In the volatile landscape of South Asian countries around India, the military’s role in internal crises is both constitutionally defined and politically sensitive. The summer of 2024 and 2025 presented critical moments to test the civil-military frameworks that define democratic governance. Recent events in Bangladesh and Nepal-confronted with massive Gen Z-driven protests-have exposed a troubling trend: armies that hesitate to act when ordered, allowing unrest to escalate and civilian authority to erode. This stands in stark contrast to the Indian Army, which has consistently upheld its apolitical ethos, professional conduct and constitutional mandate, even in the most politically charged situations.

In Bangladesh, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government faced the “Job Quota” protests since early July 2024 that spiralled into anti-government uprising. The army was formally deployed at midnight July 19. Despite being deployed on July 19, the Bangladesh army exhibited considerable reluctance to take effective measures in the initial stages to bring the situation under control and prevent the protesters from marching towards Dhaka. Widespread violence led to attacks on minorities, wrecking of public property, including Indira Gandhi Cultural Centre in Dhaka, ransacking business establishments, destruction of the Banglabandhu museum besides others. This allowed the situation to become uncontrollable.

In a significant development, on the evening of August 3, over two weeks after the initial deployment, the Army Chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman held a meeting with his generals and made a pivotal decision: the military would not open fire on civilians to enforce the curfew that Prime Minister Hasina had called for. This represented the military effectively disobeying civilian authority by deciding which orders to follow and which to refuse. While the Army’s humanitarian concern of collateral civilian deaths was understandable, inaction violated a fundamental principle of civil-military relations: once a civilian government orders military deployment, the military executes that order or resigns in protest. It does not selectively comply. The consequence was that Hasina, losing military support, was forced to resign on August 5, not because her order was unconstitutional, but because the military refused to enforce it. This represents a subtle coup d’état, where the military effectively vetoed civilian authority by refusing orders. Whether Hasina was autocratic or her policies were parochial become irrelevant; the mechanism through which she was removed-military refusal to obey civilian orders-violated democratic principles of civil-military relations.

Nepal’s experience in 2025 mirrored Bangladesh’s trajectory. Protests erupted over digital censorship, evolving into broader anti-corruption demonstrations again led by Gen G. The youth was frustrated with unemployment, economic inequality, and endemic corruption. Again these protests engulfed the whole country. As demonstrations intensified, Prime Minister Oli’s government faltered. The government in Nepal called out the army to maintain law and order sometimes on the night of September 8-9. On the morning of September 9, the Army Chief with other top civilian functionaries met at the Prime Minister’s residence. During this crucial meeting Oli was informed that the situation had spiralled beyond control. Reports indicate that the Army Chief Sigdel advised Oli to resign, stating that the military could only stabilize the country if the Prime Minister relinquished power. Initially reluctant, Oli eventually agreed to step down. By early afternoon on September 9, protesters had vandalized the Parliament building, other public and private property. The army had several units located within walking distance of critical government buildings but hesitated to intervene to protect the Parliament, Supreme Court, and other important and historical structures from being set ablaze.

In both cases, Bangladesh and Nepal, the consequences were predictable: loss of control, regime collapse, and a vacuum of authority. The constitutions and statutes of Bangladesh and Nepal clearly define the military’s secondary task: to assist civil authorities in times of crisis. This mandate is not discretionary-it is binding. The military’s failure to act decisively when ordered undermined democratic stability and emboldened agitators. The core issue in Bangladesh and Nepal was not lack of capability-it was the exercise of discretion where none was warranted. Armies are not courts. Their role is not to adjudicate the correctness of government orders but to execute them within the bounds of legality and national interest. When armies begin to weigh the political implications of orders, they risk becoming political actors themselves. This undermines civilian supremacy, erodes public trust, and destabilizes democratic institutions. This is particularly dangerous in fragile democracies, where institutional checks are weak and public sentiment volatile. Military hesitation can embolden agitators, weaken governance, and invite external interference

India’s experience offers a compelling counterpoint. The Indian army has long been recognized for its secular, apolitical conduct and disciplined execution of government directives. During Operation Blue Star in 1984, the army was ordered to clear Sikh separatists from the Golden Temple, a mission fraught with religious and political sensitivities. The army did not hesitate. It acted swiftly, fulfilling its constitutional duty without passing judgment on the political context. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Godhra riots in 2002, the Indian army was deployed to restore public order. It moved decisively, securing affected areas and preventing further violence. In both cases, the army did not sit in judgment-it acted as the stabilizing force it was meant to be. Once a government order is given within constitutional parameters, the military’s professional obligation is execution with discipline and competence. The events in Bangladesh and Nepal underscore the urgent need to reaffirm civil-military boundaries. Democracies must ensure clear protocols for military deployment in internal crises, training and doctrine that reinforce apolitical conduct. India’s model, despite its own challenges, offers valuable lessons. The Indian army’s disciplined recognition of supremacy of civilian authority has helped preserve democratic stability even in moments of deep national crisis. When armies hesitate, nations falter.

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Pro-China Nepalese Government

In recent years, Nepal has been seeking to strengthen its ties with China, particularly in the areas of economic development and infrastructure. The government of Nepal sees China as a key partner in its efforts to develop the country’s infrastructure and boost economic growth. China’s investment in Nepal’s infrastructure has been welcomed by the Nepalese government as an opportunity to help it address its infrastructure deficit and create jobs.

The Government of Nepal has also been trying to use China as a counterbalance to India’s traditional dominance in the region. India has long been seen as having a strong influence over Nepal’s politics and economy, and some in Nepal have sought to reduce this dependence by building closer ties with China.

However, this pro-China stance has also been met with some criticism and skepticism by some in Nepal who argue that Nepal should be cautious about becoming too dependent on China and should seek to maintain a balance in its relationships with both China and India.

Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Nepal

China has invested in a number of infrastructure projects in Nepal in recent years. Some examples include:

The Kathmandu-Terai Expressway: This is a 75.5 km long, 4-lane expressway that will connect Kathmandu to the southern plains of Nepal, known as the Terai. The project is being built with a $318 million loan from the China Exim Bank and is being constructed by a Chinese state-owned company.

The West Seti Hydropower Project: This is a 750 MW hydroelectric power plant being built on the Seti River in western Nepal. The project is being developed by a Chinese state-owned company and is being financed by a loan of $1.6 billion from the China Exim Bank.

The Pokhara Regional International Airport: This is a new international airport being built in Pokhara, a city in western Nepal. The project is being developed by a Chinese state-owned company and is being financed by a $216.5 million loan from the China Exim Bank.

China-Nepal cross-border railway: A loan of $8.3 billion cross-border railway project that would connect China and Nepal, is currently under discussion and it would be a major infrastructure project that would connect the two countries and help boost trade and tourism.

There are other projects include upgrading and maintenance of highways, building of bridges and many more.

China also provided a loan to Nepal for the construction of the Kerung-Kathmandu railway line, which is a major infrastructure project and also for many other projects as well.

High Level Political Visits

A number of high-level Chinese political leaders have visited Nepal in recent years. Some examples of such visits include:

In 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Nepal, becoming the first Chinese President to visit Nepal in 23 years. During the visit, China and Nepal signed a number of agreements on issues such as trade, infrastructure, and tourism.

In 2017, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Nepal and signed a number of agreements on infrastructure projects and economic cooperation.

In 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Nepal and signed a number of agreements on infrastructure projects and economic cooperation.

In 2016, Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan visited Nepal and signed a number of agreements on defense cooperation.

In 2015, Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao visited Nepal and signed a number of agreements on infrastructure projects and economic cooperation.

In 2022 alone, three high level visits took place. Li Zhanshu, number three in China’s leadership hierarchy and China’s top legislator visited Nepal for three days from September 12. Earlier, state councillor and foreign minister Wang Yi’s visited in March and Lin Jianchao, CPC’s international department chief, visited in July.

These visits demonstrate the growing importance that China attaches to its relationship with Nepal, and the increasing level of engagement between the two countries on a range of issues.

Chinese Claims to Nepalese Territory

There have been reports of border disputes and incursions by Chinese forces into Nepalese territory in recent years. The most notable of these incidents occurred in 2015, when Chinese border guards destroyed a makeshift border pillar set up by Nepalese border security personnel. Nepalese officials have also reported instances of Chinese troops crossing the border and building structures on Nepalese territory.

However, Chinese officials denied any such intentions and stated that the incursions were the result of misunderstandings and disagreements over the exact location of the border.

The boundary between Nepal and China is not clearly demarcated and there have been disputes over the exact alignment of the border in some areas.

Access to Chinese Ports

China has proposed to provide Nepal with access to Chinese ports as a way to boost trade and reduce Nepal’s dependence on Indian ports. This would allow Nepal to use Chinese ports to export its goods and import raw materials and other goods, which would reduce transportation costs and time, and provide Nepal with an alternative to Indian ports.

In 2017, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Nepal and proposed to provide Nepal with access to Chinese ports through the development of a cross-border railway that would connect the two countries, and also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to that effect. This railway would connect the Chinese city of Kerung to the Nepalese capital Kathmandu, and would also connect to other cities in Nepal.

Additionally, in 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping, during his visit to Nepal, also proposed to build a “Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network” which would include upgrading and expanding infrastructure, such as roads and railways, to connect China and Nepal, and also improve access to Chinese ports for Nepal.

The proposals are still under discussion and have not been implemented yet. However, if implemented, it would help to reduce Nepal’s dependence on Indian ports, providing Nepal with an alternative route for trade and commerce.

India’s Actions to Counter Chinese Influence

India has traditionally had a strong relationship with Nepal, and has sought to maintain its influence in the country as a counterbalance to China’s growing presence. India has been trying to counter China’s influence in Nepal through a number of different strategies.

India has been providing economic aid and investment to Nepal in order to support the country’s development and infrastructure projects. India has also been encouraging Nepalese businesses to trade with and invest in India, in order to boost economic ties between the two countries.

India has been engaging with Nepal on a political level, and has been working to strengthen its ties with the Nepalese government and political leaders. India has also been working to build closer ties with Nepal’s political parties, in order to maintain a strong relationship with the country’s political establishment.

India has been working to strengthen cultural and people-to-people ties with Nepal, in order to build stronger bonds between the two countries. India has also been encouraging Nepalis to visit and study in India, in order to build closer ties between the two countries.

India and Nepal have been cooperating on security issues, such as countering terrorism and drug trafficking, in order to maintain stability in the region.

United States Stakes in Nepal

The United States has a relatively limited influence in Nepal compared to regional powers such as China and India. However, the US has been seeking to expand its engagement with Nepal in recent years in order to promote stability and security in the region.

Besides providing development and humanitarian assistance, the US has also been providing security assistance to Nepal, including training and equipment for Nepal’s military and police forces. The US has also been working with Nepal to counter terrorism and transnational crime in the region.

In recent years, the US has increased its high-level visits to Nepal, with visits from US Secretaries of State, US Ambassador to India, and US Ambassador to Nepal, and also has been providing aid and assistance in various sectors such as, health, education and more.

Nepal’s parliament ratified the US-led Millennium Challenge Corporation or MCC compact on 27 February 2022. The MCC, a US aid agency, signed a $500 million compact with Nepal to support the country in its developmental goals. Many have dubbed the MCC compact as Washington’s hedging strategy against China’s increasing aid for Kathmandu.

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The Army Chief paid homage and laid a wreath at the Bir Smarak. He also handed over medical equipment, including ventilators, and interacted with trainee officers at the Command and Staff College of Nepalese Army in Shivapuri.

Lipulekh Dispute

Bilateral ties between India and Nepal were hit in May after Nepal claimed the Lipulekh region in north-eastern edge of Uttarakhand. Lipulekh is a tri-junction between India, Nepal and China. The Nepalese claim was made after defence minister Rajnath Singh inaugurated an 80-km-long strategically crucial road connecting the Lipulekh pass with Dharchula in Uttarakhand on May 8. It reduces the travel time to Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage by several km.

ALSO READ: Nepal Has Violated The Treaty of Sugauli, 1816

Nepal said the road was constructed in its territory but New Delhi all along maintained it was well within its boundary and some kilometers away from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China there. Kathmandu responded by issuing a new map that showed Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura, all controlled by India, as part of Nepalese territory, exacerbating the row. It questioned the treaty of Sugauli signed in 1815 after the Anglo-Gurkha war.

New Delhi had paused talks with the Himalayan nation’s communist government after its parliament cleared a new map in June 2020 featuring areas which India maintains belong to it. In its reaction after Nepal’s lower house of parliament approved the bill, India termed as untenable the “artificial enlargement” of territorial claims by the neighbouring country.

After Nepal released the map, India reacted sharply, calling it a “unilateral act” and cautioning Kathmandu that such “artificial enlargement” of territorial claims will not be acceptable to it. India said Nepal’s action violates an understanding reached between the two countries to resolve the boundary issues through talks.

In September, prime minister Oli decided to stop distribution of next school textbooks that had been published with the country’s revised political map. India too had published a new map in November 2019 showing the areas as its territories.

The Lipulekh pass is a far western point near Kalapani, a disputed border area between Nepal and India. Both India and Nepal claim Kalapani as an integral part of their territory – India as part of Uttarakhand’s Pithoragarh district and Nepal as part of Dharchula district.

In the midst of the row, Gen Naravane said that there were reasons to believe that Nepal objected to the road at the behest of “someone else”, in an apparent reference to a possible role by China in the matter. The comments triggered angry reactions from Nepal. Taking exception to these comments by the Army Chief, Nepalese defence minister Ishwar Pokhrel had said they “hurt the sentiments of the Nepali Gurkha army personnel who lay down their lives to protect India.”

Meeting With Prime Minister

Gen Naravane’s meeting with KP Sharma Oli, who also holds the defence portfolio focused on defence-related issues. The development assumed significance in the wake of the fact that Naravane was the first high-ranking official to visit Nepal a year after the boundary dispute erupted between the two countries.

The Army chief’s visit saw the two countries further ramping up the ties and explore ways to have more interactions including joint training and exchange of personnel for study visits to institutes in each other’s country.

India and Nepal have time-tested strong defence and security ties, with regular exchanges and training programmes.

India’s strategic military relations with Nepal are at two levels – between the two sovereign armies and the Indian Army’s Gorkha connect. Nearly 30,000 Gurkhas serve in seven regiments of the Indian Army. Politicians with Leftist leanings, especially Maoists in Nepal, have invariably raised the question of stopping recruitment in foreign armies, especially the Indian Army.

In 1965, King Mahendra, and in 1990, King Birendra requested India to modernise the Nepal Army, which is equipped 80 per cent with Indian military hardware provided at friendship prices – 70 per cent aid and 30 per cent payment, which over time has become near gratis. According to treaty arrangements, Nepal acquires military equipment from abroad only when India is unable to provide them. But this is not sacrosanct as the US, the UK and east Europe have provisioned the Army.

Nepal Army’s specialised training is held in India and it has a number of training slots. Joint training has reached the battalion level under the Surya Kiran series and military exercises are held in both the countries.

Economic Relations

Land-locked Nepal relies heavily on India for the transportation of goods and services. Nepal’s access to the sea is through India, and it imports a predominant proportion of its requirements from and through India.

Nepal’s imports from India in 2017 were worth $6.52 billion while its exports to the country were pegged at $420.18 million. The figure for China, which was second on the list of countries from which Nepal imported its requirements, was five times lower than that of India.

ALSO READ: China-Nepal Rail Link Planned

In August, the two sides held a meeting of their oversight mechanism that oversees India-funded development projects and agreed to speed up work on bilateral projects, including infrastructure schemes and cross-border rail links.  It was the first step by the two countries to mend their relations and get down to business.

In the coming days both sides may hold talks to speed up the Pancheshwar multi-purpose project on river Mahakali and other hydro-electric projects with India. Also, India may also work closely with Nepal in the fields of education, health and infrastructure development sectors in Nepal.

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India’s decision to send the Army Chief to Nepal to reset the ties is seen as part of a larger exercise by New Delhi to rejuvenate relations with Myanmar, the Maldives, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Afghanistan in the wake of greater efforts by China to expand its influence in the region.

Gen Naravane’s three-day visit to Nepal was expected to have a significant diplomatic overtone with India looking at resetting relations with the Himalayan nation after the ties came under severe strain following a bitter border row.

It was the first high-level visit from India to Kathmandu since Nepal came up with a new political map in May claiming several areas in Uttarakhand to be part of its territory.

Earlier in October, Gen Naravane had travelled to Myanmar along with foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla on a very crucial visit during which India decided to supply an attack submarine to the Myanmarese Navy besides agreeing to further deepen military and defence ties.

Nepal is important for India in the context of its overall strategic interests in the region, and leaders of the two countries have often noted the age-old ‘Roti-Beti’ relationship.

Nepal is geo-strategically the most important neighbour. In 1959, the then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru had said that an attack on Nepal and Bhutan will be deemed as an attack on India.

India’s strategic thinkers are concerned over reports of China grabbing Nepalese territories in a number of locations along the borders between the two countries, though Kathmandu had clarified recently that there were no such encroachments.

During crisis or calamity in Nepal, the Indian military has become the first responder – for example, aviation tragedy at the Tribhuvan International Airport 1990s, the earthquake in 2015, after the earthquake.

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China Has Annexed Over 150 Hectares in Nepal

China has annexed over 150 hectares of Nepal’s territory, according to a leading British daily whose report was rejected by the Chinese Foreign Ministry on Tuesday as a “completely unfounded rumour”.

Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry Wang Wenbin’s remarks came after The Telegraph quoting Nepalese politicians reported that China has annexed more than 150 hectares of land in five areas near the border, including by diverting the flow of a river to reclaim the previously submerged land.

“According to reports, Beijing is fast moving forward and further pushing Nepali boundaries by encroaching more and more landmass. The actual scenario could be worse as the ruling Nepali Communist Party (NCP) is trying to shield the expansionist agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),” said an expert on the condition of anonymity.

The Chinese influence in Nepal has grown dramatically since the Communist Government is in place.

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While the construction has not started, the survey is part of a pre-feasibility study for the project.

The plan was conceptualised by China in 2008 and it was decided that the railway corridor would connect Lhasa to Shigatse and would be extended to Keyrung on the Nepal border. This is to be further stretched to Kathmandu and Lumbini.

Cost has been a major concern with the entire project already hitting estimates of over $300 million. The project is complex with several tunnels and bridges required.

China plans to build a 540-kilometre strategic high-speed rail link between Tibet and Nepal passing through a tunnel under Mt Everest, a move that could raise alarm in India about the Communist giant’s growing influence in its neighbourhood.

ALSO READ The China Factor in Nepal

China is considering tunneling under Mount Everest to connect better with the South Asian markets. The extended rail line from the Tibet’s capital Lhasa to Kathmandu in Nepal, will reduce India’s influence in Nepal.

China had earlier discussed extending the Qinghai-Lhasa line to the Nepalese border without digging a tunnel.

The Lhasa line was extended to Xigaze, the second biggest city in Tibet, which is closer to the Nepalese border as Chinese authorities completed a 253-km long link railway line in August last year. 

As with any engineering project of this size, it is not without its opponents. The International Campaign for Tibet cautions that there are “dangerous implications for regional security and the fragile ecosystem of the world’s highest and largest plateau.”

Restrained by rugged Himalayan mountains with its “remarkable” changes in elevation, trains on the line would probably have a maximum speed of 120 kmph.

The feat would provide China with more influence over India’s allies and neighbours as well as continue Beijing’s plan to open up the Buddhist plateau of Tibet to tourism and modern Chinese culture.

Basically, a rail line from mainland China under the Himalayas would connect the nation to the billion plus inhabitants living below “The Roof of the World”.

ALSO READ Chinese Media Threatens India With ‘Military Pressure’ from China, Pakistan or Nepal

Indian Railway Projects

To counter China’s influence through the proposed rail corridor, India has also planned railway links in Nepal. Six cross border railway lines have been proposed between India and Nepal till date.

Unlike the Nepal-China railway line that faces hurdles because of the terrain, the construction of railway lines between India and Nepal is less challenging. Two of these projects have had some progress.

The first is the Jayanagar-Janakpur-Bardibas railway line at a cost of Rs 5.5 billion. The 69 km project is divided in three phases. In the first phase, the 34-km segment between Jayanagar and Kurtha is complete. Work is in progress in the second phase which is 18 km from Kurtha to Bhangaha in Mahottari district and the third phase which is a 17 km segment from Bhangaha to Bardibas.

The second is the Kathmandu-Raxual railway line, which is 136 km-long and is proposed to be an electrified rail line connecting the border town in India of Raxaul to Nepal’s capital Kathmandu. The Indian team has already completed the pre-feasibility study of Kathmandu-Raxual railway line and both were in the process of holding consultations on preparing the Detailed Project Report of the railway line.

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made efforts to bolster the nation’s regional pull, but the construction of a contiguous rail line between China and the Nepalese capitol Kathmandu would undermine his historical geographic advantage as early as 2020.

China has been scaling up its ties with Nepal much to the chagrin of India to stem the flow of Tibetans travelling through Nepal to meet the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala.

The idea is to find a short route to Nepal in order to access the vast Indian market in a short time. China may be trying to involve Nepal in its Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar project because New Delhi has shown less enthusiasm for the BCIM project. 

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Days before prime minister KP Sharma Oli came up with a new map of Nepal effectively committing cartographic aggression against India in the Kalapani area, his weakening domestic political situation and challenge from senior party leaders was defused after China mediated a deal between the leaders. Some days before the crucial meeting of Nepal Communist Party, Chinese Ambassador Hou Yanqi held a series of meetings with its senior leaders. Beijing made its concern clear that the ongoing strife within Nepal’s ruling coalition was not in China’s interests, since it had invested heavily in Nepal and needed Kathmandu to create as many pin pricks for New Delhi as possible.

The rift and Oli’s own nationalist politics, which seem to disappear when it comes to China, and domestic political opinion resulted in Kathmandu taking a strong position on the question of territory.

If there were any doubts about the Chinese investment in the NCP and backing for Oli, they was dispelled.

In the “Great Game” of politics in Nepal, Beijing demonstrably has an upper hand and has displaced India. During the pre-2006 people’s revolution and civil war periods, Chinese diplomats in Kathmandu, deviously claimed that Beijing did not interfere in any country’s internal affairs. They would describe the Maoists as hijackers of Mao’s name. But after the Maoists came to power in 2008, Beijing conveniently discovered ideological identity and congruity with them.

Sino-Indian Border Differences

Borders of most of India’s northern states of Ladakh, Himachal, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh contiguous to China have disputes and have heavy military deployments on both sides. In addition, there is a major dispute between India and China over the road built by the latter to reach Pakistan under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. In 2017, China also made an attempt to ingress into Bhutan in the Doklam area. India was compelled to make its military presence felt strongly.

China has never raised any objections to India building a road to Lipulekh and opening the route to Mansarovar. When India proposed the opening of the Lipulekh Pass roadway, it appealed to China since it fulfilled its economic imperatives and aspiration to reign supreme in the India market.

India and China do not have a claims or dispute over territory in the Lipulekh region that Nepal claims as its territory. China has no deployment there, but India does. Hence, this area became a convenient area for the two countries to connect via road. The lack of geographical barriers also made the route a less circuitous alternative.

The new route reduces the distance from Delhi to the India-China border. From the Indian town of Pithoragarh through Lipulekh the distance by road is about 170 kms.

The direct road allows India to import Chinese goods at a cheaper rate and export its products to China easily. In 2019, India’s trade deficit with China was about US$54 billion. With the newly built road, India wants to export its products to China and reduce the trade deficit.

China’s Message

From a stand-off between the soldiers of the two countries at Naku La in North Sikkim on 8 May 8 to Pangong Tso lake, Demchok and other places in Ladakh, China has displayed aggressiveness at the tactical level, though at the strategic level the relationship with India remains stable.

These incidents are not unconnected. Chinese military actions are not random. They are well thought through. The Chinese military is part of the political establishment.

Covid-19, the disease bought on by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, has isolated China across the world stage, with many countries pressing for an independent probe into the origins of the virus from Wuhan.

Actions by Kathmandu, and the Chinese confrontation with India is part of subtle messaging to India not to lend its voice to the growing clamour against China.

China has created a three-pronged headache for India.

•             The China-origin virus, which has already shattered all hopes of India’s goal of $5-trillion GDP by 2023-24.

•             The political-diplomatic headache originating from Kathmandu.

•             The muscle-flexing by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacks on Indian soldiers in Ladakh’s Galwan valley, Daulat Beg Oldi sector, and Naku La in Sikkim.

China in Nepal

In the past, China was interested in keeping a tab on the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal. With the abolition of the monarchy, China shifted attention to the political parties as also to institutions like the Army and Armed Police Force. Today China considers Nepal an important element in its growing South Asian footprint.

A lull in relations between India and Nepal for the past 17 years gave an opportunity to China to step up its engagement with Kathmandu through massive investments. After the 2015 India-Nepal rift, China amplified its political and economic investments in Nepal.

In October 2019, Chinese president Xi Jinping made a two-day visit to Nepal, becoming the first Chinese President in more than two decades to visit Nepal. During the visit, significant deals were inked to include a rail link connecting Tibet with Kathmandu. A road tunnel was also proposed to bring Kathmandu and the Chinese border closer. The Nepal-China Transit protocol was signed to counter the India-Nepal international trade interests.

Resentment Against China

All is not well between China and the Nepalese. China’s growing activities in Nepal have caused some unease in the country and the government. This is also reflected on social media. Chinese efforts to propagate its belief, culture and projects in Nepal, which includes moves to popularise Mandarin language to increasingly cornering local small and micro-enterprises has not gone down well. Local traders are feeling the heat due to Chinese presence.

Resentment against China, at the administrative level, can be discerned around the slow progress of the mega projects to be built by Chinese companies under its Belt and Road Initiative.

Kathmandu had accepted nine of the 35 projects proposed by China including the Kathmandu-Kerung Railway that alone is estimated to cost at least $2.3 billion, which is about 10 per cent of Nepal’s GDP. The utility of the railway line, which has been projected to end Nepal’s dependence on India for supplies, has been questioned.

While Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Maldives have been in pursuit of balancing Indian and Chinese economic, political and strategic interests, Nepal has had difficulty stabilizing these influences, resulting in acute insecurity and instability over the last several years.

For Nepal, Lipulekh is a tricky and prickly issue, since both India and China do not see it as a dispute between the two. Yet, there is a nagging suspicion that China has turned a blind eye to Nepal raising the stakes through a notification in Nepal’s parliament on 20 May.

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India’s decisions around Article 370, on 5 August 2019, steps to increase border security, an image of assertiveness against Pakistan has Beijing taking notice as any gain in India’s image will be counterproductive to furthering its own influence in South Asia. China has emerged more successful in challenging and even dislodging India from its influential pedestal in the South Asia. But Nepal is still within the India’s sphere of influence.

Beijing has stepped up its never before seen brash diplomacy to chase its global goals. From Kabul to Colombo, Male to Myanmar, Thimpu to Kathmandu, India faces the long shadow of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in areas as diverse as territory to trade, telecommunications to terrorism and tourism to technology.

For the last several years, countries like Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan have in effect become playgrounds for great-power competition between these two countries. Whether it is the internal political dynamics, investment or cultural influence, the two countries have vigorously jockeyed to expand their influence while negating or diminishing each other’s influence across the South Asian region.

The Chinese aim is to command and control vast water resources and reservoirs of the entire Himalayas – the virtual lifeline for more than 1.8 billion people of South Asia.

At the backdrop of Beijing’s current diplomatic setback at the global fora, China will intensify its offensive in South Asia, the Pacific and Indian Ocean to project its power.

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Days before prime minister KP Sharma Oli came up with a new map of Nepal effectively committing cartographic aggression against India in the Kalapani area, his weakening domestic political situation and challenge from senior party leaders was defused after China mediated a deal between the leaders. Some days before the crucial meeting of Nepal Communist Party, Chinese Ambassador Hou Yanqi held a series of meetings with its senior leaders. Beijing made its concern clear that the ongoing strife within Nepal’s ruling coalition was not in China’s interests, since it had invested heavily in Nepal and needed Kathmandu to create as many pin pricks for New Delhi as possible.

The rift and Oli’s own nationalist politics, which seem to disappear when it comes to China, and domestic political opinion resulted in Kathmandu taking a strong position on the question of territory.

If there were any doubts about the Chinese investment in the NCP and backing for Oli, they was dispelled.

In the “Great Game” of politics in Nepal, Beijing demonstrably has an upper hand and has displaced India. During the pre-2006 people’s revolution and civil war periods, Chinese diplomats in Kathmandu, deviously claimed that Beijing did not interfere in any country’s internal affairs. They would describe the Maoists as hijackers of Mao’s name. But after the Maoists came to power in 2008, Beijing conveniently discovered ideological identity and congruity with them.

Sino-Indian Border Differences

Borders of most of India’s northern states of Ladakh, Himachal, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh contiguous to China have disputes and have heavy military deployments on both sides. In addition, there is a major dispute between India and China over the road built by the latter to reach Pakistan under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. In 2017, China also made an attempt to ingress into Bhutan in the Doklam area. India was compelled to make its military presence felt strongly.

China has never raised any objections to India building a road to Lipulekh and opening the route to Mansarovar. When India proposed the opening of the Lipulekh Pass roadway, it appealed to China since it fulfilled its economic imperatives and aspiration to reign supreme in the India market.

India and China do not have a claims or dispute over territory in the Lipulekh region that Nepal claims as its territory. China has no deployment there, but India does. Hence, this area became a convenient area for the two countries to connect via road. The lack of geographical barriers also made the route a less circuitous alternative.

The new route reduces the distance from Delhi to the India-China border. From the Indian town of Pithoragarh through Lipulekh the distance by road is about 170 kms.

The direct road allows India to import Chinese goods at a cheaper rate and export its products to China easily. In 2019, India’s trade deficit with China was about US$54 billion. With the newly built road, India wants to export its products to China and reduce the trade deficit.

China’s Message

From a stand-off between the soldiers of the two countries at Naku La in North Sikkim on 8 May 8 to Pangong Tso lake, Demchok and other places in Ladakh, China has displayed aggressiveness at the tactical level, though at the strategic level the relationship with India remains stable.

These incidents are not unconnected. Chinese military actions are not random. They are well thought through. The Chinese military is part of the political establishment.

Covid-19, the disease bought on by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, has isolated China across the world stage, with many countries pressing for an independent probe into the origins of the virus from Wuhan.

Actions by Kathmandu, and the Chinese confrontation with India is part of subtle messaging to India not to lend its voice to the growing clamour against China.

China has created a three-pronged headache for India.

•             The China-origin virus, which has already shattered all hopes of India’s goal of $5-trillion GDP by 2023-24.

•             The political-diplomatic headache originating from Kathmandu.

•             The muscle-flexing by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacks on Indian soldiers in Ladakh’s Galwan valley, Daulat Beg Oldi sector, and Naku La in Sikkim.

China in Nepal

In the past, China was interested in keeping a tab on the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal. With the abolition of the monarchy, China shifted attention to the political parties as also to institutions like the Army and Armed Police Force. Today China considers Nepal an important element in its growing South Asian footprint.

A lull in relations between India and Nepal for the past 17 years gave an opportunity to China to step up its engagement with Kathmandu through massive investments. After the 2015 India-Nepal rift, China amplified its political and economic investments in Nepal.

In October 2019, Chinese president Xi Jinping made a two-day visit to Nepal, becoming the first Chinese President in more than two decades to visit Nepal. During the visit, significant deals were inked to include a rail link connecting Tibet with Kathmandu. A road tunnel was also proposed to bring Kathmandu and the Chinese border closer. The Nepal-China Transit protocol was signed to counter the India-Nepal international trade interests.

Resentment Against China

All is not well between China and the Nepalese. China’s growing activities in Nepal have caused some unease in the country and the government. This is also reflected on social media. Chinese efforts to propagate its belief, culture and projects in Nepal, which includes moves to popularise Mandarin language to increasingly cornering local small and micro-enterprises has not gone down well. Local traders are feeling the heat due to Chinese presence.

Resentment against China, at the administrative level, can be discerned around the slow progress of the mega projects to be built by Chinese companies under its Belt and Road Initiative.

Kathmandu had accepted nine of the 35 projects proposed by China including the Kathmandu-Kerung Railway that alone is estimated to cost at least $2.3 billion, which is about 10 per cent of Nepal’s GDP. The utility of the railway line, which has been projected to end Nepal’s dependence on India for supplies, has been questioned.

While Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Maldives have been in pursuit of balancing Indian and Chinese economic, political and strategic interests, Nepal has had difficulty stabilizing these influences, resulting in acute insecurity and instability over the last several years.

For Nepal, Lipulekh is a tricky and prickly issue, since both India and China do not see it as a dispute between the two. Yet, there is a nagging suspicion that China has turned a blind eye to Nepal raising the stakes through a notification in Nepal’s parliament on 20 May.

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India’s decisions around Article 370, on 5 August 2019, steps to increase border security, an image of assertiveness against Pakistan has Beijing taking notice as any gain in India’s image will be counterproductive to furthering its own influence in South Asia. China has emerged more successful in challenging and even dislodging India from its influential pedestal in the South Asia. But Nepal is still within the India’s sphere of influence.

Beijing has stepped up its never before seen brash diplomacy to chase its global goals. From Kabul to Colombo, Male to Myanmar, Thimpu to Kathmandu, India faces the long shadow of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in areas as diverse as territory to trade, telecommunications to terrorism and tourism to technology.

For the last several years, countries like Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan have in effect become playgrounds for great-power competition between these two countries. Whether it is the internal political dynamics, investment or cultural influence, the two countries have vigorously jockeyed to expand their influence while negating or diminishing each other’s influence across the South Asian region.

The Chinese aim is to command and control vast water resources and reservoirs of the entire Himalayas – the virtual lifeline for more than 1.8 billion people of South Asia.

At the backdrop of Beijing’s current diplomatic setback at the global fora, China will intensify its offensive in South Asia, the Pacific and Indian Ocean to project its power.

The post The China Factor in Nepal appeared first on IMR.

The treaty, signed by Lt Colonel George Ramsay, for Charles John Earl Canning Viceroy and Governor-General of India and by Maharaja Jung Bahadur Rana for Maharaja Dheraj Soorinder Vikram SahBahadoorShumsher Jung was sealed at Kathmandu on November 1, 1860, and ratified at Calcutta on November 15, 1860.

A significant development of this treaty was the emergence of the Gurkhas of Nepal highland, as they were recruited into the nascent British Indian Army and given the pride of place on a par with, if not superior to, recruits from the “hinterland of Hindustan.” Thus, an ‘alien’ homogeneous ethnic combat Gurkha Regiment was born to be the prima donna of Indian military in no time, thereby setting an unprecedented change in the war machine structure of South Asia. Tribal hillmen from the Nepal Himalayas became integral and an inalienable part of the folklore of India’s military operations from Hindustan to Han land; Meerut to Mesopotamia; Aliwal to Ardennes; and, Lucknow to Libya for over 200 years now.

“In fact, so pleased were the handful of part-time English trader-cum-aspiring rulers — lording over part of Hindustan heartland — with the Kathmandu king, that they concluded a second treaty with him in November 1860. It thus elaborated: ‘During the disturbances which followed the mutiny of the Native army in Bengal in 1857, the Maharajah of Nipal not only faithfully maintained relations established between the British Government and State of Nipal by the Treaty of Sugauli, but freely placed troops at the disposal of British authorities for preservation of order in frontier districts, and subsequently sent a force to cooperate with the British Army in the recapture of Lucknow and final defeat of the rebels. On conclusion of these operations, the Viceroy and Governor-General, in recognition of the eminent services rendered to the British Government by the State of Nipal, declared his intention to restore to the Maharajah the whole of lowlands lying between the Kali river and the district of Gorukpore, which belonged to the State of Nipal in 1815, and were ceded to the British Government in that year by the aforesaid treaty of Sugauli.”

Significantly, as can be found from the language of both Nepal-British treaties pertaining to Indian territories lying to the west of the Kali river, there is neither any ambiguity nor dispute that these have been with India. The British were fighting a sovereign Nepal, ostensibly on behalf of a dependent India of several scattered indigenous rulers and battered princes. Nepal, therefore, could be seen as an aggressor of Indian soil, like the British, in the 19th century. Hence, it was clearly a fight between two foreign powers — British and Nepal — for parcelling out Indian soil in the 19th Century.

India, thus, inherited the boundary with Nepal, established between Nepal and the East India Company in the Treaty of Sugauli in 1816.

Kali river constituted the boundary, and the territory to its east was Nepal. The dispute relates to the origin of Kali.

Near Garbyang village in Dharchula Tehsil of the Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand, there is a confluence of different streams coming from north-east from Kalapani and north-west from Limpiyadhura. The early British survey maps identified the north-west stream, KutiYangti, from Limpiyadhura as the origin, but after 1857 changed the alignment to Lipu Gad, and in 1879 to Pankha Gad, the north-east streams, thus defining the origin as just below Kalapani. Nepal accepted the change and India inherited this boundary in 1947.

The Maoist revolution in China in 1949, followed by the takeover of Tibet, created deep misgivings in Nepal, and India was ‘invited’ to set up 18 border posts along the Nepal-Tibet border. The westernmost post was at Tinkar Pass, about 6 km further east of Lipulekh. In 1953, India and China identified Lipulekh Pass for both pilgrims and border trade. After the 1962 war, pilgrimage through Lipulekh resumed in 1981, and border trade, in 1991.

Kalapani, a patch of land near the India-Nepal border, close to the Lipulekh Pass on the India-China border, is one of the approved points for border trade and the route for the Kailash-Mansarovar yatra in Tibet.

In 1961, King Mahendra visited Beijing to sign the China-Nepal Boundary Treaty that defines the zero point in the west, just north of Tinkar Pass. By 1969, India had withdrawn its border posts from Nepali territory. The base camp for Lipulekh remained at Kalapani, less than 10 km west of Lipulekh. In their respective maps, both countries showed Kalapani as the origin of Kali river and as part of their territory. After 1979, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police has manned the Lipulekh Pass. In actual practice, life for the locals (Byansis) remained unchanged given the open border and free movement of people and goods.

After the 1996 Treaty of Mahakali (Kali river is also called Mahakali/Sarada further downstream) that envisaged the Pancheshwar multipurpose hydel project, the issue of the origin of Kali river was first raised in 1997. The matter was referred to the Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee that had been set up in 1981 to re-identify and replace the old and damaged boundary pillars along the India-Nepal border. The Committee clarified 98 per cent of the boundary, leaving behind the unresolved issues of Kalapani and Susta (in the Terai) when it was dissolved in 2008. It was subsequently agreed that the matter would be discussed at the foreign secretary level. Meanwhile, the project to convert the 80-km track from Ghatibagar to Lipulekh into a hardtop road began in 2009 without any objections from Nepal.

The Survey of India issued a new political map (eighth edition) on November 2, 2019, to reflect the change in the status of Jammu & Kashmir as two Union Territories. Nepal registered a protest though the map in no way had changed the boundary between India and Nepal. However, on 8 November, the ninth edition was issued. The delineation remained identical but the name Kali river had been deleted. Predictably, this led to stronger protests, with Nepal invoking foreign secretary-level talks to resolve issues.

The post Nepal Has Violated The Treaty of Sugauli, 1816 appeared first on IMR.

This was Oli’s first official response to the controversy, which started after India released its new political maps on November 2, following the restructuring of the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories. Oli’s statement came after days of protests by both the opposition and the ruling parties in Nepal over the map.

“We will not allow even an inch of our territory to be occupied by any country, India must vacate it,” Oli said at the meeting organised by the Nepal Yuva Sangam, which is the youth wing of the ruling Nepal Communist Party, adding that dialogue with India will follow after “India withdraws its army from our land”.

After the new maps were released, Nepal had, in a statement, said its government is “clear” that the Kalapani area lies within Nepalese territory.

Nepal’s Domestic Politics

Since the dispute erupted in November, it continued to remain on Nepal’s domestic political agenda. Opposition parties and civil society members asked Oli to directly talk to Indian prime minister Narendra Modi.

There were continuous street protest by students and the youth wings of ruling and opposition parties, but the scale of the protests had been steadily on the decline. The issue of Kalapani and Susta, however, were not the new issues – both have remained on the agenda when it comes to bilateral visits and negotiations ever since 1990.

The issue has been mentioned in almost all the joint press statements issued after the visit of prime ministers. The issue was removed from the joint statement after the Nepal-India Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) was formed in 2016. But there have been no serious talks between two sides about settling Kalapani and Susta issue.

A single bench of Nepal’s Supremem Court demanded, from the Nepal government, the country’s original map exchanged with India during the signing of the Sugauli Treaty in 1816, in response to the public interest litigation filed by a senior advocate who appealed to the Supreme Court to order the government to start political and diplomatic efforts to protect Nepali territories. The petition claimed that Limpiyadhura, Lipulek and Kalapani areas were shown under India’s territory even though they lay within the Nepalese territory.

India’s Reaction

Reacting on Nepal’s claim that the new map of India ‘incorrectly’ depicted Kalapani area situated in the country’s far-West lies within the Indian boundary, the ministry of external affairs (MEA) said that the boundaries with Nepal remain unchanged in the new map.

“Our map accurately depicts the sovereign territory of India. The new map has in no manner revised our boundary with Nepal,” MEA spokesperson Raveesh Kumar told media on 7 November.

He, however, added that the boundary delineation exercise with Nepal was ongoing under the existing mechanism. “We reiterate our commitment to finding a solution through dialogue in the spirit of our close and friendly bilateral relations. At the same time, both countries should guard against vested interests trying to create differences between our two countries.”

India has also said that “The boundary delineation exercise with Nepal is ongoing under the existing mechanism. It is committed to find a solution through dialogue in the spirit of our close and friendly bilateral relations”.

In the second week of November, Uttarakhand chief minister Trivendra Singh Rawat claimed that Kalapani was a part of India. But Nepal government has said Lipulekh lies in Nepal territory.

With India now pushing Nepal to sign on the agreed and initialed strip maps of about 98% of the boundary, Nepal is of the view that it would sign the strip map only after the settlement of the two disputes.

India denied again, on 2 January, that a new map issued after the reorganisation of Jammu & Kashmir in any way incorporated territories from Nepal. The clarification by the spokesperson of the MEA came after Nepal’s Supreme Court called for original map exchanged with India during the signing of the Sugauli Treaty in 1816.

Boundary Working Group

Nepal proposed holding a foreign secretary-level meeting to resolve the Kalapani dispute.

Nepal has also stated that India stationed its border security troops in Nepali territory after India-China war in 1962. The Nepal government has prepared some historical documents to prove that it has held an election there in 1959 and that it also collected revenue in 1961. It has also said that it has land certificates. Nepal has been making an effort to collect all historical documents available after Sugauli Treaty of 1861.

On the basis of these documents, Nepal is keen to hold a meeting with the Indian side. The third joint commission meeting held in Kathmandu in 2014 had directed “the foreign secretaries to work on outstanding boundary issues, including Kalapani and Susta, receiving required technical inputs from Boundary Working Group (BWG) as necessary”.

Though BWG is working to settle technical issues in several places, there has not been even a single meeting on Kalapani and Susta after 2014.

The Genesis of the Conflict

In 1816, the East India Company and Nepal signed the Treaty of Sagauli to mark out Nepal’s western border. The treaty defined river Mahakali as the western border of Nepal. River Mahakali has several tributaries, all of which merge at Kalapani. India claims that the river begins in Kalapani as this is where all its tributaries merge. But Nepal claims that it begins from Lipulekh Pass, the origin of most of its tributaries. It has, therefore, laid claim to all areas east of the Lipu Gad – the rivulet that joins the river Kali on its border. According to Nepal, the Kalapani area was included in the Census of Nepal until 58 years ago. According to some quarters, the late Nepalese King Mahendra had “handed over the territory” to India in 1962 in the wake of the India-China war. A report submitted on the subject to the Nepali prime minister further claimed that India had occupied an additional 62 sq km land. India on its part has presented administrative and tax records dating back to 1830s to back its claims. A map of 1879 also shows Kalapani as part of British India.

It is interesting to note that this long-standing issue only gained prominence after India and Nepal signed the Treaty of Mahakali in 1996. Both countries have been trying to resolve the issue of Kalapani and another vast area along the Nepal-Uttar Pradesh border, Susta. In 1981, a Joint Technical Boundary Committee was formed. While it could resolve a large part of the dispute, no final settlement could be reached. The progress in the matter has been very slow. In 2014, both countries held a joint commission meeting led by their foreign ministers. In 2016, an Eminent Persons Group was formed to look into several bilateral issues, including the border dispute and the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950. The border issue was escalated in March 2017 when a Nepali was killed as India’s Border Security Forces opened fire in Kanchanpur district, near the Nepal-India borderThe Kalapani region lies in a junction bordering three countries – India, Nepal and China. Nepal and India both claim this region as part of their respective territories; India as part of Uttarakhand and Nepal as part of Darchula district. Complicating the matter is the Sugauli Treaty – signed between the East India Company and Nepal in 1816 – which marks the Mahakali river as the western border of Nepal.

India – Nepal Ties

In the last few years signs of friction appeared between India and Nepal after Nepal’s new constitution in 2015 sparked unrest by ethnic minorities and led to a trade blockade of 135 days. India raised concerns about the worries of the Terai population. Many politicians in Nepal have yet to come to terms with the economic blockade they alleged India played a role in. Though it was decided that the 1950 treaty would be revisited in keeping with changing times, Delhi said it was yet to receive the eminent persons group report on the same. India’s notching down its interest in SAARC and prioritising other regional alliances such as BIMSTEC and BBIN has also upset Kathmandu.

Demonetisation in 2016 delivered a blow to Nepal, which announced the country had Rs 33.6 million Indian currency in its formal bank channels alone. India has been also displeased with Nepal joining Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

But India and Nepal have entered into agreements for inland waterways to provide Nepal sea access, on expanding connectivity, and for building electrified rail lines. Vizag port was made Nepal’s transit point for third-country trade.

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Despite the issue being brought up repeatedly, an end to the matter will not happen without serious dialogue between the two countries with a focus on Kalapani and Susta – of which there has been none since the dispute made a resurgence barring the one meeting between Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhle and Nepal’s Ambassador to India Nilambar Acharya in the first week of November.

At a time when Nepal is trying to reduce its economic dependence on India with help from China, a border dispute left unaddressed could further drive Kathmandu into the arms of its northern neighbour.

The flaring up of this issue is bound to add further tension in the India-Nepal relationship. The ties had received an impetus when prime minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. Nepal was invited as a SAARC member for Modi’s swearing-in ceremony. Modi visited the Himalayan nation soon after announcing his ‘neighbourhood first’ commitment. India was quick to respond to the earthquake that ravaged Nepal in 2015. Nepal also continued to blame India for interfering in its internal matters. The relationship deteriorated considerably after the unofficial blockade of Nepal in 2015.

India still enjoys great leverage with Nepal. India is Nepal’s largest trading partner, and the two countries are culturally intertwined. In the past, India has played a considerable role in maintaining stability and development in Nepal. As China’s clout grows in the region and India’s tensions with Pakistan exacerbate, India needs friends in the neighbourhood. It is therefore imperative that India manages such incidents with diplomatic finesse so that an anti-India feeling does not emerge among the Nepali leaders and general populace.

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Why is Kalapani significant?

Kalapani is a trijunction meeting point of India, Tibet and Nepal borders. The region has been manned by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police since 1962. This has led to fear of Chinese involvement also. Nepal has also raised concern over Lipulekh Pass, which has been made a trading tri-junction route between India and China, reportedly without Nepal’s consent, since 2015. The Indian side claims that Lipulekh pass has been referred to as a border trading point since 1954 and that the new positions depict an anti-Indian sentiment to gain greater political mileage.

The high Lipulekh pass helps India track Chinese movements in the region. Nepal has always sought the route be a major node for India-China trade. Kalapani’s significance is centuries-old for its location on the trade and pilgrim route to Tibet. In 2015, Kathmandu was upset that it was bypassed when India and China signed a bilateral agreement to increase trade through Lipulekh.

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Lipulekh Pass

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