Implications of Japan’s Policies in the Indo-Pacific

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Dr Sano Shutaro

Amid growing mil-itary tensions in East Asia and in other parts of the Indo-Pacific, Japan has made sound and steady development with India at an unprecedented pace over the past half a decade that involves a wide and multifaceted areas of cooperation. Notably, in the security domain, the initiation of the minister-level “2 plus 2” dialogue in November 2019 has facilitated the development of the critically important partnership and contributed to the signing of the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) in early September 2020. The ACSA is expected to enhance interoperability between the defense forces of the two countries, enabling them to share supplies, such as food and fuel and reciprocally provide communications and transportation services during joint drills and rescue operations in case of disasters.

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“Free and Open Indo-Pacific”

Equally important, Tokyo has deepened and broadened the scope of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and has, in addition, taken on a more active international role in line with its region-wide initiative – the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. The FOIP is expected to reinforce the alliance as well as strengthen Tokyo’s international commitment to promote fundamental principles, strengthen regional connectivity and ensure peace and stability in the region. In July 2020, the Ministry of Defense of Japan refined the Vientiane Vision-related initiatives of 2016 and 2019 and released a new document, Achieving the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” Vision: Japan Ministry of Defense’s Approach, which stresses the need to enhance its defense cooperation and exchanges with countries not only in Southeast Asia, but also in South Asia, the Pacific Islands, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Tokyo has specifically listed India, along with the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, UK and France, with which Japan would further strengthen its partnership in harmony with the FOIP vision.

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Yet, the India-Japan security cooperation is not without challenges. The first issue is related to the new U.S. defence posture – the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) – outlined in the summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The DFE is expected to ensure that the U.S. forces would be “strategically predictable” in demonstrating the U.S. commitment to deterring aggression against its allies and partners, and, at the same time, be “operationally unpredictable” forcing the opponents such as China and Russia to “fear when, where and how the U.S. forces might appear rather than being able to anticipate when, where and how they will perform.” Under the Trump administration, the U.S. has officially shifted its primary security priorities from tackling the prolonged international terrorism to engaging in the various types of challenges in the Indo-Pacific notably posed by China, as highlighted in the 2017 National Security Strategy (NDS) and the 2018 NDS. This is an encouraging move for both India and Japan as it implies that the core of the U.S. global military posture will now shift to the Indo-Pacific region. However, it is not yet clear how the U.S. forces will be strengthened in the Indo-Pacific. Issues include, for example, the extent and locations which the level of troops would be expanded as well as the likelihood of the U.S. forces maintaining its current permanent forces or shifting them to rotational forces. Moreover, the operational unpredictability element of the DFE may in fact raise doubts about the reliability or the U.S. commitment to and its presence in the Indo-Pacific. As a practical matter, the positions of the U.S. forces will move away from the region with the DFE as demonstrated by the movement of the U.S. bombers in Guam to mainland U.S. in April 2020. The movement has been carried out to allow the U.S. bombers to have more operational flexibility as it is now easier for the bombers to operate in other parts of the world by taking off from mainland U.S. The move also enables the U.S bombers to stand out of range of foreign missiles such as China’s DF-26, the Guam Killer, which has an operational range of 4,000km. Similarly, there may also be radical changes to how and where the U.S. aircraft carriers would be deployed in the future, with a possible shift in their operational cycles as well as their power projection capabilities. Given the growing strategic competition between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific, which has become more evident with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, New Delhi and Tokyo would, therefore, need to coordinate deeply with Washington on the presence of the U.S. forces and ensure that the U.S. military commitment to the region remains intact. At the same time, the two countries would also need to ensure that the DFE does not send misleading signals that a power vacuum has emerged to the surrounding countries including China and Russia.

Security Orientation

Second is the issue related to how both New Delhi and Tokyo would deal with a possible pressure from Washington to transform their respective development-driven FOIP into highly security-oriented initiatives. To be sure, India and Japan’s FOIP are not identical. Tokyo’s FOIP primarily aims to strengthen regional connectivity via quality infrastructure development. Admittedly, Tokyo has evolved its FOIP into a more comprehensive initiative by strengthening the linkage between the development and security elements of the FOIP in light of the recent changes in the international security environment in the Indo-Pacific, but has been cautious not to transform it into a security-oriented initiative. India’s FOIP, on the other hand, is purely an economic-oriented initiative, and does not include any security element. While both India and Japan’s FOIP are not security-oriented, New Delhi and Tokyo may be forced in not-so-distant future to transform their respective Indo-Pacific initiatives into a more security-oriented one, similar to that adopted by the U.S. given the increasing U.S.-China strategic competition. However, such a transformation would most likely affect the level of support in a negative way towards their respective initiatives especially from the AEAN countries which do not want to take sides with either of the U.S. or China. Moreover, transformation could force the ASEAN countries to distance themselves from India and Tokyo’s FOIP or even worse to openly oppose to their respective initiatives, fearing the danger of losing the ASEAN centrality. New Delhi and Tokyo would, therefore, need to reaffirm that their respective development-driven FOIP initiatives remain inclusive and non-security-oriented and that the ASEAN centrality remains at the core of their FOIP to maintain their legitimacy.

Role of Quad

Closely related, some observers have speculated that the foundation of Tokyo’s FOIP rests with the Quad given ex-Prime Minister Abe’s preference for a quadrilateral security cooperation among Japan, the U.S., Australia and India as highlighted with his “Democratic Security Diamond” concept declared in 2012. The four countries resumed the Quad consultations in November 2017 after a 10-year interruption and held a ministerial-level meeting in November 2019. More recently, in early October 2020, the ministers of the Quad countries met in Tokyo with an aim to establish, promote and secure the free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific principles. Importantly, the four countries have been cautious not to develop the Quad into an explicit military initiative or a formal institutional structure that would contain/target countries such as China. They have also intentionally avoided delivering a joint statement. Given the increasing distrust in all four countries due to China’s continuous military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific as well as Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong and its initial response to the COVID pandemic, however, the four countries would need to work together in developing a mechanism such as the Quad to offset gains which Beijing could take advantage from enhancing unilateral changes to the status quo from its development and security efforts. Yet, the ASEAN leaders have expressed concerns that the Quad may supplant ASEAN’s role in the region. New Delhi and Tokyo, along with Washington and Canberra, therefore, would need to exercise discretion over the Quad, and ensure that the developments of the Quad would not endanger the principle of ASEAN centrality. Furthermore, India and Japan need to ensure that the Quad would not be embedded with their respective FOIP. Simply put, New Delhi and Tokyo’s development-driven FOIP initiatives need to be pursued separately from the Quad.

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The third issue is related to how India and Japan would address China’s, and to a lesser degree Russia’s, continuous military assertiveness in the region given the differences in India and Japan’s strategic and geographic priorities. For Japan, the Japan-U.S. Alliance remains the central pillar in Tokyo’s foreign and security policies, and its primary geographic priorities rest in the East China Sea and subsequently the South China Sea in light of the imminent challenges posed by China and North Korea. Undoubtedly, the Indian Ocean is also key to Japan’s security with the growing significance of maintaining the sea lanes of communication in the Indo-Pacific, but it is of secondary importance compared to the two seas listed above. In the case of India, New Delhi has recently expanded and strengthened its partnerships with the regional countries including Japan and the U.S. but maintaining the strategic autonomy remains the foundation of its foreign and security policies. Meanwhile, India’s main areas of geographic interest remain along the territorial borders with Pakistan and China, as well as the Bay of Bengal in the eastern Indian Ocean. That is to say, neither the East China Sea nor the South China Sea is of primary importance for India compared to the regions noted above, although New Delhi has recently expressed, according to the Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana, its intent to carry out navigation activities in the South China Sea in line with its efforts to expand the strategic partnership with Manila.

Importantly, the differences in strategic and geographic priorities between New Delhi and Tokyo, as well as their limited power projection capabilities, affect the level of expectations towards their respective partners. Specifically, it would be unrealistic for New Delhi to expect that Tokyo could give sufficient military assistance along the Line of Control or the Line of Actual Control as well as in the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, it would be unpractical for Tokyo to expect that New Delhi could give ample military support in the East and South China Seas. Given such circumstances, it would be important for both Tokyo and New Delhi to contemplate measures other than giving direct military assistance to their respective partners. For example, giving full, timely and firm diplomatic support for the security stance and measures of their respective partners by delivering both official and non-official statements, along with the strengthening of ties between their respective FOIP initiatives, would be beneficial. In addition, holding countries responsible for their authoritative and threatening behaviors at multilateral settings such as the United Nations and the ADMM-plus will also be of great value for further developing the India-Japan partnership.

Military Cooperation

The fourth issue is related to whether to allow foreign military forces including Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) to use the Indian military facilities such as the strategically significant Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI). In recent years, Chinese military, which once focused on territorial defense, has expanded its geographic focus of attention as far beyond China’s borders as possible. According to the 2019 report to the U.S. Congress, Chinese state-owned companies either owned equity in or had an operating lease at approximately 70 ports outside China, which could be converted into duo-use military functions or become strategic strongpoints. India’s concerns over China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean as well as the Ladakh stand-off with Beijing have spurred New Delhi’s interest in strengthening its military presence at the ANIs. In its relationship with Tokyo, New Delhi examined a joint project to upgrade infrastructure in the ANIs earlier in 2016. It has also been reported that the two countries discussed the possibility of building a region-wide undersea sound surveillance sensors (SOSUS) at the ANIs to improve India’s underwater domain awareness. Furthermore, the newly signed ACSA would, with prior approval from New Delhi, enable the SDF to overcome, albeit partially, the lack of power projection capabilities with the use of the ANIs as well as the U.S. base in Diego Garcia for maritime and air operations. However, opening up the islands to foreign militaries including the SDF could increase security concerns among countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Furthermore, the militarization of ANIs including its use by foreign militaries could eventually lead to a reckless arms race in the littorals, spurring Beijing to take countermeasures such as militarizing key maritime outposts of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota, Bangladesh’s Chittagong as well as Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu. Moreover, there are also ecological concerns associated with the militarization of the islands. New Delhi, therefore, needs to give full consideration of both the short-term and the mid-to-long term implications in allowing the use of its military facilities by foreign militaries including the SDF.

The final issue is related to how India and Japan would cope with China’s geo-strategically ambitious economic statecraft, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Given the strategic and economic implications, Tokyo has been more accommodating towards the BRI than New Delhi. Despite the difference, it would be counterproductive for both India and Japan to counter the BRI since the two countries, as noted above, would most likely lose support for their FOIP from the regional countries including the ASEAN member states. Therefore, India and Japan should instead develop alternatives so that the recipient countries would not become overly dependent on and/or exploited by the BRI. Importantly, the alternatives need to complement rather than compete with the BRI, given the vast development needs in the Indo-Pacific. It has been reported that the level of infrastructure demand is higher than the capacities which the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are capable of covering. Participation of India to initiatives such as the Blue Dot Network could be a good case in point. The network was announced by the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Cooperation (OPIC), Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in November 2019 with an aim to promote sustainable, high-quality, private sector-led infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific.

Given the increasing complexity and uncertainty of the international security environment in the Indo-Pacific, Tokyo has deepened and broadened the scope of the Special Strategic and Global Partnership with New Delhi. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that the relations are still at an early stage and have yet to become institutionalized. There are also many uncertainties regarding the U.S.-China strategic competition. Furthermore, domestic politics in both Japan and India, as well as in the U.S., including the change in leadership may affect their foreign and security priorities, resulting in a change of pace, if not the overall direction, in developing the India-Japan partnership. Tokyo and New Delhi, therefore, need to take due consideration to the key issues listed above, and develop their relations steadily over time rather than expeditiously rushing toward establishing an alliance-like partnership.