The US Central Command Chief General Korilla was present in Israel to coordinate their defensive measures. The main Israeli air bases were already networked with the theatre level US ABM defence architecture. As such, Israel had full access to America’s satellite networks, computation and coordination facilities, sensors and shooters. Two Aegis-class destroyers, specifically equipped for ABM defence (which had OTH radars) were integrated into Israel’s AD network. In addition, some 200 fighter jets from US, Britain and France had been scrambled to shoot down incoming missiles and drones. They specifically went for the 170-odd slow-moving drones as they noisily inched closer to Israeli air space. A majority of them were shot down before they could enter Israeli air space (mostly over Syria and Iraq and a few over Jordan). In any case, their aim was to act as decoys and swamp the AD EW systems and keep Western attention riveted to the slow flying drone swarms and, thus, enable some cruise and ballistic missiles to get through. It now appears that the drones did help to saturate the Israeli AD system. It is even speculated that a very few of the drones also managed to sneak through to their targets. The bulk however, were shot down outside Israeli air space by the US, UK and French fighters and missiles on US warships. The simple fact is that extensive ongoing ops against Houthi-fired drones and missiles against international shipping had forced the US to put in place an effective theatre level Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system that was active in the region already. Besides, Israel has a very robust layered air defence system consisting of Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missiles, Patriot, US missile defence batteries (which, since 1991 Gulf War have been used to shoot down SCUD missiles), the David Sling medium range SAMs and the Iron Dome for close-in protection within 10 to 15 kilometers. The amazing fact is that the Iranian ballistic missiles were still able to get through this most dense AD protection cover at all. Out of 7 Shahab missiles fired, some five missiles got through in the Navatim air base and created two craters on the runway and hit storage facilities. It is now being analyzed that the Iranian missiles had a booster rocket fitted to the warhead. When near the target, it separated the warhead from the missile and also fired out a couple of decoys. Most defence sensors and shooters focused on the larger carrier rocket, thus, enabling the warhead to get through and do damage. The anti-ballistic missiles fired to intercept, mostly hit the carrier rockets and missed the warheads. What is cause for concern is that the most heavily defended airspace in the world was actually penetrated. If some eight runway penetration retarder bombs had been fired on this airstrip, the base would have been out of commission for a while.
Cost Ratios. The second aspect is the skewed ratio between cost to the attacker and defender. One Shahid drone costs about $10,000. Hence, Iran spent about $3.5 million on its attack, whereas, Israel had to fire off over $1.3 billion worth of anti-ballistic missiles, Patriots, MR SAMs and Iron Domes in just one night. This attack was with around 320 drones/ missiles. What if the next attack comes with 1,500 drones/ missiles and more? Iran claims that it has not yet used its hypersonic Fateh missiles in the last attack.
Iran’s Escalation Management and Control. Viewed in hindsight, Iran has shown tremendous strategic patience and ability to exercise escalation control. It has delivered a potent, strategic message of deterrence. “Pile up all the layers of air defence, get the US, British and French to help you with 200 fighters, but the simple fact is, that we will get through.” That was the essence of Iran’s deterrence message. It is said that Iran had sent signals to USA via UAE and intelligence channels that it was not interested in any further escalation that would involve the United States. Its sovereignty had been blatantly violated and under Article 51 of the UN Charter, it would exercise its right to retaliate. Yet it gave adequate notice to prevent uncontrolled escalation. It took 13 days to respond. It hit only three military targets. There were no attacks on civilian targets or infrastructure. It virtually sabotaged the military success of its own attack by this virtue signaling, but that did enable escalation control and dominance. It sent a clear deterrent message via the missile strikes that got through the very dense and layered air defences. It sent a clear message that it could and would get through, and not tolerate any violation of its sovereignty.
American Escalation Control Measures
For its part, the United States seemed equally keen that the issue should not escalate to a regional war. There was no way Iran could prevail in any conflict with US and Israel. However, it was capable of inflicting serious damage and pain.
It could hit Israel and the oil fields in the Middle East, it could block the Strait of Hormuz and send oil prices skyrocketing giving a big hit to the global economy. The US was in an election year and President Biden could not afford a rise in price of oil that would affect transportation costs and increase not only prices of fuel but also increase prices of food triggering an inflationary spiral.
The US strategic reserve of oil itself was down to just 17 days. The US interest would not be served by any escalation in the Middle East. As such, the US efforts were to put psychological pressure on Iran.
It sent back a second carrier battle group to the Mediterranean. It sent in General Korella, Chief of the US Central Command to coordinate missile defense measures. It tried to force Iran to recalibrate costs and limit or scale down its options.
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When all this dissuasion failed and Iran fired off three salvos of some 320 drones and missiles, both the US and Israel were surprised at the scale of this attack. However, due to ample warning and preparation time, the US theater ballistic missile defence grid and Israel’s formidable air defences were able to shoot down 97 to 98 per cent of the incoming projectiles.
The US and Western media now tried to entirely play down effectiveness of the attack. The fact was that drones were just decoys. The ballistic missiles had successfully penetrated the three most well -defended targets on planet Earth.
The US and Israel tried to play down the attack as a damn squib. The US intentions seemed to be to stop Israel from escalating by any significant retaliation. Joe Biden even suggested that it was a defensive victory for Israel and they should leave it at that.
He even suggested that should Israel go for serious retaliation, it would have to do it alone and the US would not take part. However, it was evident that due to the pressure of domestic politics, Netanyahu would simply have to respond in some way. The US tried to find a way out by suggesting to Iran that Israel would just mount a token strike and it should not escalate further.
Iran’s reaction was sharp. It was determined to react in a major way, whatever the scale of the provocation, it said. Attacks on its territory were simply not acceptable and Iran wanted no part in any dumb charade or fixed match. In many ways, the situation had closed parallels with the India-Pakistan post-Pulwama scenario. India simply had to retaliate to the terror strike but was keen to do it in a manner that would prevent a sharp escalation, maybe even to the nuclear level. Iran has rejected any suggestion that it permit Israel the luxury of a token strike. Netanyahu has been under major pressure from the United States and the Western allies not to escalate. However, the key factor was domestic political pressure that did force Netanyahu to do something, perhaps, more than tokenism.
Scott Ritter says it was a political and not a military decision. The Israeli war cabinet was split with three voting members against it while the hardliners were all for a massive response on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Netenyahu was under tremendous pressure from US and other Western allies to eschew a response or go in for tokenism. It is said that for 48 hours he refused to take any calls.
So, what could have been Israel’s response options and how would the escalatory spiral unfold? That was the key issue in the looming global crisis. Could an escalatory spiral be managed? What were the off-ramps for Iran?
Matrix of Israeli Response Options. Let us now examine what was the matrix of Israeli response options to Iran’s very massive missiles strike. For a long time, Israel had viewed Iran’s nascent nuclear capability as an existential threat. It was very keen to do an Osirak redux, that is, repeat its attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor with Iran. The problem in that was that to mount a credible and effective attack, it needed United States support in terms of satellite imagery, US air-to-air refueling aircraft, US help in getting permissions to overfly Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. It is doubtful if Iran could inflict any meaningful damage in a purely stand-alone mode. Even that was likely to provoke a regional war. As was evident, it is easy to start wars, far more difficult to end them.
So what then was the matrix of Israeli overt response options?
• Option One. Attack Nuclear Facilities of Iran. Iran has five major nuclear enrichment facilities at Natanz, Arak, Faradeh, Isfahan and Bordei. The main facility at Natanz is well dug in and is in a steep valley in the Zagros mountains, which is very difficult to attack. Ishfahan is the main nuclear processing centre. Israel’s options were to use the Jericho missiles or the F -35 or the F -15E fighters. These would of course need air-to-air refueling and they could possibly have attacked with stand-off cruise missiles and deep penetration retarder bombs that could pierce underground bunkers, (joint direct attack munitions). Iran had fairly good S-300 Russian SAMs based air defences and the F-35 or F-15E would definitely take some losses. Maj Gen Ahmed Hagatalab of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in charge of defending Iran’s nuclear facilities, had publicly warned that if Israel hit these, Iran would retaliate and target Israel’s nuclear facilities.
• Option Two. Attack Ballistic Missile Production Facilities. So far Israel regarded the nascent nuclear facilities of Iran as an existential threat. The Israeli military spokesman, Adm Daniel Hagare conceded that they had underestimated Iran’s ballistic missiles capability. This was in fact a real and present danger. Their storage facilities are in deep underground bunkers that would be difficult to attack, but the production centers could be targeted and one of them was, in Isfahan.
• Option Three. IRGC Headquarters Bases. The most logical target system would be the IRGC, that is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Headquarters, barracks, bunkers and weapons storage facilities. It would be the most justifiable target system in Iran.
• Option Four. Iran’s Petrochemical Facilities and Export Terminals. Iran’s oil exports provided the financial support to build huge missile arsenals and fund a proxy war against Israel via the Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis and the Shia militias in Iraq and Iran. Iran’s war waging capabilities could be seriously hit if its oil export sector was targeted. There were the main ports at Bandar Abbas, etc, which could be primary targets in such an attack.
These were the main overt military options for Israel to strike in response to the Iranian military strike of 13 April. They could also use electromagnetic bombs to create EMP or electromagnetic pulses to fry up electronic circuits and destroy command control and communications in the critical areas. There were also media reports circulated that if Israel had to go it alone, it would seek air bases in Aizerbaijan to hit Iran from the north unexpected direction.
Covert Options. Given the tremendous US pressure on Israel to prevent escalation, Israel would most likely have to resort to a significant offensive against Hezbollah but confine the attacks in Iran to the covert level only. These would include possibly terrorist attacks by Baluch and Kurd insurgents, use of cyber warfare or (Stutnex redux) or use drones to strike these targets. Israel could also carry out covert action to destabilize and overthrow the Iran regime of the Ayatollahs but that would have to be a long-term covert action project in concert with the CIA. These could be the precise response options that could obviate Iranian retaliation and triggering a major escalatory spiral in the Middle East. Oil prices were already at $90 a barrel. A full-scale Iran-Israel war in the Middle East could send the oil prices skyrocketing through the roof and create a global economic crisis of major proportions That was in no one’s interest.
Israel’s Response Strike on 18 April. Israel mounted its counter-attack finally on 18 April, just five days after Iran’s missile strike. There was a lot of ambiguity and disinformation let lose in the media. The Israelis did not announce that they had carried out an attack, but explosions were reported in the sky over Isfahan. The Iranians equally seemed keen to play down the scale of the Israeli attacks. They said that a number of drones, (hand-held quad-copters of very limited range) had been seen flying over Tabriz and over Isfahan. Why Isfahan? Isfahan is the home base of the Iranian F-14 Tomcat fighter-bomber squadrons. It is also the home base of an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps unit. It has an S-300 missile battery and reportedly also production facilities for missiles and drones. The targets that the Israelis actually struck was the S-300 missile battery and they claim to have damaged one of its radars that are used for fire control. Next day, pictures in the US media indicated that satellite surveillance had picked up the destruction of one of the Iranian radars in the S-300 missile battery which was struck by the drones. When Iran was quite clear that there had been no missile, oblique, cruise missile strikes or fighter-bomber attacks and it had been confined merely to hand-held drones, it seemed to relax and opened its air space which it had closed earlier. Similar small drone attacks had been done by the Ukrainian intelligence agents from the vicinity of Moscow with hand-held drones to strike some targets, largely for psychological impact. This was the precise, very limited nature of the Israeli response option and Iran seemed to be quite relieved. They played it down totally, and in fact, the Iranian foreign minister went to the extent of retorting to reporters, “What strike? What attack?” They said these were just infiltrators who had come in with handheld quadcopters and tried to launch them to create a media event. They understood that Israel was under tremendous pressure from the United States and the Western allies not to respond in a major way, and it had refrained from such a major provocation. So Iran has been very cautious and very pragmatic. It refused to get drawn in, refused to escalate, and for the time being, the crisis in the Middle East seems to have been averted. How long that will hold is a matter of conjecture and we will have to wait and watch.
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India’s Response Options. The simple fact is, what can India do? Like the rest of the world, a major conflict in the Middle East would considerably harm India’s interests. Any oil shock can have a major negative impact on the Indian economy. India has very friendly relations with both Israel and Iran and as such it would be very well placed if it has to play a mediatory role. I am not sure what mediatory role has so far been played behind the scenes, but I do not see any overt evidence of India taking such an initiative, (though we did have talks with Iran to get our crew released from the ship that the Iranian Navy had hijacked in the Red Sea). We will have to keenly wait and watch as to how events unfold in the Middle East. For the time being the world has pulled back from the brink of a disaster. From a military analyst point of view, we have a new form of war which is now fairly well established in all the battles that we have seen recently, whether in the Russia-Ukraine war or in the Middle East. The emphasis is shifting primarily to missile and drone strikes rather than manned air strikes. I would again like to reiterate that China was first off the starter blocks to create a Rocket Force after Gulf War I and II. It had feverishly started the construction of its Strategic Rocket Force as far back as the 1990s. It now has the biggest rocket arsenal in the world. It has also invested very heavily in drones of all shape and sizes. Therefore, we will have to study in very great detail the Iran-Israel missile clash and draw very pertinent lessons for our own context. Specifically, we will have to re-examine how much emphasis is to be put on manned air forces and how much onto the unmanned drones and missiles. The balance increasingly seems to be shifting in favour of drone and ballistic missile arsenals coupled with cruise missiles. We will have to gear up our military-industrial complex to churn out these drones/missiles in very large numbers to cater for intensive firing rates in actual combat. The Iran missile strike had deliberately been pared down for minimal impact to tamp down chances of escalation. A purposeful and destructive strike would have required some 1,500 drones and missiles for a similar target set. The accuracy and lethality of such unmanned systems is rising exponentially and Iran has just demonstrated their ability to penetrate even the densest Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD). We are living through a new Revolution in Military Affairs. Pakistan is still stuck largely with its F-16s for retaliation. It is China that we will have to watch closely and match in numbers, throw-weight, accuracy and ability to penetrate dense AD environments.
