If China adheres to its declared “no first use” policy and “self-defensive nuclear strategy,” its nuclear arsenal must be able to survive a first strike. China’s ballistic missile submarine force is likely meant to augment its solid-fuel, road-mobile, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which can be readily hidden in the vastness of China’s territory.  Given the survivability of its land-based ICBM forces, some argue that SSBNs might be an expensive insurance policy. Beijing is working to field a credible SSBN force. To do so China must make strides in terms of command, control, communications, and quieting technologies.

China has a nascent nuclear triad, but one that remains limited primarily by range, arsenal size, and operational experience. China’s estimated 50 H-6K bombers, with a range of about 2,000 miles, are only able to deliver a payload to targets in nuclear weapons states as Russia, U.S. territory Guam, and the Indian subcontinent. Aerial refueling would only marginally extend bomber range because China does not have tanker aircraft deployed outside of the Chinese mainland; however, tankers staged from newly constructed Spratly Island airfields in the South China Sea could change this equation.

China currently fields approximately 50 to 60 ICBMs, including an estimated 24 solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 2s (DF-31A). The CSS-10 Mod 2 has a range exceeding 11,200 km and can reach most locations within the continental United States. These rely upon hardened silos, road mobility, and according to some reports underground railways to ensure their survivability. In addition to its fleet of 14 Ohio class SSBNs, the U.S. nuclear triad boasts 20 B-2A and 70 B-52H long-range bombers, and at least 450 ICBMs. Russian nuclear forces include 13 SSBNs of various classes and 78 Tu-160 and Tu-95 long-range bombers, and at least 332 ICBMs.