The South China Sea (SCS) is a contested territory. This international territorial dispute involves mainly six claimants: Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. But Beijing says it has full claim over all the islands chain. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the International Court of Justice at the Hague in the Netherlands had ruled that China had no historic claim over the waters of the SCS. As per the ruling of the tribunal, China’s claim to rights of the water bodies of the SCS is contrary to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The international tribunal rejected China’s maritime claims in the light of its “Nine Dash Line” over these areas. And the court said that China’s claim has no basis in international law. China rejected the ruling, calling it “ill-founded”. And Beijing advocated that the tribunal had no right to decide on the matter.
China is planning to develop an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) around the Spratly, Paracel and Pratas islands in the SCS. An ADIZ is a zone of airspace over land or sea in which the identification, location and control of aircraft are performed by a country in the interest of its national interest. China had unilaterally declared an ADZ over the contested East China Sea in 2003 when Hu Jintao was in power.
When Xi took over in 2012, he wanted China to materialise “China Dream” with national rejuvenation, Belt and Road Initiative, and expanding China’s debt trap all around the world. China’s total disregard for a rule-based international system in the SCS is part of this dream. China has a hidden designs to turn the whole set of islands into a part of its sovereign territory.
On 13 July 2020, the US officially dismissed China’s claims to offshore resources across the SCS as completely unlawful. US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo issued a statement clarifying America’s position on maritime claims on the SCS saying that China has no legal ground to impose its will on the region. Besides, Washington has currently aligned its position on the ruling declared by the International Court in 2016.
ASEAN and China
The so-called Tiger economies of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) talk against China behind closed doors to the QUAD but are virtually servile before the Middle Kingdom as they do not have either the political or military heft to challenge China.
In 1990s, a Code of Conduct (COC) in the SCS was raised by the ASEAN. The COC is based on a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS signed by China and 10 ASEAN nations in 2002.
In 2019, a three-year timeline was drawn at the 22nd ASEAN and China summit held in Manila in 2019. This time frame was proposed by China. The COC is a legally binding document that will be able to manage how countries act within the SCS despite disputing territorial claims. But today working on a deadline to implement the COC seems difficult even by 2022 because of China’s belligerence and the current pandemic.
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India’s Stand
India has rejected the Chinese claims on SCS by calling it a global commons and openly advocated its long-held position of freedom of navigation and overflights. Even though the Russian trade to the port of Vladivostok passes through SCS, Moscow has been silent on the SCS issue given its perceived closeness to the Chinese authoritarian state. Australia and Japan have also bilaterally discussed the SCS issue and like ASEAN want America to be at the fore-front.
The Indian Ocean Region is now becoming the new area of focus after South China Sea and it is imperative for India to augment security so that the blue economy involving fishing, mineral and energy exploration can be supported.
After the South China Sea, the IOR has become an important theatre for activity and national security plans need to cater to this. There has been increasing concern over the past few years on the upswing in Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean Region. Besides creation of infrastructure in nations like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, China has activated its first overseas base in Djibouti and has been conducting regular patrols in the region.
Chinese movement includes nuclear submarine patrols and frequent port visits to Pakistan as well. Officials believe it is only a matter of time before the first Chinese aircraft carrier group sets sail for the region as the PLAChina has already constructed a series of ports along the Indian Ocean, creating a necklace of refueling and resupply stations from the South China Sea to the Suez Canal. Ostensibly commercial in nature, the ports potentially have military value, too, allowing China’s rapidly growing navy to expand its reach.
Those include ports at Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan, which are widely criticized as footholds for a potential military presence, though no Chinese forces have officially been deployed at them.
China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2015, ostensibly to support its forces participating in international antipiracy operations off the coast of Somalia. The outpost, which began as a logistics base but is now more heavily fortified, is within miles of the American base in that country.
China has also stepped up military cooperation with Iran. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has visited and participated in military exercises at least three times, beginning in 2014. The most recent was last December, when a Chinese missile destroyer, the Xining, joined a naval exercise with the Russian and Iranian navies in the Gulf of Oman.
Despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the PLAN is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea. Chinese warships have not challenged Indian sovereignty in its territorial waters or ventured close to Indian islands with malign intent. Nor have PLAN assets impeded the passage of Indian merchantmen in the regional sea lanes and choke points.
To the contrary, the Chinese Navy has avoided any entanglement with Indian naval ships in the subcontinental littorals, limiting its ventures to friendly countries in the region, many of which are happy to benefit from Beijing’s economic and military power.
The US must also note that as the Chinese juggernaut continues to roll westwards, should Iran abandon India for China as a partner in the Chabahar port deal, it would represent yet another huge gain for China. The PLAN may now have not just Djibouti but also Gwadar and Chabahar as maritime footholds in India’s Arabian Sea neighbourhood.
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PLAN Capabilities
PLAN has grown substantially in the last two decades but while the PLA Navy looks formidable on the paper, China is still to gain expertise on carrier operations as landing a fighter on a moving floating deck in rough seas requires decades of experience. The PLA Navy is unproven on high seas.
PLAN frequently exercises with the Pakistan Navy but their exercises with professional navies have been limited. In 2014 and 2016 PLAN was invited by the USN for the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) maritime exercise but were not invited in 2018, because of the SCS dispute. On the other hand, IN has been a regular participant in the exercise since 2012.
IN SOPs and tactics have been fine-tuned over decades by exercising with major navies like the USN, RN, French Navy, RSN, etc.
In aircraft carrier operations, the Indian Navy is years ahead as compared to PLAN. The PLA Navy apparently lacks the confidence of the carrier borne team. Indian Navy regularly undertakes network centric operations. These also include the Poseidon 8I aircraft (P8I), a force multiplier, capable of undertaking surveillance missions over the whole of the areas of interest. PLAN units have normally been picked up by IN P8Is, whenever they enter Indian waters. Navy has been rapidly expanding its reach.
