In the volatile landscape of South Asian countries around India, the military’s role in internal crises is both constitutionally defined and politically sensitive. The summer of 2024 and 2025 presented critical moments to test the civil-military frameworks that define democratic governance. Recent events in Bangladesh and Nepal-confronted with massive Gen Z-driven protests-have exposed a troubling trend: armies that hesitate to act when ordered, allowing unrest to escalate and civilian authority to erode. This stands in stark contrast to the Indian Army, which has consistently upheld its apolitical ethos, professional conduct and constitutional mandate, even in the most politically charged situations.

In Bangladesh, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government faced the “Job Quota” protests since early July 2024 that spiralled into anti-government uprising. The army was formally deployed at midnight July 19. Despite being deployed on July 19, the Bangladesh army exhibited considerable reluctance to take effective measures in the initial stages to bring the situation under control and prevent the protesters from marching towards Dhaka. Widespread violence led to attacks on minorities, wrecking of public property, including Indira Gandhi Cultural Centre in Dhaka, ransacking business establishments, destruction of the Banglabandhu museum besides others. This allowed the situation to become uncontrollable.

In a significant development, on the evening of August 3, over two weeks after the initial deployment, the Army Chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman held a meeting with his generals and made a pivotal decision: the military would not open fire on civilians to enforce the curfew that Prime Minister Hasina had called for. This represented the military effectively disobeying civilian authority by deciding which orders to follow and which to refuse. While the Army’s humanitarian concern of collateral civilian deaths was understandable, inaction violated a fundamental principle of civil-military relations: once a civilian government orders military deployment, the military executes that order or resigns in protest. It does not selectively comply. The consequence was that Hasina, losing military support, was forced to resign on August 5, not because her order was unconstitutional, but because the military refused to enforce it. This represents a subtle coup d’état, where the military effectively vetoed civilian authority by refusing orders. Whether Hasina was autocratic or her policies were parochial become irrelevant; the mechanism through which she was removed-military refusal to obey civilian orders-violated democratic principles of civil-military relations.

Nepal’s experience in 2025 mirrored Bangladesh’s trajectory. Protests erupted over digital censorship, evolving into broader anti-corruption demonstrations again led by Gen G. The youth was frustrated with unemployment, economic inequality, and endemic corruption. Again these protests engulfed the whole country. As demonstrations intensified, Prime Minister Oli’s government faltered. The government in Nepal called out the army to maintain law and order sometimes on the night of September 8-9. On the morning of September 9, the Army Chief with other top civilian functionaries met at the Prime Minister’s residence. During this crucial meeting Oli was informed that the situation had spiralled beyond control. Reports indicate that the Army Chief Sigdel advised Oli to resign, stating that the military could only stabilize the country if the Prime Minister relinquished power. Initially reluctant, Oli eventually agreed to step down. By early afternoon on September 9, protesters had vandalized the Parliament building, other public and private property. The army had several units located within walking distance of critical government buildings but hesitated to intervene to protect the Parliament, Supreme Court, and other important and historical structures from being set ablaze.

In both cases, Bangladesh and Nepal, the consequences were predictable: loss of control, regime collapse, and a vacuum of authority. The constitutions and statutes of Bangladesh and Nepal clearly define the military’s secondary task: to assist civil authorities in times of crisis. This mandate is not discretionary-it is binding. The military’s failure to act decisively when ordered undermined democratic stability and emboldened agitators. The core issue in Bangladesh and Nepal was not lack of capability-it was the exercise of discretion where none was warranted. Armies are not courts. Their role is not to adjudicate the correctness of government orders but to execute them within the bounds of legality and national interest. When armies begin to weigh the political implications of orders, they risk becoming political actors themselves. This undermines civilian supremacy, erodes public trust, and destabilizes democratic institutions. This is particularly dangerous in fragile democracies, where institutional checks are weak and public sentiment volatile. Military hesitation can embolden agitators, weaken governance, and invite external interference

India’s experience offers a compelling counterpoint. The Indian army has long been recognized for its secular, apolitical conduct and disciplined execution of government directives. During Operation Blue Star in 1984, the army was ordered to clear Sikh separatists from the Golden Temple, a mission fraught with religious and political sensitivities. The army did not hesitate. It acted swiftly, fulfilling its constitutional duty without passing judgment on the political context. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Godhra riots in 2002, the Indian army was deployed to restore public order. It moved decisively, securing affected areas and preventing further violence. In both cases, the army did not sit in judgment-it acted as the stabilizing force it was meant to be. Once a government order is given within constitutional parameters, the military’s professional obligation is execution with discipline and competence. The events in Bangladesh and Nepal underscore the urgent need to reaffirm civil-military boundaries. Democracies must ensure clear protocols for military deployment in internal crises, training and doctrine that reinforce apolitical conduct. India’s model, despite its own challenges, offers valuable lessons. The Indian army’s disciplined recognition of supremacy of civilian authority has helped preserve democratic stability even in moments of deep national crisis. When armies hesitate, nations falter.

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For several years, China has been a major supplier of military equipment to Bangladesh including main battle tanks Type 59G, WS-22 122mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), FM-90 air defense missile systems, and more.

According to the SIPRI Arms Trade Database, in 2019 Bangladesh has ordered a total of 44 Chinese-made VT5 light tanks. It is also deployed by the Chinese army Xinjiang Military Command and Chinese Marines.

The VT5, also named Type 15 or ZTQ-15 in the Chinese army, is a lightweight battle tank designed and manufactured by the Chinese defense company NORINCO (China North Industries Corporation). The VT5 was unveiled to the public during the Zhuhai AirShow China in November 2016.

The main armament of the VT5 consists of one 105 mm rifled gun with a thermal sleeve and fume extractor which has a maximum firing range of 3,000 m. The main armament also includes an automatic loading system. The VT5 carried a total of 38 rounds of 105mm ammunition which can include Armour-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS), High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT), High Explosive (HE), and gun-launched anti-tank guided missile. The missile has a maximum range of 5,000m and is fitted with a tandem HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank) warhead able to destroy armored or tanks protected with reactive armor (ERA).

The hull and the turret of the VT5 are made with all-welded steel armor which provides stand protection against the firing of small arms and shell splinters. To increase the protection, the VT5 can be equipped with advanced composite armor and/or explosive reactive armor (ERA).

The VT5 is motorized with a 1,000 hp electronically controlled diesel engine mounted at the rear of the hull. and coupled to a hydro-mechanical full automatic transmission with a pivot steering capability and a cooling system. It can run at a maximum road speed of 70 km/h, 35 to 40 km/h in off-road conditions with a maximum cruising range of 450 km.

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Shringla, a former Indian High Commissioner to Dhaka, was in Bangladesh on his first visit to the country. He was addressing a seminar at the Bangladesh Institute for International Studies (BIISS)., Shringla said Bangladesh has become India’s largest development partner in the world and India’s largest trade partner in the region.

Shringla said India also welcomes the opportunity for Indian officers to train at premier military institutions of Bangladesh, just as the Indian side is ready to open military training institutes at all levels – from officer cadet training to specialised higher command training – to Bangladesh.

India’s advanced air defence system AKASH has great potential for export to friendly countries.

Logistics Bases

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) is looking at setting up logistics bases in Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Sri Lanka as part of initiatives to woo the countries to buy India’s light combat aircraft Tejas and military helicopters.

Chairman and Managing Director of HAL R Madhavan said, on 9 March, that the HAL was considering to build logistics bases in the four countries as they use a number of Russian-origin military aircraft and choppers whose serviceability is “very poor”. He said the HAL is now seriously focusing on boosting exports in sync with the government’s priority and identified South East Asia, West Asia and North Africa to sell key platforms like Tejas, attack helicopter Rudra and advanced light helicopter Dhruv.

Without divulging details, Madhavan said a number of countries in West Asia are also in touch with the HAL for possible procurement of its key products.

The combat jets are classified under various generations depending on their avionics, capability and weapons systems. The current fleet of fighter jets with the IAF range from three-and-half generation to the fourth generation.

South Korea

A Roadmap for Defence Industries Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was exchanged during a bilateral meeting between defence minister Rajnath Singh and Republic of Korea (ROK) defence minister Jeong Kyeong-Doo, on 4 February 2020.

This Roadmap lists a number of possible areas of cooperation in land systems, naval systems, aero systems, guided weapon systems including research and development cooperation, collaboration regarding testing, certification and quality assurance. The roadmap aims to facilitate defence industries in participation and collaboration on Make in India initiatives of Government of India.

This Roadmap also aims to promote investment and technology transfer in Defence Industrial Corridors in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.

ROK companies wishing to invest in India are envisaged to receive support from both Defence Investor Cell and Korea Plus Centre. Several Indian companies are involved in the manufacturing of various defence spare parts in India.

Uganda

Ugandan & Indian officials at the handover event. In the background is the fleet gifted

Uganda has received a fleet of eighty eight (88) motor vehicles including executive buses, ambulances, water trucks and utility lorries donated by the government of India. The fleet also includes a consignment of 44 military trucks to be used by the national army, Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF).

The vehicles were officially handed over, on 3 March, by the Indian high commissioner to Uganda to Uganda’s minister of foreign affairs.

The donation is a follow-up of pledges made by the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi during his official visit to Uganda in July 2018. The visit was part of a wider African tour aimed at deepening India’s ties with Africa.

Nepal

Nepal is working with Russia on payment options for an unspecified number Mi-17 V-5 helicopters, as dollar transactions have been made difficult by US sanctions against Russia. Russia has switched over to payments in national currencies with countries such as India, China and Indonesia as sanctioned Russian entities cannot use the SWIFT international payments system.

The payment in dollars could be made through China or India.

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