, is a battlefield short-range weapon system mainly for low-level and slow-moving threats like helicopters.

The missile had earned its notoriety in Afghanistan, when it was used by the Taliban to fight the Russian occupation. However, the latest variants of the Stinger can also target higher and fast-flying fixed wing aircraft within about 15,000 feet in air, besides cruise missiles and low-flying drones.

SHORADS

Israel also operates the Machbet short-range air defence system (SHORADS). This is a gun-and-missile system on a self-propelled tracked vehicle, based on the M113 armoured personnel carrier. The missiles on the vehicles are Stingers and can be used against incoming cruise missiles and drones. These vehicles usually travel with the mechanised forces to provide battlefield defences.

Spyder

The Spyder family of Short/Extended/ Medium/Long-Range Mobile Air Defence Systems (ADS) is used by Israel against a wide spectrum of threats, such as attack aircraft, helicopters, bombers, cruise missiles, UAVs and stand-off weapons.

Iron Beam

The Iron Beam is a new directed energy air defence system that is still being tested by Israel. This will not replace the Iron Dome, but will complement it.

The 100-kilowatt Iron Beam is designed to neutralise rockets, artillery and mortars (RAM), besides unmanned aerial systems (UAS), counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) and anti-tank missiles. It can function by itself or be integrated with other, broader defence systems. It uses a fibre laser to generate a laser beam to destroy an airborne target.

Each battery of the Iron Beam will consist of an air defence radar, a command and control (C2) unit, and two High Energy Laser (HEL) systems.

Naval AD System

While a naval air defence system is used usually to defend one’s own assets, given the location and size of Israel, it is also used as an alternative counter-measure for missiles travelling over the sea.

Installed on board an Israeli Navy Sa’ar-class corvette is the C-Dome, the naval version of the Iron Dome.

These corvettes are armed with two C-Dome systems, each having 20 Tamirs besides Barak-8 surface-to-air missiles, which are launched from 32 vertical launch cells.

While Barak-8 is long range, C-Dome is designed to intercept and destroy lower-flying aircraft, anti-ship missiles, as well as short-range rockets and drones.

Israel Air Force

Fighter aircraft and attack helicopters are another less talked-about air defence capability of the Israeli Air Force, along with the surveillance and command-and-control assets operated by it. The Israeli fighter jet fleet of F-15, F-16, and F-35 fighters have the capability to intercept and destroy cruise missiles and drones.

Israel had in 2021 shot down at least two Iranian drones that, it says, were heading toward Israeli territory.

This was the first time that F-35s operated by any nation were confirmed to have destroyed airborne threats, which showed how Israel has expanded the use of these fighters.

The post IRAN-ISRAEL-Israel’s Air Defence System appeared first on IMR.

Cost Ratios. The second aspect is the skewed ratio between cost to the attacker and defender. One Shahid drone costs about $10,000. Hence, Iran spent about $3.5 million on its attack, whereas, Israel had to fire off over $1.3 billion worth of anti-ballistic missiles, Patriots, MR SAMs and Iron Domes in just one night. This attack was with around 320 drones/ missiles. What if the next attack comes with 1,500 drones/ missiles and more? Iran claims that it has not yet used its hypersonic Fateh missiles in the last attack.

Iran’s Escalation Management and Control. Viewed in hindsight, Iran has shown tremendous strategic patience and ability to exercise escalation control. It has delivered a potent, strategic message of deterrence. “Pile up all the layers of air defence, get the US, British and French to help you with 200 fighters, but the simple fact is, that we will get through.” That was the essence of Iran’s deterrence message. It is said that Iran had sent signals to USA via UAE and intelligence channels that it was not interested in any further escalation that would involve the United States. Its sovereignty had been blatantly violated and under Article 51 of the UN Charter, it would exercise its right to retaliate. Yet it gave adequate notice to prevent uncontrolled escalation. It took 13 days to respond. It hit only three military targets. There were no attacks on civilian targets or infrastructure. It virtually sabotaged the military success of its own attack by this virtue signaling, but that did enable escalation control and dominance. It sent a clear deterrent message via the missile strikes that got through the very dense and layered air defences. It sent a clear message that it could and would get through, and not tolerate any violation of its sovereignty.

American Escalation Control Measures

For its part, the United States seemed equally keen that the issue should not escalate to a regional war. There was no way Iran could prevail in any conflict with US and Israel. However, it was capable of inflicting serious damage and pain.

It could hit Israel and the oil fields in the Middle East, it could block the Strait of Hormuz and send oil prices skyrocketing giving a big hit to the global economy. The US was in an election year and President Biden could not afford a rise in price of oil that would affect transportation costs and increase not only prices of fuel but also increase prices of food triggering an inflationary spiral.

The US strategic reserve of oil itself was down to just 17 days. The US interest would not be served by any escalation in the Middle East. As such, the US efforts were to put psychological pressure on Iran.

It sent back a second carrier battle group to the Mediterranean. It sent in General Korella, Chief of the US Central Command to coordinate missile defense measures. It tried to force Iran to recalibrate costs and limit or scale down its options.

READ MORE: ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR – Hamas Leadership, Setup and Capabilities

When all this dissuasion failed and Iran fired off three salvos of some 320 drones and missiles, both the US and Israel were surprised at the scale of this attack. However, due to ample warning and preparation time, the US theater ballistic missile defence grid and Israel’s formidable air defences were able to shoot down 97 to 98 per cent of the incoming projectiles.

The US and Western media now tried to entirely play down effectiveness of the attack. The fact was that drones were just decoys. The ballistic missiles had successfully penetrated the three most well -defended targets on planet Earth.

The US and Israel tried to play down the attack as a damn squib. The US intentions seemed to be to stop Israel from escalating by any significant retaliation. Joe Biden even suggested that it was a defensive victory for Israel and they should leave it at that.

He even suggested that should Israel go for serious retaliation, it would have to do it alone and the US would not take part. However, it was evident that due to the pressure of domestic politics, Netanyahu would simply have to respond in some way. The US tried to find a way out by suggesting to Iran that Israel would just mount a token strike and it should not escalate further.

Iran’s reaction was sharp. It was determined to react in a major way, whatever the scale of the provocation, it said. Attacks on its territory were simply not acceptable and Iran wanted no part in any dumb charade or fixed match. In many ways, the situation had closed parallels with the India-Pakistan post-Pulwama scenario. India simply had to retaliate to the terror strike but was keen to do it in a manner that would prevent a sharp escalation, maybe even to the nuclear level. Iran has rejected any suggestion that it permit Israel the luxury of a token strike. Netanyahu has been under major pressure from the United States and the Western allies not to escalate. However, the key factor was domestic political pressure that did force Netanyahu to do something, perhaps, more than tokenism.

Scott Ritter says it was a political and not a military decision. The Israeli war cabinet was split with three voting members against it while the hardliners were all for a massive response on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Netenyahu was under tremendous pressure from US and other Western allies to eschew a response or go in for tokenism. It is said that for 48 hours he refused to take any calls.

So, what could have been Israel’s response options and how would the escalatory spiral unfold? That was the key issue in the looming global crisis. Could an escalatory spiral be managed? What were the off-ramps for Iran?

Matrix of Israeli Response Options. Let us now examine what was the matrix of Israeli response options to Iran’s very massive missiles strike. For a long time, Israel had viewed Iran’s nascent nuclear capability as an existential threat. It was very keen to do an Osirak redux, that is, repeat its attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor with Iran. The problem in that was that to mount a credible and effective attack, it needed United States support in terms of satellite imagery, US air-to-air refueling aircraft, US help in getting permissions to overfly Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. It is doubtful if Iran could inflict any meaningful damage in a purely stand-alone mode. Even that was likely to provoke a regional war. As was evident, it is easy to start wars, far more difficult to end them.

So what then was the matrix of Israeli overt response options?

• Option One. Attack Nuclear Facilities of Iran. Iran has five major nuclear enrichment facilities at Natanz, Arak, Faradeh, Isfahan and Bordei. The main facility at Natanz is well dug in and is in a steep valley in the Zagros mountains, which is very difficult to attack. Ishfahan is the main nuclear processing centre. Israel’s options were to use the Jericho missiles or the F -35 or the F -15E fighters. These would of course need air-to-air refueling and they could possibly have attacked with stand-off cruise missiles and deep penetration retarder bombs that could pierce underground bunkers, (joint direct attack munitions). Iran had fairly good S-300 Russian SAMs based air defences and the F-35 or F-15E would definitely take some losses. Maj Gen Ahmed Hagatalab of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in charge of defending Iran’s nuclear facilities, had publicly warned that if Israel hit these, Iran would retaliate and target Israel’s nuclear facilities.

• Option Two. Attack Ballistic Missile Production Facilities. So far Israel regarded the nascent nuclear facilities of Iran as an existential threat. The Israeli military spokesman, Adm Daniel Hagare conceded that they had underestimated Iran’s ballistic missiles capability. This was in fact a real and present danger. Their storage facilities are in deep underground bunkers that would be difficult to attack, but the production centers could be targeted and one of them was, in Isfahan.

• Option Three. IRGC Headquarters Bases. The most logical target system would be the IRGC, that is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Headquarters, barracks, bunkers and weapons storage facilities. It would be the most justifiable target system in Iran.

• Option Four. Iran’s Petrochemical Facilities and Export Terminals. Iran’s oil exports provided the financial support to build huge missile arsenals and fund a proxy war against Israel via the Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis and the Shia militias in Iraq and Iran. Iran’s war waging capabilities could be seriously hit if its oil export sector was targeted. There were the main ports at Bandar Abbas, etc, which could be primary targets in such an attack.

These were the main overt military options for Israel to strike in response to the Iranian military strike of 13 April. They could also use electromagnetic bombs to create EMP or electromagnetic pulses to fry up electronic circuits and destroy command control and communications in the critical areas. There were also media reports circulated that if Israel had to go it alone, it would seek air bases in Aizerbaijan to hit Iran from the north unexpected direction.

Covert Options. Given the tremendous US pressure on Israel to prevent escalation, Israel would most likely have to resort to a significant offensive against Hezbollah but confine the attacks in Iran to the covert level only. These would include possibly terrorist attacks by Baluch and Kurd insurgents, use of cyber warfare or (Stutnex redux) or use drones to strike these targets. Israel could also carry out covert action to destabilize and overthrow the Iran regime of the Ayatollahs but that would have to be a long-term covert action project in concert with the CIA. These could be the precise response options that could obviate Iranian retaliation and triggering a major escalatory spiral in the Middle East. Oil prices were already at $90 a barrel. A full-scale Iran-Israel war in the Middle East could send the oil prices skyrocketing through the roof and create a global economic crisis of major proportions That was in no one’s interest.

Israel’s Response Strike on 18 April. Israel mounted its counter-attack finally on 18 April, just five days after Iran’s missile strike. There was a lot of ambiguity and disinformation let lose in the media. The Israelis did not announce that they had carried out an attack, but explosions were reported in the sky over Isfahan. The Iranians equally seemed keen to play down the scale of the Israeli attacks. They said that a number of drones, (hand-held quad-copters of very limited range) had been seen flying over Tabriz and over Isfahan. Why Isfahan? Isfahan is the home base of the Iranian F-14 Tomcat fighter-bomber squadrons. It is also the home base of an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps unit. It has an S-300 missile battery and reportedly also production facilities for missiles and drones. The targets that the Israelis actually struck was the S-300 missile battery and they claim to have damaged one of its radars that are used for fire control. Next day, pictures in the US media indicated that satellite surveillance had picked up the destruction of one of the Iranian radars in the S-300 missile battery which was struck by the drones. When Iran was quite clear that there had been no missile, oblique, cruise missile strikes or fighter-bomber attacks and it had been confined merely to hand-held drones, it seemed to relax and opened its air space which it had closed earlier. Similar small drone attacks had been done by the Ukrainian intelligence agents from the vicinity of Moscow with hand-held drones to strike some targets, largely for psychological impact. This was the precise, very limited nature of the Israeli response option and Iran seemed to be quite relieved. They played it down totally, and in fact, the Iranian foreign minister went to the extent of retorting to reporters, “What strike? What attack?” They said these were just infiltrators who had come in with handheld quadcopters and tried to launch them to create a media event. They understood that Israel was under tremendous pressure from the United States and the Western allies not to respond in a major way, and it had refrained from such a major provocation. So Iran has been very cautious and very pragmatic. It refused to get drawn in, refused to escalate, and for the time being, the crisis in the Middle East seems to have been averted. How long that will hold is a matter of conjecture and we will have to wait and watch.

READ MORE : ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR – Hamas Ideology and Gaza Politics

India’s Response Options. The simple fact is, what can India do? Like the rest of the world, a major conflict in the Middle East would considerably harm India’s interests. Any oil shock can have a major negative impact on the Indian economy. India has very friendly relations with both Israel and Iran and as such it would be very well placed if it has to play a mediatory role. I am not sure what mediatory role has so far been played behind the scenes, but I do not see any overt evidence of India taking such an initiative, (though we did have talks with Iran to get our crew released from the ship that the Iranian Navy had hijacked in the Red Sea). We will have to keenly wait and watch as to how events unfold in the Middle East. For the time being the world has pulled back from the brink of a disaster. From a military analyst point of view, we have a new form of war which is now fairly well established in all the battles that we have seen recently, whether in the Russia-Ukraine war or in the Middle East. The emphasis is shifting primarily to missile and drone strikes rather than manned air strikes. I would again like to reiterate that China was first off the starter blocks to create a Rocket Force after Gulf War I and II. It had feverishly started the construction of its Strategic Rocket Force as far back as the 1990s. It now has the biggest rocket arsenal in the world. It has also invested very heavily in drones of all shape and sizes. Therefore, we will have to study in very great detail the Iran-Israel missile clash and draw very pertinent lessons for our own context. Specifically, we will have to re-examine how much emphasis is to be put on manned air forces and how much onto the unmanned drones and missiles. The balance increasingly seems to be shifting in favour of drone and ballistic missile arsenals coupled with cruise missiles. We will have to gear up our military-industrial complex to churn out these drones/missiles in very large numbers to cater for intensive firing rates in actual combat. The Iran missile strike had deliberately been pared down for minimal impact to tamp down chances of escalation. A purposeful and destructive strike would have required some 1,500 drones and missiles for a similar target set. The accuracy and lethality of such unmanned systems is rising exponentially and Iran has just demonstrated their ability to penetrate even the densest Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD). We are living through a new Revolution in Military Affairs. Pakistan is still stuck largely with its F-16s for retaliation. It is China that we will have to watch closely and match in numbers, throw-weight, accuracy and ability to penetrate dense AD environments.

The post IRAN-ISRAEL – An Analysis of Israel’s Response appeared first on IMR.

Lessons Form the Israel-Iran, Ever since the revolution in 1979, there has been a significant shift in Iran’s foreign policy, and it no longer recognizes Israel’s right to exist.

Prior to 1979, Iran and Israel were allies. However, after the Islamic revolution, the new Iranian regime adopted an anti-Israel stance as part of its ideology.

Instead of direct military confrontation, Iran has engaged in proxy conflicts with Israel. It has supported various groups (such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and others) in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Palestine, which surround Israel’s borders.

These groups, once considered proxies, now operate with domestic autonomy and coordinate transnationally. They have become partners in Iran’s efforts to counter Israel’s influence in the region.

Israel’s previous strategy failed to ensure its security against Iran and its allies. The 7 October attacks exposed this vulnerability. In response, Israel shifted its approach, targeting key figures within the “axis of resistance” (the network of Iran-backed groups) and Iranian assets across borders.

Iran’s consistent message has been to avoid broader regional conflict, but it needed to restore its deterrence capability. Thus, the April 13 direct drone and missile attack on Israel aimed to redefine red lines and create a new equation with Israel.

Following the attack, several countries (including the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) warned Iran against further escalation. Israel also cautioned that any attack could lead to a direct Israeli military response on Iranian soil.

Israel has employed both covert and overt methods to target IRGC and Hezbollah leaders, impacting the dynamics of the Iran-Israel conflict in the Middle East. Some notable attacks carried out by Israel against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah leaders after as follows:

Imad Mughniyeh. Imad Mughniyeh was a prominent Hezbollah leader and a key figure in Iran’s proxy network. He was responsible for numerous attacks against Israel. On February 12, 2008, Mughniyeh was assassinated in a covert operation in Damascus, Syria. His car was targeted with a car bomb, resulting in his death.

Qasem Soleimani. Qasem Soleimani was the commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, responsible for Iran’s overseas operations. On January 3, 2020, he was killed in a covert drone strike carried out by the United States in Baghdad, Iraq. Although not directly by Israel, his death significantly impacted Iran’s operations in the region.

Brig Gen Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Zahedi was a senior Quds Force commander within the IRGC. On April 1, 2024, an Israeli airstrike in Damascus, Syria, targeted the Iranian consulate annex building next to the Iranian embassy. Zahedi was among the 16 people killed in the strike, including Gen Hossein Salami.

In retaliation for Zahedi’s death, on April 13, 2024, the IRGC, Hezbollah, and other Iran-linked groups launched retaliatory attacks against Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The operation involved the use of drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.

READ MORE – Editorial IMR Feb 2021

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) successfully intercepted most of the threats, but the situation escalated tensions in the region. The attack demonstrated Iran’s willingness to directly engage with Israel, marking a departure from its previous avoidance of direct confrontation.

The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip has the potential to escalate further. Here are some possible scenarios:

Israel Takes Control of the Gaza Strip. Historically, Israel controlled the Gaza Strip militarily until 2005. It’s conceivable that Israel could regain control, but this move would likely provoke new militant attacks and disrupt the regional balance of power. Some voices in Israel have suggested recolonizing Gaza, but such a step would fuel the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Continued Escalation and Ground Offensive. Israel has declared its intention to destroy Hamas. The endgame of their military action remains uncertain.

Power Vacuum and Anarchy. If Israel achieves its goal of eliminating Hamas, a power vacuum must not be allowed to emerge. Rapid withdrawal could lead to anarchy and radical Islamist groups filling the void. The situation in Afghanistan, where the Islamic State exploited state weakness after the Taliban takeover, serves as an example.

International Diplomacy and Mediation. International actors, including the United States, may engage in diplomatic efforts to prevent all-out war. Mediation and negotiations could play a crucial role in de-escalation. However, achieving lasting peace remains challenging given the deep-rooted historical grievances and geopolitical complexities.

Regional Spillover. The conflict could spill over into neighboring countries, affecting regional stability. Escalation might draw in other actors, leading to broader hostilities. Regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, are closely monitor developments.

The post EDITORIAL – Lessons Form the Israel-Iran appeared first on IMR.

It all started with Israel’s attack on Iran’s consulate in Syria on 1 April. Iran retaliated with a massive 320 drone-cum-missile barrage on 13 April, which left the world stunned with its scope and scale. There were fears of a massive war in the Middle East that could torpedo the global economy. For the time being, this threat has abated and the world can breathe a sigh of relief, but for how long remains to be seen.

Missile Power vs Air power

There is a wider professional military debate that has been ongoing since the start of the war in Ukraine. What is the inter-se emphasis that armed forces should place on missile/ drone power vs manned air power? This is a seminal question of allocation of resources that must now be seriously addressed. After Gulf War I & II, where Iraq had used Scud missiles to hit back at USA’s far superior airpower, China had drawn its lessons. Today, it has the largest Rocket Force in the world, which India, Taiwan, Japan and Philippines, etc, must all worry about.

The Israelis have traditionally placed very heavy emphasis on airpower and that has been the key to their technological-military superiority in the region. They could hit any country or non-state actor anywhere in the Middle East without any chance of effective response. Not anymore. We are witnessing a military paradigm shift in the region. Missiles and drones have caused a dramatic escalation of stakes. Even the Russian Air Force, though vastly superior to the Ukrainian Air Force in qualitative and quantitative terms, has been fairly restrained in its operations due to the sheer density of the air defences. Most of its attacks have been stand-off attacks with cruise missiles fired from own side of the border. It is only now that Russian Air Force has become more active over the tactical battle area with its Glide Toss Bombs (FAB- 2000 and 3000).

Density of AD Coverage: Israel vs Ukraine

There is also the aspect of force to space ratio. Israel is a small country with just 27,000 sq kms of area to defend. Ukraine is over 6,07,000 sq kms. Flight times from Russia for drones and missiles are far shorter. They are much longer in the case of Israel and so warning/ reaction times are far greater. Hence, military professionals in India must closely watch these ongoing missile wars and prepare accordingly. We will have to drastically enhance our drone and missile power, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. We will have to re-examine our allocation of resources to manned vs unmanned attack platforms. Air defenses are increasingly becoming more lethal. Missile-cum-drone wars are, therefore, the future. The Chinese have a head start in this respect and we have reason to be concerned. That is why, the recent Israel-Iran missile war has serious and pertinent lessons for us and we must examine these in depth. Israeli armed forces are very innovative and we must study the counter-measures they evolve. So let us now analyze the recent Iran-Israel conflict for immediate lessons learnt.

1 April Israeli Strike

On 1 April, Israel’s F-35 jets struck the Iranian consulate in Syria. Technically, under the Vienna Convention, that was sovereign Iranian territory. From their intelligence gathering facility in the Golan Heights, they had been tracking Iranian IRGC commanders on the way to Damascus for a conference. It is noteworthy that they did not attack them outside the consulate, but struck while they were in conference within the building. Some 11 Iranians, including three top commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were killed. These included Gen Hossein Salami, top commander of IRGC, and two other Brigadier Generals. There was speculation that the Israeli strike was deliberately designed to provoke Iran into a rash action that would justify Israeli retaliation of far greater intensity at its nascent nuclear capability. If that was the plan, it had apparently worked.

Israeli Miscalculation?

However, subsequent events do not bear out this deliberate provocation narrative. Rather, it now seems that Israel miscalculated. It had assumed that Iran would not react to the consulate strike but evidentially, it was quite mistaken. The recent resignation of the Israel’s Military Intelligence (Aman) chief on 22 April seems to confirm this. Though his resignation letter refers to the failure to predict/ forestall the 7 October strike, the timing of the resignation seems to suggest that the Iran strike was also a possible causative factor. Apparently, the intelligence chief had said Iran would not respond to an attack on its consulate. The timing of his resignation seems to confirm this major miscalculation thesis.

There was a great outrage and angst in Iran. Embassy is sovereign space and it was a direct affront to its sovereignty. Iran now considers itself a strong military power, courtesy its large arsenal of drones, cruise and over 3,000 missiles of various types.

Did Israel warn the US of this attack? It now emerges that this was done just minutes before the strike. In fact, it has been reported that US defense secretary Austin Lloyd called up the Israeli defense minister to complain that lack of adequate warning could have put US installations in Middle East at risk. US and Iran, meanwhile, stepped up backchannel negotiations to ensure that there would be no major flare up and escalation due to Iran’s impending retaliation. But Iran was adamant that it would have to react because its sovereign territory had been hit.

US Dissuasion Efforts

The US now made significant efforts to dissuade Iran from any major escalatory step. It made all efforts to make Iran recalculate and limit its response. In fact, it sent in its massive carrier battle group of the Eisenhower to the Mediterranean. General Korella, Chief of US Central Command, personally went to Israel to coordinate defensive actions to face such a missile attack. The simple fact is that Iran refused to be deterred or cowed down with these menacing preparations. It was desperate to demonstrate that it had the will and resolve to respond in a way that would underline its significant military power. Yet, it took deliberate steps at the same time that would limit the success of its own missile strike. Its aim was to make a strong statement of will and intent and underline its capacity to do deterrent damage, without crossing a threshold that would invite a devastating US-Israeli response.

Iran’s Missile Strike

Iran took 13 days to respond to the consulate provocation. When it did, Iran surprised the United States, Israel and the world with the scale and intensity of its response. This was a significant missile operation and deserves to be studied in detail for pertinent lessons. Unmanned missiles are rapidly overtaking manned air strikes as the weapon system of choice the world over. The Ukraine War bears ample testimony to this trend. The Iranian attack came in three distinct waves:-

•             First Wave. The slower moving Shahid drones, (speed 185 kmph) were launched late at night on 13 April 2024. They were launched from multiple directions from Iran, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. These would take about 4 to 5 hours to reach Israeli airspace. US satellites picked up this swarm of drones and alerted Israel and the world. President Joe Biden rushed back to the White House to huddle with his National Security Council (NSC) staff and monitor the operations in real time. Some 200 US, British and French fighters were scrambled to shoot down these drones before they entered Israeli airspace. US naval assets in the Mediterranean and Red Sea provided the sensor data to monitor and shoot down this drone swarm. The Shahid drones were based on GPS guidance. The Israelis simply shut off GPS guidance over Israel to spoof these drones. It is noteworthy that all Shahid drones purchased by Russia and used so extensively in Ukraine, have been retrofitted with GLONASS Russian navigational system, precisely for this reason. The drone swarms seemed headed for Golan Heights, Dimona nuclear facility and Southern Israel, as per initial estimates.

•             The Second Wave. A second wave of some 30 Paveh cruise subsonic cruise missiles with a flight time of 1 to 2 hours were launched by Iran. These had speeds varying between 500 to 600, kmph and a range of some 1000-1500 kms. These had much heavier warheads. Reportedly, some did get through. They were timed to arrive along with the drones. These were designed to strike Israeli AD locating and fire control radars and weapon systems. It is reported that they did hit two Iron Dome launchers and possibly a SAM battery. These have not been confirmed by Israel.

•             Third Wave. This third wave was the most lethal. It comprised of 120 Sahab Medium Range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) of 1500 km range. Their flight time to Israel was just 15 minutes. The Iranians claimed that the drones were largely inexpensive decoys designed to fool and overwhelm the Israeli defences. Most of the drones were based on GPS guidance systems. The Israelis simply switched off GPS guidance over their territory and the Americans spoofed the GPS guidance systems over Iraq and Syria. The Israeli’s layered air defences now came into action. These included Arrow 2 and 3 ABM systems along with Thaad, Patriots, David Sling, MR SAMs and Iron Dome tactical systems. These achieved a formidable 97 to 98 percent kill rate. This is not surprising, as even Ukraine has claimed kill rates varying from 70 to 90 percent using combination of S-300 surface-to-air missiles, Patriots and Stingers.

Analysis of Strike

One fact that has been lost sight of in the hoopla over the near total kill rate of Israeli air defences is that despite their formidable nature, many Iranian ballistic missiles did get through and hit their targets. These targets, especially the Nevatim Air Base were hit. This is Israel’s major air force base in southern Israel. It is claimed that F-35 and/or F-15E fighter jets from the base had carried out the air strike on the Iranian consulate in Syria on 1 April.

Nevatim Air Base is one of the most heavily defended locations on planet Earth. It has an X-band ANTP-Y-2 Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar. This base is linked with the US Anti-Ballastic Missile (ABM) defense architecture with its HQ at Colorado. This in turn is linked to the US early warning satellite network that can pick up missile launches from anywhere around the globe. It is also linked to the US computational and communication systems as also the shooters.

A technical analysis indicates that these ballistic missiles had a booster rocket that propelled the warheads separately. Anti-ballistic missile systems then targeted the body of the missile permitting the explosives to get through. These also released decoys to fool the Iron Dome system. Iran claims that many of these ballistic surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) got through. Video recordings do show seven major impacts and blast explosions. It is apparent that some more were perhaps able to penetrate Israel’s formidable air defence system. This is a very significant development.

Overall Drones/Missiles Fired by Iran

Admiral Daniel Hagare, Israel’s official military spokesman stated that Iran had fired a total of 320 drones/missiles. These included 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles and 120 surface-to-surface missiles. This was a formidable strike with huge number of drone swarms to overwhelm the Israeli air defence system and act as decoys. The amazing fact is Iran’s SSM missiles were able to penetrate this formidable and very dense AD cover at all three military targets attacked. It is speculated that Iran’s first wave of drones were designed to make Israel light up its detection and fire control radars. The second wave of cruise missiles then targeted these air defence batteries. It was stated that they were able to destroy two Iron Dome launchers. The third wave of ballistic missiles had separating booster propelled warheads and decoys that enabled the warheads to get through the Israeli air defences.

Iran’s Main Targets

Let us now examine the impact at each of the three bases targeted by Iran.

Iran confined its counter-attacks to three primary military targets that had been involved in the attack on its consulate. A target analysis is essential. The three targets were:-

•             Nevatim Air Base. This is Israel’s major Air force base in southern Israel. Iran claims that F-35 jets from this air base had struck the Iranian Consulate in Damascus. It is one of the most heavily defended places on planet Earth, as mentioned earlier. It has the best layered AD system in the world with Arrow 2 & 3 ABMs, Thadd ABMs, Patriots, David Sling and Iron Dome. Despite this formidable air defence, the shock was that 5 out of 7 Iranian ballistic missiles got through to this most heavily defended target in the world. Two of the war heads hit the runway and caused huge craters. The others hit storage facilities. If some eight such war heads had hit the runway, the air base would have been out of commission for some time. The real surprise was that despite 72 hours warning to the densest air defence target on planet Earth, these missiles (five of them) had managed to hit the primary target. It was part of deterrence signaling by Iran. Yet the Iranians had done it skilfully by giving adequate warning and virtue signaling of their intent not to escalate any further. They deliberately curtailed the amount of physical damage to prevent escalation. There were reports in the media that 72 hours prior to the Iran missile strike, Director CIA Willam Burns had met senior Iranian officials in a third country to work out a kind of deal to prevent escalation spinning out of control.

•             The Ramon Air Base. This is also the most heavily protected place on the planet with dense and layered air defences like at the Nevatim Air Base. Even here, some Iranian missiles were able to get through, leading to shock and concern in both US and Israel.

•             The 8200 Signal Intelligence Collection Unit. This unit in the Golan Heights also has an X-band ANTP-Y2 OTH radar and elaborate signal intelligence equipment jointly manned by Israel and CIA operatives. Once again, this is closely networked with the American anti-ballistic missile defence architecture with its array of satellites, sensors on US Aegis class destroyers and heavily defended by layered air defence systems.

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Key to repelling rockets on the Israeli side is the Iron Dome, a missile defence system that has become a cornerstone of the country’s security since its initial deployment in 2011.

In the months since the Hamas attack and Israel’s retaliatory military ground offensive, the Iron Dome has once again been tested with an attack by Iran on Saturday and Sunday (April 13 and 14).

Around 300 drones, ballistic and cruise missiles were launched by Tehran following a suspected Israeli strike on a Iranian consulate in Syria. Most of these were intercepted by the Iron Dome.

The system is the pivotal lower tier of a triad of systems in Israel’s air defense system.

The “David’s Sling” system covers the middle layer, while the “Arrow” missile system protects Israel from long-range projectiles.

How does the Iron Dome work?

The Iron Dome is a mobile defense system developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries developed, produced and fielded in 2011 to respond to the security threat posed by the bombings of rockets and projectiles shot into Israel, many of which landed in heavily populated areas.

The Iron Dome functions by detecting, analyzing and intercepting varieties of targets such as mortars, rockets, and artillery. It has all-weather capabilities and is able to function night or day and in all conditions, including fog, rain, dust storms and low clouds. It is able to launch a variety of interceptor missiles.

Israel is protected by 10 Iron Dome batteries, functioning to protect the country’s infrastructure and citizens. Each battery is able to defend up to 60 square miles. They are strategically placed around Israel’s cities in order to intercept projectiles headed towards these populated areas. Implementing artificial intelligence technology, the “Dome” system is able to discriminate whether the incoming threats will land in a populated or in an uninhabited area, ignoring them in the latter case, consequently reducing the cost of operation and keeping unnecessary defensive launches to a minimum. However, if the Dome determines that the rocket is projected to land in an inhabited area, the interceptor is fired towards the rocket.

The Iron Dome functions by detecting, analyzing and intercepting varieties of targets such as mortars, rockets, and artillery. It has allweather capabilities and is able to function night or day and in all conditions, including fog, rain, dust storms and low clouds. It is able to launch a variety of interceptor missiles.

A radar steers the missile until the target is acquired with an infrared sensor. The interceptor must be quickly maneuverable because it must intercept rudimentary rockets that are little more than a pipe with fins welded onto it, which makes them liable to follow unpredictable courses. It can be assumed that the launchers of the rockets know as little as the Israelis as to where the rockets would end up landing.

Israeli authorities have claimed that the military technology boasts a 90 per cent success rate at intercepting enemy rockets.

Each Iron Dome battery has three components. The first is a radar that detects incoming rockets. Then there is the Tamir interceptor missile that is launched to intercept the incoming rocket in the air.

Finally, there is a command and control centre which contains the software that creates and sends the message from the radar to the interceptor missile.

The system is designed to intercept rockets with a range of between 4 km and 70 km.

How effective is the Iron Dome?

Iron Dome has proved to be particularly effective over the years.

Bombings into Israel intensified during the 2006 Second Lebanon War when Hezbollah? fired approximately 4,000 rockets from bases in the south of Lebanon. From Gaza to the South, an estimated 8,000 projectiles were launched between 2000 and 2008, mostly by Hamas??. To counter these threats, the Defense Ministry, in February 2007, decided on the development of the Dome to function as a mobile air defense system for Israel. After its period of development and testing, the system was declared operational and fielded in March 2011.

The Israeli government has said is that the effectiveness of Iron Dome is very high. The Iron Dome only intercepts or destroys rockets which are considered to threaten civilian urban areas. If a rocket is sent from Gaza to an unpopulated area in Israel, Iron Dome will not be activated.

READ MORE: Gaza Conflict and the Role of Iron Dome

Biut the Iron Dome system has not deterred Hamas or other Palestinian militant groups from launching rocket attacks targeting Israeli territory. The Iron Dome may be effective operationally, but strategically it does not really deter the Palestinian organisations.

The IDF (Israel Defense Force) claims an 85% – 90% success rate for the “Iron Dome” in intercepting incoming projectiles. Operational in March 2011, to date the Iron Dome has successfully destroyed approximately 1,500 rockets. The destruction of these incoming rockets has saved Israeli lives offering physical protection and shielding property and other assets. In addition, for the Israelis it serves as a psychological safeguard and comfort for the Israeli people.

Regarding the Dome as an asset for Israel’s National Security Strategy, while standing as an undeniable asset, has had mixed results regarding its four major pillars of Deterrence, Early, Active Defense and Decisive Victory as well as some unintended challenges.

How is the Iron Dome financed?

Keeping the Iron Dome operational comes at a high price. Just one of the interceptor Tamir missiles is estimated to cost around $50,000.

Originally Iron Dome funding was undertaken by Israel, but because of the high cost of the system, the country has had to rely on its long-time ally, the United States.

A report from the US Congressional Research Service states that the US has contributed nearly $3 billion to Iron Dome batteries, interceptors, co-production costs, and general maintenance.

Fears of Escalation

In the early days of the current conflict, the sheer number of rockets that Hamas fired towards Israel, estimated to be between 2,200 and upwards of 3,000 (though Hamas claims to have fired 5,000), seemed to succeed in overwhelming the system. Perhaps the biggest concern with respect to Iron Dome’s capability to continue protecting Israeli territory, is the prospect of a regional escalation in the current conflict.

Hezbollah has a much bigger firepower capability than than Hamas. It has hundreds of thousands of rockets. So Hezbollah could very quickly overwhelm Iron Dome.

Future Use

In addition, while the “Dome” suffices for now, it cannot be expected to continue this way forever. Despite the system’s effectiveness, it is just a matter of time before the militants develop tactics or acquire the technology to overcome it.

As technologies develop and are implemented in operations, counter techniques can shift and new tactics can be developed, which is what the militias are only bound to do. Moreover, with the heavy funding available to the militias from their wealthy allies, acquiring more advanced technologies becomes more probable. This is a significant disadvantage for Israel. In order to preserve their upper hand, constant innovation and adaptation is a necessity. Despite these drawbacks, however, in all the positive aspects that the system offers clearly outweighs the negative. The Iron Dome stands undeniably as a critical and outstanding military asset to Israel’s National Security, even while Israel works to address and mitigate some of the unforeseen challenges related to the system.

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