By Hemesh M & Yuvraj S
India and China have had a violent confrontation after 1967 in Galwan Valley in June 2020. This has led to both the Indian Airforce (IAF) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) to marshal their fleets. It is clearly important to understand the PLAAF’s capabilities and limitations and estimate their threats to the IAF in the Ladakh and Tibet theatre of operations.
Peoples Liberation Army Air Force
The PLAAF is an aerial service branch of the Army. The PLAAF was officially established on 11 November 1949, it is composed of five branches – aviation, anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles, radar and Airborne Corps.
The rusted, derailed, oversized PLAAF in 1960/1970 started its modernization journey under Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Four Modernizations’, in consequence to the US Air Force’s assault on Iraq in 1991 brought out the importance of having an advanced air force for modern-day wars. Currently, the PLAAF is divided into five major theatre commands, viz,
• Eastern Theater Command – Nanjing
• Southern Theater Command – Guangzhou
• Western Theater Command – Chengdu
• Northern Theater Command – Shenyang
• Central Theater Command – Beijing
The PLAAF has largely banked on the Russian aerospace technologies to modernize its fleet. It is believed that J-11 programme has been ‘reverse engineered” from the Soviet Su-27 aircraft. The Israelis have passed on the technology of the ‘Lavi’ programme to China for the J10. Apart from such external support, China’s industrial policy has also been a catalyst in producing the PLAAF’s versatile fleet.
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Dissecting the Western Command
The Western Theatre Command is spread over Sichuan, Tibet, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang and Chongqing. The location of the command makes it the first strike force of the PLAAF. China has been predominantly focused on strengthening its eastern and central commands. It is only in the past few years that there has been a thrust to develop the Western Theatre Command.
Airfields. The strategic airfields in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) are Hotan, Lhasa/Gonggar, Ngari-Gunsa and Xigaze. These are the nearest facilities to Indian targets in Kashmir, northern India, and northeast India. Ngari-Gunsa and Xigaze reportedly have no hardened shelters or blast pens for their aircraft.
Lhasa/Gonggar is reported to have recently developed hardened shelters able to protect up to 36 aircraft, while Hotan reportedly hosts “two aircraft shelters” of unknown capacity. The distances of various PLAAF airfields from Indian bases are as follows.
Airfield to Airfield Distance
Srinagar to Kashgar 625 Km
Leh to Kashgar 615km
Leh to Khotan 384 Km
Leh to Shiquanhe 324 km
Ambala to Shiquanhe 363 Km
Hashimara to Gonggar 324 hm
Tezpur id Nynqchi 324 Km
Chabua to Nyngchi 217 Km
Chabua to Golmud 991 Km
Chabua to Bangda 393 Km
Source: Google Earth
High Altitude Operations. In the design of aircraft “Hot & High” has always been the worst case scenario considered by aerospace engineers. The high altitude operations are a function of the engine thrust. The average air density at 4500m is 0.19kg/m3 as compared to 1.22 kg/m3 at sea level. The engine thrust produced at an altitude is directly proportional to the density. The lower air density also effects the air-fuel mixture ratio which means more fuel needed to make the rich ratio to generate thrust.
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A review of the PLAAF fleet shows that most of the aircrafts use the derivate of AL31 engine, since the alternate indigenously developed powerplant is not fully operational. Also, the Chinese media has also reported several air accidents in TAR region.
The longer runways (see Table top right) also indicate that the altitude does effect the Max Take-off Weight (MTOW), range and the climb rate. Altitude has large effect on the manoeuvrability and range due to reduced lift and powerplant complications. To summarise, the TAR terrain partially curtails the PLAAF from spreading its wings.
Western Theatre Command Assessment
The Western Theatre Command (WTC) is dominated by the indigenously developed Su 27, which is also positioned at few other locations. The Table above gives details of the deployment of this aircraft in the WTC. To counter 157 fighters of the PLAAF in WTC, the IAF has reportedly 270+ fighters deployed to deliver a massive power blow when called for. Also, most of the Indian fighters have been periodically upgraded with advanced avionics and electronic warfare suits.
The J10 and J11, like any other Chinese developed aircrafts, are reported to be haunted by propulsion problems. The jets trail far behind in comparison to the MiG-29, Mirage 2000 and Jaguars operated by the IAF. The PLAAF advanced multirole fighter Su30MKK falls short as thrust-vectoring, advanced radar and avionics are absent.
Chengdu J20 is claimed to be the 5th-generation advanced aircraft of the PLAAF. The fighter is propelled with 2×WS-10B or AL-31FM2 , which makes it slightly underpowered and affects the supercruise performance. A closer inspection of the airframe and inlet also indicates the same. The wide fuselage width is to accommodate the large fuel to meet the operational range of 6000km.
The assessment of the aircraft design features and weapons payload indicates that the aircraft has been deployed for early strike. Its current deployment in the Eastern Theatre Command (ETC) is to check the USAF’s operations by F22s and F35s. USAF would largely rely on the mid-air refuelling and AWA&CS to operate its stealth fighters on the Chinese front. J20 is intended to fly undetected and launch the first strike against strategic air-targets. The use of J20 for offensive against IAF will be an interesting air operation.
The IAF Su30 MKI radar is reported to have picked up the J20 during its sorties in TAR. This clearly questions the PLAAF’s claim of J20 being a stealthy aircraft. A closer look of the airframe profile indicates higher radar cross section (RCS) in the side and rear sections of the aircraft. The traditional power-plant of the aircraft also may not meet the required thermal signatures.
Transport Aircrafts
This arm of the PLAAF has the highest asymmetry as compared to the IAF. The large airlift is only dependent on IL76, Il78 and Y7. The induction of Xian Y20 has been an attempt to match the Indian strategic lift capability. The IAF’s demonstration of operating the C130J Hercules and C17 Globemaster at forward bases is an open challenge to the PLAAF. Recently inducted Chinook helicopters enable quick movement of troops and weapon systems.
Bombers
The PLAAF primary bomber is the H6 which is a license-produced copy of the Tu16 aircraft. The improved H6 has variants for nuclear, conventional bombing, reconnaissance and anti-ship missions. The prominent H6K variant has a combat radius of the 3500km. This range enables the aircraft to take off from eastern theatre and launch K/AKD-20/ CJ-20 or DH20 cruise missiles. These long distance cruise missiles (>2,000 km) can be launched well within the Chinese territory to eliminate strategic ground targets. However, with the Soviet Era design any upgrade would been only a temporary solution. This would eventually be phased out on induction of Next generation bombers.
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles
The highly industrious Chinese policy has boosted the development of large variety of unmanned platforms. The WTC predominantly operates the undermentioned drones.
• WJ-1: The first land attack version of Chengdu Pterodactyl I (Wing Loong), which is a weapon platform without the reconnaissance/targeting pod under the chin.
• GJ-1: Another land attack version of Pterodactyl I that combines the capabilities of both Pterodactyl I and WJ-1 so that it can identify and engage targets on its own. GJ-1 can be distinguished from both Pterodactyl I and WJ-1 in that GJ-1 has both the reconnaissance/targeting pod under the chin as well as hardpoints to carry weapons.
The PLAAF’s UAVs in WTC mostly carry precision guided munitions (Smart Bombs). The delivery of these bombs would need to fly them in proximity to the targets, thus, making them prone to Indian surface-to-air missiles (SAM). The mountainous terrain also poses great challenges like all-weather capability, secured data links and control from command centres.
Satellites, AWACS, Electronic Warfare and Information Warfare
Satellites. China had over 130 military satellites in 2015 and had doubled its launch rate during the period 2009-2014 as compared to the period 2003-2008. This large constellation has an edge to monitor enemy deployments and troops movements. It empowers the deployment of satellite guided missiles and UAVs.
AWACS. It is estimated that China could possibly have over 20 AWACS and AEW&C aircraft in service to boost PLAAF operations. These include the Kong Jing-2000 (KJ-2000), four KJ-200 and two KJ-500 in the PLAAF fleet.
Electronic Warfare. Electromagnetic spectrum management is “planning, coordinating, and managing joint use of the spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures to enable EMS-dependent capabilities and systems to perform their functions in the intended environment without causing or suffering unacceptable interference.
PLA has a dedicated wing namely People Republic Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). This wing, apart from ESM also carries out roles of cyber, space and electronic attacks.
Mid-Air Refuelling
To overcome the effects of high altitudes and the restrictions that are posed on MTOW from PLAAF bases in TAR, the use of refuelling tankers is required for offensive missions. However, PLAAF operates only 17 refuelling aircraft (IL78 and Xian H6) which may not give them much strategic advantage against India.
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Air Defence
PLAAF integrated Air Defence has been regarded as one of the best by several Western defence analysts. It comprises the newly acquired Russian S400 (250-300km), the older S300 and its improved and reverse-engineered version named the HQ9. IAF would be particularly concerned about them and the shorter-range Hq12 air defence systems. IAF’s offensive operations would be highly contested due to China’s robust air defence cover. China, not being a part of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) cannot expand the range of S400 to 300km. The Indian version of S400 (in procurement phase) has full strike capability of 400+ Km also reported to house several features of S500. The recently inducted IAI’s Harop Loitering munition of the IAF would give the air defence a tough battle in Ladakh.
Training
The PLAAF predominantly exercises its air force within the country or along with F16 fighters in Pakistan. Recent PLAAF exercises with unscripted scenarios have found that pilots are excessively reliant upon ground control for tactical direction. In unanticipated combat scenarios, this dependence on explicit control tower guidance becomes extreme, while “ground commands” are simultaneously often unable to keep up with the complex and changeable air situation.
War Scenarios and Conclusion
• The geography of TAR is the biggest operational drawback for PLAAF aircrafts.
• The lack of proven Chinese power plants limits/trims the capability of its fighters to a large extent.
• The initial damages to the front line Chinese airbases will handicap the Chinese PLAAF offensive.
• The large rail and roads to TAR facilities eases reinforcements to the forward bases.
• IAF performs regular exercises with USAF, RAF, French and Russian Air Forces, which has helped gain proficiency and understand its platform limitations.
• The wars of 1962, 1965, 1971 and 1999 along with the recent surgical airstrikes have forged the IAF as compared to inexperienced PLAAF.
• The distribution of airbases in TAR would increase the dependency of the air defence units to protect the runways and airstrips.
• Accuracy of ballistic missiles of the PLA will play a crucial role in PLAAF operations.
• The lack of blast pens in TAR is a major shortage as it would hamper the moving of detachments to forward bases.
• PLASSF can choke the IAF operations along the LAC.
• Unlike Indian forward airbases there are no supporting airstrips in proximity to the LAC in TAR.
• The use of Pakistani airbases to launch an offensive against India cannot be ruled out. A two front war will stretch IAF’s resources due to shrinking squadrons.
• The networked PLAAF air defence like S400, S300, H9 and H12 poses a serious challenge to the IAF.
