Afghanistan

The Taliban almost certainly will remain firmly in control of Afghanistan during the next year and continue to combat ISIS-Khorasan and anti-Taliban resistance groups, though these groups still conduct deadly attacks in country. The Taliban also continues to restrict al-Qa’ida and its affiliates’ activities in accordance with the Taliban’s perception of its Doha Agreement obligations, though some al-Qa’ida elements probably circumvent these restrictions to provide modest covert support to the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan militant group. Low-level Taliban members continue to kill or arrest former Afghan government and military personnel, but senior regime leaders probably are not directing this campaign.

The Taliban has made some progress toward gaining de facto recognition with regional partners, despite persistent concerns about the state of human rights, inclusive representation in government, and militancy in Afghanistan. Iran has met with the Taliban to discuss water rights and threats posed by terrorist groups, particularly ISIS-Khorasan and Jaysh al-Adl.

India is pursuing low-level engagement with the Taliban, focused on humanitarian assistance, countering terrorism, and enabling private sector growth.

• Russia is continuing to deepen its relationship with the Taliban, expressing its intent to formally recognize the government and cooperate against terrorism. In September 2024, the Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson emphasized Russian efforts to remove the Taliban from Russia’s list of terrorist groups and develop multilateral cooperation while blaming the West for instability in the country.

• In January 2024, China’s President Xi accepted the diplomatic credentials of a Taliban- appointed ambassador. The Taliban’s focus on improving internal security and reducing violence has enabled some foreign investments from China, including oil extraction and copper mining activities in Afghanistan.

India

Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s defense priorities will probably focus on demonstrating global leadership, countering China, and enhancing New Dehli’s military power. India views China as its primary adversary and Pakistan more an ancillary security problem to be managed, despite cross-border attacks in mid-May by both India’s and Pakistan’s militaries.

• Following a late April terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi conducted missile strikes on terrorism-related infrastructure facilities in Pakistan. The missile strike provoked multiple rounds of missile, drone, and loitering munition attacks, and heavy artillery fire, by both militaries from 7 to 10 May. As of 10 May, both militaries had agreed to a full ceasefire.

To counter Chinese influence and boost its global leadership role, India is giving priority to advancing its bilateral defense partnerships in the Indian Ocean region through exercises, training, arms sales, and information sharing. India also has increased trilateral engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and actively participates in multilateral fora such as the Quadrilateral, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN.

• In late October 2024, India and China reached an agreement to move forces away from the two remaining contested positions along the disputed Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. The disengagement did not resolve the longstanding dispute about border demarcation but reduced some tension still lingering from a 2020 incident when troops on both sides were killed in a clash along the Line of Actual Control.

India almost certainly will continue promoting its “Made in India” initiative this year to build its domestic defense industry, mitigate supply chain concerns, and modernize its military.

India continued to modernize its military in 2024, conducting a test of the nuclear-capable developmental Agni-I Prime MRBM and the Agni-V multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle while also commissioning its second nuclear-powered submarine to strengthen its nuclear triad and bolster its ability to deter adversaries.

India will maintain its relationship with Russia through 2025 because it views its ties to Russia as important for achieving its economic and defense objectives and sees value in the relationship as a means to offset deepening Russia-China relations. Under Modi, India has reduced its procurement of Russian-origin military equipment but still relies on Russian spare parts to maintain and sustain its large inventory of Russian-origin tanks and fighter aircraft that form the backbone of its military’s ability to counter perceived threats from China and Pakistan.

Pakistan

During the next year, the Pakistani military’s top priorities are likely to remain cross-border skirmishes with regional neighbors, rising attacks by Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and Baloch nationalist militants, counterterrorism efforts, and nuclear modernization. Despite Pakistan’s daily operations during the past year, militants killed more than 2,500 people in Pakistan in 2024.

• Pakistan regards India as an existential threat and will continue to pursue its military modernization effort, including the development of battlefield nuclear weapons, to offset India’s conventional military advantage.

• Pakistan is modernizing its nuclear arsenal and maintaining the security of its nuclear materials and nuclear command and control. Pakistan almost certainly procures WMD-applicable goods from foreign suppliers and intermediaries.

• Pakistan primarily is a recipient of China’s economic and military largesse, and Pakistani forces conduct multiple combined military exercises every year with China’s PLA, including a new air exercise completed in November 2024. Foreign materials and technology supporting Pakistan’s WMD programs are very likely acquired primarily from suppliers in China, and sometimes are transshipped through Hong Kong, Singapore, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. However, terrorist attacks targeting Chinese workers who support China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects has emerged as a point of friction between the countries; seven Chinese nationals were killed in Pakistan in 2024.

• Pakistan and Iran have taken steps, including high-level meetings, to deescalate tensions after the two countries conducted unilateral airstrikes on each other’s territory in January 2024 in response to cross-border terror attacks.

• In September 2024, Taliban and Pakistani border forces clashed near border posts, resulting in the death of eight Taliban fighters. In March 2025, Pakistan and the Afghanistan exchanged air and artillery strikes on each other’s territory, each citing alleged militant infrastructure as the targets.

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Key Highlights from DIA’s Worldwide Threat Assessment 2025

China’s Strategic Posture:

• Accelerated PLA modernization aims to enable a Taiwan takeover by force if needed.

•  Massive investments in nuclear, space, cyber, and disinformation capabilities.

• Expanding global basing and maritime presence from Cambodia to Africa.

Russia’s War Trajectory:

• Sustained war in Ukraine with incremental gains, high human and material costs.

• Increasing use of cyberattacks, space-based weapons, and destabilization operations across Europe and Africa.

Tech-Driven Threat Evolution: AI, space, cyber, biotech, and unmanned systems are reshaping global conflict and espionage strategies.

Rising Adversarial Coordination: China, Russia, Iran, and NorthKorea are intensifying bilateral military, tech, and diplomatic collaboration to counter U.S. influence.

Hybrid and Asymmetric Warfare: From Iranian proxy strikes to North Korean missile exports and cybercrime, non-traditional threats are expanding in complexity and reach.

Homeland Vulnerabilities: U.S. infrastructure faces growing threats from drones, fentanyl trafficking, cyberattacks, and potential terrorist infiltrations via the southern border.

Global Flashpoints: The Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, Red Sea, and Central Asia remain hotspots for escalation with direct implications for U.S. and allied interests.

Bottom line: The security landscape is defined by hybrid conflict, deepening adversarial ties, and accelerating technology disruption.

Strategic foresight and resilience are no longer optional they’re imperative.

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Pakistan military’s 2018 gamble to install the former Pakistan cricketer-turned politician, Imran Khan, flopped with the ousting of the former prime minister and his government in 2022. Along with the arrests of Imran Khan, his wife and several of his party workers, many serving military officers of various cadres were also interrogated and arrested on numerous charges.

Recently, on 12 August 2024, the former Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed was arrested by the Pakistan military. The Supreme Court ordered the arrest of the former chief. He was charged with misconduct, corruption and for abetting in political interference. Since then, court martial proceedings have been launched against him.

“Complying with the orders of Supreme Court of Pakistan . . . the process of Field General Court Martial has been initiated and Lt Gen Faiz Hameed (Retd) has been taken into military custody,” the Pakistan army stated. Since the conception of Pakistan, its military has been infamous for having influence over the country’s politics.

According to various reports presented against Hameed, there were allegations against him for allegedly harassing the owner of Islamabad’s ‘Top City’ housing scheme and society. Besides him, three other retired officers have been detained by the military in relation to Hameed’s case. But an important element to factor in, amidst all the said charges, is the undeniable close affiliation the former spy master has shared with the ousted prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan.

Khan has dismissed the charges against him as “frivolous and politically motivated,” even though he was forced to serve time in a jail for a year.

However, the appellate courts have since reversed, invalidated or suspended the charged convictions due to the lack of substantial evidence. But, the authorities in Islamabad seemed determine to file new cases against Khan in order to keep him in jail. Hence, the determination of the Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen Asim Munir to contain the political turbulence and to nail Imran Khan’s cronies should be no surprise with the arrest of his “top dog” spy master, Faiz Hameed.

The Former ISI Spy Chief, PMLN and the State

Lt Gen Faiz Hameed served as the 24th Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (DG ISI) from 2019 to 2021. He is known as the “India baiter” and Imran Khan’s affiliate.

It was reported that post-Taliban’s take over of Afghanistan in 2021, the chief had paid a visit to Kabul. The visits of the DG ISI had been clandestine in the past. However, it was not the case with his trip to Kabul. Several images of Lt Gen Faiz and Pakistan’s Ambassador Mansoor Ali Khan, having tea at Kabul’s Serena Hotel, surfaced on the social media. The purpose of Hameed’s visit was to seek “peace and stability” in Afghanistan and to get the first-hand account of the ground situation in Afghanistan. Despite the statements made by the former DG ISI, it was confirmed that the objective of his visit was to meet with the top Afghan leadership and certain foreign envoys in Kabul. Even though no official details were divulged at the time, it later came to light that the chief had brokered peace between the Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Baradar network.

The main promoter of Taliban had been Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, who was also in favour of the Haqqani Network when the fight to take over Kabul erupted between the warring factions. The ISI has been reported in the past to have utilized the Haqqani Network to orchestrate attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul as well as to sway the Sunni Pashtun force in a direction inclined to Pakistan. Additionally, under Hameed’s command’s, reports of the induction of Pakistan Army regulars in the anti-resistance operations against the Resistance Force, led by Commander Amrullah Saleh in Panjshir Valley, were conducted.

It was inferred, that Pakistan’s consistent aid to Taliban rose from their desire for a strategic depth in Afghanistan, while nurturing an outfit such as Taliban to act as ISI’s puppet to curb the possible terror threats, which it incurs from Tehreek-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). However, the tables have turned since then. The disillusionment of the Pakistani government of controlling the Afghan Taliban shattered with Taliban’s lackadaisical and undetermined effort in fostering a peace deal with TTP and Pakistan. The TTP later called off the ceasefire with Pakistan in 2022. The negotiations were carried out between a delegation led by Faiz Hameed and TTP leaders in Khost, Afghanistan. Under the negotiations, corps commanders of TTP, Muhammed Khan and Muslim Khan were released. Since then, TTP has ravaged Pakistan with their persistent attacks.

Besides the TTP threat, Pakistan was also hopeful with regards to the Pakistan-Afghan border areas, which even though are demarcated by the Durand Line, still remain as areas of dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghans view the border as an artificial entity and do not recognize the Durand line agreement, which Pakistan inherited post-1947. Afghanistan has claimed certain areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a part of their territory and views Pakistan as the illegal occupiers of their land. Hence, there have been several border skirmishes between the security forces of both nations. Pakistan’s relations with China and the presence of Chinese immigrants in the area have also served as reason for mistrust amongst the local habitants in these regions, who view the Chinese presence as a form of planned displacement of their communities to accommodate the Chinese, with exploitation of their land. Several attacks were orchestrated on Chinese citizens, who were assigned to Sino-Pakistan projects by various insurgents and militant outfits. Later on, at the behest of China, Pakistan decided to carry out a large scale military operation – Azm-i-Istehkam – to neutralize the threats especially around the Durand Line. This has resulted in rallies and ‘jirgas’ (tribal councils) being held in many cities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) due to the fear of mass displacement.

Additionally, the refoulement of Afghans back to their homeland from Pakistan has also sparked further tensions between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan government is of the view that many Afghan refugees may be sleeper cells or individuals involved in organized crimes. The inhibitions arising from the growing TTP threat and other offshoots remain to be a strong reason for Pakistan’s preventive course of action. Pakistan has blamed Kabul for being lenient in their approach towards the TTP and has blatantly made accusations of Taliban allowing the anti-Pakistan elements to carry out operations from Afghanistan, while also providing safe havens to them.

Furthermore, with Pakistan struggling economically, the decision for refoulement of undocumented Afghans has been considered prudent and imperative by Islamabad.

With the evolving political developments, dotted with several security and political threats erupting from Imran Khan’s PTI party opposing and clashing with the newly installed prime minister Shehbaaz Shariff’s PML-N, it was expected of the COAS Gen Aseem Munir to employ pre-emptive measures to wrest control over the state of affairs with the favoured political government installed by the military in power.

As a handpicked candidate of Imran Khan, Fiaz Hameed has been acknowledged for his involvement in Khan’s PTI party rioting across Pakistan on 9 May 9, 2023. This move was enough to upset Islamabad, given that PTI workers barged into and torched the official residence of the IV Corps commander in Lahore and also attempted to force themselves into the army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Further reports of Hameed providing counsel to Khan after taking premature retirement from the army, also suggested of his abetment in the May 9 riots in 2023, which has been regarded as an anarchy against the military institution.

Additionally, Nawaz Sharif also asserted that Gen Hameed had colluded with few generals and individuals from higher judiciary to impeach him from power in 2017.

In 2017, Hameed became infamous for orchestrating anti-blasphemy protests against the PML-N government by the far-Right group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan.

“The arrest of former ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed sends a clear signal to those still on the fence – there will be no compromise, no exceptions. Fall in line or face the consequences. The writing is on the wall,” stated Baqir Sajjad Syed, the national security correspondent of the influential Dawn newspaper.

Apart from various charges against Hameed, his personal swipe at the COAS Gen Munir for being a Shia in hopes of dismantling the Saudi-Pakistan relations and expecting the response to remove Munir or halt his appointment also, may have fanned the growing conflagration.

The Military Institution Always Wins in Pakistan After years of impunity, the reign of the former chief ended with the military usurping back its socio-economic and political control. The COAS, Gen Munir seems to have solidified his position with the removal of the puppet government set by the former COAS Gen Javed Qamar Bajwa. He has also carried out a witch hunt against the associates and close affiliates of Imran Khan. The arrest of Gen Bajwa’s former ISI spymaster also has been made into an example for those who would conspire against the current military regime. It would be no surprise if the security of the former COAS may also be under threat.

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The assessment noted that the US had taken steps to destroy or disable some of the equipment before it was left behind, but that much of it was still in working condition. The assessment also noted that the Taliban’s ability to use this equipment would depend on a number of factors, including their training and maintenance capabilities.

The assessment concluded that the US’s decision to leave behind so much equipment was a “significant miscalculation” that could have “serious consequences” for the region. The assessment also called for a review of the US’s policies on military assistance to ensure that such a mistake does not happen again.

The assessment has been criticized by some who argue that it does not go far enough in assessing the risks posed by the weapons and equipment left behind in Afghanistan. However, the assessment does provide a valuable overview of the situation and it is likely to be used by policymakers as they consider how to address the issue.

Arms in the Black Market

The Taliban in Afghanistan are selling the US arms on the black market. These weapons have been reported turning up in a number of countries, including Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia. They have also been reported being used by terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Haqqani Network.

In Pakistan, for example, there have been reports of Taliban-linked groups selling US-made weapons to militants in the country’s tribal areas. These weapons have been used by militants to carry out attacks against Pakistani security forces and civilians.

In Iran, there have been reports of Taliban-linked groups selling US-made weapons to Iranian proxies in the Middle East. These weapons have been used by Iranian proxies to carry out attacks against US forces and allies in the region.

In Central Asia, there have been reports of Taliban-linked groups selling US-made weapons to militants in the region. These weapons have been used by militants to carry out attacks against government forces and civilians.

The sale of US arms by the Taliban on the black market is a serious concern. These weapons could be used by terrorist groups to carry out attacks against US forces and allies, as well as civilians. The sale of these weapons also undermines the US’s efforts to combat terrorism in the region. The Taliban and other groups in Afghanistan have a well-established network of arms dealers, and it is difficult to track down these weapons once they have been sold.

The going black market rate of US arms left behind in Afghanistan varies depending on the type of weapon system and its condition. However, some general estimates can be made.

For example, a M4 rifle in good condition could sell for between $500 and $1,000 on the black market. An AK-47 rifle in good condition could sell for between $200 and $500. A Humvee in good condition could sell for between $50,000 and $100,000. A Black Hawk helicopter in good condition could sell for between $1 million and $2 million.

High Technology Systems

There is some concern that high-technology systems left behind in Afghanistan may have landed up in China or Russia. China and Russia are both major players in the global arms trade, and they have been known to purchase weapons from black market sources. If they were to acquire high-technology US systems, it would give them a significant advantage in terms of military capabilities.

The US government is also concerned that China and Russia could use their intelligence services to try to acquire high-technology US systems through other means, such as espionage.

Diversion of arms supplied in a conflict zone is not new. In Ukraine too, afms supplied by the USA and European allies have been diverted into the black market and it is difficult to estimate the scale of diversion. Some of the items that are believed to have been diverted include small arms and light weapons (SALW), ammunition, and night vision goggles.

For example, a Kalashnikov rifle in good condition could sell for between $200 and $500 on the black market. A Javelin anti-tank missile could sell for between $50,000 and $100,000. A night vision goggle in good condition could sell for between $1,000 and $2,000.

Establishing Accountability

As of yet, no one has been held accountable in the US for the large amount of weapon systems abandoned in Afghanistan. There have been calls for investigations and accountability, but no formal charges have been filed. The issue is likely to continue to be debated in the US for some time to come.

Some have argued that the US government should be held accountable for the weapons that were left behind, as they were ultimately responsible for the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Others have argued that the Afghan government should be held accountable, as they were responsible for the security of the weapons.

Here are some of the reasons why no one has been held accountable yet:

The US government has not yet released a full report on the withdrawal from Afghanistan, so it is not clear who was responsible for the decision to leave behind the weapons.

There is no clear legal basis for holding anyone accountable for the abandoned weapons. The US government has not been accused of any specific crime, and it is not clear that any laws were broken.

The US government is reluctant to open itself up to legal liability by investigating the abandoned weapons. If the government were to be found liable, it could be forced to pay damages to the Afghan government or other parties.

It is possible that the US government will eventually be held accountable for the abandoned weapons. However, it is also possible that the issue will be swept under the rug. Only time will tell what will happen.

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Weapon systems left behind by US forces in Afghanistan

Aircraft: 78 aircraft procured for the government of Afghanistan, including 60 Black Hawk helicopters, 18 A-29 Super Tucano attack planes, and 10 C-130 transport planes. These aircraft were demilitarized and rendered inoperable before the US military left.

Ground vehicles: Over 40,000 military vehicles, including 12,000 Humvees, 700 mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, and 200 tanks.

Small arms and light weapons: Over 300,000 weapons, including M4 rifles, M16 rifles, and AK-47 rifles.

Heavy weapons: 26,000 heavy weapons, including 105mm howitzers, 122mm howitzers, and 25mm machine guns.

Munitions: Over 1.5 million rounds of ammunition, including 7.62mm ammunition, 5.56mm ammunition, and 120mm mortar rounds.

Other equipment: Night vision goggles, biometric devices, and communications equipment.

It is important to note that the list above is not exhaustive. There may be other weapon systems that were left behind by US forces in Afghanistan.

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The unthinkable is happening in the Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi: the Pakistan Army is divided in its political loyalties. For the better part of 76 years, it was Pakistani politicians who have been divided in their loyalties to the Army GHQ. And the GHQ unfailingly picked their favourite politician and installed him or her in office, usually to rescue a Martial-Law-Administrator-turned-President from the hot seat. These roles are likely to be reversed if the ongoing tussle on the streets of Pakistan for control of the country reaches its logical conclusion later this year. It may happen sooner if the streets of Pakistan become bloodied after Nawaz Sharif returns home from Umrah in Saudi Arabia instead of going back to his self-imposed exile in London. It may happen only next year if Sharif is able to – even while being out of any formal office – restore a semblance of normalcy in the life of the aam admi in his country or if simmering differences in the Army are papered over.

Divided Loyalties

The new Army Chief, General Asim Munir Ahmed Shah, will stop at nothing to prevent the hugely popular Imran Khan from returning to elected office in Islamabad. Khan sacked General Munir, as he is commonly known, as Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief before he completed even one year as spymaster and installed his most loyal General Faiz Hameed, now retired, in that crucial post. In Pakistan, the Chief of the (ISI) always has unfathomable tricks up his uniform, which less wily and conspiratorial Chiefs of Army Staff have to contend with. Despite his retirement, Faiz – as he is best known – commands huge loyalty at the Army GHQ.

After all, as ISI Chief, he won Afghanistan back for Pakistan without firing a shot on India’s Independence Day in 2021, went to Kabul soon after and practically handpicked and installed members of the new Taliban regime that September. Since retirement, Faiz has been helping Khan build his populist mass movement just as he is said to have covertly helped the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) leader build up his movement to dislodge Sharif as Prime Minister after the infamous 2016 Panama Papers leak on illegal foreign assets owned by politicians. Because Faiz has a following in the Army ranks, Munir has been viewing the former’s activities with great consternation. The Chief is unable to maintain the disciplined, monolithic atmosphere within the Pakistan Army any longer.

Then there is another General who has become a backroom player, the retired Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa. Always suspected, it has now been circumstantially acknowledged that Bajwa was instrumental in regime change in Islamabad last year because, for the most part, Khan had become an insurgent against Pakistan’s benefactors in Washington. After Shehbaz Sharif succeeded Khan, Bajwa is known to have been in constant contact with Nawaz Sharif in London.

Arrogated Guardian

The unprecedented intrigues within the Army – which were always firmly and quickly put down in the past before they drew big attention – do not bode well for India and for the rest of the world. The Army has been Pakistan’s only stable institution since General Ayub Khan – self-appointed Field Marshal in 1965 – seized power 11 years after that country’s formation in a constitutional coup d’état, justified by the Supreme Court under the “Doctrine of Necessity.” Every other institution in Pakistan has been systematically eviscerated and cannot be a reliable interlocutor for India. This applies to Washington as well, although successive administrations in the White House make a pretence of wanting democracy in Islamabad.

Most of Pakistan’s leaders like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had gradually, through trial by fire, been installed in office and also thrown out of office, matured under the Army’s overarching roof as the arrogated guardian of that country’s ultimate self-interest. Khan is yet to reach that level, having been in power just one time. Hillary Clinton, the United States of America’s Secretary of State, famously said: “It is like that old story – you cannot keep snakes in your backyard and expect them to only bite your neighbours. Eventually, those snakes are going to turn on whomever has them in the backyard.” Unlike other Prime Ministers mentored by the Army GHQ, Khan is yet to learn that lesson. Otherwise, he would not have committed the monumental mistake of making peace with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). That fragile peace ended when Khan ceased to be Prime Minister and Faiz retired as ISI Chief. The proverbial snakes have since been turning on those within Pakistan.

But the illusory idea of peace with the TTP has a big following within the Army’s ranks and this school is now ranged against Bajwa’s idea of accommodation with India and engagement of the US. Munir belongs to this camp, so does Nawaz Sharif. If these differences are not reconciled soon and the Army can no longer be the glue holding the country together, there is every possibility that Pakistan could splinter like Yugoslavia. With Pakistan’s secret warehouses full of nuclear weapons, this is not good news for anyone, least of all for neighbour India.

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At a time when US President Joe Biden’s words put the spotlight on Pakistan as “the most dangerous nation in the world”, Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities are also occupying a position of significance and creating anxieties for various major global powers.

US President Biden at a Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Reception in Los Angeles (California), during which he berated both China and Russia said, “This is a guy (Xi Jinping) who understands what he wants but has an enormous, enormous array of problems. How do we handle that? How do we handle that relative to what’s going on in Russia? And what I think is maybe one of the most dangerous nations in the world: Pakistan. Nuclear weapons without any cohesion.”

Pakistan’s government, the Taliban, its various outfits in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and other jihadist groups inside Pakistan have created a worry over the nuclear weaponry falling into terrorist hands, reported Global Strat View.

Pakistan supports the Taliban covertly. The world believes that Pakistan’s nuclear program remains a threat of being stolen by terrorist organizations. Last year in August, after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghan soil, Afghanistan has quickly fallen into the Taliban’s extremist clutches.

The political upheaval in Afghanistan also has regional repercussions, especially for those in neighbouring Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s continued production of fissile material and subsequent weapons, as well as the potential deployment of more tactical nuclear weapons, only makes the increasing possibility of the misuse of these materials more glaring and plausible, reported Global Strat View.

A London-based Pakistjournalist Farooq Sulehria said, “The Talibanization of the Pakistan military is something we can’t overlook. What if there is an internal Taliban takeover of the nuclear assets?”

There has been multiple instance when experts and US Presidents have expressed their concerns over Pakistan’s nukes. During the time of the Obama administration, a Harvard nuclear expert, Graham Allison, stated, “When you map weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, all roads intersect in Pakistan.”

He said this while sitting on the US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.

Moreover, ex-US President Bill Clinton also had similar apprehension regarding Pakistan’s strides towards nuclear testing. Clinton, worried about the geopolitical threat of South Asia if Islamabad was to go ahead with its nuclear armament.

Clinton made all sorts of offers within his ambit. Whether it was a state dinner to billions of dollars in assistance to the country, Clinton tried to persuade the then-Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to put off the nuclear testing.

However, once Clinton was unable to succeed in getting his way, he publicly condemned Islamabad’s move. Clinton described the nuke tests “dangerously destabilizing.” Pakistan went ahead with its testing, and the US imposed crippling economic sanctions in retaliation.

Along the same lines, Generals Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with their high-ranking generals, claimed their awareness of the risks the Afghanistan move would pose for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its national security.

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IS-K has claimed responsibility for a string of high-profile attacks in Pakistan, underscoring the growing threat it poses to the predominately Muslim nation of some 220 million people.

In the deadliest attack, an IS-K suicide bomber blew himself up inside a Shiite mosque in the northwestern city of Peshawar on March 4, killing at least 64 people and wounding scores of others. It was the most lethal attack in Pakistan in nearly four years.

Since it first emerged in 2015, Islamic State’s local affiliate in Afghanistan has focused its violent campaign within that country, fighting against Afghan and foreign forces as well as the Taliban, a rival militant group.

Experts believe IS-K militants have moved from their bases in Afghanistan and established cells in major Pakistani cities, RFE/RL reported.

The IS-K assaults have provoked fear and alarm in Pakistan, which has also witnessed a dramatic surge in attacks by the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a rival extremist group that has close ties with the Afghan Taliban.

IS-K has already carried out five attacks this year. On March 8, IS-K claimed responsibility for a roadside bomb that killed five members of the security forces and wounded 28 people others in southwestern Pakistan.

The growing attacks prompted Moazzam Jah Ansari, the police chief in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to declare IS-K a “bigger threat to peace and security in the province compared to the TTP”.

Many IS-K fighters are former members of the TTP, which was thrown into disarray and driven out of its bases in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal belt by a massive military offensive in 2014.

But the TTP soon found itself fighting turf wars with the Afghan Taliban. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the rivalry has intensified.

The Afghan militants have waged a nationwide hunt for IS-K members and even targeted the country’s small Salafi minority to curb alleged support for the group from among its members.

Underscoring the rivalry, the Afghan Taliban condemned IS-K’s deadly attack in Peshawar. The TTP, meanwhile, said that such attacks do not align with its jihad, or holy war, in Pakistan.

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This was seen as a foreign policy move that has not yet been taken by China or Russia, both of which have close strategic and economic ties with these five countries. With growing Chinese footprints in these countries in both the defence and security segment as well as the economic sphere, it has become imperative for India to have a “robust foothold” there, sources said.

India, which considers the Central Asian countries part of its “extended neighbourhood”, firmed up plans to hold the summit meeting when the foreign ministers of these countries visited New Delhi in December 2021 for the third round of the India-Central Asia Dialogue.

India had invited the presidents of the five Central Asian nations as chief guests at the Republic Day celebrations, which was to be followed by a summit meeting, but the plans were cancelled due to the spiralling third wave of the Covid pandemic.

PM Narendra Modi’s Address

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, addressing the virtual summit featuring presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyz Republic, on 27 January, talked about an ‘ambitious vision’ for the future.

In his initial remarks at the Summit, Modi said, “We all are concerned about the Afghan situation and this makes cooperation between India and Central Asia all the more important for regional stability and security.”

The prime minister called for defining an ambitious vision for cooperation between India and Central Asia in the coming years.

Mutual cooperation between India and Central Asia is essential for regional security and prosperity, Modi said.

Modi had paid a visit to all Central Asian countries in 2015. Subsequently, there have been exchanges at high levels at bilateral and multilateral forums.

The event was held to commemorate 30 years of the establishment of India’s diplomatic relations with these nations, witnessed unanimity on taking cooperation to the next level for boosting regional connectivity and security. The leaders agreed on considerably enhancing India-Central Asia trade, which is only about $2 billion at present, nowhere near China’s over $40 billion.

The prime minister and the five presidents decided to set up a joint working group on Afghanistan, with a broad consensus emerging on issues such as combating terrorism and drug trafficking.

Increased Significance

In July 2015, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit all Central Asian countries to boost strategic and trade ties. He also met the leaders of these countries in 2018 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting that was held in Qingdao. However, the strategic importance of the five Central Asian countries “has increased” ever since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021. New Delhi believes these countries will prove to be beneficial for India in having some sort of a channel open with the Taliban regime that is currently in power in Kabul, they said, even as the Modi government has started sending humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.

Ties between India and Central Asia started taking a decisive turn as the US government signed the so-called peace deal with the Taliban in February 2020, and fears began to mount about Afghanistan in the aftermath of the NATO’s pullout. Prior to that India mostly looked at Central Asia from the perspective of energy ties.

As India closed all its embassy and consulates in Afghanistan, it also took the initiative to host the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue in November 2021, which was chaired by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. All security chiefs from the five Central Asian nations attended the meeting along with Russia and Iran, to send a message to the Taliban government.

Chinese Influence

New Delhi’s Central Asian outreach assumes significance amid China’s efforts to strengthen ties with these nations that are part of the eight-member SCO, which also includes India. What gives Beijing a geopolitical edge is the fact that it shares borders with three of the five countries.

Two days before the India summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping interacted with Central Asian leaders and announced an assistance of $500 million to support livelihood programmes in these former Soviet bloc countries. He also listed several big projects of strategic importance that had been completed, including the China-Central Asia natural gas pipeline, the China-Kazakhstan crude oil pipeline, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway and the China-Tajikistan expressway. In a bid to counter the Chinese challenge, India has extended a $1-billion line of credit for infrastructure development projects and offered to provide more training slots and scholarships to meet the requirements of Central Asian countries.

After the recent unrest in Kazakhstan, Russia sent troops there as part of a peacekeeping mission to restore order, while China firmly backed the beleaguered nation’s efforts to curb violence.

Background

“The inception of the India-Central Asia Dialogue at foreign ministers’ level, the 3rd meeting of which was held in New Delhi from 18 to 20 December 2021, has provided an impetus to India-Central Asia relations,” said an official statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs.

“The participation of the secretaries of National Security Councils of Central Asian countries in the Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan held in New Delhi on 10 November 2021 outlined a common regional approach on Afghanistan,” it added.

The issue of maintaining close ties with the Central Asian countries, when it comes to Afghanistan, was something that was also discussed between Prime Minister Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin during the India-Russia Summit held in December 2021.

Besides, India is also keen to strengthen trade and energy ties with the Central Asian countries with a focus on increasing connectivity. New Delhi has pushed for the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the TAPI (Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India) pipeline for natural gas during the summit.

Comments

The summit is a huge stride for India’s diplomacy and is a first step to carve out its zone of influence.

India should know what it wants out of the Central Asian region and use its influence accordingly. Countries with interests in Central Asia have their own groupings and connect: China from economic (BRI), Russia from strategic (CSTO), Turkey from ethnic (Turkic Council), and the Islamic world from the religious (OIC) It would be befitting for India to give a poignant cultural and historical perspective to the region through a summit-level annual meet. The aims are different – targeting Russia, sabotaging China’s BRI, thrusting Islamisation, economic linkages, military cooperation, trade, lobbying, etc.

Since the region is a critical lynchpin to India’s security policy, the summit will have a waterfall impact to facilitate India’s multifaceted approach towards the region. Central Asia carries no specific stance towards any country, with the exception of Russia. While their strategic visions are often  opaque, they are wary of China.

For three decades, Central Asia remained a cauldron of outside actors. Today, the main security provider to the region is Moscow, which considers Central Asia as its ‘near abroad.’

After the US forces left Afghanistan overnight, the Islamists too have been eyeing to launch their holy jihads to establish new Khilafats there. Regional analysts have estimated that some 8,000 ISIS and Takfiri extremists have been waiting in North Afghanistan to infiltrate across the 2,245 km long porous border.

While leaders of all five states of the CAR have visited India, yet, India’s commercial success has been negligible at a paltry $1.4 billion trade in 2019.

In 2017, India joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) but SCO is only a sluice gate to regulate the Russian and Chinese and prevent them from dominating the region. Moscow tends to use it for regulating India-China tensions.

India’s civilisational influence and still enjoys a range of attributes. The Ferghana Valley was India’s crossing-point (to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) on the Great Silk Road to connect with China and Europe. Buddhism spread to the rest of Asia from here. This can be the basis of an annual summit. A string of cultural events highlighting the facets of medieval culture, art and painting, including Sufi traditions, should be highlighted.

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The 2010s saw Turkey undertake concerted efforts to expand its geopolitical influence, both within its immediate neighbourhood of the MENA region and beyond. Yet even as Ankara’s current economic fortunes indicate otherwise, her political and military actions continue to gain visibility, signalling Turkish President Erdogan’s continued intent to grow her security presence far beyond the Middle East. Perhaps, nowhere is this more evident than within the Indian subcontinent. India, for most part, has not shared any geopolitical grievances of note against Turkey over the course our history as a free nation. Yet Turkey’s ambitions, and determination to be recognised as a global power, has led President Erdogan to present Turkish security interests within the subcontinent and beyond as antagonistic to India’s. Identifying, strategising on, and countering this hostile presence is, therefore, essential for India’s national security interests.

Challenge 1: The Afghan Theatre

Over the past year, Turkey has sought to expand its influence within Afghanistan in the context of the US withdrawal. Ankara’s specific interest in Afghanistan thus far seems to be in securing Kabul airport. In July 2021, just a month before the fall of Kabul, Erdogan offered to send Turkish private military and security personnel to secure Kabul airport – only backtracking following a rebuke from the Taliban warning of “dire consequences”. Yet Turkey has retained its interest in Afghanistan, securing a deal in December 2021 with the Taliban regime to run airports in Kabul and across the rest of Afghanistan in partnership with Qatari firms.

The national security implications of this deal for India remain substantial. The December 2021 deal not only reiterates continued intention of operating as a key stakeholder in the Afghan geopolitical theatre, but also demonstrates Ankara’s links with key Taliban factions. Moreover, Turkey’s economic control over Afghan airports may translate into political control, cementing its control over all ports of entry in and out of that landlocked country. India must bear this last factor in mind when framing future HUMINT and diplomatic operations within Taliban-occupied Afghanistan, and exfiltrating ground assets.

At a diplomatic level, a Turkish presence in Afghanistan also blocks India’s outreach to Central Asia. In recent years, Turkey has sought to expand its influence into Central Asia as demonstrated by its leadership of the Turkic Council. A solidified Turkish presence in Afghanistan may be used by Ankara as leverage over the bloc’s other member-states to hamper India’s security and geostrategic interests in Afghanistan. These concerns remain particularly valid at a time when India has actively stepped up its engagement with Central Asia in coordination with its Afghan strategy, as illustrated by the December 2021 meeting in New Delhi between PM Modi, NSA Doval and the foreign ministers of five Central Asian states- four of whom represented member-states of the Turkic Council. Indeed, the meeting may signal South Block’s acknowledgment of this possibility, as well as its national security implications for India. India’s approach to Central Asia in general and Taliban-occupied Afghanistan cannot be divorced from the looming regional threat posed by Turkish belligerence. South Block will need to continue monitoring the extent of Turkish influence over the foreign policies of the Central Asian states, and devise policy accordingly- as it already seems to be doing.

Challenge 2: The China Connection

As highlighted previously, Turkey’s belligerence within its neighbourhood and beyond has taken a toll on its economy, leaving it vulnerable to foreign manipulation and leverage. The past decade has seen the Turkish economy struggle under the weight of its adventurism, leaving it susceptible to Chinese control. Tensions do remain – such as the Uyghur question, and the economic competition engendered with China due to Erdogan’s push for economic influence in Central Asia. However, China has exploited the Turkish economy’s weaknesses by rapidly expanding its BRI projects within the country over the past decade. In recent years, China’s economic influence has become increasingly visible in Turkey, from Chinese companies owning majority stakes in key Turkish infrastructure and business projects and to the Chinese construction of Turkey’s 5G infrastructure.

The primary threat posed to India by this encroaching Chinese control over Turkey’s sluggish economy is the potential exacerbation of Ankara’s belligerence against India under Chinese influence. Turkey’s growing hostility to the Indian stance on the issue of Kashmir increasingly coincides with China’s – and with Beijing’s vast economic leverage over China, the Turkey-China axis could pose serious security challenges to India within Kashmir in the future. Additionally, this Chinese influence could be used to heighten Turkish opposition to Indian interests within global for a like the UN, including on critical issues such as India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group and influence within UN committees.

Challenge 3: Support for political extremism within India

Another security challenge posed to India by Turkey is its support of banned domestic terrorist outfits within India. Turkey’s funding of key domestic. extremist outfits through front organisations such as IHH –- most notably its links to the PFI – constitute a significant breach of India’s sovereignty, and demonstrate Turkey’s geopolitical adventurism within the subcontinent. This is a threat compounded by Turkey’s vast militant and intelligence networks in neighbouring states such as Nepal, aimed directly at fomenting terror and political instability within India.

Solution 1: Targeting the money trail via organised crime

Countering Ankara’s malign activities against India necessitates a recognition of the close links between transnational Turkish organised crime syndicates and the MIT- Turkey’s foreign intelligence services. Turkish organised crime, operating primarily out of Western European capitals, essentially serves as an extension of Turkish foreign policy interests- as the revelations by former Turkish mafia boss Sedat Peker have highlighted. Indeed, Peker’s revelations surrounding the MIT’s use of Turkish organised crime syndicates to funnel arms to al-Nusra in Syria, as well as the close links between AKP figures (including officials in the Foreign Ministry) and noted Turkish mafia figures abroad underscore the crime-intelligence nexus characterising Turkish security policy under Erdogan. Moreover, it demonstrates the centrality of these diasporic organised crime networks as a source of funding for Turkey’s offensive activities overseas – including in India, through support to extremist organisations and the establishment of centres of influence in Afghanistan, where India continues maintaining security interests.

As such, combatting Turkey’s malign activities against India requires a focus on the money trail, and specifically the role of Turkish diasporic criminal networks in this respect. Hence, identifying and targeting the activities of Turkish organised crime – both within India and elsewhere needs to take centre stage in New Delhi’s defensive strategy. This will require, among other factors, the provision of new mandates to Indian intelligence networks in Western Europe and the MENA region, and an expanded understanding of the threat posed by Turkish organised crime to Indian security interests.

Solution 2: Surreptitious Economic Control

Turkey’s economic woes have left it vulnerable to exploitation by foreign powers- most visibly that of China. However, opportunity still exists for India to use its comparative economic heft to acquire leverage over Ankara and hopefully help put an end to its nefarious activities. Turkey’s recent introduction of a ‘citizenship by investment’ regulation provides India with an opportunity to deepen its economic influence within Turkey, and hopefully utilise this influence to press the Turkish state to cease its anti-India activities.

Solution 3: The creation of a Middle Eastern Axis

Tackling Turkey’s anti-India activities will also require the MEA to step up India’s engagement with key Middle Eastern powers at a strategic level, and through military and intelligence cooperation.

Turkey’s belligerent attitude within the MENA region has isolated it among most of its fellow regional powers. Turkey is currently locked in a series of proxy wars with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, ranging from Libya to Syria and increasingly, a battle for political influence in Lebanon. Ankara similarly shares an acrimonious relationship with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s Egypt, under whose leadership Egypt has seen a crackdown on the Turkish-backed Muslim Brotherhood within the country. Israel continues to remain vexed by Turkey’s support for Palestinian militant groups, despite its occasional cooperation with Ankara in non-regional conflicts such as the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. And Turkey continues to share a complex yet tense relationship with Iran, finding itself often operating on the opposite side of the fence through their proxies in the Syrian Civil War despite their common concerns surrounding Kurdish nationalism.

Unlike Turkey, however, India has maintained consistently positive relations with all these competing Middle Eastern powers. The creation of a Middle Eastern alliance, formal or otherwise, aimed at keeping a check on Turkish influence would therefore serve India’s interests in defending against Turkish belligerence. Indeed, India may use her image as a neutral arbitrator to increasingly position herself as a mediator within various Middle Eastern conflicts, simultaneously providing New Delhi with the opportunity to string together an alliance between like-minded nations to counter Turkish aggression. Such an alliance also leads into the first solution of tracking the money trail, as expanded intelligence cooperation between India and Middle Eastern powers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and Egypt provide policymakers in South Block with a better understanding of Turkish financial operations and their potential links to Ankara’s belligerence within the Indian subcontinent. It would also help maintain a lid on the establishment of Turkish centres of power across the region, which may hold future potential for anti-India activities on Ankara’s part.

In summary, India does not seek a poor relationship with Turkey. Yet as MI6 Chief Richard Moore recently noted during his speech at the IISS, policymakers are supposed to “deal with the world as it is, not the way they would like it to be”. Turkey’s unprovoked aggression towards India is unfortunate, yet undoubtedly merits a response. Synergising our military, intelligence and economic capabilities in this respect is, therefore, fundamental to India’s long-term security interests, allowing us to rid the subcontinent of hostile influence and negotiate with Turkey on equal terms.

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Moscow-hosted an international meeting to discuss the Afghan crisis with Taliban leaders and delegates from 10 countries, including China, Pakistan, Iran and India, on 20 October, in an effort to boost its influence across Central Asia. The talks came after Putin warned that Islamic State (IS) fighters were converging on Afghanistan.

The talks followed a G20 summit on Afghanistan — held on 12 October — to help the country avert a humanitarian catastrophe in the wake of the power shift there.

Russia’s Concerns

Russia is concerned about the impact of the Taliban seizing to power in Afghanistan in the wider region. Moscow has moved to engage the Taliban, but has stopped short of granting recognition to the group which is banned as a “terrorist” organisation in Russia. Unlike Western countries that rushed to evacuate diplomats following the fall of Kabul on August 15, Russia has kept its embassy there open.

A week before the meetimg, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that IS fighters were gathering in Afghanistan to spread into former Soviet republics and eventually Russia. Putin cautioned that around 2,000 fighters loyal to the “Islamic State” had gathered in northern Afghanistan, adding that their leaders planned to send them into neighboring Central Asian countries disguised as refugees.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made it clear in the run-up to the Moscow meeting that the discussions would not cover the issue of granting recognition to the Taliban, stressing the need for the group to live up to “expectations” on human rights.
Russia has lauded the efforts of Afghanistan’s Taliban government to improve the national security and political situation but stressed the need for the Islamist group to ensure inclusivity in its governance to achieve a stable peace in the war-torn country.

Lavrov said Moscow believes it’s time to mobilize global efforts to provide Kabul with effective financial, economic and humanitarian assistance to help prevent a humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan.

Lavrov emphasized the importance of respecting human rights and pursuing well-balanced social policies, adding that he discussed those issues with the Taliban before the talks. He added that Russia would dispatch a shipment of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and urged the international community to quickly mobilize resources to prevent a humanitarian crisis.
Russia says its diplomatic offensive to garner support for Kabul stems from concerns continued instability would encourage terrorist groups to threaten security of Afghanistan’s neighbors and the wider region.

Lavrov highlighted those fears while addressing the gathering in Moscow and urged the Taliban to deliver on their pledges of preventing terrorist groups from threatening Russia’s “friends and allies.”

Taliban’s Appeal

This was the Taliban’s most significant international meeting since seizing power over Afghanistan in mid-August. This was the first opportunity for the Taliban to get a hearing in order to get economic aid and international recognition that has eluded since they stormed into Kabul two months ago. Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi, while addressing the meeting, renewed a call for the global community to recognize the new government in Kabul and again demanded the United States unfreeze about $10 billon in Afghan central bank in foreign reserves.

The senior Taliban leader defended his interim government as “already inclusive” and said they would not accept any deal under pressure, according to the text of the speech Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid shared with media.

Washington Absent

The U.S. and other Western countries are working out how to engage with the Taliban without giving them the legitimacy they seek, while facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid to Afghans.
Washington also was invited to the talks in Moscow, but U.S. officials cited logistical reasons for not attending them. United States deputy secretary of the treasury, Adewale Adeyemo said the US Treasury was taking every step it could within its sanctions program to make clear to humanitarian groups that Washington wants to facilitate the flow of aid into Afghanistan.
Chinese officials renewed their resolve to work with the Taliban to help them deal with the economic and humanitarian challenges facing the country.

Charges Against Taliban

The Taliban’s resurgence has stirred international fears of a return to their hardline form of Islamist rule in the 1990s, when they hosted Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda movement and carried out egregious human rights violations, including public stonings and the marginalization of women at work and in schools.

The Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August after the United States and Western countries withdrew all their troops almost 20 years after the Islamist group was removed from power by the U.S.-led military invasion for harbouring al-Qaida planners of terrorist attacks on America.

The Taliban are under fire at home and internationally for reneging on some of their pledges to protect the rights of women and minorities.

The hardline group is also being accused of persecuting members of the ousted Afghan government, charges Taliban officials reject as unfounded and politically motivated propaganda.

Official Statement

Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Iran and five formerly Soviet Central Asian states joined the Taliban in calling for the UN to convene such a conference as soon as possible to help rebuild the country. They said it should take place “with the understanding, of course, that the main burden…should be borne by the forces whose military contingents have been present in this country over the past 20 years.”

At the end of discussions, a statement was issued saying: “Participating countries call on the current Afghan leadership to take further steps to improve governance and to form a truly inclusive government that adequately reflects the interests of all major ethno-political forces in the country.”

The statement also stressed the need for the Afghan leadership to “respect the rights of ethnic groups, women and children.”
While governments around the world, including Russia, have declined to give official recognition to the Taliban government, the communique recognized the “new reality” of their ascent to power.

India’s Role

India will play a key role in the coming days on the all-important question of according recognition to the Taliban, which now finds itself in a weaker position after blasts in mosques on two successive Fridays, in October, claimed about 150 lives.
The Taliban’s credibility as the sole guarantor of security in Afghanistan suffered a blow when three back-to-back bomb attacks at a famous mosque in its spiritual capital of Kandahar killed 47 persons. On 8 October, an explosion in a Kunduz mosque killed over 100 worshippers.

Senior Indian diplomats participated in talks with Taliban in Moscow, on 20 October, along with diplomats from Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran. India’s ambassador to Qatar, Deepak Mittal, had met Taliban representatives in Doha towards the end of August

India holds a view different from the other participants at the October 20 Moscow talks on providing humanitarian aid but is on the same page as Russia, Iran and China on persuading the Taliban to form an inclusive government and ensure there is no spillover of extremism to other countries.

The interaction of Indian diplomats with the Taliban can help the former take a view on removing their senior ministers from UN blacklisting. India is the chair of the UNSC’s sanctions committee till the end of next year.
After Kabul’s fall in August, India raised questions on the lack of inclusivity in the new Taliban regime, rights of minorities, women and children, and also voiced concern on terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.

In March 2021, Moscow hosted an international conference on Afghanistan in which Russia, United States, China and Pakistan released a joint statement, calling on the then-warring Afghan sides to reach a peace deal.

Comments

Russia’s initiative in hosting the talks is part of an effort to boost its influence in the region after the US pullout. Its main fear is the risk of instability in Central Asia, and possible migrant flows and Islamist militant activity directed from Afghanistan.
The concerns have intensified after a series of attacks by the Afghan affiliate of Islamic State — dubbed Islamic State in Khorasan Province after an ancient name for the region — on mosques and other targets that have killed hundreds of people.
Russia fought its own disastrous war in Afghanistan in the 1980s and has close military and political ties with former Soviet Central Asian republics that border Afghanistan.

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With the Taliban in power in Afghanistan, the Islamic State (IS) group has threatened to usher in another violent phase. There has been a sudden uptick in IS attacks since the Taliban takeover on 15 August.

Two deadly bombings have hit Kabul. One was outside the airport at the height of evacuations before the U.S. exit that killed 169 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members. Another deadly bombing, on 8 October, in the northern province of Kunduz killed 46 worshippers inside a mosque frequented by Shiites. The Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), the Afghanistan-based arm of the terrorist organisation, has claimed responsibility. Earlier, on October 3, a bomb targeted a memorial service being held for the mother of the Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, in a Kabul mosque, killing five. All these attacks suggest that the IS-K’s ability to strike has grown. Other deadly IS attacks have struck in the capital, Kabul, and provinces to the east and north, while smaller-scale attacks target Taliban fighters almost daily.

Now that the US and the international presence is mostly gone, the IS was going after the state, which is now the Taliban.

Hatred Towards Shiias

The IS’s doctrinal hatred towards the Shias is known. In Iraq and Syria, it systematically targeted Shias, who it calls “rejectionists” of faith, and used such attacks to mobilise the support of Sunni hardliners and trigger sectarian conflicts.

Long Rivalry

Both the Taliban and IS advocate rule by their radical interpretations of Islamic law. But there are key ideological differences that fuel their hatred of each other. The Taliban say they are creating an Islamic state in Afghanistan, within the borders of that country. The Taliban downplay IS’s capabilities and dismiss them as a fringe group with no mainstream appeal.
IS says it is the Islamic State, a global caliphate that it insists all Muslims must support. It is contemptuous of the Taliban’s nationalist goals and doesn’t recognize them as a pure Islamic movement. For similar reasons, IS has long been a staunch enemy of al-Qaida.

Both the Taliban and IS advocate particularly harsh versions of Islamic Shariah law and have used tactics like suicide bombers. But when it ruled territory in Syria and Iraq, IS was even more brutal and carried out more horrific punishments than the Taliban did.

IS emerged in Afghanistan in 2015 with the name Islamic State in Khorasan Province, at a time when the group was at its peak, controlling much of Iraq and Syria. It drew members from Afghan and Pakistani militants, including a wave of Taliban defectors.

The group initially found support among Afghanistan’s small Salafist movement in eastern Kunar and Nangarhar provinces. The Salafis had largely been marginalized by the Taliban, and by connecting with the rising IS, the Salafist movement found a means to establish military strength.
But IS’s brutal ways have since led some Salafi clerics to voice opposition. In the years after its emergence, IS was badly hurt by military setbacks at the hands of the Taliban and by U.S. airstrikes, before surging again the past year.

End Game

The IS’s immediate aim is to destabilize the Taliban and shatter the group’s image as a guardian of security.
For now, its strategy is slow and methodical. It is reaching out to tribes and other groups to recruit from their ranks while stamping out dissent among moderate Salafis and carrying out jailbreaks, assassinations, and attacks on Taliban personnel.
The Taliban are also strong and can uproot IS on their own, even without the backup of U.S. airstrikes that nearly eliminated IS. The IS — unlike the Taliban during their insurgency — do not have access to safe havens in Pakistan and Iran.
The Taliban have rejected cooperating with the U.S. against IS.

IS’s future trajectory in Afghanistan will depend largely on its ability to recruit more members and win over large segments of the population. Since their inception, they have been poaching Taliban members.

Comments

While both groups have used tactics of terror, the IS-K is a pan-Islamist jihadist outfit, while the Taliban are largely a Pashtun nationalist militancy. The rise of the IS-K poses multiple challenges to the Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan, which many in Afghanistan and Pakistan saw as a solution to the country’s security woes. On one side, their promise to provide security looks hollow. Afghanistan’s cities under the Taliban remain as insecure as they were under the previous Islamic Republic. On the other hand, even if the Taliban, under pressure from Afghanistan’s donors and the public, want to make some concessions on the many restrictions already imposed, they would come under pressure from the more extremist IS-K, which says the Taliban are not Islamic enough. For the people of Afghanistan, who are stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea, the war that started 40 years ago continues, no matter who is in power in Kabul.

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