Pakistan continues to be obsessed with Kashmir and its prime minister Imran Khan once again brought up the issue at the UN General Assembly in September. Pakistan also continues to support cross border terrorism. As war clouds hover over Ladakh, and the world’s two largest armies, are face-to-face, with Pakistan continuing to invoke nuclear threat every now and then, there is a need to visit nuclear dynamics in South Asia, and call the Pakistani nuclear bluff.
In 2018, the then Pakistan prime minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi had said that his country had developed short-range nuclear weapons to counter the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine of the Indian Army. Nuclear War in South Asia is a real possibility, warned the Pakistan’s national security adviser (NSA), Lt Gen (retired) Nasser Khan Janjua in 2018. India has been stockpiling a range of dangerous weapons and threatens Pakistan continuously with conventional warfare, he added. The then Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa said “the IAF has the capability of locating and striking nuclear and other targets in Pakistan. We have a draft nuclear doctrine. It is answered in that – what happens when the enemy decides to use nuclear weapons on us. As far as IAF is concerned, it has the ability to locate, fix and strike and that is not only for tactical nuclear weapons but for other targets across the border (as well).”
Global Realities
Today there are eight overt nuclear powers, USA, Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea; one covert (Israel), one nuclear aspirant (Iran). Saudi Arabia has stated that they will go nuclear if Iran acquires. There is a risk that middleweight militaries and non-state actors may muster nuclear devices. Mary Robinson, wrote in The Elders, on December 2019, “The risk of a nuclear war is higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Nuclear weapons and the climate emergency are the two existential threats facing humanity today”.
The multi-polar world is watching efforts to deter N Korea and Iran, and that will decide the future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation. World is ill prepared for rise of nuclear aspirants and opaque or non-existent nuclear doctrines of those countries.
Indian Nuclear Scenario
India has declared a policy of ‘No First Use’ (NFU) of nuclear weapons but India will react with a massive retaliation in case attacked. China also has a NFU policy. Sitakanta Mishra wrote in “Pakistan’s Nuclear Threshold: Not as Low as Perceived”, that though the exact contours of Pakistan’s nuclear threshold were unclear, Khalid Kidwai, the former head of Strategic Planning Division (SPD), in 2001 delineated four generic ‘redlines’: spatial threshold (loss of large parts of territory), military threshold (destruction of large parts of land or air forces), economic threshold (economic strangulation), and political threshold (political destabilization or large scale internal subversion).
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In 2002 then president Pervez Musharraf stated that “nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India,” and would only be used if “the very existence of Pakistan as a state is threatened”. With this background, India does not envisage a nuclear war with China. In any case China does have conventional military superiority and there is unlikely to be a situation when it threatens India with nuclear weapons, and invite a massive retaliation. The threat of a nuclear attack, therefore, is only from Pakistan.
The first scenario is that Pakistan launches a full-fledged nuclear attack, and India is forced to respond with massive retaliatory nuclear strike. The second scenario is that Pakistan attacks India with Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW). As per India’s declared policy, it is expected to respond with a massive retaliatory nuclear strike. Both these scenarios will mean assured mutual destruction. The third scenario is that Pakistan attacks with TNWs but Indian political leadership dithers in decision making or inordinately delays response under international pressures. In such a case Indian Armed Forces will have to continue conventional offensive under NBC environment.
Indo-Pak Nuclear Dynamics
Both India and Pakistan are overt nuclear weapon powers since 1998, with each having around 100-150 nuclear warheads. Pakistani establishment routinely makes loose statements telling the world of high risk of nuclear war in the South Asian region, and indirectly indicating to India that it will respond with a nuclear attack if it was threatened beyond a point. India has to, therefore, remain prepared for a possible nuclear strike. Since Pakistan’s implied threat of nuclear response and its threshold is somewhat vague, there is a significant space for conventional offensive operations. Uri surgical strike and Balakot air strikes prove the point. A scenario of “repeated alerts and false alarms” is likely to prevail in the Indo-Pak context, particularly till confidence building and risk reduction measures are firmly in place.
Pakistani Nuclear Capability
Pakistan started its nuclear programme in 1972 just after the 1971 Indo-Pak war dismembered it and Bangladesh was liberated. The first nuclear weapon test was carried out in May 1998. Pakistan is estimated to have a stockpile of 130 warheads. The maximum missile range currently (Shaheen-III) is 2750 km. That will cover most of India. People’s Republic of China (PRC) has allegedly transferred missile and related materials to Pakistan. North Korea had been secretly supplying Pakistan with ballistic missile technology in exchange for nuclear weapons technology. Pakistan’s low-yield weapons can be carried on fighter-bombers and on short-range ballistic missiles Shaheen and Gauri. They have built Soviet-style road-mobile missiles and air defences around strategic sites, with other concealment measures. Pakistan also possesses nuclear tipped Babur cruise missiles with range up to 700 km, extendable to 1,000 km. The Hatf-IX (Nasr) is a battlefield TNW with range up to 70 km. PAF has two dedicated squadrons of the JF-17 Thunder, now believed to be the preferred vehicle for delivery of nuclear weapons. One squadron of F-16s is capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The French Mirage-III are also upgraded to carry a new air launch cruise missile. Pakistan is developing a sea-based variant of the Hatf-VIII Babur nuclear cruise missile. Pakistan has pushed a proposal to build its own nuclear submarines.
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Pakistan refuses to adopt NFU indicating that it would strike India with nuclear weapons even if India did not use such weapons first. Pakistan’s asymmetric nuclear posture has significant influence on India’s decision and ability to retaliate, as seen in 2001 (Indian Parliament) and 2008 (Mumbai) deadly attacks on Indian soil. Pakistan’s motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development programme is to prevent another invasion of Pakistan. Pakistan is not a signatory to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). While the world has been worried about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons passing on to rouge states or even terrorists, Pakistan has repeatedly claimed that their weapons are most secure. Unlike rest of the world where the nukes are controlled by civilian heads of government, in Pakistan the nuclear button is reportedly with the Army.
Indian Nuclear Capability and Response
India launched its nuclear programme in 1967 just after China exploded a nuclear device in 1964. India carried out the first nuclear explosion in 1974 and its first nuclear weapons test in May 1998. India is reportedly having a stockpile of around 110 nuclear warheads. The maximum operational ballistic missile range (of Agni V) is 5,800 km. This covers all of China. India was estimated to have 800 kg of separated reactor-grade plutonium with a total amount of 8,300 kg of civilian plutonium, enough for approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons. Supersonic BrahMos cruise missile with nuclear warhead 300kg and range 450 km, and Nirbhay long range cruise missile with 1500 kg warhead and 1000 km range are also part of the arsenal. India is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group. India has signed neither the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty nor the NPT. India maintains NFU nuclear policy and has a nuclear triad capability as a part of its ‘Minimum Credible Deterrence’. India’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC) was established in 2003 and is the joint Services custodian of all of India’s nuclear weapons, missiles and assets. However, the political leadership, in the form of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) is the only body authorized to order a nuclear strike.
Agni-VI and Surya missiles, under development, will have range going up to 16,000 km. Dhanush (350 km) Sagarika (700 km) and K-4 (3500 km) are the three naval missiles. Nuclear-armed fighter-bombers, land-based nuclear weapons, coupled with nuclear powered submarines, including indigenous submarines, make a formidable capability.
Indian Air Defence Strategy
To the defender, for identifying a nuclear vis-a-vis conventional missile or aircraft strike there is little difference. In case of such high level vagueness, India will have no choice but to presume every incoming raid as a nuclear attack. The threat to intercept includes subsonic low-flying tactical cruise missiles and aircraft and fast moving long-trajectory ballistic missiles. The air defence aircraft with IAF have air-to-air missiles (AAM) and the surface-to-air missiles (SAM) with IAF and Army will be used to intercept as many incoming projectiles as possible. Credible SAM capability with SPYDER and Akash, among others, exists. Later, S-400 Triumf will join the fleet.
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The Indian Ballistic Missile Defence Programme (IBMDP) is an initiative to develop and deploy a multi-layered ballistic missile defence system against a ballistic missile attack. The two-tiered system is planned to intercept any incoming missile launched from 5,000 kilometers away. Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile is for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for lower altitude interception. It includes the Long Range Tracking Radar, and 3D Multi Function Control Radar.
On 27 March 2019, India tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon during an operation code named Mission Shakti. The target of the test was a satellite present in a low Earth orbit (LEO), which was hit with a kinetic kill vehicle. The ASAT test utilized a modified anti-ballistic missile interceptor, Prithvi Defence Vehicle Mark-II, which was developed under Project XSV-1. The test made India the fourth country after the US, Russia and China to have tested an ASAT weapon. This capability further reinforces the Air Defence capability against a nuclear ballistic missile. Strong passive air defence measures, including against NBC threat need to be regularly rehearsed.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Approach
Pakistan hopes that a limited nuclear strike offers a quick tactical victory through speed and penetration against critical targets. It may use Hatf IX (Nasr) which is a solid fuel, low-yield, sub-sonic surface-to-surface, tactical missile with 100 km range, 500 Kg warhead. It is normally used like an artillery system, with 5-6 missiles fired simultaneously at the target area. Pakistan hopes/intends that quick strike could induce delays in Indian decision-making cycle.
Military Operational Considerations in NBC Environment
If the Indian armed forces are forced into continued conventional operations because the political executive dithers or delays decision for a nuclear response then it must ensure to keep critical elements intact to carry on an offensive under NBC environment. Mass for mass, nuclear detonation is a millions times more powerful and results in blast, fire, and radiation. Free electrons emitted affect radio waves, especially at lower frequencies of Radar, VHF and UHF. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generates high voltages that can destroy unshielded electronics. Military needs to war-game actions under EMP effects. Forces need to repeatedly revisit nuclear operational doctrine and need to educate nuclear operators and decision makers.
Indian Nuclear Response Preparation
Peacetime capability building and demonstration contributes to deterrence. Early warning and attack assessment needs network of radars, other sensors and processing stations. A fail-safe communication system must link the surveillance, early warning, command and control systems with the nuclear forces (C4SR). Artificial Intelligence (AI) is already helping strategic decision making. Ability of Indian military elements to absorb enemy first strike through dispersion and redundancy and remain operationally efficient is critical. Survival of decision makers and other support services through active and passive means is important. There is a need to provide air defence to all these elements, critically the national capital.
All resources for nuclear mission must be earmarked, disbursed and secured. Integrated satellite, aerial and ground-based surveillance system to gather data for ‘targeting’ must be in place. Adequate processing facilities for rapid retargeting based on event templates, current intelligence & higher inputs. All nuclear warheads must be pre-positioned and ready to be armed. There should be a clear plan to kill enemy second strike ability by targeting higher direction centres, and simultaneous deep operations to disrupt enemy’s preparation and movement.
Ground Offensive Under Nuclear Overhang
A tactical nuclear weapon can threaten employment of mass formations and forward fixed operating bases. Field Commanders may be forced to ensure dispersal, survivability, and force protection. Isolation of units, mass casualties, and loss of C2 capabilities will necessitate semi-independent operations and decentralized control. This may add functional stress. A tactical nuclear weapon can alter terrain and create obstacles such as fallen trees, fires, craters, rubble, and radiation. Creation of obstacles will deny terrain and slow the counterattacks. The striking force may have to cross areas contaminated by fallout and initial radiation. Army may have to replace units in case of tactical nuclear attack in TBA. In a nuclear environment decisive battles must be greatly compressed and campaigns accelerated.
IAF would support Indian Army’s offensive and defensive operations by creating air superiority in TBA and providing an air umbrella to surface strike forces. It would undertake interdiction missions. Fixed wing and rotary wing will provide logistic/ replenishment support and also mass casualty/ medical evacuation in case of nuclear attack. IAF will also support nuclear disaster relief operations at national and tactical level by moving disaster management teams, NBC equipments and medical supplies. It will also set up ‘Rapid Air Mobile’ hospitals.
Calling the Pakistani Nuclear Bluff
Deterrence is a product of a nation’s military capabilities and willingness to use them. Indian policy is to terminate conflict at the lowest possible level of violence. Nuclear deterrence also requires air superiority, space superiority, cyberspace superiority, global precision attack, rapid global mobility, global integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and command & control.
Escalation control is essential. It involves conveying to the enemy that, although we are capable of escalating to a higher level, we have deliberately held back. Escalation can be controlled by tight limits on the area of employment and timing and duration of employment be kept short. A channel of communication with the adversary must remain available to permit negotiations for escalation control and conflict termination. Critical thing is the turnaround time for the decision to launch a nuclear counter-strike. The final decision on use of nuclear weapons has to be made by the leader (prime minister), based on political and military advice, especially when you are going to act only in retaliation.
Pakistan has been routinely reminding the world about the escalated risk of a military show-down in South Asia. It is often geo-political brinkmanship to extract American sympathy and military aid. Pakistani Generals would never dare to risk their own and their future generations through a nuclear attack. Pakistani reaction to shooting down of Atlantique aircraft, its response to heavy casualties in Kargil and its response to Uri and Balakot strikes were all very mute. India must, therefore, remain aggressive in its conventional operations and intelligently manage escalation. It is time to call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff.
