At the outset, it must be reiterated that this write-up is not intended to endorse or defend the establishment’s actions, whether through commission or omission. On the contrary, there are legitimate questions that must be answered – why the outreach to the protesters was inordinately delayed, why was the police response not sufficiently proactive in the initial stages, why was the crowd allowed to develop into a critical mass before decisive crowd-control measures were employed and why was the use of pellet guns not transparently acknowledged at the outset. These are serious issues, and the SC constituted committee should establish responsibility and attributability for decisions that may have unnecessarily escalated the situation. However, accountability is not one way street and the actions of the protestors, including causing severe injuries to the police personnel, should also be examined to arrive at a balanced perspective in this volatile and explosive situation.

The police have stated before the SC that the protesters refused to vacate the Jantar Mantar complex and no permission had been granted for the Parliament march. Therefore, the gathering and the attempt to march towards the Parliament were illegal by an unlawful assembly. Despite repeated requests and warnings by the police, protestors breached multiple layers of barricades and refused to comply with lawful directions in their bid to reach the Parliament. Disregarding these significant causative factors, the ongoing public discourse assumes that the protesters were exercising their legitimate democratic right to protest and that the police subsequently violated that right. That narrative becomes imperfect once a protest crosses the line and degrades into violence. The right to peaceful protest is fundamental. The right to attack another human being is not. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita itself recognises the right of private defence of every person. That includes a policewoman. A police person does not surrender his fundamental right to life and bodily integrity merely because she is wearing a uniform. More importantly, the organisers and participants in a protest cannot distance themselves from violence by arguing that “criminal elements” infiltrated an otherwise peaceful demonstration. A large organised demonstration also carries a degree of collective responsibility for maintaining discipline within its ranks and ensuring that participants do not attack police personnel. In fact, the organisers should cooperate with the police to identify and isolate those who attempted to turn a peaceful demonstration into a violent confrontation. If they fail to do so, they cannot expect the entire burden of responsibility to fall upon the police.

Since the recommendations of the SC appointed committee to frame guidelines for graded use of force during disorderly protests will be applicable pan India, it should not narrowly focus on this incident. The case of J&K is particularly instructive. Agitational resistance manifesting in protests, stone throwing incidents and bandhs started in 2008, with the ISI of Pakistan attempting to replicate the tactics seen in Intifada II in Palestine. Engineered mass protests against the SF for alleged human rights violations, withdrawal of the Army and Armed Forces Special Powers Act were common, especially on Fridays. There were also a few incidents of terrorists joining the protestors and firing on the SF. The intent was to provoke the SF to retaliate, resulting in collateral damage to escalate the situation.  The 2010 Kashmir unrest was a series of violent anti-India protests and riots that resulted in the deaths of over 100 civilians, mostly teenagers and young adults. Protests later broadened into anti-India rallies, demands for independence, and clashes over unrelated international events.  The SF heavily used tear gas, batons and live ammunition during the peak of the crisis. Due to intense criticism over lethal casualties from live gunfire, the police and para military forces introduced 12-bore pump-action pellet shotguns in 2010 as an alternative crowd-control method. Therefore, if the pellet guns were used on July 20, this year by the SF as enshrined in their SOP, they followed the matrix of graded use of force. Surprisingly, there was intense pressure on the Army as well to acquire riot control equipment for such situations. It was rightly resisted, highlighting the use of the Army in its secondary role as an instrument of last resort and its doctrine and training based on “fire for effect”.

Moreover, in a rapidly deteriorating violent-crowd situation, an individual officer may have only seconds to decide whether he or his colleagues are in imminent danger. Judging that decision later from a video clip, without visualising what the officer could actually see and reasonably apprehend at that moment, risks producing an inherently distorted assessment. The proportionality and necessity of the response must, therefore, remain central to any investigation. But proportionality must be assessed against the threat actually confronting the officer and not against an ideal peaceful protest. This is where the present debate needs greater balance.

Courts, lawyers and the media have an important role in protecting citizens from state excesses. But protection of civil liberties cannot mean treating law enforcement personnel as people without rights. The police are also citizens. They have families, fears and physical vulnerabilities. The shield and helmet do not make them invulnerable. Indeed, if the state expects police personnel to confront violent crowds, it has an obligation to give them appropriate training, equipment, clear rules of engagement and competent leadership. Conversely, police leadership must ensure that personnel are not placed in situations where poor planning, delayed intervention or inadequate communication make violence more likely. The real lesson from this occurrence should, therefore, not be that police action is essentially suspect or that protesters are inherently innocent. It should be that both sides have rights and responsibilities. The right to protest is indispensable to a free society. So is the right of the person in uniform to return home safely after enforcing the law. The objective should not be to choose between the two. It should be to ensure that both perform their respective mandates without fear or unnecessary castigation.

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The Allocations were as follows:

Rs 31,772.23 crore – Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).

Rs 24,771.28 crore – Border Security Force (BSF).

Rs 13,214.68 crore – Central Industrial Security Force (CISF).

Rs 8,096.89 crore – Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).

Rs 8,329.10 crore – Seema Suraksha Bal (SSB).

Rs 7,052.46 crore – Assam Rifles (AR).

Rs 1,286.54 crore – National Security Guard (NSG)

Total Rs 1.27 lakh crore earmarked for paramilitary forces.

The allocations made to the ministry, headed by Union Home Minister Amit Shah, according to the Budget document, is higher by over Rs 10,000 crore, as in the Budget for 2022-23, it was pegged at Rs 1,85,776.55 crore.

The bulk of the amount allocated to the MHA, Rs 1,27,756.74 crore, has been earmarked for the CAPFs in comparison to Rs 1,19,070.36 crore in 2022-23.

Among the CAPFs, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), mostly responsible for internal security duties and fighting militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, has been allocated Rs 31,772.23 crore in comparison to Rs 31,495.88 crore given in 2022-23.

The Border Security Force (BSF), which guards India’s border with Pakistan and Bangladesh, besides handling internal security assignments, has been given Rs 24,771.28 crore in comparison to Rs 23,557.51 crore given in the current financial year.

The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which protects vital installations such as nuclear projects, airports and metro networks, has been given Rs 13,214.68 crore in comparison to Rs 12,293.23 crore allocated in 2022-23.

The Shashastra Seema Bal (SSB), which guards India’s borders with Nepal and Bhutan, has been allocated Rs 8,329.10 crore in comparison to Rs 8,019.78 crore given in 2022-23.

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), which guards India’s borders with China, got Rs 8,096.89 crore in comparison to Rs 7,626.38 crore given in the current fiscal.

The Assam Rifles, which is deployed along the India-Myanmar border and for anti-insurgency duties in the North-East, has been allocated Rs 7,052.46 crore in comparison to Rs 6,561.33 crore given in the current financial year.

The National Security Guard (NSG), the elite commando force to tackle any emergency security situation, has been allocated Rs 1,286.54 crore in comparison to Rs 1,183.80 crore given in 2022-23.

Expectations

What the CAPFs expected from the 2023 Union budget was funds for infrastructure development in border areas, better equipment with latest technology for disaster management, training and operations and a robust communication system.

Each year funds for the CAPFs see only a marginal increase, most of which goes into salaries, allowances and other wages, with only a little left over for the development and modernisation of the organisation.

Although a separate fund is also earmarked for modernisation of the forces, focus on infrastructure development and better training and equipment, is often ignored owing to lack of funds.

In the previous budget, in 2022, the Ministry of Home Affairs was allocated Rs 1,85,776.55 crore – a more than 11 per cent increase over the Rs 1,66,547 crore allotted in the previous fiscal year.

Last year, as a new feature, funds were allocated for the modernisation of the CAPF, to equip the forces with modern, state-of-the-art weapons and equipment, according to their operational requirement, keeping in view their deployment pattern in different sectors. Besides, upgraded IT solutions were also to be provided to CAPF. The plan announced a total financial outlay of Rs.1,523 crore between 1 February 2022 and 31 March 2026.

The National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) and Delhi Police, both of which also roll up to the Ministry of Home Affairs, also had similar expectations from the budget.

With climate change there has been an increase in episodes of natural disasters, which requires the latest technology relief operations and the next budget should focus on that.

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If the measure to give the primary role to the ITBP gets finalised by the government, it is likely to worsen the situation from an already unequal scenario. And the ostensible reason behind the proposed move is even more inexplicable – ‘to avoid future conflicts between Indian Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army’. This defies military logic, tactical knowledge of the terrain, and the tense situation that has been playing out since April 2020.

Undemarcated Boundaries

While border management is the responsibility of the MHA, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) gets drawn in as well when the matter in concern is undemarcated boundaries. And a large part of India’s cartography involves borders that are still not internationally accepted. Managing these disputed zones is where the Army gets drawn in but without the full command and control of all national assets to ensure the sanctity of India’s boundaries. Egos, turf wars, and the perennial issue of bureaucratic empire-building remain at the forefront instead of a cohesive national operational plan managing these boundaries.

Since boundary delineation disputes ultimately involve the Army, the most effective command and control mechanism would be to have all other national assets, military, police, or other civilian troops under the coordination of the senior-most local commander. This ensures efficient use of the workforce and eschews duplication and wastage of national resources.

Assam Rifles Also Involved

The MHA-MoD turf war has been an ongoing affair, especially involving the Assam Rifles and now the ITBP as well. As India’s oldest counter-insurgency force, the Assam Rifles has been fought over by both ministries for decades. Even as the MHA is the budgeting ministry for the Assam Rifles and provides police-like nomenclature for its ranks, operational control rests with the MoD. A serving Lieutenant General functions as a Director General supported by various Army officers donning police ranks. The MHA has wanted to wrest complete control of the paramilitary force from the MoD and appoint its own personnel to run it. But the operational scenario of the Northeast has ensured better sense prevails.

The report of the Group of Ministers (GOM) on National Security after the Kargil conflict, identified the various problems of border management. It recommended that, to enforce the accountability, the principle of “One Border One Force” may be adopted while considering deployment of forces at the border.”

In 2002, based on the GOM report, the Assam Rifles were nominated as the border-guarding force for the India-Myanmar border, a role which the force had performed effectively for many years. The recommendations of the GOM have been implemented along all our borders with neighbouring countries except the most sensitive and important border with China, where the Army and ITBP continue to man the 3488 km long sensitive and disputed borders.

Dual command and control structure leads to conflicting directions and guidelines emanating from the two controlling ministries, ie, MHA and MoD and intermediary HQs. The government, instead of synergising border management, is creating additional issues of coordination by proposing to merge Assam Rifles with ITBP. 

Remote Command

It is the Army that maintains the overall control of the LAC from India’s side, monitoring patrols and manning key points to keep a check on Chinese movements, and it has been this arrangement since the 1962 Indo-China War as is the wont in all such undemarcated boundary scenarios. The ITBP was raised in October 1962 to monitor the border with Tibet and has been at the frontline of deployment but not under the command and coordination with local military formations. The ITBP patrolling programme, for example, although shared with the Army, was always drawn out in the North Block, New Delhi. Such remote distance command and control is not a workable situation, especially given the undemarcated nature of the boundary and the likelihood of clashes with Chinese troops. For effective boundary management, there needs to be a local commander responsible for all national assets deployed.

Duplication of Resources

The pattern of LAC management has been anything but efficient with two ministries barely coordinating with each other in terms of budgeting and logistics for specialised equipment to expenditure on daily provisions.

While this duplicates purchases without enhancing the economy of scale, it also makes a mess of logistics management. At the scale of deployment now required in Ladakh, particularly, duplication of equipment means extra logistical burdens.

Managing all that specialised equipment drawn from multiple sources requires that much more effort at store-keeping. Alternatively, single command and control ensure that scarce national resources are not wasted on duplicated efforts and avoid wastage on account of maintenance costs.

There have been numerous calls by domain experts to develop enhanced Army-ITBP command and coordination, but they always face the spectre of MHA intransigence. So much so that even though both require similar high-altitude equipment, there is no common purchasing mechanism.

Army’s Objections

For long, the army, backed by the MoD, has taken to strongly reiterating its decade-long demand for the ITBP to be placed under its “operational control” for “better and coordinated border management” along the 4,057-km Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.

On the strength of the Naresh Chandra taskforce on national security, the Army says “Single-point command and control has become critical after the Chinese intrusion.”

But the MHA has already dismissed the move, holding the army will not get control over the ITBP come what may. The MHA officials stress that the ITBP showed alacrity in reporting the 19-km deep intrusion by the Chinese soldiers in Depsang Bulge to all authorities concerned on 15 April 2020.

The army, however, contends there are “glaring deficiencies” in the “deployment and patrolling patterns” of the ITBP, which is also “not optimally-equipped in weaponry” and has “limitations” in reacting to operational contingencies.

Comments

Should the MHA succeed in pushing its case for the ITBP to take the lead role along the LAC, it would require a lot more workforce. Besides lacking the structure and organisational capabilities to tackle conflict situations, the ITBP doesn’t have the troop strength for an enhanced role either. Raising more ITBP battalions then poses a question: Why are budgetary constraints imposed only on armed forces recruitment with a short-term Agniveer formula and not on a Central Armed Police Force (CAPF)? India obviously seems to think that the CAPF is more important for its security than the armed forces that have always pulled its chestnuts out of the fires.

The belief among bureaucrats and police advisors appears to be that the Chinese seek peace and tranquillity along the LAC as also that replacing the army with the ITBP will avoid future clashes. The government continues to fail to comprehend that the Chinese can never be trusted. Adversaries respect strength not peace overtures, as Doklam, Kargil and Ladakh proved. Additional deployment of troops along the LAC, repositioning a strike corps from the plains, as also speeding up the raising of the mountain strike corps sent the message that India means business.

The Chinese philosophy of salami slicing is here to stay. The ramifications of making the ITBP responsible for the undemarcated border are immense. In the case of the Chinese, their border guards (Peoples Armed Police along the LAC) are under the PLA, while in our case, the ITBP remains under the MHA. Thus the ITBP would be challenging the PLA, not their Chinese counterparts. The ITBP neither has the strength nor is it equipped, trained and motivated to fulfil this task. If additional ITBP battalions are raised, then it is even more absurd. This would happen at the cost of the army facing manpower cuts and schemes like Agnipath to cut down expenditure.

Battles between ministries for power and control of forces and borders must stop. The MOD must be responsible for security of un-demarcated areas and the MHA along demarcated borders. Troops deployed along un-demarcated borders must be under the commander responsible for the region.

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In 2013, DARPA announced the advanced One Shot XG program to substantially increase the efficiency of the military snipers. The program revolves around a small, mountable scope system that can either be placed on its spotting scope or on weapon’s barrel. The scope is designed to automatically calculate a number of decisive variables, such as wind conditions, weapon alignment etc., using an internal OS.

Extreme Accuracy Tasked Ordnance

The Extreme Accuracy Tasked Ordnance Program is a project initiated by DARPA, in which they are developing a class of smart and self guided bullets that can change their projected path during the flight to align with the movement of the target or due to any external factors that may drive the bullet off course.

It has an advanced real-time optical guidance systems that lets you track and direct projectiles – bullets to their targets by adjusting for weather, wind, target movement and other factors. In 2016, Russia also revealed that they are already working on a similar “smart bullet” designed to hit targets at a distance of up to 10 km.

Cornershot

This can be the biggest life saver of all in urban combat, where soldiers have to navigate buildings, walls and other obstacles, and if they could shoot their opponents without leaving the cover of a wall, then the risk involved will be greatly reduced. Of course, a bend barrel wouldn’t be such a good idea, so they had to improvise. And the Cornershot is what it led to. A nozzle mounted video camera relays a video feed to a screen on which soldiers can analyze the battleground and take on enemies with no risk of bringing harm to themselves.

Sonic Guns

Sonic and ultrasonic weapons (USW) are weapons of various types that use sound to injure, incapacitate, or kill an opponent. Some sonic weapons are currently in limited use or in research and development by military and police forces. Some of these weapons have been described as sonic bullets, sonic grenades, sonic mines, or sonic cannons. Some make a focused beam of sound or ultrasound; some make an area field of sound.

Extremely high-power sound waves can disrupt or destroy the eardrums of a target and cause severe pain or disorientation. This is usually sufficient to incapacitate a person. Less powerful sound waves can cause humans to experience nausea or discomfort. The use of these frequencies to incapacitate persons has occurred both in anti-citizen special operation and crowd control settings.

Laser Induced Plasma

Effect Weapon

The Pentagon is working on a weapon that uses lasers and plasma to transmit sound files, even human speech, directly to individual people at great distances. The lasers could be beamed down from military planes or other vehicles to issue instructions or disperse crowds of protestors or otherwise disgruntled people in the area. Individuals begin to hear strange, disembodied voices and see bright lights that come seemingly from nowhere, while others duck for cover from phantom machine gun fire or begin to feel a burning sensation.

This specific project, called Non-Lethal Laser Induced Plasma Effects (NL LIPE), aims to have a perfected a beam that can produce audible instructions and commands to an individual or a small group of people within three years and maybe have a practical prototype system ready in five years.

The Pentagon’s central less-than-lethal weapon office, called the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD), is working on it.

Russia’s Filin 5P-42

The Filin 5P-42, a new non-lethal light-based optical interference system designed for military and law enforcement use, is capable of effectively suppressing enemy optical systems including, sniper sights, laser rangefinders, guidance systems and thermal imagers in low light conditions.

By increasing or decreasing the number of emitters in a single system, and combining components with a lower or greater power output, it’s possible to create both strong stations for military and special purpose use and weaker ones for the civilian market, including use by large companies for security or for guarded facilities.

Filin is not so much a weapon as it is a system of protection against weapons. The system interferes with the enemy rifleman or gunner’s ability to aim correctly, to the extent that it may cause some hallucinatory symptoms. While lasers emits a rather powerful beam of light, and can damage both optics and a gunner’s sight, Filin does not blind the adversary.

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