PLA Rocket Force – Key Takeaways
• The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its strategic deterrence capabilities.
• In 2021, the PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and training. This was more than the rest of the world combined excluding ballistic missile employment in conflict zones.
• The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), which are capable of conducting both conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets as well as conventional strikes against naval targets.
The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities. In 2021, the PRC continued building three solid-fueled ICBM silo fields, which will cumulatively contain at least 300 new ICBM silos.
The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PRC’s strategic land- based nuclear and conventional missile forces and associated support forces and missile bases. The PLARF is a critical component of the PRC’s nuclear deterrence strategy and its strategy to deter and counter third-party intervention in regional conflicts. According to the PRC’s 2019 defense white paper, the PLARF is working towards “enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long- range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernized rocket force.
The PLARF fields a variety of conventional mobile ground-launched short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. The PLARF’s ground-based missile forces complement the air and sea-based precision strike capabilities of the PLAAF and PLAN. The PLARF’s conventional missile forces includes the CSS-6 (DF- 15) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) (range 725-850 km); the CSS-7 (DF-11) SRBM (600 km); the CSS-11 (DF-16) SRBM (more than 700 km); the land-attack and anti-ship variants of the CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) (approximately 1,500 km); the hypersonic glide vehicle capable DF-17 MRBM; the DF-26 IRBM (approximately 3,000 km); the CJ-10 (DH-10) ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) (approximately 1,500 km); and the CJ-100 (DF-100) GLCM (approximately 2,000 km). The PLARF’s conventionally armed CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the capability to conduct long- range precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific from mainland China. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), and is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the field. The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 IRBMs, which it first revealed in 2015 and fielded in 2016. The multi-role DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea from mainland China. In 2020, China fired anti-ship ballistic missiles against a moving target in the South China Sea. The PLARF is developing and testing several new variants of theater-range missiles and developing capabilities and methods to counter adversary ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. In 2021, the PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and training, more than the rest of the world combined excluding ballistic missile employment in conflict zones. The DF-17 passed several tests successfully and is deployed operationally. While the DF-17 is primarily a conventional platform, it may be equipped with nuclear warheads. In 2020, a PRC-based military expert described the primary purpose of the DF-17 as striking foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific.
The PLARF is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces with more survivable delivery systems, and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities. The PRC appears to be doubling the numbers of launchers in some ICBM units. The PRC’s ICBM arsenal consists of approximately 300 ICBMs, including fixed and mobile launchers capable of launching unitary and multiple reentry vehicles. China’s fixed ICBMs consist of the shorter range CSS- 3 (DF-4), as well as the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A) and MIRV-equipped Mod 3 (DF- 5B), which is capable of carrying up to five MIRVs. PRC media indicates a follow-on DF-5C may be in development. The solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 class and CSS-20 (DF-41) ICBMs complement this force. The CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), with a range in excess of 11,000 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States. PRC media reports suggest a DF-31B might also be in development. The DF-41 ICBM has been operationally deployed with commentary during the 2019 parade noting that two brigades existed for the system. The PRC appears to be considering additional DF-41 launch options, including rail- mobile and silo basing. The PRC is building multiple ICBM silo’s intended to support the land-based component of the PRC’s nuclear triad. Additionally, sources indicate a “long- range” DF-27 ballistic missile is in development. Official PRC military writings indicates this range-class spans 5,000-8,000km, which means the DF-27 could be a new IRBM or ICBM. Additionally, on 27 July 2021, China conducted the first fractional orbital launch of an ICBM with an HGV. The HGV flew around the world and impacted inside China. This demonstrated the greatest distance flown (~40,000 km) and longest flight time (~100+ minutes) of any PRC land-attack weapons system to date. According to senior U.S. military officials, the HGV did not strike its target, but came close.
Strategic Support Force – Key Takeaways
• The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities.
• The SSF’s Network Systems Department is responsible for information warfare with an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare.
• The PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities-including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems-that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.
• The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly and Beijing has devoted significant resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration. SSF works with civilian organizations, such as universities and research organization, to integrate civilian support to military efforts.
The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established in 2015 to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The SSF reports directly to the CMC and supports the entire PLA with its capabilities. The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper described the SSF’s modernization goals as “seeking to achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force.”
The SSF oversees two deputy theater command-level departments: the Space Systems Department responsible for military space operations, and the Network Systems Department responsible for information operations (IO), which includes technical reconnaissance, EW, cyberspace warfare, and psychological operations. At the headquarters level, the SSF has a four-department administrative structure that includes the Staff, Equipment, Political Work, and Logistics Departments. As a strategic organization, the SSF is directly subordinate to the CMC, but some of its subordinate units may report to the theater commands in wartime. The SSF provides information support derived from space-, cyber-, and terrestrial-based means to all PLA services and the five joint theater commands. Civilian reserve and militia units – typically comprised of personnel from the Ministry of Information and Industry Technology, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and academic institutions – augment SSF cyberspace operations during peacetime and are organized into specialized units during wartime to support network defense operations.
In 2021, General Ju Qiansheng was promoted to SSF commander. He previously served as commander of the Network Systems Department. Lt. Gen. Shang Hong was the commander of the Space Systems in 2021. He previously served as the chief of staff for the former General Armaments Department, Chairman of the China Satellite Launch and Tracking General, and commander of the Jiuquan Satellite Launch center. The leader of the Network Systems Department is unknown.
The SSF participates in joint exercises and training throughout China, including possible national strategic joint exercises. For example, since its creation, the SSF has participated in joint far seas training exercises with the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force concentrated on advancing joint operations and informatized warfare capabilities. These exercises allow the SSF to assess and improve its capabilities to support joint operations and better enable the PLA to project power into the East and South China seas.
Network Systems Department. The SSF Network Systems Department is responsible for information warfare with a mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare (EW), and psychological warfare. By placing these missions under the same organizational umbrella, the PRC seeks to remedy the operational coordination challenges that hindered information sharing under the PLA’s pre-reform organizational structure. The integration of cyberspace and EW elements under one organization was a crucial step towards realizing the operational concept of integrated network and electronic warfare that the PLA has envisioned since the early 2000s. The Network Systems Department operates five theater-aligned technical reconnaissance bases, a number of signals intelligence bureaus, and several research institutes. The Network Systems Department provides intelligence support to the theater commands by leveraging a diverse suite of ground-based technical collection assets to provide a common operating picture to geographically dispersed operational units.
The SSF and the “Three Warfares” Concept: The SSF Network Systems Department, performs missions and tasks associated with the PLA’s concept of “Three Warfares,” which comprises psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. This department is the only publicly known organization in the PLA that performs psychological warfare operations. See ‘Special Topic: PRC Views of Information and Information Dominance’ for more on PLA views on information warfare, including psychological warfare.
The SSF’s strategic space, cyberspace, and psychological warfare capabilities and missions are not bound by geographic constraints and can be used independently or to enable and support PLA global power projection operations. The SSF’s information support role involves centralizing technical intelligence collection and management, which provides strategic intelligence support to the theater commands, enables power projection, supports strategic defense in the space and nuclear domains, and enables joint operations. The PRC continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary’s use of space-based assets during crisis or conflict. In addition to the development of directed- energy weapons and satellite jammers, the PLA has an operational ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile intended to target low-Earth orbit satellites, and the PRC probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.
SSF Space Systems Department
Space and Counterspace Trends. The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly and Beijing has devoted significant economic and technological resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as profit-generating launches, human spaceflight, scientific endeavors, as well as lunar and Martian exploration missions. Space has been considered a distinct domain of warfare since at least 2015, and the PLA expects space to play an important role in future conflicts by enabling long-range precision strikes and in denying other militaries the use of overhead command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The PRC probably will continue to develop the capabilities for use against satellites in orbit to degrade and deny adversary space capabilities.
Space and Counterspace Organizations. The SSF Space Systems Department is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support; space surveillance; space information support; space telemetry, tracking, and control; and space warfare. The Space System Department operates at least eight bases, including those whose core missions are the launch, tracking, R&D, and operation of the satellites vital to China’s overhead C4ISR architecture. The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command stations in several locations worldwide. The SSD also operates Yuan Wang space support ships that track satellite and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches.
China’s space program comprises organizations in the military, political, defense-industrial, and commercial sectors. The PLA historically has managed China’s space program and continues to support both civilian and military interests. This includes strengthening and investing in its science and technology sector, growing international partnerships, and improving China’s capabilities in space-based ISR, SATCOM, satellite navigation, human spaceflight, and robotic space exploration. Although state-owned enterprises are China’s primary civilian and military space contractors, China is placing greater emphasis on decentralizing and diversifying its space industry to increase competition.
The SSD’s China Launch and Tracking Control (CLTC) operates all four launch sites, in addition to Yuan Wang space support ships, two major satellite control centers-Xian Satellite Control Center (XSCC) and the BACC-and the PLA telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) system for all Chinese satellites.
China leads the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a multilateral organization with rotating leadership whose members include China, Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey, with Egypt, Indonesia, and Mexico as associate members. APSCO oversees a space surveillance project known as the Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System (APOSOS). As part of the project, China provided to Iran, Pakistan, and Peru 15-cm telescopes that are able to track objects in LEO and GEO. All tasking information and subsequent observation data collected is funneled through the Chinese Academy of Science’s National Astronomical Observatory of China. APOSOS has near full coverage of LEO and GEO. The organization is planning to improve optical system capabilities, coverage, and redundancy as well as data sharing networks.
China utilizes locations worldwide to aid in TT&C of space missions both around the Earth as well as in cislunar and deep space. There are ground stations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ethiopia, France, Greenland, Kenya, Kiribati, Namibia, Norway (Svalbard), Pakistan, South Africa, and Spain. There are also four sites in Antarctica that can provide similar support as well as a BeiDou reference station: Great Wall, Kunlun, Taishan, and Zhongshan Stations.
The State Council’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) is the primary civilian organization that coordinates and manages China’s space activities, including allocating space research and development funds. It also maintains a working relationship with the PLA organization that oversees China’s military acquisitions. SASTIND guides and establishes policies for state-owned entities conducting China’s space activities.
The China National Space Administration (CNSA), subordinate to SASTIND, serves as the public face of China’s civilian space efforts. China is increasingly using CNSA efforts to bolster relationships with countries around the world, providing opportunities to cooperate on space issues. China had more than a hundred cooperative space-related agreements with more than three dozen countries and four international organizations.
Many space technologies can serve a civilian and military purpose, and China emphasizes “military-civil fusion”-a phrase used, in part, to refer to the use of dual-use technologies, policies, and organizations for military benefit. The SSF works with civilian organizations like universities and research organizations to incorporate civilian support to military efforts since there is an already high demand for aerospace talent and competition for finite human resources. China’s commercial space sector features partially state-owned enterprises such as Zhuhai Orbita, Expace, Galactic Energy, and OK-Space for remote sensing, launch, and communication services.
International Cooperation. In 2021, China launched the China-France Oceanography Satellite, China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite 04A, Ethiopian Remote-Sensing Satellite, and Student Small Satellites (SSS) for the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). Beijing also completed the in-orbit delivery of the Pakistan Remote-Sensing Satellite (PRSS-1), Venezuelan Remote-Sensing Satellite (VRSS-2), Sudan Remote-Sensing Satellite (SRSS-1), and the Algerian Communications Satellite (Alcomsat-1). China has provided satellite carrying or launching services for countries including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Laos, and Luxembourg. China has built satellite data receiving stations with countries including Bolivia, Indonesia, Namibia, Thailand and South Africa.
Space and Counterspace Operations. The PLA views space superiority, as well as the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components of modern “informatized warfare.” China’s perceptions of the importance of space-enabled operations to the United States and its allies has shaped integral components of PLA military planning and campaigns. In addition, space is a critical enabler of beyond-line-of-sight operations for deployed PLA forces. The PLA probably views counterspace operations as a means to deter and counter a U.S. intervention during a regional military conflict. Moreover, PRC defense academics suggest that reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and early warning satellites could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”
The PRC seeks to enhance the PLA’s C2 for joint operations and establish a real-time surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning system, and it is increasing the number and capabilities of its space systems, including communications and intelligence satellites, as well as the BeiDou navigation satellite system. These capabilities allow the PLA to maintain situational awareness of potential flashpoints as well as monitor, track, and target adversary forces. Additionally, the PRC continues to develop direct ascent, co-orbital, electronic warfare, and directed energy capabilities that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict. PLA writings indicate the purpose of these capabilities is to deter and counter the intervention of a third party during a military conflict.
Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022
