A trilateral defence pact signed in Islam’s holiest city promises collective security. History, and the pact’s own first weeks, suggest a more modest and more complicated story

Seventy years ago, a Pakistani prime minister looked at the parade of Arab and Muslim unity pacts passing through his region and delivered a verdict that has outlived every one of them: “Zero plus zero plus zero still amounts to zero.” Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy was not being cynical for its own sake. He had watched, or would go on to watch, a succession of grand regional groupings rise on ceremony and dissolve on reality. The United Arab Republic, Egypt and Syria’s federation founded in 1958 as the high-water mark of pan-Arab ambition, collapsed in 1961. The Baghdad Pact lost Iraq within a year of its founding, limped on as the Central Treaty Organisation, and expired quietly in 1979. The Regional Cooperation for Development, launched in 1964 by Iran, Turkey and Pakistan — then, as now, the region’s three major non-Arab Muslim states — was rebranded the Economic Cooperation Organisation in 1985 and achieved little of consequence. Even the Gulf Cooperation Council, founded in 1981 explicitly to present a united front against Iran, remains today visibly split on how to handle Tehran.

That history is the essential backdrop against which to read the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed on 7 August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey at Al-Safa Palace in Islam’s holiest city. The headline provision is simple and dramatic: an armed attack on any one of the three is to be treated as an attack on all. It is language borrowed, consciously or not, from NATO’s Article 5, and it arrived amid genuine regional alarm — a war between the United States, Israel and Iran that began on 28 February 2026 and has since drawn missiles and drones onto every Gulf Cooperation Council state, a revived conflict in Yemen, and a Strait of Hormuz that no longer feels like open water. Riyadh, Islamabad and Ankara have spent the past week insisting the pact is defensive, not conspiratorial. Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, put it bluntly: there is no common threat that the three states have put into writing, and any country that does not attack a signatory has nothing to fear from the agreement. Pakistan’s foreign minister, Ishaq Dar, called it “purely defensive in nature” and said the door remains open to other states willing to resolve disputes peacefully — a hint that Egypt, among others, has been sounded out.

Solidarity this quickly assembled, however, sits on genuinely recent estrangement. Only a few years ago, President Erdogan was campaigning to make Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman an international pariah over the 2018 murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a campaign inseparable from Ankara’s patronage of the Muslim Brotherhood — an organisation Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Cairo all regard as an existential threat to their own systems of rule. Pakistan’s own loyalties have been tested before, too: Islamabad’s parliament voted unanimously for neutrality rather than troops when Saudi Arabia went to war in Yemen in 2015. None of this makes the Mecca pact meaningless. It does mean the coalition of convenience gathered in Mecca has less inherited trust to draw on than its signing ceremony suggested, and Suhrawardy’s arithmetic — that regional solidarity pacts have a long history of adding up to less than the sum of their announced ambitions — is exactly the test this one now has to pass.

What the Text Does and Does Not Commit Anyone To

Strip away the ceremony and the pact is a single operative sentence: an attack on one is an attack on all. What it does not yet contain is almost as important as what it does. There is no standing joint command, no integrated planning staff, and no publicly specified list of what military action a signatory would actually be obliged to take if another were struck. Officials on all three sides describe committees, a permanent secretariat and a push toward interoperability, intelligence-sharing and joint training as the next steps — which is another way of saying the substance is still being built, not already in place. Nor, despite a wave of early commentary, does the pact appear to extend Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent over Saudi Arabia or Turkey. Islamabad has historically reserved its nuclear capability for the threat it perceives from India, and nothing in the public text or in officials’ own statements suggests that calculus has changed.

What each partner actually brings to the table is more prosaic, and arguably more telling: Pakistan supplies a combat-tested military and the Muslim world’s only nuclear arsenal; Turkey brings NATO’s second-largest standing army and an increasingly formidable drone and defence-industrial base; Saudi Arabia brings capital, religious-diplomatic weight and the setting itself. Combined, the three countries field close to 1.4 million active personnel, roughly 3,400 aircraft, 6,000 tanks and more than 340 naval vessels — a formidable roster on paper, assembled from three militaries that presently run on incompatible equipment, doctrine and command culture, a mismatch analyst have flagged as the pact’s first practical obstacle to becoming anything more than a declaration.

Against Whom, Really?

Every signatory insists the pact targets no one. The circumstantial evidence points elsewhere. Turkey has the most active live confrontation of the three. Ankara has accused Israel of genocide in Gaza, joined South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice. Watched an Istanbul court indict Prime Minister Netanyahu, and clashed diplomatically with Israel over Turkish military activity in post-Assad Syria, to the point that Erdogan and Netanyahu have traded open insults. Saudi Arabia’s friction with Israel is milder and runs through its now-familiar refusal to normalise relations absent real progress toward Palestinian statehood.

 Iran is the more obvious backdrop. Riyadh has absorbed repeated Iranian and Iranian-proxy strikes since February — yet Tehran’s own reaction to the pact has been dismissive rather than alarmed. The Iranian parliamentarian has mocked the idea that a paper agreement with Turkey and Pakistan would deliver Saudi Arabia any more security than years of hosting American forces did.

The most honest test of the pact’s real solidarity, though, is not rhetorical but empirical, and it has already happened. Pakistan has been fighting an actual, bloody war along its Afghan border since October 2025, a conflict its own defence minister has called open war. United Nations has recorded hundreds of Afghan civilian deaths in a single quarter. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Turkey has lifted a finger, militarily or diplomatically, to help Pakistan there — the mediating role, such as it exists, has come from China instead. A pact tested this early against a live conflict involving one of its own members, and found wanting, tells you more about its current operational weight than any joint statement does.

The View From New Delhi

Indian commentary has been unusually engaged, and unusually candid about the stakes. The Hindu’s international affairs editor, Stanly Johny, described the pact plainly as a new triple alliance taking shape in West Asia — a characterisation more assertive than the “just a hedge” framing favoured by some Western analysts. The Week went considerably further, calling the pact’s implications for India “ominous” and laying out the logic bluntly: it dilutes American and Israeli influence in a region where India has built substantial business and military ties of its own. It says that the pact hands Pakistan a louder strategic voice and the promise of potential military backing in any future confrontation with India. It goes on to state that all this by binding together, in one bloc, the Muslim world’s only nuclear power, NATO’s second-largest army and the traditional custodian of Islam’s holiest sites. Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal has pushed back hard on those inclined to dismiss the pact as symbolic, asking pointedly which other defence pact besides NATO contains a provision quite like this one, and warning that if Pakistan succeeds in building a narrative of shared regional threats, India could eventually find itself cast as a target within that narrative. A more measured note has come from Takshashila’s Aishwaria Sonavane, who points out that the three militaries simply lack the institutional foundations for NATO-style interoperability given how differently each is equipped and trained — a caution echoed in a Hindu editorial analysis that flagged the same interoperability gap as the pact’s most immediate practical constraint.

India’s official response, by contrast, has been carefully unhurried. The Ministry of External Affairs said it was closely following developments and would study the implications for India’s national security, language nearly identical to what New Delhi said about the Saudi-Pakistan bilateral pact a year earlier. That calibration looks justified on the narrow nuclear question, where the evidence does not support alarm. It looks less complete on three other fronts that deserve sustained attention rather than a one-off statement. First, Turkey’s entry meaningfully widens the circle of states with a formal defence relationship to Pakistan, at a moment when Ankara’s own ties with New Delhi have cooled over Turkey’s vocal support for Islamabad during recent India-Pakistan tensions. Second, the pact adds fresh urgency to an old vulnerability: as Saudi-Pakistani military interoperability deepens, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait — a chokepoint critical to Indian energy imports and trade — could increasingly fall within the orbit of a bloc in which India has no seat. Third, China’s shadow role deserves closer watching than it has received. Chinese-origin air defence systems already sit inside Pakistan’s contribution to Saudi security, and any formal deepening of that relationship, especially if Iran’s pressure on the Gulf continues, would be a development India could not treat as peripheral to its own two-front planning. None of this argues for alarm. It argues for the kind of patient, specific monitoring that India’s own commentators, rather than its official statements, have so far done best.

What It Could Mean for Washington

Washington’s own position in this story is awkward. The pact was signed without American blessing and, more strikingly, without an American reaction. More than a day after the signing, the Trump administration had issued no formal response at all. A silence regional analysts read as its own kind of statement. Analysts at the Baker Institute and the Center for International Policy have both framed the pact less as a rejection of the United States than as a hedge. Gulf states diversifying their security options after more than a decade of accumulating doubt about American staying power, doubt the 2026 Iran war has sharply intensified rather than created. That distinction matters, but it may matter less over time than the pact’s practical effect. A Gulf security architecture in which Washington is no longer the only, or even the first, port of call. For a United States already stretched between the Iran conflict, its own domestic debates over troop commitments abroad, and a Gulf increasingly willing to hedge its bets, the Mecca pact is less a challenge to American power than a quiet vote of diminished confidence in it — delivered, pointedly, by three of Washington’s own longstanding regional partners.

A Pact Still Being Written

The days since the signing have brought a steady trickle of detail rather than a single clarifying moment. Islamabad’s police marked the agreement with a flag march; Saudi landmarks lit up in celebration; Turkish officials have floated Egypt as a possible future member, which would turn a trilateral pact into something closer to a standing Sunni-majority security caucus. None of this settles the deeper question. Suhrawardy’s old arithmetic was never really about the sincerity of the leaders signing such pacts — it was about the gap between declared solidarity and the institutional machinery needed to make that solidarity mean anything under pressure. The Mecca pact has, for now, more declared solidarity than machinery. Real capability on paper, a genuine and understandable shared anxiety about American reliability, and a founding trio whose most serious quarrels are barely a few years old. Whether it becomes the exception to seventy years of regional pacts that added up to less than they promised, or simply the latest entry in that list, will be decided less by what was signed in Mecca on 7 August than by how the three governments behave the next time one of them is actually attacked.

The post What the Mecca Pact Really Adds Up To appeared first on IMR.

Pakistan’s PFX (Pakistan Fighter Experimental) programme—publicly showcased at IDEAS 2024— is framed as a 4.5 gen leap focused on sensor, electronic warfare (EW), and avionics sovereignty. This article explains the programme’s aims and architecture, traces the JF-17’s evolution to Block III (KLJ-7A AESA radar, expanded EW/defensive aids, modern cockpit and HMD/S), and outlines weapons options and export context.

Over the past two decades, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has modernised along three reinforcing lines:

(I)  Recapitalising legacy fleets through co-development and licence production,

(ii) Growing airborne sensing and battle management capacity, and

(iii)  Iterating avionics faster than airframes.

The CAC/PAC JF-17 programme replaced ageing A-5/F-7/Mirage types and, crucially, established a domestic assembly and upgrade base at PAC Kamra. In parallel, PAF added AEW&C capacity (Saab 2000 Erieye and Chinese ZDK-03), tightening the sensor-to-shooter chain and informing doctrine for distributed air defence and strike control. More recently, the induction of the J-10C in 2022 provided a medium-weight node with advanced radar and weapons to complement the JF-17’s light/affordable mass.

Against this backdrop, the Pakistan Fighter Experimental concept (PFX) was presented at IDEAS 2024 in Karachi. PFX is framed as a 4.5-generation push expected to conclude its initial development cycle before decade’s end. Rather than a clean-sheet stealth jet on day one, PFX is positioned as an integration and sovereignty programme: drive ownership of the high-value stack – AESA radar, electronic warfare (EW), mission computing, and secure national datalinks – while using the JF-17 industrial line as the pragmatic launch pad.

Concretely, PFX is already moving in near-term spirals via an operational upgrade track colloquially dubbed PFX Alpha, coordinated through NASTP. The idea is to mature indigenous radar/EW/avionics increments on in-service airframes (starting with late-build JF-17s), collect test data, and de-risk the eventual PFX air vehicle. This “systems-first” staging acknowledges earlier lessons (e.g., Project Azm’s difficulties) and keeps capability flowing to squadrons while deeper R&D proceeds.

Technically, three levers define PFX’s early emphasis.

•  First, AESA-first sensors: Local content in T/R modules and beam-forming hardware, plus growth modes (TWS, SAR/GMTI) and reliability targets (MTBCF) that enable persistent multi-role tasking.

• Second, EW as a system: Indigenous ESM/ELINT receivers and DRFM-based self/stand-in jamming fused with RWR/MAWS and, ultimately, AESA-assisted jamming.

•  Third, open architecture and sovereign links: A hardened mission computer and national waveform/crypto to federate fighters, AEW, ground-based air defence (GBAD), and teaming with UCAVs/CCAs. Together, these shift centre-of-gravity from “airframe-first” to brains and network first.

JF-17 Block III is the immediate transition context. Block III centres on the NRIET/CETC KLJ-7A AESA (moving beyond the earlier mechanically-scanned KLJ-7), a wide-angle HUD and HMD/S, integrated MAWS/RWR, and a modernised mission-computer spine. Pakistan selected KLJ-7A for Block III after competitive evaluation; subsequent induction and carriage of the long-range PL-15/PL-15E BVRAAM validate the BVR leap implied by the avionics upgrade. In effect, Block III turns the JF-17 into a credible BVR-first light fighter and a ready host for PFX Alpha avionics/EW spirals.

From a management standpoint, PFX formalises a habit honed during sanctions: decouple airframe and avionics, preserve production momentum, and reintegrate electronics as sources and funding allow. PAC Kamra’s expanding role in structures, assembly and MRO, plus sustained collaboration with Chinese partners on airframes and sensors, provides the industrial scaffolding. The delta in PFX is ownership of software-heavy value – beamforming/ECCM, EW management, secure datalinks – so upgrade cycles shorten and exportable variants can be partitioned cleanly.

Programme Management and Industrial Model

The PAF manages fighter modernisation through a systems-first doctrine refined over two decades: preserve airframe momentum, iterate avionics on a decoupled track, and expand domestic sustainment so that upgrades and readiness are not hostage to external shocks. This operating model – proven on the CAC/PAC JF-17 line – underwrites PFX, which formalises sovereignty in the high-value layers (AESA, EW, mission computing, and secure datalinks) while leveraging the existing industrial base at PAC Kamra.

Governance logic: decouple, spiral, reintegrate. Sanctions constraints at the turn of the century forced a structural choice: separate the airframe programme from the electronics stack so that delays in one do not stall the other. That decision produced a repeatable pattern:

(1)   Field a robust baseline airframe;

(2) Run avionics/radar competitions in parallel;

(3) Spiral-in winning subsystems as they mature; and

(4) Keep software and integration pathways open for rapid refresh.

PFX takes this logic from platform practice to programme doctrine: an explicit spiral 3 pipeline (”PFX-Alpha”) to push indigenous radar/EW/avionics into service jets, harvest test data, and de-risk the eventual PFX air vehicle.

Institutional roles and workshare. PAC Kamra serves as the centre of gravity for structures, final assembly, avionics production/repair, and MRO. Under the JF-17 workshare, PAC manufactures a majority share of the airframe and executes final integration; that investment yields assured access to spares, lower life-cycle cost, and the ability to execute block upgrades at home. CAC/AVIC remain airframe and systems partners; CETC/NRIET anchors the KLJ-7/7A radar lineage. The Avionics Production Factory (APF) at Kamra extends repair/overhaul and licensed builds, and provides an institutional shell for future T/R module and beamforming work as PFX matures.

PFX-Alpha: the bridge from fleet to future. Operationally, PFX-Alpha is the near-term capability engine: an Operational Capability Upgrade (OCU) path for late-build JF-17s that prioritises radar/EW, open-architecture mission computing, and secure national datalinks.plus integration of new munitions (including indigenous A2G). Organisationally, the OCU is run through NASTP, which frames it as the first sequential step towards PFX while building local test/qualification capacity (anechoic/RCS/RF benches, EW range instrumentation). This “fleet first” staging keeps squadrons relevant and creates the data/QA backbone PFX will need in flight test.

Industrial model and supply security. The industrial design point is assured readiness. Three lines matter:

1. Domestic content and MRO. Expand the local content beyond structures into radar/EW LRUs and mission-computer boards; strengthen depot-level MRO and module-swap TAT to keep mission capable (MC) rates high.

2. Dual-source and buffer. Where parts cannot be localised, dual-source and hold buffer stocks (especially RF semiconductors and high-power GaN/PA modules).

3. Open interfaces. Enforce interface control documents (ICDs) and software modularity so that vendor rotation does not trigger system-wide requalification. This model reduces the cost/risk tail of long-life fleets and makes export support (MRO, spares pools, line modifications) a revenue engine rather than a drain.

Avionics and radar selection practice. On JF-17 Block III, the selection of the KLJ-7A AESA formalised the doctrine: pick a radar with multi-mode growth (TWS/SAR/GMTI), acceptable reliability (air-cooled architectures), and a vendor with integration & export posture aligned to Pakistan’s needs. PFX extends this logic by aiming to internalise more of the AESA value chain (T/R manufacture, beamforming, calibration/test) over time, while preserving upgrade freedom (future modes, cooperative EW, and datalink-driven sensor fusion).

Software, datalinks and IP governance. The heart of PFX is software: beam forming/ ECCM algorithms, EW threat libraries, and a secure, sovereign waveform. Programme rules emphasise:

• Partitioned software baselines (sovereign vs. exportable) to sustain exports without leaking core IP.

•  PKI and secure-boot across mission computers and radios to harden against tamper.

•  Data rights and toolchains retained in-country (build servers, firmware signing, EW library management).

Certification, compliance and exportability. To make sovereignty durable, PFX couples capability insertion with certifiable processes (DO-178C/254-like methods for software/hardware) and export control governance (feature-tiering, mode limiting, and redaction of sensitive ECCM). The result is a catalogue that can be sold with matching MRO/ToT packages, keeping PAC’s lines warm and feeding the R&D flywheel.

Risk register and mitigations. Supply chain fragility (RF semis, precision machining) is mitigated via dual-source and buffer. Vendor claims vs. fleet reality are handled by incremental spirals and instrumented trials before wide release. EW fratricide/interop risk is managed by common EW orchestration middleware and rigid emission deconfliction procedures. Workforce throughput risk is addressed by NASTP pipelines and vendor-shadow teams embedded at Kamra.

What changes with PFX. Relative to past practice, PFX shifts the centre of gravity from “airframe first” to “brains and network first” institutionalises a spiral pipeline (PFX-Alpha) to keep capability flowing, and deliberately grows the domestic share of radar/EW/mission-computer value. The end-state is not just a new aircraft; it is an industrial capability to continuously insert sensors, software, and network effects at home and for export.

PFX: Technical Aims and System Architecture

PFX is a systems-first programme that concentrates investment and governance on the high-value layers of a modern fighter: an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, an integrated electronic warfare (EW) complex, an open-architecture mission computer, and a sovereign, secure datalink fabric that fuses airborne and ground sensors. Rather than pursue a one-shot clean-sheet airframe, PFX proceeds in spirals, pushing sensors/EW/avionics increments into service aircraft (PFX-Alpha) while de-risking the eventual air vehicle. The aim is to localise more of the sensor/EW value chain, shrink upgrade cycles, and tighten the sensor-to-shooter loop across fighters, AEW, GBAD, and unmanned teammates.

AESA-first sensors. The radar thrust prioritises

(i) multi-mode capability (TWS, SAR/GMTI, maritime),

(ii) reliability/MTBCF improvements, and

(iii) increasing local content in T/R modules and beam forming hardware.

On JF-17 Block III, PAF selected the KLJ-7A AESA, which open literature describes as supporting multi-target track/engage and improved ECCM; vendor statements cited by trade media have referenced fighter-sized detections at nominal ranges and the ability to track ­15 targets and engage several concurrently. PFX extends this logic by building domestic capacity around array manufacturing, calibration, and mode growth, while keeping upgrade freedom for future waveforms and cooperative sensing.

EW as a system. PFX treats EW as a federated system, not a bolt-on. The target stack includes: wideband ESM/ELINT receivers; DRFM-based self-protection and stand-in jamming; AESA-assisted jamming modes; and tight fusion with the defensive aids suite (RWR/MAWS/CMDS). Orchestration middleware is required to

(i)   Deconflict emissions so jammers do not blind own-ship sensors,

(ii)  Prioritise effects by phase of flight (ingress/strike/egress), and

(iii)  Expose machine-to-machine hooks for UCAV/CCA escort jammers.

Instrumented range trials (X bands) with red/blue cells are integral to tune tactics and avoid EW fratricide.

Open mission computing. The mission-computer spine follows open-architecture principles: clean interface control documents (ICDs), process isolation for safety-critical and mission-apps, and a development tool chain owned incountry. Sovereign control over beam forming/ ECCM code and EW threat libraries is a central design rule. Practically, the stack should support:

(i)    Fast mode insertion for radar/EW.

(ii)   Plug-in sensor/ weapon drivers.

(iii)  Deterministic timing for sensor fusion, and

(iv)  Exportable partitions so features can be tiered by customer without exposing core IP.

Sovereign datalinks and sensor fusion. A secure national waveform (or a hardened gateway layer between mixed vendors) underwrites PFX’s network effects. The fabric must: authenticate with a sovereign PKI; support low-latency target handoff from AEW to shooter; and bridge airborne and GBAD/ISR nodes. Planning targets include: AEW shooter hand-off <200 ms for BVR stacks; time-synchronised tracks across fighters/ AEW/ GBAD; and graceful-degradation modes for GPS-denied or EMCON-constrained operations. Crypto keying and emergency revocation procedures are part of the operational concept.

Manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T). PFX assumes teaming with UCAVs and collaborative combat aircraft (CCA): attritable escorts for jamming/decoy roles; stand-in ISR/targeting; and weapons trucks to extend magazine depth. The mission computer and datalink layers therefore expose human-in-the-loop control, autonomy guard-rails (fail-safe behaviours and ROE thresholds), and data taps for post-mission learning.

Test, calibration and sustainment. Delivering sensor/EW sovereignty requires ground infrastructure: anechoic chambers and array calibration benches; RCS ranges; EW test ranges with threat emitters; and avionics repair/overhaul lines. PAC Kamra’s Avionics Production Factory (APF) anchors radar/avionics MRO today; PFX’s roadmap expands that role toward board-level manufacture, T/R module test, and long-term software sustainment. Depot-level processes (fast line-replaceable unit swaps, LO coating repair where applicable) are part of the sortie-generation calculus, not an afterthought.

Architecture checklist (engineering view).

•  AESA: front-end (array, T/R modules, phase shifters) with calibration & BIT; beamforming DSP with mode growth (TWS/SAR/GMTI).

• EW complex: ESM/ELINT receivers; DRFM jammers; DASS fusion (RWR/MAWS/CMDS); EW orchestration server for emission control.

•  Mission computer: partitioned OS; deterministic middleware; plug-in radar/EW/weapon apps; secureboot and code-signing.

• Datalink: sovereign waveform or gateway; PKI; AEW/GBAD bridging; low-latency hand-off targets; GPS-denial resilience.

• Test & MRO: anechoic/RCS/EW ranges; APF upgrade lines for radar/EW LRUs; software toolchains and EW library management.

Indicative KPIs and milestones.

These KPIs are engineering waypoints to steer PFX-Alpha spirals; the precise values will be tuned as flight-test evidence accrues. The governing idea remains constant: own the brains and the network, shorten the upgrade loop, and make sovereignty durable through tooling, test, and software ownership.

JF-17 Block III: Avionics, Radar, and Cockpit

Block III is the operational bridge into the PFX era. Its centrepiece is the NRIET/CETC KLJ-7A AESA radar, wrapped in a modernised mission-computer spine, an integrated defensive-aids suite (DAS), and an updated human.machine interface (HMI) comprising a wide-angle HUD and helmet-mounted display/sight (HMD/S). The design intent is twofold:

(i)   Shift the JF-17 from a budget multi-role fighter to a BVR-first light fighter with credible electronic protection; and

(ii) Provide an open, software-forward backbone for rapid capability insertion in the PFX spirals.

KLJ-7A AESA radar (modes, reliability, growth). KLJ-7A replaces the earlier mechanically scanned KLJ-7 with a solid-state AESA that supports multimode tasking. Air-to-air modes include search, track-while-scan (TWS), and multi-target engagement; air-to-surface modes include strip/spot synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and ground moving target indication (GMTI). In maritime roles, sea-search and surface-track modes support anti-ship targeting. Open literature attributes improved ECCM and LPI behaviours to the array’s agile beam forming; vendor quoted figures (as relayed by trade media) describe fighter-sized detections at nominal ranges with the ability to track on the order of ­15 targets and engage several concurrently. Architecturally, Block III emphasises reliability and maintainability: modular line-replaceable units (LRUs), on-board built-intest (BIT) for fault isolation, and thermal design choices (air-cooled subarrays) intended to balance cost, weight, and mean time between critical failures (MTBCF). Growth provisions include room for mode expansion (e.g., higher-resolution SAR, cooperative EW-assisted modes) and tighter coupling to the mission-computer fusion layer.

Defensive-aids suite and EW coupling. Block III’s defensive-aids suite (DAS) integrates a radar warning receiver (RWR), missile-approach warning sensors (MAWS), and a countermeasures dispensing system (CMDS) under unified control. The EW manager fuses RWR and MAWS cues with radar/HMD/S symbology to shorten pilot reaction time and to coordinate expendables and jamming under emission-control rules. In line with PFX’s “EW-as-a-system” intent, the Block III avionics spine exposes interfaces for external escort/stand-in jammers and future AESA-assisted jamming behaviours, while enforcing deconfliction so self-protection effects do not blind own-ship sensors.

Cockpit & human machine interface. The HMI moves to a pilot-centric layout: a wide-angle holographic HUD for primary flight and weapon symbology; a helmet-mounted display/sight (HMD/S) enabling high off-boresight cueing and cue-to slew of sensors and missiles; and enlarged multi-function displays (MFDs) with page sets for radar, EW, stores, and targeting pod video. Hands-on-throttle-and-stick (HOTAS) mappings reduce head down time for air-to-air merges and time-critical surface strikes. Symbology integrates datalink tracks (friend/hostile/unknown), EW threat rings, launch-acceptability regions (LAR) for BVR shots, and cueing for PL-10-class WVR missiles.

Mission computer, data buses, and software. Block III’s mission-computer spine adopts open-architecture design: clean interface control documents (ICDs); partitioned software to separate safety-critical functions from mission apps; deterministic middleware for sensor fusion; and digital backbone buses (hybrid Ethernet/MIL-STD style) for growth. This enables:

1. rapid mode insertion for radar/EW,

2. plug-in drivers for new sensors and weapons,

3. low-latency fusion of on-board and off-board tracks, and

4. exportable software partitions for feature-tiering.

Built-in-test, crash/error logging, and sovereign code-signing/secure-boot are used to harden field updates and preserve data rights.

Sensor fusion and AEW/GBAD hand-off. The avionics layer fuses KLJ-7A tracks with HMD/S line-of-sight, DAS cues, targeting-pod video, and off-board datalink tracks (e.g., AEW hand-offs). Operator-visible effects include: stable track quality across sensors, lower shot-latency for BVR employment, and improved ID confidence when EO/SAR corroborates radar returns. Planning targets for the PFX era emphasise sub-200 ms hand-off latency from AEW to shooter for BVR stacks and robust operation under EMCON or GPS denial (via  INS centric timelines and waveform agility).

Targeting and stores (management context). Block III commonly pairs with the WMD class targeting pod for EO/laser designation. Stores management software spans BVR/WVR A2A (e.g., PL-15/PL-10 families where integrated), precision A2G glide weapons (e.g., LS-6/GB-6 series), maritime missiles (e.g., C-802/CM-802AKG), and SEAD options (e.g., LD-10), with page sets for pre-planned (PP) and target-of-opportunity (TOO) flows.

Growth, maintenance, and sustainment. Block III’s avionics were specified with sustainment in mind: fast LRU swaps, accessible trays for radar/EW modules, and support tooling for BIT and calibration at PAC depots. Software refresh cadence is governed by flight-safety gates and cyber/crypto policies (secure-boot, PKI, and emergency key revocation). These practices tie directly to sortie-generation metrics and underpin the PFX goal of shortening the sensor/software upgrade loop.

Weapons Integration

Block III shifts the JF-17 from a budget multi-role fighter to a BVR-first light fighter with credible standoff and SEAD options, while preserving growth room for PFX spirals in radar/EW and networking. This section summarises air-to-air, air-to-surface & maritime, and SEAD/DEAD integrations for procedural context.

Air-to-Air (BVR/WVR)

BVR : Open-source imagery and defence reporting in 2024.2025 confirm the carriage of the PL-15/PL-15E family on JF-17 Block III airframes, marking the platform¡¯s intended move to a long-range BVR posture. Earlier SD-10/PL-12 remains in service as a cost-effective medium-range option and for mixed loads.

WVR : The PL-10E combined with the Block III HMD/S provides high off-boresight cueing and closein agility. The cockpit/HOTAS updates and datalinked track symbology shorten the sensor-to-shooter loop in merges.

Air-to-Surface & Maritime. Block III’s stores management and mission computer support a mixed A2G/maritime loadout consistent with prior public material on the JF-17 family. Representative categories include:

• Precision glide munitions: LS-6/GB-6 families (pre-planned and target-of-opportunity workflows), providing JSOW-like employment logic.

• Maritime/land-attack: C-802/C-802AK (pre-planned and inertial/radar-guided antiship) and CM-802AKG man-in-the-loop cruise missile (TV/INS), used for land/sea targets depending on variant.

• Targeting/sensor pods: WMD-7 EO/laser pod for search/track/designation and LGB guidance; cockpit pages provide PP/TOO flows, video, and line-of-sight cueing. Operational specifics vary by customer configuration and export controls;

in all cases, standoff employment doctrine integrates AEW hand-offs and GBAD deconfliction through the datalink layer.

SEAD/DEAD. For suppression and destruction of enemy air defences, Block III leverages the LD-10 anti-radiation missile, an ARM derived from the SD-10/PL-12 body with a passive seeker for emitter homing. In PFX spirals, EW orchestration (RWR/MAWS, AESA-assisted jamming, and escort jammer control) is intended to reduce EW fratricide and to shape survivable ingress/egress windows for ARM shots.

Stores management, datalink employment, and fusion. The stores management system (SMS) communicates with weapons via a MIL-STD-style digital bus and presents PP/TOO flows for glide weapons, ARM hand-offs, and antiship profiles. The fusion layer combines KLJ-7A tracks, EW cues, HMD/S line-of-sight, and AEW datalink tracks for mid-course updates (BVR) and launch acceptability region (LAR) computations. PFX targets sub-200 ms AEW¡æshooter hand-off to improve first-shot probability in BVR stacks.

Configuration variance and export posture. Exact weapon compatibility depends on customer licensing, export approvals, and software baselines. Programme practice emphasises partitioned software so export tiers can be configured without exposing sovereign ECCM, threat libraries, or datalinks.

Exports, Sustainment, and MRO Implications

PFX treats sustainment as a design domain, not an afterthought. Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) Kamra¡¯s factories.notably the Avionics Production Factory (APF) and Aircraft Rebuild Factory (ARF).provide the industrial backbone for line, intermediate, and depot maintenance, with an explicit roadmap to expand radar/EW repair and software sustainment as PFX spirals mature. For export users, the same infrastructure enables MRO, spares pooling, and upgrade paths aligned to partitioned software baselines.

Sustainment philosophy and industrial posture. The near-term goal is assured readiness: keep mission-capable (MC) rates high via fast line-replaceable unit (LRU) swaps, strong depot capacity, and tight feedback from flightlines to engineering. Structurally, the JF-17 programme already localises a majority share of the airframe and final assembly at PAC Kamra; PFX shifts more of the high-value sustainment into avionics/radar/EW, shortening upgrade loops and insulating fleets from external shocks.

PAC Kamra roles (APF/ARF) and today’s scope. APF originated as a radar maintenance centre and now covers a wide span of avionics work, including repair/overhaul and MRO for ground and airborne radars, integration, and production support. ARF executes overhauls for fighter/trainer/transports (e.g., JF-17, F-7P/PG, K-8, C-130 props), plus structures and accessories. These roles let PAC perform depot-level inspections, structural work, and avionics repair under one campus, reducing cycle time for major checks and upgrades.

Radar & EW sustainment under PFX. Block III’s KLJ-7A AESA introduces new MRO needs: array health monitoring, subarray T/R module test, and calibration within anechoic facilities. PFX spirals add:

1. Array & RF benches: verification of T/R gain/phase, noise figure, sidelobe control; environmental/thermal screens.

2. Calibration infrastructure: near-field scanning, boresight tools, and automated built-in test (BIT) upload paths.

3. EW complex MRO: DRFM jammers, ESM/ELINT receivers, DASS integration (RWR/MAWS/CMDS) with orchestration middleware.

4. Sovereign software sustainment: beamforming/ECCM code, EW threat-library curation, secureboot/ PKI pipelines for field updates. These investments make radar/EW support domestic, cut shipping delays, and enable faster mode insertions (e.g., SAR/GMTI refinements, cooperative EW behaviours).

Supply chain, spares and repairables. To stabilise MC rates, PAC’s provisioning model builds buffer stocks of high-failure LRUs and dualsources items that cannot yet be localised (notably RF semiconductors and high-power GaN/PAs). Repairables flow to APF benches for triage and board-level fix; rotables (e.g., pumps, actuators) cycle through ARF. Standard work cards and failure trend dashboards drive procurement and obsolescence actions.

Condition-based and AI-enabled maintenance. PFX incorporates condition-based maintenance (CBM): streaming health data from engines, avionics, and AESA BIT is analysed to predict failures and schedule interventions before AOG events. International practice (e.g., USAF’s PANDA predictive-maintenance programme) shows that ML-driven anomaly detection and fleet-wide pattern mining can raise availability and reduce life-cycle cost; PFX adopts the same principles with sovereign toolchains and on-prem data lakes for security.

Software, data rights, and export baselines. Sovereign control of mission-computer images, radar/EW firmware, and threat libraries is central to MRO. PFX standardises:

• Partitioned baselines (sovereign vs. exportable) so exports can be supported without exposing core ECCM or crypto.

•  Secure-boot/PKI across mission computers and radios, with emergency key revocation procedures and audit trails.

• Tooling in-country: build servers, code-signing, calibration databases, and EW library management hosted at PAC/NASTP.

Export customer support and regional hubs. For export operators, PAC offers MRO and line-mod services backed by Kamra depots, with options to stand-up second-line hubs (inspection benches, calibration rigs, spares vaults) in-country. Software partitions allow feature tiering to match licensing; common training syllabi and documentation reduce error rates and turnaround time.

Indicative sustainment KPIs (planning targets)

These values are engineering waypoints; actual thresholds will be tuned by flightline evidence and reliability growth curves. The governing idea remains constant: own the sensors/EW/software sustainment stack, reduce external exposure, and convert MRO into an export-grade service line.

Conclusion

This article set out the PFX programme as a systems-first path that shifts the centre of gravity from airframes to avionics, electronic warfare, mission computing, and sovereign datalinks. JF-17 Block III operates as the practical bridge: KLJ-7A AESA, an integrated defensive-aids suite, an open mission computer spine, and a cockpit with HMD/S that together enable a BVR-first posture and rapid capability insertion.

The programme logic consolidates a decouple, spiral, and reintegrate model through PFX-Alpha, using inservice airframes to mature radar, EW, and software increments while de-risking the eventual air vehicle. The industrial posture at PAC Kamra anchors structures, MRO, and avionics work, and provides the scaffolding for deeper ownership of beamforming, EW libraries, and secure waveform management.

Within this architecture, weapons integration across A2A, A2G/maritime, and SEAD is framed as an expression of the avionics spine and datalink fabric rather than a standalone catalogue. Sustainment is treated as a design domain, with APF/ARF capacity, condition-based maintenance, and partitioned software baselines positioned to keep availability high and upgrade cycles short.

In sum, PFX is presented as a governance and integration pattern that continuously inserts sensor, software, and network effects across the force, with JF-17 Block III as the near-term carrier and the industrial base in place to sustain momentum.

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Pakistan’s Khushab nuclear complex, located in Punjab province, sits at the heart of the country’s weapons-grade plutonium production effort. This facility stands apart from standard nuclear power plants, thanks to its specialized heavy-water-moderated reactors – four in total – that collectively produce significant amounts of both plutonium and tritium, two essential ingredients for modern nuclear weapon designs. Estimates suggest that Pakistan currently maintains a stockpile of around 170 nuclear devices, each requiring on the order of 10 grams of tritium to achieve boosted fission yields. By leveraging short irradiation cycles, uranium metal fuels, and potentially lithium-6 doping, these reactors can generate not only the desired high-purity ²³⁹Pu (weapons-grade plutonium) but also tritium-albeit at levels that may be constrained by operational inefficiencies.

A pivotal enabler in this setup is heavy water (D₂O), produced onsite using hydrogen sulfide (H²S) exchange technology. Heavy water allows the use of natural or low-enriched uranium, making the process more flexible and cost-effective for weapons purposes. Additionally, these reactors can be tuned to shorter burnups – around 5-6 MWd/kg – to keep the plutonium at ²³⁹Pu 90 wt%. Tritium emerges from two main pathways: neutron capture in deuterium (within the D₂O) and irradiation of lithium-6 (either in targets or doped into reactor elements). Because tritium decays at a rate of 5.6% per year, Pakistan must replenish its stockpile constantly to keep existing warheads operational, which, in turn, shapes how Khushab’s reactors might be run-whether in single-batch modes or partial/ continuous recycling to maximize throughput of weapons-usable materials.

This article:
1. Examines the Khushab Reactors’ Design and Operation
•              Outlining the four heavy-water reactors, their typical power ranges, and why short-cycle irradiation is crucial for achieving weapons-grade plutonium.
•              Highlighting the importance of uranium metal fuel and describe how its properties facilitate rapid breed-out of ²³⁹Pu .
2.            Explore Heavy-Water Production and Lithium-6 Doping
•              Detailing the hydrogen sulfide exchange process that supplies Khushab’s heavy water.
•              Explaining the use of lithium-6 targets or doping, illustrating how tritium is generated in tandem with plutonium.
3.            Analyzing Tritium Requirements for an Arsenal of 170 Devices
•              Demonstrating how tritium’s half-life drives annual replenishment needs for existing warheads.
•              Presenting a more realistic tritium production range (down 30-35% from theoretical maxima) and show how this impacts the number of additional weapons each year.
4.            Quantify the Potential for New Warhead Production
•              By comparing the available plutonium output and the leftover tritium to calculate 3-5 new boosted devices per annum.
•              Discussing how short reactor cycles, frequent refueling, or partial reloads can amplify or constrain these figures.

By piecing together these reactor operations, fuel cycles, and radioactive by-products, we gain a clearer view of how Pakistan sustains and potentially expands its nuclear arsenal. The Khushab complex emerges as a technically sophisticated enterprise that, through judicious use of heavy water, uranium metal fuel, and lithium doping, can co-produce high-quality plutonium and tritium. Understanding these processes, along with the numbers that shape arsenal maintenance and growth, remains central to grasping the full scope of Pakistan’s nuclear posture.

ALSO READ: Pakistan Army rubbishes Imran Khan allegations; says nukes are safe

Operational Layout: Three Modes of Khushab Reactor Operations
One of the distinctive features of the Khushab heavy-water reactors is their flexibility in how they can be fueled and operated. Depending on Pakistan’s objectives-tritium production for boosting to maximizing weapons grade Plutonium production-each reactor can be run in a specific mode. These modes differ in terms of fuel cycle length, lithium-6 doping, and burnup levels. Below is an outline of the three principal modes:

1. Baseline “Clean Core” Mode
Objective: Higher burnup for somewhat more conventional operations, not aimed at producing weapons-grade plutonium.
A.            Fuel & Burnup
•              Typically uses low-enriched uranium (could be 3.5-4% ²³⁵U) or even natural uranium, depending on design.
•              Operates with longer irradiation cycles (e.g.12-18 months, analogous to some commercial or research reactors) to extract more energy per kilogram of fuel.
•              The resulting plutonium has a higher concentration of ²⁴⁰Pu and other heavier isotopes (e.g. ²⁴¹Pu), making it unsuitable for weapons-grade needs.
B.            Tritium Production
•              Primarily from neutron capture in deuterium within the heavy-water moderator; lithium doping is minimal or absent.
•              Yields moderate amounts of tritium-tied to total neutron flux and operational conditions-but significantly less than a dedicated tritium-focused cycle.
C.            Fuel Recycling
•              Often a once-through approach or partial reload for experimental or civilian use.
•              This mode is not optimized for short discharge or high Li doping, so the impetus for reprocessing for weapons material is low.
Outcome:
•              A “clean core” yields relatively higher burnup but non-weapons-grade plutonium.
•              Tritium production is secondary, mostly a side effect of heavy-water usage, rather than a targeted outcome.

2.            “Tritium Core” Mode
Objective: Maximize tritium output-especially if the goal is to build or maintain boosted fission devices.
A.            Fuel & Li-6 Doping
•              The reactor can still use standard or lightly enriched uranium.
•              Lithium-6 doping (via targets) is significantly increased, so a greater fraction of neutrons produce ³H  (tritium).
B.            Cycle Length & Burnup
•              Can vary: some operators maintain a moderate cycle to strike a balance between tritium generation and overall reactor output.
•              Plutonium is still produced but has higher isotopic contamination (more ²⁴⁰Pu, ²⁴¹Pu  ) because the fuel remains in the core longer.
C.            Tritium Handling
•              Larger emphasis on tritium recovery and purification (through dedicated tritium extraction systems).
•              If the moderator or coolant is heavily doped with Li-6, specialized facilities are needed to capture the tritium.
Outcome:
•              High tritium yield due to lithium captures, but plutonium is not weapons-grade (longer irradiation times degrade the ²³⁹Pu  purity).
•              Useful when the operator’s main concern is sustaining or expanding tritium stockpiles.

3.            “Co-Production Core” Mode
Objective: Simultaneously produce weapons-grade plutonium (90% ²³⁹Pu) and significant tritium in one cycle.
A.            Short Irradiation for Pu
•              The fuel (often uranium metal for efficient breeding and short residence) is discharged at low burnup (e.g., 5-6 MWd/kg).
•              This ensures the plutonium remains high in   ²³⁹Pu content, avoiding excessive ²⁴⁰Pu  buildup.
B.            Enhanced Li-6 Doping
•              To drive up tritium production, operators may incorporate additional Li-6.
•              Each short cycle yields a batch of both high-purity plutonium and a notable quantity of tritium (recovered post-irradiation).
C.            Frequent Refueling / Partial Reload
•              Because burnup is capped so low, the reactor must be refueled more often (possibly every few months).
•              This leads to frequent shutdowns or continuous on-power refueling (if the reactor design allows).
•              Spent fuel is quickly reprocessed to extract the newly bred ²³⁹Pu .
Outcome:
•              Achieves both nuclear weapons materials in a single reactor cycle.
•              Less efficient in terms of energy production (since the fuel is discharged prematurely).
•              Typically the best approach for maximizing warhead potential:  90% ²³⁹Pu  plus tens of grams to over a hundred grams of tritium per year (depending on the reactor size and doping).

ALSO READ: NUCLEAR WEAPONS: Nuclear Dynamics in South Asia

How These Modes Impact Khushab’s Output
A.            Mode Selection is Driven by Objectives
•              Pakistan can switch between or balance these modes across its four Khushab reactors, depending on whether it prioritizes straightforward electricity/research (clean core), high tritium (tritium core), or co-producing tritium and weapons-grade plutonium (co-production core).
•              In practice, open-source assessments suggest co-production might be favored if the goal is to maintain a steady stream of both quality plutonium and sufficient tritium.
B.            Material Throughput
•              For co-production or tritium-focused modes, the reactors see frequent short cycles  -> more fresh or recycled fuel required.
•              Single-batch or partial reload patterns ensure ²³⁹Pu is extracted before significant neutron capture forms unwanted isotopes (²⁴⁰Pu, etc.).
C.            Arsenal Growth
•              Recent estimates place Pakistan’s arsenal at 170 nuclear devices.
•              If co-production is pursued, each Khushab reactor can yield a certain fraction of the required plutonium plus tens of grams of tritium per year, enough to maintain existing warheads (due to tritium decay) and produce 3-5 new devices annually in aggregate-depending on operational efficiency and doping strategies.

By adjusting among these three modes, Khushab’s operators effectively control the balance of weapons-grade plutonium, tritium yield, and overall burnup. This operational flexibility is what makes the Khushab complex central to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program-allowing shifts in strategy as material needs evolve.

Tritium Requirements and Warhead Production Potential
An integral part of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program revolves around managing tritium ³H – a short-lived isotope essential to boost the yield of fission warheads. Because tritium decays relatively quickly, maintaining and expanding a tritium stockpile becomes a continuous operational concern. This section explores how Pakistan’s estimated arsenal of 170 devices might drive ongoing tritium needs and how Khushab’s production fits into meeting those demands while still enabling the manufacture of new warheads.
A.            Existing Arsenal: Decay and Annual Replenishment
•              Tritium has a half-life of 12.32 years, meaning it decays at about 5.6% per year. Consequently, each device loses a fraction of its original T load annually.
B.            Annual Top-Up Needs
•              Each device’s 10 g T inventory diminishes by around 0.56 g per year (5.6% of 10 g).
•              Multiplied by 170 devices, the entire arsenal loses an estimated 95 grams of T annually.
•              Replacing that 95 g is necessary to keep the boosted warheads at full potency.
C.            Role of Purity
•              It is crucial that only high-purity tritium-free of contaminants-is used in warheads.
•              Because tritium often needs re-extraction and purification, Pakistan’s actual annual requirement may be somewhat higher than 95 g to account for processing losses.

Tritium Production at Khushab
A.            Reduced Output Estimates
•              Under ideal “co-production” mode, open-source estimates once placed the four Khushab reactors’ total tritium capacity near 200 g per year.
•              However, factoring in operational inefficiencies (maintenance downtime, suboptimal lithium doping, partial cycles), a 30-35% reduction is realistic.
•              This lowers the annual production to around 130-140 g across all four reactors.
B.            Meeting the Arsenal’s Replenishment
•              If Khushab provides  130-140 g T per year, then 95 g must go to replace decayed tritium in existing warheads.
•              That leaves  35-45 g surplus T for expansion or other strategic reserves.
C.            Tritium Extraction & Handling
•              Whether produced via lithium-6 doping (in metallic Li targets or Li-bearing coolant) or as a by-product of heavy-water operation, tritium must be removed from reactor systems.
•              Dedicated tritium recovery facilities (and possibly enrichment systems) are needed to purify T to weapons-grade quality.
•              This adds complexity and expense but is essential for ensuring a reliable supply of boost-quality tritium.

Plutonium and the Production of New Warheads
A.            Plutonium Availability
•              Short burnups (5-6 MWd/kg) at Khushab produce weapons-grade plutonium with  90 wt%  ²³⁹Pu.
•              Aggregate annual output from the four reactors can reach tens of kilograms of Pu-enough for several warheads if each requires 5-8 kg.
B.            Tritium-Driven Bottleneck
•              Even if plutonium is plentiful, tritium often becomes the limiting factor for assembling new boosted warheads.
•              With an estimated 35-45g leftover per year (after replenishing the existing stockpile), the amount of new weapons possible depends on each warhead’s T load.
C.            3-5 New Devices per Year
•              A typical boosted device might again use 10 g of tritium.
•              Given 35-45g of surplus, 3-4 new warheads per year are comfortably supported.
•              Some slight year-to-year variance (e.g., improved Li-6 doping or improved reactor uptime) might push this figure to 5 in especially productive periods.

Through these interwoven processes, Khushab’s reactors uphold Pakistan’s capacity to maintain an existing arsenal of 170 devices, each reliant on regular tritium top-ups, while still enabling an incremental growth in warhead count of 3-5 new boosted devices per year. The precise output each year hinges on reactor uptime, doping strategies, and reprocessing throughput-but in broad terms, this arrangement presents a robust pathway to sustaining and modestly expanding a plutonium-based, boosted weapon program.

Technical Underpinnings: Uranium Metal Fuel, Heavy Water Production, and Lithium-6
The Khushab reactors derive their unique dual-production capability-of weapons-grade plutonium and tritium-from a combination of fuel choices, moderator technology, and isotopic doping. This section delves deeper into these critical elements, explaining why uranium metal is chosen over typical uranium oxide, how heavy water is produced and utilized, and the significance of lithium-6 in enhancing tritium yields.
1.            Uranium Metal Fuel
a.            Why Metal Fuel Instead of Oxide
•              Higher Density: Uranium metal has a greater density of fissile atoms compared to uranium oxide (UO₂), which can favor faster conversion of ²³⁸Pu into ²³⁹Pu.
•              Rapid Neutron Economy: Short-cycle or low-burnup reactors benefit from a more reactive core at startup. Metal fuel offers improved thermophysical properties (higher thermal conductivity, more favorable neutronics) for breeding.
•              Easier Fuel Fabrication for Weapons-Grade Goals: When the objective is to discharge fuel early (at 5-6 MWd/kg) to preserve a high fraction of ²³⁹Pu, metal fuel rods can be replaced more readily without the complexities associated with longer-burnup oxide fuels.
b.            Drawbacks and Handling
•              Corrosion Sensitivity: Uranium metal can be more reactive with coolants and requires protective cladding (e.g., Zircaloy or stainless steel).
•              Higher Fabrication Cost: Producing and shaping metal fuel assemblies is more specialized than standard reactor-grade UO₂.
•              Weapons-Focused: The tradeoff is that metal fuel is far less efficient for electrical power generation at high burnups but is excellent for short, intense plutonium production cycles.
2. Heavy Water (D₂O) Production at Khushab
a.            Role of Heavy Water
•              Key Moderator: D₂O has a low neutron absorption cross section, making it ideal for fueling with natural or slightly enriched uranium.
•              Higher Conversion Ratio: The superior neutron economy means more neutrons survive to convert ²³⁸Pu  into ²³⁹Pu.
•              Tritium By-Product: As neutrons interact with deuterium nuclei, a fraction of them form tritium (3H), especially over multiple reactor cycles.
b.            Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S) Exchange Process
•              Industrial Setup: Pakistan relies on exchange towers where chemical equilibrium between hydrogen sulfide gas and liquid water progressively enriches deuterium.
•              Scalability: Multiple units and large volumes of H₂S allow for a steady throughput of deuterium, eventually yielding high-purity heavy water.
•              Onsite Integration: The Khushab site is believed to have its own heavy-water production facility, ensuring a domestic, uninterrupted supply crucial for fueling short cycles repeatedly.
c.             Moderator Management
•              In specialized “tritium core” or “co-production core” modes, operators may carefully monitor D₂O purity (removing contaminants, including the trace buildup of tritium) to maintain the moderator’s reactivity while also recovering the tritium.
3. Lithium-6 for Tritium Enhancement
a.            Capture Reaction
•              ⁶Li+n→α+³H: Lithium-6 has a high cross section for thermal neutrons, making it a potent driver for tritium production.
•              Metallic Targets or Coolant Doping: Li-bearing targets can massively boost T output. This approach is especially favored if the reactor runs in a “tritium” or “co-production” mode.
b.            Facility Requirements
•              Tritium Recovery: Post-irradiation, the tritium must be extracted-either from the coolant or from discrete target elements. This process demands specialized handling and radiochemical processing to achieve the high purity needed for weapons usage.
•              Cost & Complexity: Lithium doping adds extra costs and engineering overhead, but it allows operators to meet the arsenal’s T needs (both for replacing decayed tritium in existing warheads and for fueling new devices).
c.             Synergy with Heavy Water
•              While D₂O alone can produce some tritium via, ²H + n → ³H adding Li-6 significantly increases total tritium yield.
•              This synergy is pivotal in the “co-production” mode, ensuring there is enough T to match the volume of newly produced weapons-grade plutonium.

In essence, Khushab’s choice of uranium metal fuel, reliance on onsite heavy-water production, and selective use of lithium-6 doping are tightly interwoven strategies. They maximize plutonium quality and tritium yields, ensuring that Pakistan can both sustain its arsenal of 170 boosted devices over time and incrementally expand it by an estimated 3-5 new warheads per year in a “co-production” operational regime.

Spent Fuel Reprocessing and Fuel Cycle Management
While the Khushab reactors themselves lie at the core of Pakistan’s weapons-material generation, reprocessing of the discharged fuel is what ultimately unlocks the produced plutonium. In parallel, specialized tritium extraction processes ensure that any ³H generated-whether via lithium-6 targets or the heavy-water moderator-is recovered at sufficient purity for weaponization. This section explains how spent fuel reprocessing undergirds the entire cycle, from short core irradiation to final warhead production.
A.            Why Reprocessing Is Crucial
a.            Extracting Weapons-Grade Plutonium
•              When fuel is discharged at 5-6MWd/kg burnup, the newly formed ²³⁹Pu still resides within a matrix of other isotopes, fission products, and unburned uranium.
•              Chemical separation is necessary to isolate plutonium from this highly radioactive mix.
•              Pakistan’s known or suspected reprocessing sites (e.g., the New Labs facility at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology) handle this critical step.
b.            Closing the Loop
•              Because the short cycle discards fuel while most of its fissile potential remains untapped (intentionally so, to keep ²³⁹Pu pure), reprocessing recovers unburned uranium and the newly created plutonium.
•              If operators choose, they can blend the recovered uranium-now possibly enriched with some plutonium-back into fresh fuel elements, continuing the cycle.
c.             Resource Efficiency
•              Continuous or partial reloads, combined with reprocessing, drastically reduce the amount of fresh enriched uranium needed each year to maintain Khushab’s production tempo.
•              While not as resource-efficient as commercial high-burnup reactors, it is optimal for weapons purposes.
B.            Recovering Tritium from Heavy Water and Li-6 Targets
a.            Tritium Extraction Systems
•              When reactors are doped with lithium-6, a significant fraction of   will be created directly in targets or in Li-bearing coolant sections.
•              Specialized tritium extraction facilities (chemical or cryogenic separation steps) are required to separate the ³H from other hydrogen isotopes.
•              Heavy-water cleanup can also yield T, but only if there is an attached tritium recovery plant.
b.            Purification for Weapons Use
•              Weapons-usable tritium needs to be virtually free of other isotopes (especially ²H) and contaminants.
•              Techniques may involve vacuum distillation, isotopic exchange columns, or cryogenic distillation. These are expensive and demand meticulous handling protocols.
c.             Inventory Management
•              Given the short half-life (12.32 years), reprocessing staff must track how much T is lost over time and ensure just-in-time transfers from the reactor/coolant loops to storage before decay lowers its effective concentration.
•              The synergy of frequent reactor refueling and regular extraction cycles helps keep a steady flow of fresh T ready for warhead assemblies.
C. Short Refueling Cycles: Operational Footprint
a.            Batch vs. Continuous Replenishment
•              Batch Refueling: The reactor is shut down at the end of a short (100-200 day) run, all fuel is removed, and fresh or recycled fuel is loaded.
•              On-Power Refueling: Possible in some PHWR designs, where spent bundles are swapped out gradually so that the core remains critical without lengthy outages.
b.            Frequent Fuel Transfers
•              Whether batch or continuous, the net result is significantly more frequent spent fuel transfers to reprocessing sites than in a typical commercial reactor.
•              This heightened traffic in spent fuel casks or reprocessing shipments is a key indicator that short-burnup cycles-and thus weapons-grade objectives-are underway.
D.            Closing the Weapons Cycle
a.            Plutonium Metal Conversion
•              Once separated, plutonium nitrate or oxide solutions undergo further chemical processing to yield plutonium metal-the form typically needed for nuclear warhead cores.
•              Pakistan’s specialized metallurgical and chemical labs oversee these final steps, ensuring the Pu meets the design specifications of the warhead.
b.            Warhead Assembly
•              After plutonium metal and high-purity tritium are secured, warhead components (e.g., implosion systems, neutron initiators) are brought together in specialized weaponization facilities.
•              This final assembly is presumably integrated with delivery vehicles-ranging from short-range ballistic missiles to cruise missiles-forming the operational deterrent force.
c.             Annual Production Outlook
•              Frequent reprocessing + short cycle ->  a steady, if modest, throughput of  60+kg WGPu annually and  130-140g T (under realistic conditions).
•              Enough to sustain 170 existing devices and produce 3-5 new warheads each year, reinforcing Pakistan’s incremental arsenal growth policy.

Together, spent fuel reprocessing and tritium recovery provide the crucial last links in Khushab’s nuclear supply chain. Only by extracting and refining the plutonium to metallic form-and concurrently purifying tritium-can the raw output of these heavy-water reactors be transformed into fully assembled, boosted nuclear warheads. This cycle underscores the role that reprocessing plants and specialized tritium-handling facilities play in underpinning Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capabilities.

Conclusion and Outlook
Over the course of these sections, we have traced how the Khushab nuclear complex in Pakistan accomplishes a dual mission of producing weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) and tritium (³H) through carefully managed reactor operations, specialized fuel choices, and systematic reprocessing. By leveraging heavy water moderators, uranium metal fuel, and lithium-6 doping, Khushab’s four heavy-water reactors can employ short irradiation cycles to secure high-purity plutonium (with ²³⁹Pu at 90 wt%) while also accumulating enough tritium to sustain and modestly expand its nuclear arsenal.

Kartikeya Sethi is the Founder CEO of Vel Atomics

The post NUCLEAR WEAPONS – How Pakistan Sustains Its N-weapons Supply Chain appeared first on IMR.

Operation Herof

The operation began on 25 August 2024. A female fidayeen, named Mahal Baloch, also known as Zilan Kurd, along with Fidayee Rizwan Baloch detonated their Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) at the gate of Pakistan’s Bela military camp, while several checkpoints and blockades were erected on major highways across the area.

After the VBIED detonation, the elite arm of BLA, the Majeed Brigade, led by Commander Ghous Bakhsh Simalani, known as Talib, infiltrated the army camp and managed to take control of a large portion of the camp, killing more than 40 military personnel. According to the BLA, Pakistan military reinforcements were forced to retreat and were unable to buttress the efforts to counter the attack on the camp.

Simalani is reported to have joined BLA in 2019 and was the son of Meshedar Simalani, who was killed in November 2022 during a BLA attack on the Pakistani forces.

According to Jeeyand Baloch, the spokesperson of BLA, the “Fidayeen unit” of the BLA – the Majeed Brigade – had succeeded in holding down the Bela camp for 20 hours, during which 68 military personnel were killed, leaving several injured.

While the operation commenced within the Bela camp, major highways in Balochistan were blockaded by the BLA’s Fatah Squad Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS). Checkpoints and surveillance was conducted by the outfit to restrict the movement of the military and law enforcement personnel. During the blockades, 62 military personnel were reported to have been killed in the clash with the BLA unit. Further reports of BLA taking over 22 military, police, and Levies personnel as hostages surfaced.

During the course of the operation, several highways such as the Gwadar-Jiwani Coastal Highway, Mand-Turbat Highway in the Hotabad area, Abdoi Highway in Tegran, Turbat-Heronk CPEC Highway, Quetta-Taftan Highway, Noshki-Kharan Highway, Mastung-Khadkucha Highway, Kalat- Karachi Highway, Bolan and Koh-e-Sulaiman’s main highways, Balgtar-Panjgur and Sibi-Mithri Highway were reported to have been cordoned off by the outfit.

Reports of a military convoy being attacked on the Mand-Turbat road in the Hotabad area, resulting the deaths of five Pakistani soldiers also made the news.

Attacks also carried out at toll plazas such as the Garari in Kalat, which was captured by the BLA, and resulted in the deaths of at least 15 soldiers. In Bolan, 16 Frontier Corps personnel were attacked and their weapons confiscated.

In the process of seizing maximum ground and obstructing military reinforcement to the affected region, the railway tracks running through Bolan were also destroyed by the BLA.

On 26 August, Operation Herof concluded with BLA reiterating its objective to drive Chinese presence out of Balochistan. It might be noted, this was not the first time when the BLA had issued a warning to China.

Additionally, China’s military delegation led by General Li Qiaoming, visited Pakistan on the death anniversary of Akbar Bugti. Several meetings were held between the Chinese delegation and Pakistan prime minister Shehbaz Sharif, defence minister Khawaja Asif, and chief of army staff Gen Asim Munir. At the time of the meetings, BLA had already struck a terror chord in Balochistan and was looking towards the completion of its operation.

Post operation Herof, the Balich media handle on behalf of their leader Aslam Baloch released the names of its martyrs and praised their efforts.

Amongst the dead fighters he mentioned Muhammad Baloch, known as Mirak, from Panjgur, Sangat Fazal Gul Zehri, known as Shavez, Sangat Tayab, known as Lala, from Noshki, Sangat Junaid Zehri, known as Kami, from Khuzdar,Muhammad Asif Nechari, known as Naveed, and Muhammad Bakhsh Simalani, known as Khalid.

Muhammad Baloch joined BLA in 2022 was also related to Sangat Raees, who died in the 2018 Karachi consulate attack. It is worth mentioning that Sangat Tayab, was a soldier in Pakistan military prior to joining BLA. After getting discharged from the Pakistani military, he offered his services to BLA for the Baloch cause.

The Aftermath

The 25-26 August BLA attacks were condemned as acts of terrorism by Pakistan and sanitation operations were ordered in Balochistan. The US, too, backed Pakistan and condemned the attacks as an act of terror. Pakistan did not release the names of the military officers killed in Operation Herof. However, its Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) released a statement in regards to the attacks, stating “On behest of inimical and hostile forces, these cowardly acts of terrorism were aimed at disrupting the peaceful environment and development of Balochistan by targeting mainly the innocent civilians, especially in Musakhail, Kalat and Labela Districts. Resultantly, numerous innocent civilians embraced shahadat.”

Furthermore, the ISPR also stated that the BLA militants had indiscriminately targeted civilians by halting a bus in Rara Sham area in Musakhail district.

The BLA responded by claiming that the statements made by the ISPR were designed to control perception and instil doubt among the Baloch masses, who viewed the group as freedom fighters. It further clarified that the individuals targeted on the bus were indeed Pakistan’s military personnel, part of the death squad who were disguised as civilians. To clarify its motive, the BLA issued a warning to all the inhabitants of the region asking them to avoid the areas which it had planned to target prior the commencement of its operation. Its objective remained confined to targeting the military and the law enforcement agencies.

Pakistan’s consistent disregard for the Baloch grievances, extra judicial killings of the ethnic Baloch, arbitrary detainment, abductions and forced displacement of the Baloch to alter the demography in the region and to accommodate the Chinese immigrants has left feelings of despondency and resentment amongst the Baloch.

To exacerbate the already brewing hatred towards the Pakistan military, several Pashtuns, Sindhis and minority groups along with the Balochis hold Islamabad responsible for the atrocities afflicted and view Pakistan as an illegal occupier of their lands, exploiting their resources to benefit Punjab and the Chinese.

The presence of the Chinese due to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been a cardinal factor for the rapid uptick in the level of insurgencies and attacks on the Chinese nationals residing in Pakistan. This has become a root cause for China to demand a large-scale military operation such as Operation Zarb-e-Azb to contain the insurgent situation and protect its people. In order to smoothen the situation with a miffed China, Shehbaaz Sharif visited China and pledged to take necessary action to maintain strong ties with the “iron brother.”

In June 2024, Pakistan complied with China’s wishes and commenced Operation Azm-e-Istehkam. The announcement of the operation was met with several protests in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) area. The operation is expected to expedite the implementation of the Pakistan’s National Action Plan (NAP) which was conceived in 2014. The news of the operation was not well received by the locals of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and protests have prevailed ever since against the proposed operation.

It may be important to mention that the reservations from the citizens seem valid, given that Operation Ground Zero comes as a stark reminder of Pakistan’s propitiation policy towards the Chinese while cloistering off the Baloch. In 2021, Pakistani Major General Ayman Bilal confirmed that on orders of China, he led the operation to crush the Baloch freedom movement. The success of the CPEC was more essential to Pakistan’s interest and so was placating China.

Due to all the past factors, undoubtedly, the insurgent groups, such as the BLA, have consistently found fuel to spark their ongoing conflagration against Pakistan. Several offshoots or splinter groups along with Baloch insurgent groups, which are anti-Pakistan, such as Hafiz Gulbahadur group, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army, are seen to coordinate with one another to sometimes carry joint operations as well.

Pakistan’s unstable diplomatic relations with the Taliban may also add to Pakistan’s deteriorating security situation. It may be vital for Pakistan’s current regime to address the grievances of its citizens besides cleaning its political outhouse of rivals rather than simply doing somersaults on the Chinese whims.

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Pakistan military’s 2018 gamble to install the former Pakistan cricketer-turned politician, Imran Khan, flopped with the ousting of the former prime minister and his government in 2022. Along with the arrests of Imran Khan, his wife and several of his party workers, many serving military officers of various cadres were also interrogated and arrested on numerous charges.

Recently, on 12 August 2024, the former Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed was arrested by the Pakistan military. The Supreme Court ordered the arrest of the former chief. He was charged with misconduct, corruption and for abetting in political interference. Since then, court martial proceedings have been launched against him.

“Complying with the orders of Supreme Court of Pakistan . . . the process of Field General Court Martial has been initiated and Lt Gen Faiz Hameed (Retd) has been taken into military custody,” the Pakistan army stated. Since the conception of Pakistan, its military has been infamous for having influence over the country’s politics.

According to various reports presented against Hameed, there were allegations against him for allegedly harassing the owner of Islamabad’s ‘Top City’ housing scheme and society. Besides him, three other retired officers have been detained by the military in relation to Hameed’s case. But an important element to factor in, amidst all the said charges, is the undeniable close affiliation the former spy master has shared with the ousted prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan.

Khan has dismissed the charges against him as “frivolous and politically motivated,” even though he was forced to serve time in a jail for a year.

However, the appellate courts have since reversed, invalidated or suspended the charged convictions due to the lack of substantial evidence. But, the authorities in Islamabad seemed determine to file new cases against Khan in order to keep him in jail. Hence, the determination of the Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen Asim Munir to contain the political turbulence and to nail Imran Khan’s cronies should be no surprise with the arrest of his “top dog” spy master, Faiz Hameed.

The Former ISI Spy Chief, PMLN and the State

Lt Gen Faiz Hameed served as the 24th Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (DG ISI) from 2019 to 2021. He is known as the “India baiter” and Imran Khan’s affiliate.

It was reported that post-Taliban’s take over of Afghanistan in 2021, the chief had paid a visit to Kabul. The visits of the DG ISI had been clandestine in the past. However, it was not the case with his trip to Kabul. Several images of Lt Gen Faiz and Pakistan’s Ambassador Mansoor Ali Khan, having tea at Kabul’s Serena Hotel, surfaced on the social media. The purpose of Hameed’s visit was to seek “peace and stability” in Afghanistan and to get the first-hand account of the ground situation in Afghanistan. Despite the statements made by the former DG ISI, it was confirmed that the objective of his visit was to meet with the top Afghan leadership and certain foreign envoys in Kabul. Even though no official details were divulged at the time, it later came to light that the chief had brokered peace between the Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Baradar network.

The main promoter of Taliban had been Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, who was also in favour of the Haqqani Network when the fight to take over Kabul erupted between the warring factions. The ISI has been reported in the past to have utilized the Haqqani Network to orchestrate attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul as well as to sway the Sunni Pashtun force in a direction inclined to Pakistan. Additionally, under Hameed’s command’s, reports of the induction of Pakistan Army regulars in the anti-resistance operations against the Resistance Force, led by Commander Amrullah Saleh in Panjshir Valley, were conducted.

It was inferred, that Pakistan’s consistent aid to Taliban rose from their desire for a strategic depth in Afghanistan, while nurturing an outfit such as Taliban to act as ISI’s puppet to curb the possible terror threats, which it incurs from Tehreek-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). However, the tables have turned since then. The disillusionment of the Pakistani government of controlling the Afghan Taliban shattered with Taliban’s lackadaisical and undetermined effort in fostering a peace deal with TTP and Pakistan. The TTP later called off the ceasefire with Pakistan in 2022. The negotiations were carried out between a delegation led by Faiz Hameed and TTP leaders in Khost, Afghanistan. Under the negotiations, corps commanders of TTP, Muhammed Khan and Muslim Khan were released. Since then, TTP has ravaged Pakistan with their persistent attacks.

Besides the TTP threat, Pakistan was also hopeful with regards to the Pakistan-Afghan border areas, which even though are demarcated by the Durand Line, still remain as areas of dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghans view the border as an artificial entity and do not recognize the Durand line agreement, which Pakistan inherited post-1947. Afghanistan has claimed certain areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a part of their territory and views Pakistan as the illegal occupiers of their land. Hence, there have been several border skirmishes between the security forces of both nations. Pakistan’s relations with China and the presence of Chinese immigrants in the area have also served as reason for mistrust amongst the local habitants in these regions, who view the Chinese presence as a form of planned displacement of their communities to accommodate the Chinese, with exploitation of their land. Several attacks were orchestrated on Chinese citizens, who were assigned to Sino-Pakistan projects by various insurgents and militant outfits. Later on, at the behest of China, Pakistan decided to carry out a large scale military operation – Azm-i-Istehkam – to neutralize the threats especially around the Durand Line. This has resulted in rallies and ‘jirgas’ (tribal councils) being held in many cities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) due to the fear of mass displacement.

Additionally, the refoulement of Afghans back to their homeland from Pakistan has also sparked further tensions between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan government is of the view that many Afghan refugees may be sleeper cells or individuals involved in organized crimes. The inhibitions arising from the growing TTP threat and other offshoots remain to be a strong reason for Pakistan’s preventive course of action. Pakistan has blamed Kabul for being lenient in their approach towards the TTP and has blatantly made accusations of Taliban allowing the anti-Pakistan elements to carry out operations from Afghanistan, while also providing safe havens to them.

Furthermore, with Pakistan struggling economically, the decision for refoulement of undocumented Afghans has been considered prudent and imperative by Islamabad.

With the evolving political developments, dotted with several security and political threats erupting from Imran Khan’s PTI party opposing and clashing with the newly installed prime minister Shehbaaz Shariff’s PML-N, it was expected of the COAS Gen Aseem Munir to employ pre-emptive measures to wrest control over the state of affairs with the favoured political government installed by the military in power.

As a handpicked candidate of Imran Khan, Fiaz Hameed has been acknowledged for his involvement in Khan’s PTI party rioting across Pakistan on 9 May 9, 2023. This move was enough to upset Islamabad, given that PTI workers barged into and torched the official residence of the IV Corps commander in Lahore and also attempted to force themselves into the army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Further reports of Hameed providing counsel to Khan after taking premature retirement from the army, also suggested of his abetment in the May 9 riots in 2023, which has been regarded as an anarchy against the military institution.

Additionally, Nawaz Sharif also asserted that Gen Hameed had colluded with few generals and individuals from higher judiciary to impeach him from power in 2017.

In 2017, Hameed became infamous for orchestrating anti-blasphemy protests against the PML-N government by the far-Right group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan.

“The arrest of former ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed sends a clear signal to those still on the fence – there will be no compromise, no exceptions. Fall in line or face the consequences. The writing is on the wall,” stated Baqir Sajjad Syed, the national security correspondent of the influential Dawn newspaper.

Apart from various charges against Hameed, his personal swipe at the COAS Gen Munir for being a Shia in hopes of dismantling the Saudi-Pakistan relations and expecting the response to remove Munir or halt his appointment also, may have fanned the growing conflagration.

The Military Institution Always Wins in Pakistan After years of impunity, the reign of the former chief ended with the military usurping back its socio-economic and political control. The COAS, Gen Munir seems to have solidified his position with the removal of the puppet government set by the former COAS Gen Javed Qamar Bajwa. He has also carried out a witch hunt against the associates and close affiliates of Imran Khan. The arrest of Gen Bajwa’s former ISI spymaster also has been made into an example for those who would conspire against the current military regime. It would be no surprise if the security of the former COAS may also be under threat.

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Crux of the Matter and the Af-Pak Challenges

Since the Taliban take over of Afghanistan, there has been a certain change in the attitude of Taliban. Unlike what Pakistan had expected, the Taliban has moved away from being viewed as a puppet of ISI and Pakistani forces. It has remained vocal on its stance in regards to the Durand Line, discrediting Pakistan’s recognition of what the British Raj left behind as a demarcated area bestowed upon Pakistan as its territory.

Additionally, Pakistan’s request for assistance with the looming TTP threat availed no fruitful result as it is apparent that Taliban has chosen to lean towards its affiliate. Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja Asif excoriated the Taliban government in Kabul for its inaction against militants along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

In an interview with BBC Urdu, Asif stated that Pakistan also offered to grant Rs10 billion to relocate the militants towards the western border. He further reiterated that “It’s correct that we have been carrying out operations in Afghanistan, and we will continue to do so. We won’t serve them with cake and pastries. If attacked, we’ll attack back”.

He placed the stress on the element of surprise which the Pakistani forces hope to achieve in terms of their attack strategy which meant to proceed with the attacks without any prior warning to the Taliban government stating, “This would eliminate the element of surprise. Why should we tell them, ‘get ready, we are coming’?”

In response, the Taliban called the statement “irresponsible”, and forewarned Pakistan of “consequences” in case of cross-border attacks.

Following the deterioration of the Pak-Afghan relations, reports of Pakistani ISI colluding with the ISIS Khorasan (ISK) or Daesh Khorasan emerged. In one such report, a former TTP commander outlined the nature of the relationship between ISK and ISI, which was established through “Dabori Agreement” in the form of a quid pro quo approach. ISK gets the opportunity to infiltrate areas now easily accessible with the aid of ISI, the agreement also provides the necessary funds, logistics and arms required to carry out their assignments while Pakistan is able to achieve the deniability for the actions of ISK. ISI has been notably recognized for its cooperation and aid to Taliban prior to the US exit from Afghanistan in 2021. Due to this precedence, most jihadist groups would seek the opportunity to align with the ISI for consistent donorship and aid.

ISK is Taliban’s rival group, which upon the exit of the Afghan Taliban from the war theatre, has tried to gain complete authority and monopoly on Jihad in the Khorasan area while using Afghanistan as a launching pad for its operations. The Afghan Taliban, upon its return to power has carried out several operations to wipe ISK and its safe havens in Afghanistan. However, the ISK cadre has continued to retain its strength, if not multiply in numbers, by also attracting the soldiers, intelligence officers and cadres from the previous Ghani government, who were prosecuted or who stand the chance of being killed off by the Afghan interim government. ISK, on the other hand, has criticised Taliban for going soft in terms of Jihad and has also managed to successfully gain support amongst various jihadist groups, who also view the new persona of a politically functioning Taliban government as a deviation from Jihad.

The recent reports of ISK in cohorts with the ISI presents an expected obstacle for any sincere reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. To stretch the matter further, the possibility of the Pakistan military pushing the ISK cadre across the Durand Line under the cover of a retaliatory fire as a result of border skirmishes has certainly aggravated the situation.
Apart from the border skirmishes, the largest refoulement of the Afghans in Pakistan on the Pakistani claim of Afghans leading to the growing terrorism activity in the country, has also added more fuel to the fire of an already simmering Taliban sentiment.

Hence, given that the breakdown in relations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan has proved no fruition for either of them, the so called “good meeting” in Doha has become ends to the means.

In case of Pakistan, China has expressed its discontentment with Pakistan’s efforts at countering terrorism and protecting its citizens against the threats from insurgent groups and militant outfits such as the TTP, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Since majority of Chinese investments are in western Pakistan, especially along the border of Afghanistan, these projects are constantly susceptible to terror threats from many insurgent and militant groups who view the Chinese presence as a contiguous subjugation and marginalization of the local citizens. Pakistan’s approach to retain its ongoing ties with China at the cost of the Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun and minority interests, with constant crackdowns to hush the grievances, has not attained any brownie points for Pakistan. It was apparent that there was a foreseeable uptick in the militant cadre and the number of terrorist orchestrated activities which Pakistan undermined as minor threats.

Since the BLA claimed Dasu Dam attack in March 2024 on the Chinese citizens in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), several Chinese firms have suspended their operations until further notice. After the attacks, China demanded of Pakistan to initiate a large-scale counter terrorism operation against the militants, just as it had done in the past in form of operations Zarb-e-Azb and operation Radd-ul-Fassad.

On the Chinese demand, Pakistan’s government announced operation Azm-e-Istehkaam or “Resolve of durable stability” to “combat the menaces of extremism and terrorism in a comprehensive and decisive manner.”

The operation is essential to Pakistan’s interest which entailed to not only placate the Chinese worries to perpetuate the economic and defence aid to Pakistan, but also as an effort to curtail spread of the armed groups and anti-Pakistani insurgents. With Pakistan’s economy in a chaotic milieu, it is blisteringly taking measures to secure both foreign and domestic investments. However, due to the the lack of political stability and the disintegrating security issues, the probability of attracting domestic or foreign investors seems like a difficult task.

UAE-Taliban
It is apparent, the extended invitation to the representatives of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a well contemplated and premeditative move by Pakistan. Prior to Taliban’s visit to Doha, the Afghan delegation paid a visit to the UAE.

The UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan met with Taliban’s Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is a designated terrorist with a FBI placed bounty on his head. Even though several nations have not entirely acknowledged the Taliban government, the UAE government has indirectly provided the Taliban with an informal legitimate credibility by extending the invitation to discuss bilateral ties and regional stability. China, too, has tried to maintain relations with the Taliban fearing the spill over of the terrorism activities along its shared borders with Afghanistan and in an effort have kept their embassies open and accredited Taliban diplomats. Given Pakistan’s recent agenda to mollify China and furnish the funds for its large-scale operation Azm-e- Istehkam, the intent for the meeting in Doha was as expected for the success of the operation.

The question remains, to what extent Afghan Taliban would honour the Pakistani wishes to dispose its protected TTP assets in name of counter-terrorism, regardless of the probable compromise that may have been made to further individual interests between the two.

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According to Pakistan’s bomb disposal teams, 100kg of explosives were utilized to carry the attack in Khar. Due to the large number of casualties, the Pakistani authorities declared a health emergency at the local district hospital. Pakistan’s prime minister Shehbaz Sharif condemning the attack, stated “The terrorists are enemies of Pakistan, we will eliminate them from the face of this earth.” Grandiloquent statement sans any teeth.

The target, JUI-F is a Deobandi Sunni political party. It is a part of the ruling coalition in Pakistan, which is believed to have strong ties with the Afghan Taliban, as well. Like other religious parties, JUI-F, too, has undeniably tried to take advantage of the economic crisis in Pakistan and the arrest of the former Pakistani prime minister, Imran Khan. As a result, the JUI-F political rally held on 30 July in Khar was aimed to garner the electoral support ahead of the upcoming elections in Pakistan.

The area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has seen several attacks in the recent months, and most were claimed by TTP. Bajaur, specifically, has been a hotbed of such attacks and was also controlled by Taliban in the past. During the leadership of Imran Khan, large number of TTP fighters were brought back from Afghanistan into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This was as part of a failed programme for rehabilitation of TTP fighters. Imran Khan claimed that upon assuming power in Kabul, the Afghan Taliban, had ordered their Pakistani fighters to return to Pakistan. He stated that the Pakistani government was left with limited choices; the government could “either line up those 40,000 people, including fighters and their families, and shoot them, or we could rehabilitate them.”

In an effort to alleviate the TTP issue in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), such a plan was actually proposed. Despite the political consensus to “rehabilitate” the terrorists, the program was never implemented. The incoming Taliban fighters were not rehabilitated or employed. Having no options to return to Afghanistan, most fighters were seen rallying for ISIS recruitment or Al Qaeda, with the hope of getting paid. The former Pakistani prime minister, foreseeing the need to nip the TTP issue in the bud, had suggested such a program. He had claimed his government had wanted to resettle TTP fighters in Pakistan’s FATA region, but the efforts were unsuccessful as the provinces had failed to make provision for the necessary resources to counter the elements rejecting the merger of the tribal areas with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

There has been a sharp increment in number of TTP fighters in the region, followed by a series of persistent attacks on military and police posts. There is a strong consensus that FATA had provided sanctuary to several regional and foreign jihadist fighters belonging to Taliban, al-Qaida’s central Leadership, and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). Safe havens provide the insurgents and terrorists the time to plan attacks, generate critical support for Infrastructure by raising funds, imbibing ideologies and providing technical assistance to associated groups and cells. Known in Pakistan as ilaqa-e-ghair (lawless lands), the Pashtun tribal areas that are around the Peshawar Valley have, without a doubt, been a sanctuary for various groups.

Waziristan is a stronghold of the TTP. The movement commanded by Baitullah Mehsud had been a safe haven for core elements of al-Qaida and the IJU. Despite the advantages that FATA provides for the militants, the area suffers a severe disadvantage due to the financial vulnerability of their protectors – the TTP and the Afghan Taliban to maintain their scale of militancy. The other important factor, which caters to Pakistan’s worries in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, is the ongoing insurgency in the area. This is also known as the War in North-West Pakistan. It is an ongoing armed conflict involving Pakistan and various Islamist jihadist outfit such as the TTP, Jundallah, Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), al-Qaeda, and their Central Asian allies, amongst which are the ISIL, ISIL–Khorasan (ISK), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkistan Movement, Emirate of Caucasus, and elements of organized crime.

Also, ever since Taliban’s exit from the war theatre, ISK has consistently tried to exert it’s monopoly on Jihad in the South Asian region. Treating each other as rivals, ISK and Taliban have consistently launched attacks on their individual leaders, commanders or assets. Recently, Taliban claimed the assassination of an ISK recruiter/ commander, Aijaz Ahmad Ahangar alias Abu Usman Al-Kashmiri, a Srinagar-born ISHP leader recently based in Afghanistan, in a Taliban raid in Kabul. Evidently due to the growing rivalry amongst the two, the attack in Khar on the pro-Taliban JUI-F came as no surprise.

ISIS has in the past, also claimed the responsibility for the assassination of a Pakistani political party official in Inayat Killi. It has recently issued claims in the name of “Khorasan Province” branch (ISKP), which remains predominant in Afghanistan and north-west Pakistan. The group also claims attacks in Pakistan in the name of its “Pakistan Province” or “Wilayat-e-Pakistan” branch. In 2019, ISK declared the province of “Wilayat-e-Hind” (Province of Hind) on 12 May, followed by Wilayat-e-Pakistan on 14 May. It is vital to mention that ISIS does not recognize the sovereign borders as decided by the nations but functions as pan-Islamic entity.

In the early years from the conception of the two wilayats, ISK continued to target Taliban and its allies or exploit the local tribal or regional conflicts by planting itself amidst the issues. In India, IS managed a response in Islamist-insurgency-ridden Kashmir, and there was some level of organized support in the form of ISJK.

In Pakistan, ISK conducted large-scale terrorist attacks resulting in mass casualties. The jihadist landscape of Pakistan offers greater opportunities to IS and limits the risks of factional issues which may hinder in making it a part of a larger wilayat consisting of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asian States. While the growing TTP threat has over-shadowed the activities of ISK in Pakistan due to their frequent attacks, it must be noted that the Islamic State has also been responsible for one of the deadliest bombings in Pakistani history, which killed 149 people in Balochistan in 2018.

Post the Khar attack on 30 July, the response of the Pakistani government was rather underwhelming in regards to their failing security capabilities and counter-terrorism response. Pakistan failed to negotiate peace with the TTP last year. Its military forces have been incapable of sustaining or even launching operations near the Afghan border and have been unable to mount a formal offensive due to its economic crisis and political polarization. The recent attacks have also fuelled tensions between Pakistani officials and the Taliban administration in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government has accused the Taliban of providing safe haven to some terror outfits. Taliban officials, of course, have denied that claim.

With the break-down in the Pakistan-Afghan Taliban bilateral relations, there is little chance of any cooperation in counter-terrorism operations between these two states. It is highly unlikely that the current prime minister of Pakistan, Shehbaz Sharif, will be able to show any game-changing progress on this front any time soon. The same is the case with the newly appointed chief of army staff (COAS), General Asim Munir, too.

At any rate, the Pakistani military will need to be seen as doing something. This may require the Pakistani government to pursue its threat and carry out counter-terrorism measures beyond its borders. The Pakistan army will, however, be very reluctant to do this. Due to Pakistan ISI’s deep involvement with state sponsored terrorism and defence against India and the current deterioration of bilateral relations with Kabul, Pakistan will be forced to re-calibrate its move in regard to its army’s counter-terrorism operations.

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Pakistan is experiencing its most severe crisis in modern times. The nuclear-armed state is struggling with governmental ineptitude, an unstable economy, and devastating effects of climate change. Pakistan and its creditors in the West and in China face difficult decisions.

Political and military leaders in the nation have presided over decades of ineffective policymaking, widespread corruption, and widespread social unrest. The two major parties continue to fight endlessly, yet their policies are quite similar. The next elections are likely to be used as a pretext for more infighting rather than serious attempts to improve Pakistan’s situation. The populace has little hope in the governing elite to improve their lives. Politicians are busy serving their own interests and parties.

As things stand, Pakistan might go into default like neighbouring Sri Lanka, which has faced shortages of essentials like food and medicine.

Financial Circumstances

The prime minister of Pakistan must balance the books with little in foreign exchange reserves in the bank. Shahbaz Sharif’s administration did not cause the present situation, but he still has political ambitions and is acting desperately. Recent events including the post-pandemic vicious cycle in commodities, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a policy shift by the US Federal Reserve, and disastrous floods at home might all be contributing factors in the current economic crisis. The World Bank and the IMF have decided that Pakistan cannot be awarded additional loans without first undertaking long-term steps to ensure macroeconomic stability.

The foreign currency reserves of Pakistan dropped with only enough to pay for imports for three weeks. This is the 13th balance of payments problem Islamabad has faced since 1988, and the 23rd Fund program it has been a part in since 1958.

Twenty years ago, Pakistan’s economist Meekal Aziz Ahmed remarked, “Economic management in Pakistan has steadily deteriorated to the point where the economy has lurched from one financial crisis to the next. At the heart of the problem has been poor management of public finances and deep-seated unresolved structural issues in the economy that bad management and poor governance have exacerbated. The consequences are plain to see: macroeconomic instability, high inflation, poor public services, criminal neglect of the social sectors, widespread corruption, crippling power outages, growing unemployment, deepening poverty and a deteriorating debt profile.”

Pakistan has to implement changes to address its underlying structural difficulties if it is to overcome its economic troubles. “Borrowed growth” has done significant harm to the economy of the nation.

Recent years have seen a shift away from Western dependency, with financial aid coming instead from key strategic allies like as China, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States.

Incoming Funds

Saudi Arabia, China, the United Arab Emirates, and international financial institutions might immediately begin contributing billions of dollars. Although, if annual inflows are predicted to continue at different rates, the vast majority of these funds will just add to Pakistan’s existing external debts and annual debt payment commitments.

Pakistan’s petroleum sector is expected to be the primary recipient of Saudi Arabia’s potential $10 billion investment in the nation. It also plans to deposit an additional $2 billion with Pakistan’s national bank.

The United Arab Emirates is to provide $3 billion in finance, which includes the transfer of its $2 billion in foreign currency deposits held at the State Bank of Pakistan. Saudi Arabia also agreed to refinance loans from Chinese commercial banks to Islamabad, increase bilateral currency swaps, and provide $1 billion in oil on a payment plan. China is expected to pump in about $9 billion into Pakistan’s economy.

If the government does not significantly increase exports of goods and services, reverse the declining trend in remittances, and foster an atmosphere that is favourable to foreign investors, it might become trapped in foreign debts within a few years. With Pakistan’s deeply ingrained worldview, it’s hard to see the country learning anything.

Threat from Taliban

The ISI saw the Taliban’s triumph in Afghanistan as a chance to dominate Kabul, giving Pakistan great “strategic depth.” Pakistan may have thought it had accomplished its strategic aims in Afghanistan by putting a friendly militia in Kabul after the Taliban’s August 2021 coup. As a result, Pakistan hoped it would be better equipped to deal with the problem posed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Nonetheless, the Taliban started to openly reject Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs. Islamabad must now take action against the TTP since their client has openly bitten their hand that has fed them.

The TTP is not a unified group that can be easily disbanded and integrated into mainstream society and politics. This is especially the case when the ideology championed by the violent organization is well recognized.

Relationship with the United States

The United States’ and Pakistan’s relationship is also delicate. The situation escalated in April 2022 when Imran Khan blamed the United States for orchestrating the opposition’s vote of no confidence in him.

It would seem that the current connection between Pakistan and the Biden administration would continue, given the recent retirement of General Bajwa and the selection of his protégé, Gen Syed Asim Munir, as his replacement. After all, General Bajwa sent weapons and ammunition from Pakistan to Ukraine through Royal Air Force. The Biden administration has commented in support of Pakistan’s strategy of cracking down on the Taliban. But, Afghanistan has been called the “graveyard of empires.”

Murky Politics

Support for the Shehbaz Sharif administration seems to be waning. Although it is possible that Pakistan’s economy may recover from its current downturn, doing so would require the government to make unpopular fiscal choices before the general election later in 2023. The current administration’s attempts to prevent Imran Khan from voting have only served to make matters worse.

Relations with India

Although many in Pakistan and India may have been taken aback by Shahbaz Sharif’s apparent friendly overtures towards India, in an effort to improve his standing both at home and abroad, India’s response has not been encouraging because of Pakistan’s continued support for activities inimical to India. The Pakistani Army and the ISI may not appreciate Sharif’s gestures. Sharif has made a mistake for which he will be eventually held accountable. An elaborate and all-encompassing plan is necessary to address all issues.

Loans Repayment Restructuring

The figures are alarming: The country’s foreign currency reserves are only enough to cover imports for one to three weeks at a time. The national debt is almost 79 percent of GDP, or $270 billion. Keeping the lights on, so to speak, seems to be a challenge. Power outages around the nation have been severe.

The purpose of a IMF delegation to Pakistan was to attempt to finalize the release of a $7 billion aid package that was agreed upon in 2019. In an effort to comply with IMF criteria, the government recently abandoned exchange restrictions that had been artificially propping the rupee, sending it to all-time lows. Even if another billion or so is released from escrow, this will only be a temporary fix. It may not be pleasant, but a heavy dosage is necessary if Pakistan is to avoid default.

China is Pakistan’s largest bilateral creditor, holding nearly $30 billion in debt. China denies that its loans put developing countries in a “debt trap.” Pakistan has to get into debt restructuring discussions as soon as possible with China, the IMF, and the Paris Club of creditor countries.

Stark Future Scenario

What happens to Pakistan if its economy goes into free fall as a result to loan payments default or it runs out of foreign exchange reserves. Some of the possible effects include:

Currency Devaluation: If Pakistan runs out of foreign exchange reserves, the value of its currency (the Pakistani rupee) could plummet. This could make imports more expensive and cause inflation to rise, which would hurt the purchasing power of ordinary citizens and lead to economic hardship.

Capital Flight: If foreign investors lose confidence in Pakistan’s economy, they may withdraw their investments, causing capital flight. This could lead to a further depletion of foreign exchange reserves and exacerbate the economic crisis.

Reduction in Public Spending: If the government is unable to borrow or obtain loans, it may have to cut public spending, including on essential services such as healthcare and education. This could have serious consequences for the well-being of citizens and further erode public trust in the government.

Social Unrest: A severe economic crisis could lead to social unrest and political instability. This could exacerbate existing tensions between different ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic groups in the country.

International Pressure: Pakistan may come under pressure from international organizations and countries that have provided loans or aid in the past. This could include demands for economic reform, austerity measures, and political change.

Conclusion

The nation’s political culture has been so ingrained with the practice of relying on others. This demonstrates the failure of economic governance because it entails the cash-strapped nation lurching from one crisis to another, without being able to prevent the next one, and outsiders are regarded as band-aid solutions to its enduring economic issues. Above all, this strategy reduces the nation to the regrettable position of a supplicant whose ability to support its own economy rests on others rather than on itself.

The post Pakistan on the Brink of Default appeared first on IMR.

Consequently, the terror group is targeting Pakistan’s security forces with impunity and is in no mood to restart the peace negotiations anytime soon.

The recent spike in terror attacks is a major failure of Pakistan’s powerful military establishment. While the political leadership in Pakistan is facing criticism from different quarters, the security establishment should be blamed for the recent security turmoil in the country. The civilian government was not even included in peace negotiations with TTP and therefore had limited information on the outcome(s) of the dialogue, according to a report in Pakistan Tribune.

It is reported that former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Lieutenant General (Retd) Faiz Hameed single-handedly led negotiations with TTP and had possibly compromised on certain controversial demands of the terror group, according to Pak media reports

Therefore, it is not surprising that TTP felt emboldened and acted aggressively after its core demands were not ‘officially’ accepted by the Pakistan government. The security situation has worsened since General Asim Munir took over the charge as Pakistan’s new Chief of Army Staff (COAS) on November 29. Interestingly, TTP official announced the ending of a months-long ceasefire with the Pakistan government on November 28, expecting a hawkish policy from the new Army chief.

The terror group is mostly targeting security forces in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. According to the annual report of Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Pakistan witnessed as many as 376 terror attacks in 2022 and KP province experienced an exponential rise in violence whereby “the fatalities there went up by 108 per cent.”

Islamabad promised stability in the tribal areas after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. On the contrary, Pashtun areas are among the worst hit by the ‘new’ wave of militancy in Pakistan.

While TTP is largely operating in KPK province and Balochistan, it has conducted few attacks in Islamabad and Punjab as well in the last one year. On December 23, TTP militants detonated a car bomb in Pakistan’s capital, killing a police officer and injuring several others. Worryingly for the security establishment, there is a spike in TTP-led suicide attacks in Pakistan.

The recent Peshawar Mosque bombing was also a suicide attack. Reports suggest that the bomber was standing in the front row at the time of the explosion. The mosque is located inside a ‘highly fortified’ compound in Peshawar that included the headquarters of KPK police force and the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) offices. Last month, TTP militants seized a CTD police station in KPK’s Bannu district and took hostages to negotiate with the government authorities.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and General Syed Asim Munir visited Peshawar following the suicide bombing and reportedly held a meeting to discuss the law-and-order situation in KPK. Sharif stated that the capacity of the country’s anti-terrorism institutions and police would be enhanced and National Action Plan (NAP) would be “implemented comprehensively and with full force”.

Imran Khan also condemned the attack in a tweet: “It is imperative we improve our intelligence gathering & properly equip our police forces to combat the growing threat of terrorism.” Khan’s known ‘soft approach’ on the TTP issue and the PTI government’s lackadaisical attitude have been criticised for the deteriorating situation in KPK province.

Peshawar attack was the deadliest terrorist act since a suicide bombing at a Shia Mosque in Koocha Risaldar area during Friday prayers in March 2022, resulting in 58 deaths and 200 injuries. The investigation had revealed that the attacker was an ‘Afghan exile’ who trained with the Islamic State (IS) before carrying out the attack.

Frequent attacks target law enforcement agencies, but the recent Police Lines bombing is seen as a major escalation. Some analysts are predicting a new military operation against TTP after this attack as the political leadership, security establishment, and even the opposition leaders have failed to control the scourge of militancy in Pakistan.

Politically, Pakistan is completely paralyzed as the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) alliance government and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) are indulged in a ruthless battle to rule Islamabad. It is believed that the weakened economy and the persistent political instability present an opportunity for TTP and similar groups to increase pressure on the Pakistani state to fulfill their key demands. More importantly, Islamabad cannot continue to pressure the Afghan Taliban on TTP until its own house is not in order.

The post Why Pakistan’s security situation keeps worsening appeared first on IMR.

The second submarine, PNS/M KHALID (S-137), was delivered to Pakistan Naval Forces Command at a ceremony held, marking the latest step in the project to modernize three AGOSTA 90B class submarines of Pakistan Naval Forces Command by STM. STM delivered PNS/M HAMZA (S-139), the first submarine in the project, to Pakistan Naval Forces Command on 29 April 2021.

Third submarine next in line

STM is continuing work in Pakistan with a view to completing the modernization of the third and last submarine on schedule.

STM was awarded the submarine modernization contract in 2016, paving the way for the exportation for the first time of Turkish engineering products in the highly advanced technological field of submarines. The contract for the mid-life upgrade of a single Agosta 90B class submarine was later expanded to include the modernization of the second and third submarines. Under the modernization project, various sensor and weapon systems are being upgraded, involving the integration of state-of-the-art systems that have been installed and integrated by STM.

The submarines’ sonar suites, periscopes, command and control systems, naval data distribution system, converters, steering control system, chilled water system and radar & electronic support systems are all being replaced, and systems produced by numerous indigenous and national companies, including ASELSAN and HAVELSAN are also being exported under the scope of the Project. All hull-related structural modifications, materials and workmanship activities carried out on the submarines under the modernization project have been certified by the international classification society DNV (Dat Nordske Veritas). The project is continuing at the PN Dockyard Shipyard of the Pakistan Navy using local workmanship of PN Dockyard , where engineering, design, material, documentation, training  and technical support is being provided by STM.

The first Agosta 90B Class Submarine PNS/M HAMZA (S-139), modernized by STM for the Pakistan Navy, participated in the SEASPARK-2022 Tactical Exercise, during which it successfully fired a torpedo and sank a decommissioned frigate.

The post Turkey’s STM Delivers 2nd Upgraded Agosta 90B-Class Submarine To Pakistan Navy appeared first on IMR.