The Allocations were as follows:

Rs 31,772.23 crore – Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).

Rs 24,771.28 crore – Border Security Force (BSF).

Rs 13,214.68 crore – Central Industrial Security Force (CISF).

Rs 8,096.89 crore – Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).

Rs 8,329.10 crore – Seema Suraksha Bal (SSB).

Rs 7,052.46 crore – Assam Rifles (AR).

Rs 1,286.54 crore – National Security Guard (NSG)

Total Rs 1.27 lakh crore earmarked for paramilitary forces.

The allocations made to the ministry, headed by Union Home Minister Amit Shah, according to the Budget document, is higher by over Rs 10,000 crore, as in the Budget for 2022-23, it was pegged at Rs 1,85,776.55 crore.

The bulk of the amount allocated to the MHA, Rs 1,27,756.74 crore, has been earmarked for the CAPFs in comparison to Rs 1,19,070.36 crore in 2022-23.

Among the CAPFs, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), mostly responsible for internal security duties and fighting militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, has been allocated Rs 31,772.23 crore in comparison to Rs 31,495.88 crore given in 2022-23.

The Border Security Force (BSF), which guards India’s border with Pakistan and Bangladesh, besides handling internal security assignments, has been given Rs 24,771.28 crore in comparison to Rs 23,557.51 crore given in the current financial year.

The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which protects vital installations such as nuclear projects, airports and metro networks, has been given Rs 13,214.68 crore in comparison to Rs 12,293.23 crore allocated in 2022-23.

The Shashastra Seema Bal (SSB), which guards India’s borders with Nepal and Bhutan, has been allocated Rs 8,329.10 crore in comparison to Rs 8,019.78 crore given in 2022-23.

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), which guards India’s borders with China, got Rs 8,096.89 crore in comparison to Rs 7,626.38 crore given in the current fiscal.

The Assam Rifles, which is deployed along the India-Myanmar border and for anti-insurgency duties in the North-East, has been allocated Rs 7,052.46 crore in comparison to Rs 6,561.33 crore given in the current financial year.

The National Security Guard (NSG), the elite commando force to tackle any emergency security situation, has been allocated Rs 1,286.54 crore in comparison to Rs 1,183.80 crore given in 2022-23.

Expectations

What the CAPFs expected from the 2023 Union budget was funds for infrastructure development in border areas, better equipment with latest technology for disaster management, training and operations and a robust communication system.

Each year funds for the CAPFs see only a marginal increase, most of which goes into salaries, allowances and other wages, with only a little left over for the development and modernisation of the organisation.

Although a separate fund is also earmarked for modernisation of the forces, focus on infrastructure development and better training and equipment, is often ignored owing to lack of funds.

In the previous budget, in 2022, the Ministry of Home Affairs was allocated Rs 1,85,776.55 crore – a more than 11 per cent increase over the Rs 1,66,547 crore allotted in the previous fiscal year.

Last year, as a new feature, funds were allocated for the modernisation of the CAPF, to equip the forces with modern, state-of-the-art weapons and equipment, according to their operational requirement, keeping in view their deployment pattern in different sectors. Besides, upgraded IT solutions were also to be provided to CAPF. The plan announced a total financial outlay of Rs.1,523 crore between 1 February 2022 and 31 March 2026.

The National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) and Delhi Police, both of which also roll up to the Ministry of Home Affairs, also had similar expectations from the budget.

With climate change there has been an increase in episodes of natural disasters, which requires the latest technology relief operations and the next budget should focus on that.

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If the measure to give the primary role to the ITBP gets finalised by the government, it is likely to worsen the situation from an already unequal scenario. And the ostensible reason behind the proposed move is even more inexplicable – ‘to avoid future conflicts between Indian Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army’. This defies military logic, tactical knowledge of the terrain, and the tense situation that has been playing out since April 2020.

Undemarcated Boundaries

While border management is the responsibility of the MHA, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) gets drawn in as well when the matter in concern is undemarcated boundaries. And a large part of India’s cartography involves borders that are still not internationally accepted. Managing these disputed zones is where the Army gets drawn in but without the full command and control of all national assets to ensure the sanctity of India’s boundaries. Egos, turf wars, and the perennial issue of bureaucratic empire-building remain at the forefront instead of a cohesive national operational plan managing these boundaries.

Since boundary delineation disputes ultimately involve the Army, the most effective command and control mechanism would be to have all other national assets, military, police, or other civilian troops under the coordination of the senior-most local commander. This ensures efficient use of the workforce and eschews duplication and wastage of national resources.

Assam Rifles Also Involved

The MHA-MoD turf war has been an ongoing affair, especially involving the Assam Rifles and now the ITBP as well. As India’s oldest counter-insurgency force, the Assam Rifles has been fought over by both ministries for decades. Even as the MHA is the budgeting ministry for the Assam Rifles and provides police-like nomenclature for its ranks, operational control rests with the MoD. A serving Lieutenant General functions as a Director General supported by various Army officers donning police ranks. The MHA has wanted to wrest complete control of the paramilitary force from the MoD and appoint its own personnel to run it. But the operational scenario of the Northeast has ensured better sense prevails.

The report of the Group of Ministers (GOM) on National Security after the Kargil conflict, identified the various problems of border management. It recommended that, to enforce the accountability, the principle of “One Border One Force” may be adopted while considering deployment of forces at the border.”

In 2002, based on the GOM report, the Assam Rifles were nominated as the border-guarding force for the India-Myanmar border, a role which the force had performed effectively for many years. The recommendations of the GOM have been implemented along all our borders with neighbouring countries except the most sensitive and important border with China, where the Army and ITBP continue to man the 3488 km long sensitive and disputed borders.

Dual command and control structure leads to conflicting directions and guidelines emanating from the two controlling ministries, ie, MHA and MoD and intermediary HQs. The government, instead of synergising border management, is creating additional issues of coordination by proposing to merge Assam Rifles with ITBP. 

Remote Command

It is the Army that maintains the overall control of the LAC from India’s side, monitoring patrols and manning key points to keep a check on Chinese movements, and it has been this arrangement since the 1962 Indo-China War as is the wont in all such undemarcated boundary scenarios. The ITBP was raised in October 1962 to monitor the border with Tibet and has been at the frontline of deployment but not under the command and coordination with local military formations. The ITBP patrolling programme, for example, although shared with the Army, was always drawn out in the North Block, New Delhi. Such remote distance command and control is not a workable situation, especially given the undemarcated nature of the boundary and the likelihood of clashes with Chinese troops. For effective boundary management, there needs to be a local commander responsible for all national assets deployed.

Duplication of Resources

The pattern of LAC management has been anything but efficient with two ministries barely coordinating with each other in terms of budgeting and logistics for specialised equipment to expenditure on daily provisions.

While this duplicates purchases without enhancing the economy of scale, it also makes a mess of logistics management. At the scale of deployment now required in Ladakh, particularly, duplication of equipment means extra logistical burdens.

Managing all that specialised equipment drawn from multiple sources requires that much more effort at store-keeping. Alternatively, single command and control ensure that scarce national resources are not wasted on duplicated efforts and avoid wastage on account of maintenance costs.

There have been numerous calls by domain experts to develop enhanced Army-ITBP command and coordination, but they always face the spectre of MHA intransigence. So much so that even though both require similar high-altitude equipment, there is no common purchasing mechanism.

Army’s Objections

For long, the army, backed by the MoD, has taken to strongly reiterating its decade-long demand for the ITBP to be placed under its “operational control” for “better and coordinated border management” along the 4,057-km Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.

On the strength of the Naresh Chandra taskforce on national security, the Army says “Single-point command and control has become critical after the Chinese intrusion.”

But the MHA has already dismissed the move, holding the army will not get control over the ITBP come what may. The MHA officials stress that the ITBP showed alacrity in reporting the 19-km deep intrusion by the Chinese soldiers in Depsang Bulge to all authorities concerned on 15 April 2020.

The army, however, contends there are “glaring deficiencies” in the “deployment and patrolling patterns” of the ITBP, which is also “not optimally-equipped in weaponry” and has “limitations” in reacting to operational contingencies.

Comments

Should the MHA succeed in pushing its case for the ITBP to take the lead role along the LAC, it would require a lot more workforce. Besides lacking the structure and organisational capabilities to tackle conflict situations, the ITBP doesn’t have the troop strength for an enhanced role either. Raising more ITBP battalions then poses a question: Why are budgetary constraints imposed only on armed forces recruitment with a short-term Agniveer formula and not on a Central Armed Police Force (CAPF)? India obviously seems to think that the CAPF is more important for its security than the armed forces that have always pulled its chestnuts out of the fires.

The belief among bureaucrats and police advisors appears to be that the Chinese seek peace and tranquillity along the LAC as also that replacing the army with the ITBP will avoid future clashes. The government continues to fail to comprehend that the Chinese can never be trusted. Adversaries respect strength not peace overtures, as Doklam, Kargil and Ladakh proved. Additional deployment of troops along the LAC, repositioning a strike corps from the plains, as also speeding up the raising of the mountain strike corps sent the message that India means business.

The Chinese philosophy of salami slicing is here to stay. The ramifications of making the ITBP responsible for the undemarcated border are immense. In the case of the Chinese, their border guards (Peoples Armed Police along the LAC) are under the PLA, while in our case, the ITBP remains under the MHA. Thus the ITBP would be challenging the PLA, not their Chinese counterparts. The ITBP neither has the strength nor is it equipped, trained and motivated to fulfil this task. If additional ITBP battalions are raised, then it is even more absurd. This would happen at the cost of the army facing manpower cuts and schemes like Agnipath to cut down expenditure.

Battles between ministries for power and control of forces and borders must stop. The MOD must be responsible for security of un-demarcated areas and the MHA along demarcated borders. Troops deployed along un-demarcated borders must be under the commander responsible for the region.

The post MHA-MoD Turf War on Control of ITBP appeared first on IMR.

The Agnipath Scheme approved by the government and now under implementation has its serious flaws, which must be addressed.

Lessons from Ukraine

The ongoing war in Ukraine has some very pertinent lessons, which India must ingest and implement before it is too late. Simply put, 70 per cent of our high-tech equipment is of Russian origin, which has been put to the unforgiving test of combat. There is a dire need to retro-fit and re-design based on lessons learnt. The key lesson, however, is the unprecedented levels of lethality on the modern battlefield and the sheer scale of casualties that are staggering and unprecedented. We are almost back to the carnage and slaughter levels of World War I era. The Clausewitzian dictum of war, not just as an unrelenting contest of national wills but also of stamina and endurance, is back. This is the most inopportune time to downsize or reduce numbers (as we are doing in India). The world over, defence budgets are rising very fast and armed forces are adding not just new weapons and equipment but also increasing the size of their armed forces. This is the new era of not just high-tech but high-tech and Mass. Nations that want to win in such unrelenting wars will need to generate the mass that is required to prevail in such intense and long duration grinds of attrition. Wars will increasingly be a test of national will and stamina to stay the course. Both Russia and Ukraine are feverishly raising and training new formations even as they are locked in brutal combat. Downsizing a standing field force in such a dire scenario could well be an invitation to very severe problems in wartime.

High Tech and Mass. Today, the world is witnessing the sheer costs nations are willing to endure to attain their objectives and simply prevail in such hard fought slogs of attrition. Russia is not at all short of high-tech equipment. (We are buying most of ours from them). What Russia is painfully short of is manpower and its ill-effects are for the world to see as it recycles the same tiered and battered formations again and again and is constantly having to move its units and formations around to plug gaps. Russia attacked Ukraine with a force of just 1,50,000. Ukraine, in turn, mobilized fully and has fielded a force of 2,50,000. This has enabled it to regain the initiative because it can constantly open up new fronts. Manpower is not a drain on resources needed to buy high-tech equipment. It is a key resource without which no war can be won. India has no dearth of manpower. In fact, we have the largest and youngest population in the world. Yet we have been exhibiting an obsessive concern to down size and reduce our manpower, as if instead of being an asset, it was our biggest liability.

Historical Precedents

There are some underlying reasons and a history to this down-sizing urge – especially in the Indian Army. It goes back to 1990, when the Indian economy had come close to the point of collapse. The government of the day told the armed forces they simply had no money to give for our military modernsiation and we would have to wait till our GDP went up. In a desperate bid to raise money for the capital budget, then Army chief Gen VP Malik had come up with the idea of slashing the Revenue Budget by down-sizing. Desperate times call for desperate solutions, perhaps. Today, our economy is the fifth largest in the world. We had suppressed manpower by 50,000 men and were trying to cut another 50,000. That is the time the Kargil War intervened. We were forced to restore disbanded units and raise some 36 new Rashtriya Rifles battalions and new Sector and Force HQs (not to mention a new Corps HQ for Leh). In cost cutting and accounting exercises, we simply cannot afford to lose sight of our threat environment and need for retaining operational effectiveness. Accountant Generals cannot replace Generals in times of war.

The primary rationale for the launch the Agnipath scheme was the panic over the ballooning pension bill of the armed forces. This panic was not entirely unjustified. The combined salary bill of the armed forces today is Rs 1.08 lakh crores. The pension bill now surpasses it at a whopping Rs 1.12 lakh crores. Quite clearly, this level of outlay for pensions was unsustainable and something would have to be done about it. There was a proposal to apply the National Pension Scheme (NPS) to the armed forces, too, but this was deemed politically unacceptable. There was a far more viable Inverse Induction Model – wherein soldiers retiring from armed forces would automatically move on to the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and paramilitary forces (PMFs) or do a short stint and then migrate to CAPFs. This was the most logical option and one which the armed forces have been asking for decades. Unfortunately, the IPS lobby has been most unwilling to accept this for pure reasons of turf, empire building and institutional egos. The ostensible reason given is that they need young troopers. Considering that the age of retirement in the CAPFs is 58, this sounds a bit rich. Data indicates that the CAPFs so far took only 0.9% of retired soldiers in Groupp C posts and just 0.47% in Gp D posts. Thus, the most logical and desirable model which would have provided tactical skills and combat experience of the Army soldiers to the CAPFs, was never allowed to take off.

The Agnipath Scheme now adopted is a mish-mash of many models. Unfortunately, in trying to please all it has ended up pleasing almost nobody. The ostensible aims are rather noble. It is to infuse discipline into the Indian population at large. So far, each year 60,000 armed forces personnel used to retire and go back to the villages. If they and the National Cadet Corps (NCC) could not instill general discipline, I fail to see how 43,000 Agniveers every year (present intake) will make a greater difference? A great deal of concern is expressed about the second career of the Agniveers. Promises galore are being made but these would have to be fortified by an act of Parliament.

My basic question however, is about the first chosen career. How viable or attractive is it in comparative terms? A youth in a village – would he opt for the Police, CRPF or BSF, etc, where once in he can serve for 58 years or a most uncertain four year Tour of Duty in the Army? Four years is simply too short a period to integrate the Agniveers into the ethos and regimentation of an Army unit – especially where crew-served weapons are involved. There is also the danger of trained manpower being exploited by terrorists, gangsters or anti- national elements on release. We had faced this threat in the Punjab in the 1980s. Shabeg Singh was a former major general of the Army. If he and other boys could go astray then how can we be so sanguine that the Maoist or other groups will not exploit the Agniveers? Also, we need to consider the burden on the commanding officers at the unit level. If the CO is operationally committed on the Line of Control/ counter-terrorism operations/ Line of Actual Control, how does he train these Agniveers? By the time he does, they would be on their way out. Will a short-term inductee not be risk-averse? The Ukarine war has clearly highlighted the conscripts and short term inductees as the weakest link in the chain.

Cutting Manpower

The Agnipath scheme has been accompanied by a manpower cut of almost 1.5 lakhs in the Army. For two years no recruitment was done on the plea of Covid. Since 60,000 soldiers retire each year, it implies that the Army is short by minimum 1.5–2 lakhs already. Given the alarming level of rising threats from China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey and terrorists elsewhere, this almost sounds like a civilisational death wish. The Agnipath scheme is long term in impact. Financial gains will only be realized 15 year down the line when they would ostensibly have retired. So, no new weapons will come into the armed forces now as a result of this scheme. We still have to find resources to buy or produce the weapons in the here and now. Meanwhile, the existing manpower assets have also been slashed.

Ukraine Pointers

The Russia-Ukraine War has clearly highlighted the tremendous new lethality of the modern battlefield. The casualties to weapons, equipment and personnel have been of an unprecedented level, that is reminiscent of the slaughters of the First World War. Force preservation, reconstitution of battered units and casualty replacement are the worrying new dilemmas. Wars will no longer be short duration and high-intensity. The Ukraine War is already into its seventh month and the end is nowhere in sight. It is becoming a serious test of national stamina and endurance. Russia has no shortage of equipment. It is drastically short of manpower and its problems are acutely visible to the whole world. We have no dearth of manpower but are busy slashing and down-sizing when we need to be desperately creating new jobs for the rising youth-bulge in our population. The pattern of wars is inexorably shifting back to the levels of lethality of the two World Wars. The Indian Army was a regular standing army precisely structured to fight such intense wars. Now that we are returning to the era of such wars, we are busy destabilizing ourselves by creating unprecedented amounts of organizational turbulence. Why do we want to down size, get in short-term inductees as 50 per cent of the force, reduce 17 single service commands to just five Tri-Service ones, as also change our regimental model – and why do we want it done day before yesterday? We have a tried and tested armed forces, which have served us very well so far. An old military proverb says “don’t change horses mid-stream” before the battle.

What then is the way out? Two constructive suggestions – increase the colour service from four to seven years and retention from 25% to 50%. We will, thereby, make the army a viable career and return to the tried and tested model, which kept the Army young and won you the 1971 War!

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The scheme has been accused of diluting the professionalism of the armed forces. They also feel that the process will result in mixed units, who will lack cohesion and hence regimentation, which will reduce their effectiveness. There is also the criticism that with the induction of women in all trades, a unit’s fighting efficiency and rigour will reduce.

The concept is new for the Indian armed forces, but similar schemes have been implemented in several other countries, without any adverse impacts.

The scheme has been evolved keeping in mind the phenomenal changes in society and technology, and to equip the organisation to be future ready. In a modern battle field everyone requires a younger workforce, tech-savvy or tech friendly armed force and a modern fighting soldier.

The future of warfare entails a lighter human footprint, but soldiers equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry, supported by cutting-edge technology to fight a war in a highly informationised environment. This recruitment reform would help in right sizing the armed forces provided it gets dovetailed into the imperatives of fifth generation warfare.

There is a desire among the youth, especially those in the border areas, to serve the country for a short duration, rather than settle for a service spanning about two decades.

In a Nutshell

Agniveers will go through 26 weeks of basic military training (the existing module is of 44 weeks), bear a distinct rank; and have on-the-job training in the unit. After the four-year engagement, they will go back to society. During the service, their uniform will have a distinct insignia. The armed forces should achieve a younger warrior profile without compromising on quality or capability. And, Agniveers should be looked after in terms of employment benefits and post-exit opportunities.

For the ranks below officers, the Agnipath Scheme is the equivalent of the short service scheme for officers The armed forces have a Short Service Commission (SSC) for officers for 10 to 14 years, which was necessitated as a cadre-management exercise. The SSC scheme has worked well and SSC officers have been fairly well employed in the civil world.

Agniveers will be selected from across the country. The selection process should improve homogeneity, national cohesion and integration.

Agniveers will be entitled to all medical facilities, leave, CSD facilities, honours and awards. They will have a fixed salary package, with annual increments. In addition, they will get the risk and hardship, dress, and travel allowances. Agniveers will be provided life insurance cover for their engagement period. They will also be entitled to compensation for disability. One-time ex-gratia will be paid in case of death on duty in addition to the insurance.

The tax-exempt ‘Seva Nidhi’ package and detailed skill-set certificate will be provided to Agniveers, for possible employment outside.

Significant Advantages

One significant advantage of this scheme would be the much lower age profile of the service. It will increase promotional avenues of the permanent cadre. The significant advantage for the young entrant will be early employment with significantly good emoluments and a 25 per cent chance of joining the permanent cadre. The Agniveers will acquire new skill sets, leadership and team-building capabilities.

It may not be possible to train or assign hi-tech jobs in this short period of engagement of Agniveers, but they will be used for many less technical jobs, including working on the aircraft and on ships. Those who become permanent employees will go through higher technical training. The armed forces have confirmed that their combat capability will not be affected by such enrolment.

Primarily, the scheme has been woven around the need for the national exchequer to save money, which can then be used for modernisation of the forces. India’s defence budget for 2022-23 is Rs 5.25 lakh crore, of which Rs 1.2 lakh crore is for pension component. As per reports, the “prospective life-term saving” in the cost of engagement of a jawan who leaves after 17 years of service with pension and other benefits, as compared to an Agniveer, will be Rs 11.5 crore. National defence budget management is essential. There has to be a much more significant percentage for Capital acquisitions. No major country has such adverse capital to revenue expenditure and pension bill ratios. It is hoped that the money saved would be used to focus more on the advancement of technology and military modernisation.

Countering Criticism

It is unfair to say that Agniveers will not have the desired status in the forces. They will be a key member of the team. Similarly, it will also give an opportunity for the youth to choose if they want to continue the armed forces career or switch to other options.

While there may not be assured side-stepping in paramilitary forces or in any other government organisation, help and guidance will be provided to soldiers for their employment, including in the private sector.

As regards professionalism, a cursory look at the list of gallantry award winners will indicate that most of them had service less than five years and there is no doubt that with better educational qualifications, it is feasible to abridge the existing training period.

As regards regimentation, there are mixed units in the army, which have in no way performed lesser than the ‘pure’ regiments. In any case, dedication is a factor of motivation and not of the number of years that one puts in.

The example of western countries indicates that the induction of women in no way reduces the efficiency, but in most cases enhances it. More significantly, the scheme would reduce the average age of the force thereby enhancing its youthful profile and fitness levels.

There is also an apprehension that this youthful population with military training could “create political militias”, if they cannot find suitable employment avenues. However, a young person aged 21-25 with a nationwide exposure and having led a disciplined life will have much better employability than any other youth from a similar background.

The Seva Nidhi funds will prepare them for self-employment. Of course, both the central government and the state governments as well as the society at large will need to provide an enabling environment for their absorption into other walks of life.

No Change in Regimental System

No change is being done to the Army’s regimental system under the ‘Agnipath’ scheme and the numbers of personnel to be recruited in the first year of its roll out would only make up three per cent of the armed forces. There were apprehensions that the ‘Agnipath’ scheme would change the composition of several regiments that recruit youths from specific regions as well as castes such as Rajputs, Jats and Sikhs.

On the criticism that the short-duration tenure of ‘Agniveers’ will harm the effectiveness of the armed forces, such a system exists in several countries, and hence, it is already “tested out and considered best practice for an agile army. Most armies across the world depend upon their youths and the new scheme will only bring about a right mix of “50 per cent-50 per cent” slowly in a very long run of youngsters and experienced personnel in the supervisory ranks.

China Case Study

Military reforms in China were the result of the Gulf War of 1990 and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995. The Chinese Communist Party leadership adopted a three-pronged approach by exponentially ramping up defence spending. It involved investing in new weaponry, enhancing anti-access area denial tactics, and establishing programmes to boost the Chinese defence industry. They brought in a fundamental change – integrated fighting force with first-rate naval and air capabilities. As the other services expanded, the army was shrunk to around 9,75,000 from an approximate three million in the mid-70s and the higher defence management paradigm was reorganised into theatre commands by February 2016.

Suggestions

In addition to the reservation provided for former Agniveers in CAPFs and other PSUs, both central government and state governments, there needs to be provisions to provide them with cheaper credit to start their own businesses. Despite 5th and 6th Central Pay Commissions clearly recommending ex-servicemen’s induction into the CPOs, it has not been implemented by bureaucrats, who occupy the top echelons of CPOs and consider them their handmaidens. It is essential that at least 25 per cent of jobs in all CPOs be reserved for former Agniveers. This will provide CPOs with trained workforce, thereby reducing their training costs, and will ensure that no Agniveer remains unemployed and disgruntled after his ‘Tour of Duty’.

The Agnipath Scheme should be seen as a national project, rather than just a defence ministry initiative to cut costs. It must, therefore, not be allowed to fail due to bureaucratic machinations.

Among a slew of reforms that the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) recommended, one pertained to the recruitment practices of the armed forces. It stated, “the Army must be young and fit at all times. Therefore, instead of the present practice of having 17 years of colour service (as has been the policy since 1976), it would be advisable to reduce the colour service to a period of seven to ten years and, thereafter, release these officers and men for service here”.

In 2000, a Group of Ministers (GOM) endorsed the KRC’s recommendation stating that, “in order to ensure that the armed forces are at their fighting best at all times, there is a need to ensure a younger profile of the services. However, this is a highly complex matter. While the army desires a younger age profile, so do the central paramilitary forces (CPMFs)”. The Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security set up by the UPA government in 2011 also addressed this issue. Its report, however, is not public so far.

Keeping all aspects in mind, the colour service of jawans should be set at seven years, instead of four as incorporated in the Scheme.

The defence forces should absorb 50 per cent and release the balance to the civilian pool. Over the next 60 years, 13.8 lakh youth would be Agniveers, provided the 50 per cent absorption formulae is accepted.

The Agnipath scheme should be made an Act through legislation in Parliament with the proviso of being a pre-qualification for:

(i) Entry into all government and corporate jobs;

(ii) candidates for Assembly and Lok Sabha elections should be Agniveers as a prerequisite;

(iii) Ministry of Defence staff cadre.

Once the MoD stands dispensed with, 45% of the pension bill for civilians in the ministry, currently as part of the defence budget, will vanish, thereby resulting in national savings.

The post In Defence of the Agnipath Scheme appeared first on IMR.

The Union Cabinet took a historic decision approving an attractive recruitment scheme for Indian youth to serve in the Armed Forces for which a scheme has been introduced with the name Agnipath. The youth, in the age group of 17.5 years to 23 years (revised upper age limit) will be selected under the Agnipath and called Agniveers. With the announcement of this Agnipath Scheme, a window of opportunity has been opened for the youths to serve their nation for a period of four years.

Broad Objectives

The broad objectives of the Agnipath Scheme are:

•  To enhance the youthful profile of the Armed Forces so that they are at their fighting best at all times with increased risk-taking ability.

•  To imbibe the Armed Forces ethos, courage, commitment, and teamwork in the youth.

•  To provide abilities and qualities such as discipline, motivation, dynamism, and work skills so that youth remains as an asset.

•  To provide an opportunity to the youth who may be keen to serve the Nation in uniform for a short period of time.

•  To attract youth talent among the society to effectively exploit, adapt, and use emerging modern technologies with enhanced technical thresholds of intake while leveraging Technical institutions of the country.

The Scheme

The Key Features are:

• Opportunity to serve the nation as Agniveers through enrolment in the Forces.

•   Pan-India merit based recruitment.

•   Four years tenure.

•   Attractive monthly emoluments and handsome ‘Seva Nidhi’ package.

•   Opportunity to apply for enrolment in permanent cadre.

Based on merit and organisational requirement, up to 25% Agniveers selected through central, transparent, rigorous system after four years. The other 75 per cent will be released with benefits.

Agnipath scheme has a recruitment process for individuals below the rank of officer, with the goal of deploying fitter, younger troops on the front lines, many of whom will be on four-year contracts.

The Armed Forces will be recruiting 46,000 Agniveers in 2022 through Agnipath scheme. On completion of the four-year period, Aginveers will go to the society as a disciplined, dynamic, motivated, and skilled workforce for employment in other sectors to pursue their career in the job of their choice. During their four years in service, the recruits will be trained by the armed forces in the skills required.

Women will also be inducted into the armed forces under the new scheme. Officials, however, added that the recruitment of women under the scheme will depend on the needs of the respective services.

Conditions of Service

Eligibility. Age limit for applicants is 17.5 to 23 years.

Recruitment. Candidates will be enrolled under the respective Service Act for a service duration of four years including training period.

Selection. Selection will be done through a centralised, transparent and rigorous system. On enrolment in regular cadre, pay fixed as regular soldier. Pension as per extant regulations.

Screening Assessment. Centralised transparent screening, based on merit and demonstrated performance during service. Agniveers can apply on volunteer basis to enroll in the regular cadre.

Financial Package

Composite Annual Package. Firs year package – approx Rs 4.76 lakhs. Upgradation up to approx Rs 6.92 lakhs in the fourth year.

Allowances. Risk and hardship, ration, dress, travel allowances as applicable.

Seva Nidhi.

On completion of four years tenure all candidates will be entitled to ‘Seva Nidhi’.

•   30 per cent of monthly emoluments to be contributed by individuals.

•   Equal amount matched and contributed by the Government.

•   Corpus of approx Rs 11.71 lakhs after four years exempted from Income Tax.

Death Compensation.

•   Non-contributory life insurance cover of Rs 48 lakhs.

•   Additional ex-gratia of Rs 44 lakhs for death attributable to service.

•   Pay for unserved portion up to four years including ‘Seva Nidhi’ component.

Disability Compensation. Compensation based on percentage of disability laid down by medical authorities. One time ex-gratia of Rs 44/ 25/ 15 lakhs for 100%/ 75%/ 50% disability, respectively.

Incentives and Job Reservation

Incentives. The ministries of home affairs and defence announced concessions and incentives that will assist Agniveers in their further employment. PSUs under housing and petroleum ministries were working on hiring ‘Agniveers’ after their service in the armed forces. Shipping ministry announced 6 attractive service opportunities for Agniveers from Indian Navy for a smooth transition into Merchant Navy.

Reservation. The government has announced a 10% reservation for ‘Agniveers’ in central police forces & Assam Rifles with upper age relaxation. Defence Ministry also came up with a 10% quota in the Coast Guard, defence civilian posts and 16 defence PSUs, which include major ones like Hindustan Aeronautics, Bharat Electronics, as well as four shipyards and 41 ordnance factories.

The post The Agnipath Scheme appeared first on IMR.

OPVs are long range surface ships, capable of operating in maritime zones of the country including island territories with helicopter operation capabilities. The OPV is 98m long, 15m wide, has 3.6m draught, 2140 tonnes displacement and a range of 5,000 nm. It can attain a sustained speed of up to 26 knots.

ALSO READ: China creating a flashpoint in South China Sea

Some of the roles undertaken by the OPVs include coastal and offshore patrol, policing maritime zones of the country, surveillance, anti-smuggling and anti-piracy operations.

The vessel will be inducted into the Coast Guard after completion of extensive trials and testing for the equipment and machinery.

Larsen and Toubro has already designed and built ICGS Vikram, ICGS Vijaya, ICGS Veera, ICGS Varaha, ICGS Varad and ICGS Vajra.

ICGS Kanaklata Barua Commissioned

Earlier, on 30 September, Fast Patrol Vessel (FPV) ICGS Kanaklata Barua of the Indian Coast Guard was commissioned at the Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Kolkata. The FPV was delivered to the Indian Coast Guard on June 9.

FPVs are medium-range surface vessels with a length of 50m, width of 7.5m and displacement of around 308 tonnes. Its powerful, fuel-efficient platforms are designed to perform multipurpose operations like patrolling, anti-smuggling, anti-poaching and rescue operations.

The vessels are designed for a maximum speed of 34 knots with an endurance of more than 1,500 nm. It is equipped with three main engines. The entire design of the FPVs has been developed in-house by GRSE as per requirements specified by the Indian Coast Guard.

Coastal Security Exercise

A two-day coastal security exercise, named ‘Sagar Kavach,’ was conducted by the Indian Navy, along with Indian Coast Guard and concluded on 8 October.

Coastal police, coastal district administration, Cochin Port, fisheries department, Customs, Marine Enforcement Wing, Central Industrial Security force (CISF), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Light House department and members of fishermen community participated in the exercise. More than 20 ships of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard as well as 50 patrol craft manned by various security agencies participated in the exercise.

The post COAST GUARD: OPV Launched, FPV Commissioned appeared first on IMR.

On 31 August, a statement from the Army said that on the night of August 29-30, “PLA troops violated the previous consensus arrived at during military and diplomatic engagements…and carried out provocative military movements to change the status quo.” However, the Indian troops “pre-empted this PLA activity on the Southern Bank of Pangong Tso Lake, undertook measures to strengthen our positions and thwart Chinese intentions to unilaterally change facts on ground.”

A few hours later, the social media was abuzz with news that a Tibetan officer had died. Company Leader Nyima Tenzin lost his life on a landmine in the theatre of operations.

This news turned the spotlight on the Special Frontier Force (SFF) and its predominantly Tibetan soldiers. The deployment of the SFF emerged as a source of pride for India’s Tibetan community. A video from 4 September showed Tibetans in Shimla gathering, singing and tying their traditional khatas (white scarves) to a departing convoy as they waved goodbye to SFF personnel headed for the Ladakh front.

ALSO READ: INDIA-CHINA: Indian Troops Occupy Key Heights North of Pangong Tso

The SFF serves in the Directorate General of Security (DGS) – a wing of India’s external intelligence agency R&AW. With help from the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) – the air wing of the DGS and superior reconnaissance capabilities, the Tibetan refugees-dominated SFF can conduct covert operations behind Chinese enemy lines at will.

The SFF has mostly operated in the shadows since its creation in 1962. When Tibetan resistance fighters began crossing over into India with the 1956 uprising. More followed in the wake of the failed uprising three years later and the Dalai Lama’s exile to India. Most of the resistance fighters were from the Kham region of eastern Tibet, which was one of the major sites of rebellion against the Chinese.

Earlier they were used in a covert manner, but now, it’s against China. It’s a clear message, even to the people in Tibet.

Raising of the SFF

The fighters did not lack passion but needed weapons and training. The CIA was roped in for training the SFF recruits, though no written agreements existed. This suited the Americans well, as their own agenda in Tibet got bolstered through this involvement. They were smuggled into East Pakistan and flown to the island of Saipan in the Pacific, where for four months they were trained in communication and guerilla warfare. In July 1957, they were air-dropped into Tibet and started supplying intelligence to Washington.

By 1958, 23 units had completely driven the Chinese from Tibet’s south, but were in dire need of arms and ammunition. There were 25,000 fighters, but most poorly equipped. The CIA support failed to deliver.

The 6,000 or so fighters who remained in India would be given a new opportunity in 1962. Encouraged by Biju Patnaik, a World War 2 veteran and Bhola Nath Mullik, the then chief of Intelligence Bureau, prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru gave the green light to recruitment of Tibetan refugees. Mullik had the support of leaders of the Tibetan resistance movement.

India, perhaps, wanted China to know that Tibetan nationalism could and would be weaponised against the PLA, should push come to shove again?

Maj Gen Sujan Singh Uban, who had earlier commanded the 22 Mountain Regiment and was a Second World War veteran was chosen to raise the force. An old Gurkha training centre at Chakrata (Uttarakhand) was lying vacant. The unit was raised on 14 November 1962. A week later, China announced its “unilateral ceasefire”, so the unit did not see any action in the war.

The outfit was called Establishment 22, named after Gen Uban’s old mountain regiment. They would be all paratroopers — an elite unit capable of high-altitude warfare, special operations, and fighting behind enemy lines. They would report to the Cabinet Secretariat, and were not part of the Army. A women’s wing was also created. In 1967, Establishment 22 was expanded and renamed the Special Frontier Force.

They would finally see action in the 1971 war. They were deployed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and fought with extraordinary valour. More than 50 would lay down their lives, a sacrifice that was, given the secrecy of the outfit, never given its due recognition.

In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the CIA-trained, Indian-funded Tibetans used hastily-imported Bulgarian assault rifles and U.S.-manufactured carbines to obscure their links to India. Fighting under the direct command of RAW’s legendary spymaster Rameshwar Kao, Brig. Uban’s forces engaged in a series of low-grade border skirmishes.

ALSO READ: PLA troops vacate Finger 4 area in Pangong Tso

The SFF succeeded in destroying several key bridges at the cost of 56 dead and 190 wounded. They ensured that Pakistan’s 97 Independent Brigade and 2 Commando Battalion remained bogged down in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Indira Gandhi deployed the SFF, once again, during the Operation Blue Star in Harmandir Sahib in Amritsar.

The SFF also played a key role during the Kargil conflict. It is rumoured that the capture of Tiger Hill was made possible because of the SFF deployment.

New Attention

The new attention on the SFF holds implications both inside Tibet and for the Tibetan community in India. Tibetan people in the diaspora and refugee community are now showing their patriotism. The limelight might provide the opportunity for the SFF’s warriors to get long overdue recognition from the government.

The use of the SFF against China has renewed attention towards the Free Tibet movement.

China Nervous

Two days before the Tibetan lost his life in Ladakh, on 28-29 August, the Seventh Tibet Work Forum (TWF) was held in Beijing. For the first time, the TWF was given large publicity. The TV report lasted more than 14 minutes, mostly quoting XiJinping. In his speech, he emphasised that Beijing’s objective was to build a new socialist modern Tibet that is “united, prosperous, civilised, harmonious and beautiful.”

Seventy years after the so-called ‘liberation’ of Tibet, has no ethnic Tibetan been made Party Secretary in Tibet? No Tibetan has ever made it to the Politburo? The reason is that the Han still do not trust the Tibetans, though Xi is fond of mentioning his theory: “Governing border areas is the key to governing the country and stabilising Tibet is a priority for governing border areas.”

China has been quietly militarising the Tibetan plateau for over 60 years under the pretext of development and modernisation. For Tibet, this has only led to an influx of soldiers, Han (Chinese) settlers, and weapons. The militarisation of the Tibetan plateau has led to the recent Galwan incident.

China’s renewed attempt in crushing any form of Tibetan dissent is complementary to its advances along the Indo-Tibetan border. China’s control over Tibet is not only highly questionable, the vast number of cultural, socio-political, and humanitarian atrocities it has carried out has made it constitutionally immoral.

The PLA has been trying hard to recruit Tibetans in the Army and in militia outfits.

The two ‘coincidental’ events – India taking control over the ridge south of Pangong Tso and the Tibet Working Forum in Beijing – are linked to the ‘stability’ of the borders. Tibetans are ready to give up their lives to protect India’s from China. Clearly, Beijing is troubled by the happenings in Ladakh.

Commemts

The very fact that India has allowed the deployment of the SFF to go public suggests that New Delhi has just one message to give – India hardly cares about what China thinks. Gone are the days when pro-China policymakers in India would desist from taking steps that would ‘annoy China’. India is least bothered if border infrastructure in Ladakh antagonises China or if the ‘22 Establishment’ instils a sense of fear in the Chinese psyche.

India does not care if New Delhi’s support to the Dalai Lama irks China or if Xi Jinping is worried about Tibet and wants to curb ‘splitism’ in the occupied territory. If China does not turn to status quo ante in Eastern Ladakh, India will force the real facts on the ground dating back to the pre-1950 era when Tibet was an independent Buddhist nation, because if the SFF can help raise the Mukti Bahini for the liberation of Bangladesh, it can also free Tibet from Chinese occupation.

The Vikasi of the SFF have not forgotten how Tibet was coerced to become a part of China in 1951 when a Tibetan delegation was made to accede the Buddhist nation to China even without an approval from the Dalai Lama. Nor have the Tibetan fighters forgotten how the Dalai Lama was insulted in 1959 when Mao Zedong’s PLA forces shelled the Potala Palace.

Tibetans have not forgotten the thousands of monks who were either murdered by China or driven to immolate themselves. By sending Tibetans on the front-line, India is reminding China that the land it is fighting from is not even Chinese land.

The post INDIA-CHINA Clash: Tibetan Soldiers Employed in Ladakh appeared first on IMR.

With Naikoo, who carried a reward of Rs 12 lakh on his head, two other terrorists were killed in a separate encounter in Sharshali Khrew area of Awantipora on 5 May.

Six months of persistent surveillance and the arrest of a mason, who reportedly built HuM commander Riyaz Naikoo’s hideout, led the forces to the big catch. A cordon and search operation had been carried out after the security forces were tipped off about the presence of militants in Beighpora area.

Mobile internet services were suspended in Kashmir as a precautionary measure. Soon after the incident, stone pelting broke out in the area following which cellular services were also shut.

Naikoo had taken over the HuM leadership in the Valley from Mohammad Yasin Itoo, alias Mehmood Ghaznawi, after he was killed in August 2017 in a gunfight in Shopian’s Awneera. Before Ghaznawi, Burhan Wani, the poster boy of militancy in the Valley, was killed in July 2016.

Naikoo’s killing is a significant blow to pro-Pakistan group HuM. It also marked an end of an era in which a generation of militants, like Burhan Wani and Zakir Musa, evoked folklore popularity and gained an unprecedented support and sympathy. It also proved that the shelf life of terrorists in J&K was few months. None of the surviving commanders and cadres has been able to step forward.

The reversals began in autumn of 2018 when dozens of district-level commanders were killed in precise anti-insurgency operations that dramatically dented the capabilities of the militant groups.

Nearly 800 militants – most of them locals, ill-trained and ill-equipped – have been killed in last four years and during the first half of 2020.

Saifullah Mir, aka Qasim Haider, a resident of Malangpora in Pulwama and part of the Burhan Wani group of 12 terrorists, listed as a A++ category terrorist, is reported to have succeed Riyaz Naikoo to fill the void in the group. A medical assistant in the past, he has treated terrorists wounded in encounters with the security forces.

Saifullah began as a guide for terrorists in Pulwama, Tral, Kakapora and Kulgam areas. He has been active in Srinagar city as well.

On the killing of Naikoo, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen Bipin Rawat remarked, “The priority of the Armed Forces is to always get after the terrorist leadership and neutralize them as fast as possible. If you succeed in doing so, recruitment levels go down. They are not able to spread violence among the people because it is the leadership that spreads all the violence amongst the people and coerces the local population-young boys and girls through misinformation and they try to encourage them to join more often than not through fear and coercion. So if we are able to eliminate leadership, we are quite hopeful that you will find that recruitment will come down and there will be lesser violence in the Valley. It has always been the effort of the Armed Forces and they will continue doing so.”

“Creating a more than life-size image of a terrorist leader is somehow propagating them into this Rambo kind of image. I think the more we stay away from them and highlight their negativity more, we will not create this Rambo image of these people. They are people just spreading terrorism, mayhem, and not allowing normalcy to return in the state. They are not heroes in the eyes of the local population. People are being coerced to treat them as heroes because of social media,” the CDS opined on attempts to build a larger than life image of Riyaz Naikoo.

The Resistance Front Launched

The Resistance Front (TRF),  a new terror group has been rushed by Pakistan to take responsibility for major terror attacks and firefights in Jammu & Kashmir. It is controlled by three top handlers of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan – Sajad Jatt for South Kashmir, Khalid for Central Kashmir and Hanzala Adnan for North Kashmir.

The TRF was launched in late 2019 after Parliament scrapped Jammu & Kashmir’s special status and divided the state into two centrally-administered union territories, Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir.

The exercise is designed to give terror in Kashmir an indigenous face to ward off international pressure, particularly from the anti-terror financing watchdog Financial Action Task Force (FATF), over Pakistan sponsoring Islamist terror groups and what New Delhi describes as its jihadi terror factories.

This objective reflected the choice of names for the Inter Services Intelligence’s (ISI) recent terror initiatives such as TRF or the low-key JK Pir Panjal Peace Forum. These names do not have a religious label but suggest that they are homebred.

It is a facade to help the terror group gain space in the public mind and to attract local recruits. LeT’s old guard was focussing on getting TRF new recruits from the Kashmir Valley.

TRF’s social media managers in Pakistan claimed responsibility after five terrorists and an equal number of army soldiers were killed in the Keran sector in early April. The group also claimed responsibility for the gunfight in north Kashmir’s Handwara town that killed five security men, including the commanding officer of a Rashtriya Rifles battalion and a Major on 3 May. 

TRF is expected to carry out grenade attacks, mostly using its overground workers or fresh recruits rather than risking its trained hands. The group, however, lost dozens of grenades when the police caught some of its overground workers ferrying arms and ammunition in March.

Comments

The elimination of Riyaz Naikoo was a result of developing actionable human intelligence and operational synergy among forces fronting the counter-terror operations.

The Special Operations Group of the Jammu & Kashmir Police had been working on people in the Kupwara district who had access to Riyaz Naikoo. One of them was a man who had played a role in building the secret bunker in his native village in south Kashmir’s Pulwama. The intelligence was pinpointed.

Riyaz Naikoo’s elimination, a serious setback to terror group HuM in south Kashmir, is considered one of the most successful security operations in recent months in Jammu & Kashmir.

Even Syed Salahuddin, the Hizbul founder, who also leads the Pakistan’s ISI-backed alliance of terror groups – United Jihad Council – said the “the enemy (India) has the edge”. A day after Naikoo’s killing, he could be heard saying, “It’s a shock for all of us (killing of Riyaz Naikoo) but these ‘shahadats’ (sacrifices) are going on in Kashmir since long. Since January this year 80 Mujahideens (terrorists) have given their ‘Shahadat’ (eliminated by the security forces) and all of them were highly educated and trained.”

The security forces have now concentrated on spotting every terrorist infiltrating from Pakistan, analysing infiltration routes to spot gaps in counter-infiltration grid along the LoC, focusing on human intelligence, and stepping up offensive against foreign terrorists in Kashmir Valley.

Pakistan, by all accounts, is determined to bear down on India. This is the first summer after India scrapped Jammu & Kashmir’s special status in August 2019 and Islamabad has been prepping ever since.

It was clear that the Deep State was clearly in-charge of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. And Imran Khan, quite like India had anticipated right in the beginning, was letting the army run the show.

Imran Khan’s tweets on Kashmir had attributed violence in Kashmir to an “indigenous resistance movement” and accused India of finding a pretext to launch a “false flag operation.” This remark has been interpreted in New Delhi to imply that the TRF model of funding terror and denying a role in terrorism in Kashmir was the template.

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Riyaz Naikoo’s Bad Deeds

Riyaz was involved in:

•             Killing of Haji Ghulam Mohammad Dar, father of a sarpanch, at Dogripora on March 8, 2014

•             Firing on a police bus near Bhatpora Tokena

•             Killing of Gh Mohi-Ud-din Dar

•             Killing of Javaid Akbar Khanday, resident of Khandaypora

•             Killing of police Head Constable Ashiq Hussain Mir at the Padgampoara crossing

•             Kidnapping of Constable Naseer Ahmad

•             Looting of nine weapons from the residence of former MLA Wachi

•             Killing of six migrant labourers in Kulgam

•             Killing of truck drivers and fruit traders post August 5, 2019

•             Release of an audio tape threatening attacks on the jail staff after preferential treatment being provided to militants and separatists lodged in various jails was discontinued.

The post Elimination of HuM J&K Head Significant Blow to Pakistan appeared first on IMR.

The volatile 778-km long Line of Control (LoC), recorded over 1,547 times until 3 May from January – nearly half of the entire year’s figure in 2019 at 3,168.

The highest number of violations (411) were recorded in March 2020 when Covid-19 cases started peaking globally.

There were 3,479 CFVs and firings across the LoC and the 198-km international border (IB) in J&K in 2019, smashing all annual records since 2003.

The upward trend in CFVs has continued since the government revoked the special status of J&K on 5 August 2019 and then split the state into two union territories. Though there was a general decline in terrorist violence in the hinterland, with the snow in the mountain passes melting, there has also been a spike in infiltration attempts.

In April 2020, as many as 28 terrorists were killed in J&K – the highest since August 2019. 64 terrorists were killed in Kashmir and along the LoC in 2020 so far. In 2019, 152 terrorists were killed in J&K as against 215 in 2018, official figures stated.

Islamabad also blamed the Indian Army of 708 ceasefire violations in 2020, that it said killed two civilians and injured another 42.

Recruitment Up

The bigger cause of worry was that at least 35 local youths had joined terror groups in the first four months of this year, according to official figures of the armed forces. The local recruitment in 2019 was 119 – much less than 219 in 2018.

The Indian security forces have gone on the offensive, keeping the approaching summer in mind when infiltration attempts increase along the LoC and terrorists in the Valley become very active.

Casualties

Since 21 March, at least 33 militants and two of their associates have been killed in 15 gunfights across the Valley. Most of these encounters took place in four districts of south Kashmir – Pulwama, Shopian, Kulgam and Anantnag, which are considered the hotbed of militancy.

Twenty security personnel lost their lives in this period. Eighteen were killed in gunfights and in attacks by militants, and two army men died on the LoC in CFVs by Pakistan.

Terror Factories in Pakistan

Terror factories in Pakistan are continuing training modules and launch pads along the border from where the final push is made to cross over are also active. The encounter in the Keran sector, on 5 April, in which five special forces soldiers died while taking down a group of infiltrating terrorists-also showed a clear Pakistan hand, with recoveries of food packets and other supplies that had evident markings.

Army chief, Gen MM Naravane also accused Pakistan, on 17 April, of backing terrorism in the region at a time when the world was united to fight the Covid-19 pandemic. “While the whole world is focused towards fighting Covid-19, Pakistan-instigated terrorists have been targeting innocent civilians in the hinterland; just three days back they targeted a retired Kashmiri soldier. Therefore, we cannot let our guard down,” Naravane said.

Intelligence Assessment

Intelligence agencies had earlier pointed to terror launch pads that had been activated in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir’s (POK) Dudhnial, Sharda and Athmuqam across the Keran sector on this side of the Line of Control.

The encounters which happened during March to April point towards Pakistan-backed terrorist groups focusing on north Kashmir. It was a renewed attempt by Pakistan to give Kashmir terrorism a local face. According to an assessment presented to national security planners in late April, the ISI had messaged the 100-odd foreign terrorists to lie low and let the local terrorists front the battle with security forces.

The assessment was that foreign terrorists would be consolidating logistics, expanding the overground workers facilitation network and concentrating on recruitment of Kashmiri youth. Foreign terrorists had also stepped up efforts to radicalise the youth in the Doda-Kishtwar-Ramban range to prepare them for recruitment.

The intelligence brief had also predicted a spike in terror activities and attacks from April, after the starting of Ramzan.

NSA’s Review

National Security Adviser Ajit Doval carried out a complete operational review of the security situation in Jammu & Kashmir on 9 May. The review meeting was attended by Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane, Intelligence Bureau director Arvinda Kumar, Research and Analysis Wing chief Samant Kumar Goel, Border Security Force director general SS Deswal, Central Reserve Police Force chief AK Maheshwari. Northern Army Commander Lt Gen YK Joshi, and general officer commanding of the army’s Srinagar-headquartered 15 corps Lt Gen BS Raju and the Nagrota-based 16 corps commander Lt Gen Harsha Gupta and Jammu and Kashmir police chief Dilbag Singh had also attended the high-level review at New Delhi.

The meeting noted Pakistan government’s renewed push from terror launch pads, the rise in infiltration and how Pakistan was funding newly-created outfits such as The Resistance Front or the J&K Pir Panjal Peace Forum to claim that terrorism in the Kashmir valley was indigenous and not sponsored by Pakistan.

Placing the Pakistan Air Force on high alert was assessed as an effort to further Imran Khan’s narrative that asks the international community to intervene lest there is a confrontation between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

Comments

The security grid has increased surveillance in the four districts of south Kashmir, while also keeping a close watch on the LoC. The months of April and May saw a pattern of encounters going up every year, when the snow starts melting on the upper reaches of the Himalayas and militants start infiltrating from POK into Kashmir.

With modern surveillance gadgets, security forces are registering big successes in tracking and zeroing in on militants. Once a militant is caught on radar, he is tracked through electronic surveillance, and the success is remarkable. Also, human intelligence inputs help the forces to coordinate operations in the better way. Intelligence gathering has also seen a marked improvement.

A section of security officials and experts believes CFVs by Pakistan are a desperate attempt to foment unrest in India.

In the security grid, many consider these CFVs an attempt to give a cover fire to help militants crossing over to India.

Pakistan’s strategy of pushing terrorists across the border continues unabated. It’s likely that Pakistan is actually trying to take advantage of the Covid-19 outbreak and hit India with terror strikes when the latter is trying to control the epidemic. Plus, the nullification of special status of J&K by New Delhi last year did not lead to the kind of unrest that Islamabad had expected.

The post COUNTER-TERRORISM: Spike in Encounters and Recruitment appeared first on IMR.

From Srinagar to Thiruvananthapuram and Dibrugarh to Kachchh, the Army carried out various activities like laying wreath at the police memorials, honouring and felicitating health professions and emergency supply operatives. Visits to hospitals were carried out over hundreds of towns in all states from the local army formations all over the nation in small and big numbers by army teams along with military bands which played patriotic tunes as a tribute to the nation’s frontline warriors against coronavirus.

Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, Bengaluru, Bhopal, Agra, Amritsar, Belgaum, Ranikhet Pithoragarh among many metropolis, big and small townships saw the Army, Navy and IAF and Coast Guard (ICG) visiting hospitals and paying tributes. The activities started with laying wreaths at the local police memorials, an event which is truly unprecedented and brings the forces closer to their uniformed brethren. Whole country and all countrymen enjoyed this rich salute and poured wishes and love to the armed forces over social media.

The Armed Forces also organised multiple other events like fly past by fighter and transport aircrafts of the IAF throughout the length and breadth of the country. The helicopters of IAF, Indian Navy and ICG showered flower petals on the hospitals treating COVID patients. Army and IAF bands visited COVID hospitals and played tunes in an expression of gratitude to the Corona Warriors.

Fighter aircraft formations, comprising of the Sukhoi-30 MKI, MiG-29 and Jaguar fly past over Rajpath and orbited over Delhi visible to the residents from their roof tops. In addition, C-130J Hercules transport aircraft also flew over Delhi.

The Navy and ICG ships formed formations near shores at select locations. Ships were illuminated at 25 locations covering the entire coastline of the country including the remote sites and far flung island territories of Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep and Minicoy islands.

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