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Session 1 – Inaugural Session

The seminar was inaugurated by Air Marshal Surat Singh, DG Air Ops, Air HQ. The welcome remarks were given by Air Marshal Anil Chopra, Director General, CAPS. This was followed by an industry perspective provided by Col KV Kuber, Director of Defence and Aerospace, Ernst & Young. The guest speakers also released the EY-IMR knowledge paper on Air & Missile Defence.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra commenced his introductory statements by addressing the protracted conflict in Ukraine, which has persisted for sixteen months, despite the substantial casualties incurred by both opposing factions. The vulnerabilities manifest themselves through the widespread deployment of tanks, drones, large ships, cruise missiles, and aircraft, which are strategically withheld from entering technical zones due to the presence of formidable air defence systems. The concept of air Denial has been surpassed by both parties involved. Hence, the conflict has once again underscored the significance of the air and missile defence systems. Several key lessons can be derived for India from this conflict, including the imperative of maintaining unhindered supply chains and promoting domestic manufacturing. Additionally, he emphasised the significance of counter-drone technology, which encompasses various tools such as kinetic interception and electromagnetic interdiction. According to Air Marshal Chopra, India is currently developing medium and long-range surface-to-air missiles. However, there is a need to expedite the advancement of cost-effective iterations of missiles and unmanned aircraft. The speaker proposed that the private sector is making significant strides in the field, exemplified by the Kalyani missile creation. This missile was developed through a partnership between Rafael Advanced Defence Systems Ltd and DRDO, and its production involved collaboration with various players in the Indian industry, including both public and private sector entities and MSMEs. The author emphasised the government’s initiatives to promote indigenisation, encompassing both the public and commercial domains.

Air Marshal Surat Singh, DG Air Ops, Air HQ gave the Inaugural Address. He addressed the crucial capabilities of the air defence and missile system in various contexts, including times of peace, periods of uneasy peace, and even in times of war. The activation of this capability is the initial step, while its deactivation is the final action. In certain instances, it persists consistently. It offers both deterrence and the assurance needed to execute air operations. The system encompasses numerous interconnected components and sub-systems that encompass monitoring, control, and the ability to make decisions for destruction swiftly. He highlighted critical advancements in air defence during the last decade while focusing on reducing the size of systems and sub-systems and the increasing lethality of weapons and Unmanned systems, encompassing both offensive and defensive capabilities. He emphasised the evolving nature of operations, which were formerly limited to land but have since expanded into the air and are now expanding into space. He stressed the necessity of successfully encountering the threats. India’s capacity to cope with threats needs jointmanship as well as an exhaustive capability. The endeavour is to be made not in isolation but as a team. Therefore, the diverse range of threats necessitates an air defence system that can enhance capabilities and multiply abilities multiple-fold. This will entail utilising expedited, reliable, and fortified decision-making mechanisms alongside a fusion of active and passive sensors to generate a comprehensive representation. He concluded by emphasising the interaction between a user and a manufacturer during the initial stages of development of any system is crucial to the smooth transmission of situational awareness and the successful incorporation of the decision-making tool.

Col KV Kuber, Director of Defence and Aerospace, Ernst and Young, provided the defence industry perspective. He stated that the Indian Air Force was responsible for safeguarding the entirety of the nation’s airspace, which encompasses the island territories and offshore facilities and falls within the jurisdiction of the air defence identification zone. In order to effectively safeguard the expansive airspace, it is imperative to implement a strategy that involves the proactive positioning of surface-to-air missiles, the utilisation of countermeasures against advanced technologies, the establishment of surveillance systems and radar networks, as well as the deployment of short-range surface-to-air missiles to deter and neutralise aerial incursions. Col Kuber emphasised the significance of the heightened dissemination of quantum technologies, the integration of quantum into military operations, and the transformative impact it will have on the character of warfare. The speaker provided an explanation regarding the distinction between quantum and linear phenomena, highlighting the pervasive nature of the former in contrast to the latter. During his discourse, he also referred to the hypersonic glide vehicles. In order to effectively address the issue, it is advisable to develop an anti-missile capability that facilitates the straightforward identification of these entities. The speaker concluded his discourse by comparing the escalating military expenditures of the United States and China and subsequently deliberated on the appropriate course of action for India considering this development. In order to augment its capabilities, the government has pursued collaboration with the private sector to develop advanced weaponry. It will be stipulated to be productive.

SESSION 2 – EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES

Session 2 was chaired by Air Vice Marshal Tarun Chaudhry, Asst Chief of Air Staff Ops (Projects), Air HQ. He emphasised technology’s importance in shaping a conflict’s contours. Therefore, it is essential for all parties involved to acknowledge and adapt to new challenges brought about by technological advancements in the context of warfare. He underlined the need to develop an appropriate industrial environment for research and development to quickly provide the essential equipment or solutions. Here, timeframe and R&D efforts are of utmost importance.

Gp Capt Prashant Arora, Air HQ, discussed the ‘Lessons in AD from the Russia-Ukraine War.’ As part of the philosophies/concept of operations, he highlighted the DEAD/SEAD missions conducted by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), which allowed the Ukrainians to mount an effective air defence response. Russian forces employed Kh-31 and Kh-58 ARMs extensively against Ukrainian ground-based air defence weapons. The Ukrainians also utilised customised MiG-29s equipped with AGM-88 HARM with success.

The Ukrainian PSU’s innovative and flexible air defence systems have prevented the Russian VKS from dominating the sky. Russia’s VKS employed the S-400 in Belarus and Crimea to illustrate its practical air defence doctrine. The surface-to-air missile system of the S-400 was effective at bringing down aircraft. Russian aircraft were forced to fly at low altitudes due to the Ukrainians’ effective use of the S-300 SAM and SA-11. The Pechora system was an effective anti-aircraft armament for the Ukrainians. As part of the anti-missile/SOWs operation, it is impossible to intercept Russian Tochka-U and Iskander missiles due to a lack of adequate interceptor missiles. Between 80% and 90% of Ukrainian missiles were intercepted by the Russian S-400. Intercepting Russian “Zircon,” “Vanguard,” and “DF-ZF” hypersonic cruise missiles during anti-hypersonic operations is complex. He stated that the Russian VKS Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) had little effect on the efficacy of the air defence network. Active AD capability and passive AD measures against missiles/ SOWs/ HCMs/HGVs are essential for assuring survivability. AWACS and AEW&C are crucial enablers for AD Operations. The development of future AD capabilities must be prioritised, and plans must account for detecting and eliminating low RCS threats.

Brig Manish Kumar, Brig AAD Ops, Army HQ, discussed the ‘Emerging Air Threat: Challenges to Ground Based Air Defence Weapon Systems (GBADWS) from Recent Conflicts.’ He addressed the concept of air threat in its state of being and air threat in its manifestation. Air threats encompass various factors, including numerical strength, quantity, aircraft types, capabilities, operational ranges, refuelling capabilities, and tactical approaches. “Air Threat Manifestation” refers to the strategic process of developing and implementing measures to mitigate air defence risks. The manifestation of air threats necessitates the management of stand-off threats, limited stand-off threats, and dynamic threats. He emphasised the increase in the variety of air attack instruments and the expansion of the range of potential threats, including remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAs) and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Additionally, they mentioned the emergence of futuristic air threats such as hypersonic and hyper glide technologies, as well as surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and ballistic missiles. Furthermore, they noted the resurgence of conventional dumb bombs, explicitly referring to rocket-boosted kinetic energy (REK) weapons and gliding munitions. According to Brig Manish Kumar the VKS air operation in Russia is limited to the Central Military District (CSFO) and activities related to air defence. The initial chapter operations yielded successful outcomes. The initial attacks were limited to Stand Off Launches utilising Kh series Cruise Missiles and ARMs. However, they were effectively countered by the Ukrainian S-300 air defence systems. Moreover, the SHAHED-136 introduction was employed in Ukraine. The term “three-layer air defence” is a misnomer. Each layer must be designed to address a specific type of threat. To address various levels of threat, encompassing stand-off threat, limited stand-off threat, and dynamic threat, it becomes imperative to implement a comprehensive array of mitigation measures. He identified the prerequisites for comprehensive air defence solutions, which include low radar cross-section (RCS) surveillance, low-level surveillance, and stealth surveillance. The layout challenges faced by the defence industry encompass several key aspects, including the miniaturisation of components, the management of electromagnetic interference and electromagnetic compatibility in limited spaces, the ability to handle multiple targets simultaneously, and the development of cost-effective electronic identification friend or foe (IFF) solutions.

Sh Vasudev Ramakrishna, Scientist F, LRDE, DRDO, discussed the ‘New Developments in Radars for Detection, Tracking Threats and Targeting.’ He deliberated on radars concerning air and ballistic missile defence. Modern radar systems possess various applications, encompassing areas such as ballistic missile defence, air defence, weapon designation, reconnaissance, commercial utilisation, weather monitoring, and interplanetary investigations. The radar may be categorised as surveillance radars, which possess a mechanical rotation fixed RPM, offer volumetric search capabilities, have fixed target update intervals, and exhibit limited range and angular resolution as well as accuracies; track radars, designed for tracking a single target, have limited search capabilities; and multiple radars for diverse threats, which are specialised in their respective functions and have limited programmability. To construct a unified multifunction radar system in the future, it will be necessary to address various components of radar sub-systems, including waveform agility (such as low pulse repetition frequency and medium pulse repetition frequency, as well as target radar cross-section estimation), as well as the programmability of radar modes (such as air defence and ballistic missile defence).

SESSION 3 – EMERGING THREATS, SURVEILLANCE AND DETECTION

Air Vice Marshal Anil Golani, Additional Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies, chaired session 3. He emphasised the importance of hypersonic weapons and the difficulties faced by current countermeasures in addressing them. In contrast to ballistic missiles that can be easily intercepted and monitored, identifying hypersonic missiles poses a significant challenge. To effectively tackle these challenges, it is imperative to embrace technological advancements.

Air Commodore SM Paranjpe, Team Ldr, Project AD Services Interface Gp, Air HQ addressed the challenges associated with ballistic and hypersonic missiles, as well as stand-off weapons. He gave an account of the historical background of hypersonics, with particular emphasis on ‘The Great Extinction Event’ that occurred approximately 66 million years ago, resulting in the extinction of all dinosaur species. It also emphasised the historical, contemporary, and prospective dimensions of hypersonic weaponry; and furnished an extensive account of the fundamental principles underlying hypersonic velocities, elucidating various attributes of hypersonics, ultrasonics, supersonics, and related phenomena. He elucidated the distinct challenges associated with stand-off weapons by examining the ballistic trajectory and orbital trajectory within the classification of ballistic armaments. He discussed the tactical obstacles associated with air defence, specifically focusing on four key aspects: being situated beyond the radar horizon and at a low altitude, operating at high altitudes and speeds, flying at low altitudes and high speeds, and possessing small or stealthy characteristics. He gave insight into the origins of the challenges, specifically highlighting the Anti-Hypersonic Weapons Technology Challenge and the requisite scientific expertise. He concluded by directing attention towards the main points to be learned and the actions being implemented to address them, categorising them into three distinct areas: Technology, Organisation, and Operations.

Sh Nandakumar S, Scientist F, LRDE, DRDO, gave an insight into ‘the OTH Radar for Peninsular & Chinese Front: a Perspective.’ Considering that OTH Radars operate at high frequencies, he emphasised their value. He compared the two Over Horizon (OTH) Radars, such as the Surface Wave OTH (SW OTH) and the Sky Wave OTH (SKW OTH). He emphasised the examination of OTH Radar, specifically highlighting various countries such as Iran, the United Kingdom, the United States, Romania, and Israel and the respective radar systems they possess. He presented an analysis of a separate survey pertaining to the Skywave Over-The-Horizon (OTH) Radar, specifically focusing on the United States. He emphasised the various sub-systems of the SkW OTH Radar, including transmitters, receivers, and Tx Antennas, as well as the techniques and technologies employed within these sub-systems. According to the research conducted by Sh Nandakumar S, developing a Skywave Over-the-Horizon Radar (SkW OTHR) for specifically identified locations is feasible. He emphasised the development of Ionosphere modelling is imperative for SkW OTHR. He proposed that the implementation of the Frequency Management System should be completed within a time-frame of approximately five years. He discussed the advancement of the Surface Wave Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) for the Indian Navy, specifically in the Gujarat Peninsula, which is nearing completion. It is anticipated that the radar system will become operational within a year. Additionally, Nandakumar highlighted the forthcoming development of the Two-L shape (180* Coverage) SkW OTHR for Sea/Air Surveillance, which is expected to be completed within a time-frame of 5-7 years. This technological advancement is anticipated to provide the Indian Armed Forces with enhanced capabilities to assess the Chinese front. 

SESSION 4 – AIR DEFENCE COUNTERMEASURES

Air Vice Marshal PV Shivanand, Asst Chief of Air Staff (Air Defence), Air HQ chaired the session. He highlighted that conventional air defence was designed to detect certain airborne flight objects. In recent times, there have been changes in the basic detection capability; and multiple new threats challenge the domain of air defence. We need to address it on priority.

Wg Cdr KJ Antony, Joint Director AD, Air HQ, presented his views on ‘Countering Stealthy Aerial Threats.’ His presentation centred around four fundamental domains pertaining to the attainment of stealth capabilities. These domains encompassed the concept of stealthy aerial threats, their potential ramifications on air operations, as well as the strategies employed to counteract such threats, encompassing both existing and future technologies. He perceived stealth as a fusion of technological elements aimed at evading or prolonging the process of detection. For example, stealth aircraft must possess minimal signatures across various electromagnetic (EM) spectrum domains, including radar, infrared, acoustics, and visual signature. In order to attain stealth capabilities in a fighter aircraft, it is imperative to strike a delicate equilibrium between the attributes of stealth, manoeuvrability, and cost-effectiveness. The individual emphasised that achieving stealth or low observability can be accomplished by reducing radar cross-section, minimising infrared signature, and diminishing visual signature. He classified stealthy aerial threats into three categories: airborne platforms that employ stealth technology, threats with low radar cross-section (RCS) or low observability, and threats that do not require line-of-sight (LOS) engagement, such as terrain-hugging missiles and ballistic missiles. In order to address the challenge posed by covert airborne threats, the individual in question proposed the implementation of an anti-stealth system capable of functioning autonomously or in conjunction with other systems. This system would utilise multiple sensors to generate a comprehensive air situation depiction, thereby enhancing the likelihood of successful detection. Ultimately, he emphasised the importance of space-based systems to mitigate the risks posed by stealth aerial threats in forthcoming times.

Cdr Viraat Shiggaon, Cdr Staff Requirements, Naval HQ, explained the ‘AD Countermeasures: Naval Perspective.’ He focused on the growing dangers in the maritime sphere and the accompanying advances in AD technology of the future. While marine air defence (AD) is generally comparable to other services, the sea presents unique obstacles. Cooperative engagement is made possible by both long- and medium-range SAMs. The evolution of modern air defence weaponry is motivated by the changing geopolitical landscape. It serves as an anti-access/area-denial mechanism. Since its final velocity is so incredible, it cannot be stopped by traditional AD systems. The use of decoys and MIRVs increases the difficulty of engagement. The topic of the operations of unmanned vehicles and swarm drones was discussed. It is a low-priced A2/AD weapon that regular armies and insurgents can deploy. He discussed potential future technologies for naval air defence, focusing on “the electromagnetic railgun,” which is affordable and can engage supersonic targets at extended ranges; “laser/microwave weapons,” which can engage hypersonic weapons/anti-drone systems; and “anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) interceptors,” which can engage ASBMs during both the boost and re-entry phases. He ended by stressing the importance of indigenisation, the introduction of cutting-edge technology and innovations, and the creation of counter-technologies.

Brig. OP Vaishnav, AAD Dte, Army HQ explained ‘Countering Unmanned Aerial Threats – Future Roadmap.’ He focused on how the aerial danger posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has changed over time. UAS include anything from tiny quad/hexa copters to huge fixed-wing military UAVs. There are three levels of threat – superficial, intermediate, and severe. He pointed out that India’s rivals on both sides can now produce and build unmanned aerial systems on their own. The Burraq, Barq LGB, Wingloong-10, CH-4, Shahpar-2, and Sharp Sword are among the dangerous autonomous weapon systems they want to modernise with. Surveillance, identification, and tracking; microprocessors or calculating a firing solution; and interdiction were the three pillars he emphasised under the Counter UAS system pillars.

Sh Amit Kumar, Scientist F, PGAD, DRDO, presented his views on ‘Countering the Threat from Ballistic and Hypersonic Missiles and Stand-off Weapons.’ The increased range and precision of ballistic missiles, their potential use by non-state actors, and the diffusion of ballistic missile technology were all issues he brought up, as was the danger posed by ballistic missiles in the Indian subcontinent, he said. India needs a ballistic missile defence system because of its no-first-use (NFU) nuclear strategy. Ballistic, subsonic, and supersonic cruise missiles are the current go-to options for delivering warheads across vast distances. Using hypersonic glide vehicles, hypersonic cruise missiles, and MARVs by adversaries is a common strategy for countering and penetrating missile defences. An emerging danger is the hypersonic glide vehicle. Low altitude gliding, high manoeuvrability, re-targeting area, and high cross-range capability to plan the glide path allow it to penetrate enemy ballistic missile defence while engaging time-critical targets like ballistic missile launch pas/silo, deeply buried command centres, air bases, warships, and tactical targets.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), Director General, CAPS, delivered his closing remarks at the conclusion of the ideation sessions. Air Marshal Chopra commended the astute presentations and notable presence of all panellists, as well as the intellectually stimulating questions posed by the audience.

The seminar ended with a Vote of Thanks by Maj Gen Ravi Arora, Chief Editor Indian Military Review.

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The legislative amendment was passed on 14 July by voice vote as part of an en bloc (all together as a single unit) amendment during floor consideration of the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA).

“The United States must stand with India in the face of escalating aggression from China. As Vice Chair of the India Caucus, I have been working to strengthen the partnership between our countries and ensure that India can defend itself along the Indian Chinese border,” said Khanna.

“This amendment is of the utmost importance, and I am proud to see it pass the House on a bipartisan basis,” he said.

In his remarks on the House floor, Khanna said there is no relationship of greater significance to US strategic interests than the US-India partnership.

“My bipartisan NDAA amendment marks the most significant piece of legislation for US-India relations out of Congress since the US-India nuclear deal,” Khanna said.

The legislation says that the United States-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (ICET) is a welcome and essential step to developing closer partnerships between governments, academia, and industry in the two countries to address the latest advances in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, aerospace, and semiconductor manufacturing.

Such collaborations between engineers and computer scientists are vital to help ensure that the United States and India, as well as other democracies around the world, foster innovation and facilitate technological advances which continue to far outpace Russian and Chinese technology, it said.

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by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 1 here

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

After initial SEAD strikes on 24 February (the first day of the offensive) a large train of Mi-28 transport and Hokum attack helicopters was seen flying towards the Hostamel airport. It was attacked by air and missile strikes and possibly also by MBRLs. Elements of an air assault formation (possibly one of the Guards airborne divisions) landed and seized the Antonov airport at Hostamel. The giant Ukrainian AN-225 transport aircraft (the world’s largest) was destroyed in the fighting here. As per standard practice, military experts expected them to hold an airhead (to fly in reinforcements and supplies) and await a land link-up with the tank columns of the 41st Army that were crossing over from Belarus border. Given the distance of approximately some 150 kms, the link-up would at best have taken 2-3days. However, what followed was somewhat unorthodox and confusing. Instead of holding the airhead, the airborne troops left it and charged straight for Kiev some 23 kms away. Reportedly, the 141 Motorised National Guards Brigade under Chechen Maj Gen Magomed Tusaev charged into Kiev. They were surprised by the stiff resistence and the Javelins and artillery took a heavy toll. Reportedly, they lost some 58 armoured vehicles to the ATGMs and the Chechen Maj Gen was killed. Finding the Hostomel airfield unoccupied the Ukrainians recaptured it, thus, denying the airhead for flying in reinforcements and logistics supply. Apparently, this coup de main operation was planned at the highest level because President Putin himself called upon Ukrainian forces to surrender. Later, he personally praised the sacrifice of the paratroopers. There definitely was a major failure of intelligence here. On what intelligence basis was such a bold operation launched on the enemy capital? It could not be based merely on the expectation that the Ukraine forces would not fight and surrender tamely? That cannot be the basis of operational planning and there seemed to be no fall back option or Plan B in this coup de main operation. It seemed to be based on very subjective parameters and assumptions.

GROUND OPERATIONS

The Russian advance began on multiple thrust lines. As assessed by IMR, it was a full scale invasion option. Rapid progress was made in first 3-4 days with spear heads covering over 150 kms to reach the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, the emphasis shifted to siege warfare – surrounding cities, isolating the entry and exit routes and pounding cities savagely with rockets, cruise missiles and conventional artillery. Humanitarian corridors were agreed on by both sides to let civilians flee the cities. Some 6.5 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced and over 3.5 to 5 million have been forced to flee to Poland and other neighboring countries. The pace of operations has been slowed down greatly partly due to need for logistical pauses and very heavy and dogged resistance by the Ukrainian army, which used their Javelins ATGMs and Strella SAMs  to cause fairly substantial attrition. However the simple ground reality is that neither US nor NATO are putting boots on ground nor will they enforce any No-Fly Zones. So, theoretically, Russia has all the time in the world to methodically and steadily but surely grind down the Ukraine military in a meat-grinder war of attrition, which could carry on for months. The longer it lasts the more Ukraine will suffer. Unfortunately, it will also have a fearful impact on the global economy that was staging a tenuous recovery from Covid. Let me now cover the operations in the Northern, Eastern and Southern sectors in detail.

Northern Sector

The Russian forces attacked in the Northern sector toward Kiev the capital and Kharkiev (former capital and financial hub which had the T- 80 tank factory here).

Kiev. The 41st Army charged across the Belarus border towards Kiev on two thrust lines west of the Dnieper river, while elements of 36the Army advanced along the east bank towards Chernobyl nuclear plant and further on to Hostomel airport. These thrust lines made very rapid initial progress and in just 2-3 days were on the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, operations slowed down to try and isolate and then besiege Kiev, while they carried out precise Iskander TBMs and Kalibr cruise missiles strikes and limited bombardment by MBRLs. They made a few probes towards Kiev city centre but were repulsed. The satellite imagery on 4th/5th day of war showed a huge 65 km long convoy stretched on the road to Kiev. This included assault tank echelons, which should have been moving cross country but were stuck to the road due to the slush and mud caused by the spring thaw. The convoy remained stuck like that for a couple of days. Had the Ukrainian Air Force been active, this would have led to a disaster but apparently the convoy was well protected by the slant range of the S-400 missiles from Belarus and remained largely unscathed. It did not seem as if the Russians were planning to fight in the streets of Kiev, which were heavily defended by Javelin ATGMs and Stinger SAMs and would have entailed heavy troop casualties and collateral damage to the civilian population. Some experts felt this was a deception operation designed to keep the world’s attention riveted towards Kiev, while they made major advances in the East (Donbas) and the south sea coast. Cruise missiles were used to destroy the Antonov aircraft manufacturing plant and oil storage depots. Strangely, almost no attacks were made by aircraft or cruise missiles on key command and control targets like the Presidential palace, Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Interior. This, to my mind, is a cardinal mistake of this war – the failure to target the top political and military leadership of Ukraine in a pinpoint and concerted manner.

Sumy. The 20th Army elements advanced on to Sumy and surrounded and bombed the city heavily.

Kharkiev. The 6th Army mounted heavy and sustained attacks on Kharkiev. It was surrounded and pounded to rubble. The tank manufacturing plant was destroyed by cruise missile strikes and bitter fighting took place on the streets. The Russians claim to be in control of the city but this is disputed by the Ukrainians.

Eastern Sector

This was the scene of major hostilities since 2014 and daily exchanges of artillery and mortar fire were taking place along the line of contact (LOC). Russians claim that Ukraine had massed some 60,000 of its best troops opposite Donbas and were planning to launch an offensive to take back the 30 per cent or so of the territories of the break-away districts of Donetsk and Luhansk, which was under Russian control. Attacks in this sector, therefore, were largely frontal and heavily contested. As per the Russians, it was to pin down Ukrainian forces in the North and not let them reinforce this sector that attacks were launched concurrently on Kiev and Kharkiev in the North.

•  The Russian 8th Army mounted fierce attacks on the Lukansk district and, by end of March, claimed to have liberated some 93 per cent of its territory.

•  The Russian 49th Army mounted fierce attacks on Donetsk district and, by end of March, claims to have liberated 56 per cent of its area. It also mounted operations towards Mariupol to link up with troops operating out of Crimea to establish a land corridor for Crimea.

•  In Phase II of the Russian operation they could complete the capture of the entire Donbas region and possibly try and encircle and annihilate the 60,000 or so Ukrainian troops operating against the Donbas region by encircling them from North and South in a major pincer movement.

Southern Sector

This encompasses the coast of Ukraine on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The three major ports here are Sevastopol (already with Russia on lease since decades) and now part of Russian occupied Crimea. The other major ports are Odessa and Mariupol. Russian Marines and Army made the most impressive gains here and have almost cut off Ukraine from the sea and made it a land locked state.

•  The Russian 58th Army and the Marines have advanced on Mariupol, laid siege to it and reduced the city to rubble by very heavy bombardment and missile strikes. The Russians claim to be in control of Mariupol, though Ukrainians claim that pockets of resistance remain. Mariupol and Kharkiev are the two major cities where the Russians have employed their standard tactics of capturing cities and the firepower used has been fearful. The land link up of Crimea with Donbas is now complete and is a major and significant gain.

•  The Russian 22nd Army and Marine elements advanced on and Quickly captured the coastal port city of Kherson (the first major city with a population of 300,000) that fell to the Russians. They then moved on and surrounded the port city of Mykolyiv and pounded it fiercely. Parts of the city have fallen to the Russians. Army elements and Marines have also advanced and captured the nuclear power plant complex of Zhaporizhzia. This is the largest nuclear plant in Europe with 6x 950 MW reactors (only one functional). They have also captured the Aneshader nuclear plant which has 25 per cent of the power generation capacity of the whole of Ukraine. Thus, almost all nuclear facilities in eastern Ukraine are now under Russian control.

•  While the world’s interest was riveted on Kiev, the Russians have made the most impressive advances in the South and have captured almost all the major seaports of Ukraine and cut off its access to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. If Russians could induct fresh troops here they could drive up north along both banks of the Dnieper river and partition Ukraine into Eastern and Western parts along the Dnieper river. This could well be attempted by the Russians in Phase II of the operations.

Major Outcomes and Lessons Learnt So Far

The Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine is now in its second month. It began as a swift war of manoeuvre but now has turned into an inexorable attrition nightmare. Western propaganda is trying to claim it as a pyrrhic victory for Ukraine, which they armed very heavily with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger SAMs, which they claim had won the war in Afghanistan. These claims are over-hyped. Certainly, these defensive missiles have, to an extent, slowed down Russian operations and have been used to target their follow-on and logistics echelons. However, in no way can these tactical defensive weapons by themselves win the war for Ukraine. They can only serve to prolong it.

The American aim seems to be to prolong this war for a couple of months to humiliate Putin and impose maximum attrition on his war machine. This amounts to fighting the Russians till the last Ukrainian man or building standing. In the bargain, no one seems to care for the highly adverse impact on the global economy that has been struggling to recover from the impact of Covid pandemic. Nor does this approach show any sensitivity to the cost of human suffering of the people of Ukraine who have been callously dumped by the West.

The expenditure rate of these Javelins and Stingers missiles has been enormous. Zelinsky now wants 500 of these per day at an estimated missile replacement cost of $39 million per day. It is virtually impossible for even US and NATO to supply at such lavish scales.

Russian interdiction has now destroyed many oil storage depots, ammunition dumps, tank and aircraft manufacturing plants in Ukraine. They have captured all the Ukrainian nuclear plants in east Ukraine and control the water supply and power to most cities. Sadly, it is doubtful how long the Ukrainians can last in the face of such heavy punishment.

In a pure war of attrition, Russia is bound to prevail. Each day that the war lasts will tilt the war more in Russia’s favour. No amount of Western propaganda of an impending collapse of material and moral support for the war in Russia can hide this basic military fact. They may win the war on television and captive social media, the ground reality, however, will inexorably shift in Russia’s favour. In a meat grinder war of pure attrition Russian missile power, air power and fire power will prevail. Abraham Lincoln’s words – “You can fool all of the people some of time; you can fool some of the people all of the time, but you can’t fool all the people all the time” – may come back to haunt these shrill spin masters.

Russian force usage has been very uncharacteristically restrained. Whether this stems from cultural factors or a Russian apprehension that this war is likely to spread and escalate remains to be seen. They are clearly retaining their most advanced weapon systems for a time when they apprehend that they may have to fight NATO and American forces. So, we have not heard the last of this conflict and that is worrying. The Russians are clearly apprehending a widening and escalation of this conflict and are clearly husbanding their cutting edge resources. We have seen no T- 14 Armata tanks or active protection systems in this conflict despite the very dense anti-tank environment.

Traditionally, Russians maintain momentum by employment of fresh second and third echelons, which are carefully kept out of the battle for when the first echelons will run out of steam. Will Phase II see an induction of fresh troops and more material? That will depend on Russia meeting its minimal objectives – they say these have largely been met.

The use of the Russian air force has been rather limited. This failure to press home air superiority has needlessly extended this conflict.

Meteorological factors like the spring thaw and slush were not given adequate Importance.

Use of tactical ballistic missiles (Iskanders) and cruise missiles (Kalibr) have been Impressive and very effective. Over 1000 of them have been used in this war for pin-point destruction of targets.

Biden’s talks of Ukrainian sovereignty and calls for regime change in Russia are rather hypocritical and contradictory.

Economic sanctions could backfire if the dollar stops being the world currency for oil trade. Sanctions will hit Europe very hard and cause stagflation in the US economy.

Information and media war will be covered in a separate article.

Read Part 1 here

The post An Assessment of Military Operations appeared first on IMR.

by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 2 here

Gerasimov’s Hybrid War vs Traditional Russian War Doctrines

A few days before the start of the Russia–Ukraine war, IMR had done an in house war-game (Feb 2022 issue). Based upon known Russian doctrines and recent demonstrated combat performance in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria – we had forecast that Russian likely war aims would be to seriously wreck Ukraine as a functional military state and attempt regime change. They would advance on multiple thrust lines but seek to retain ground only in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the East and Crimea and the coastal areas in the South. These would be terrain objectives that would be retained at any cost. Russia had a huge advantage in airpower, missile power and traditional artillery firepower. Its T-72 and T-90 tanks were clearly superior to the Ukrainian T-80 and T-64 tanks especially in optronics and night fighting capabilities.

The signature Russian way of war has been to use massive fire assaults to create shock and awe and, thereby, economise on force levels and military lives. This was most evident in World War II, when Stalin called artillery the God of war and quipped that quantity generates its own quality. Russian forces have traditionally relied on echelonment of forces. Second and third echelon forces were kept in reserve and used to maintain relentless momentum in any offensive once the first echelon was used up or petered out. Based on this anchor premise, most military observers felt that Russia could achieve these objectives in 10 days (two to three weeks at best) in Ukraine. This war, however, has now entered its second month.

The Gerasimov Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare. The Chief of Russian General Staff Gen Velary Gerasimov had enunciated a whole of government doctrine for warfare based on a combination of hard and soft power in 2013. This entailed use of regular and irregular forces (conventional and sub-conventional forces) and coherent use of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, information warfare, disinformation, political, diplomatic and economic tools to gain victory. Based on this Gerasimov Doctrine, the Russians had made impressive use of hybrid warfare in 2014 to foment insurgencies in Russian speaking areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. They captured significant chunks of these provinces (around 30 per cent), which declared themselves as independent (a la Abhkazia and Osettia in Georgia). Just before this conflict Russia recognized these as independent states. Hybrid war had worked very well so far in both Georgia and Ukraine.

Transition from Hybrid War to Regular Warfare. The key question here is – when on 24 Feb President Putin announced his decision to launch a “Special Operation” in Ukraine with the stated aim of destroying Ukraine’s military potential and carrying out De-Nazification, was he not making a direct transition from hybrid war now to full scale conventional war? From 2017 onwards, the US had been heavily arming Ukraine with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger missiles. In July 2021, US, Polish, Ukrainian and Latvian troops had held a joint military exercise in Ukraine (Ex Three Swords). This entailed over 1200 troops and 200 tanks and armoured vehicles along with air power elements. Tactics to counter a Russian attack had been worked out in detail. Russian sources indicate that plans were being hatched to mount an invasion of the Russian held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk and concurrently ask for membership of NATO. This would involve US and NATO troops in this conflict. It was this exercise that had convinced President Zelinsky that, if Russia attacked, US & NATO forces would come to his aid. In December 2021, in yet another provocation Ukraine and USA co-hosted a major naval exercise (code named Op Sea Breeze) on the Black Sea in which 34 nations’ navies took part. American B-52 bombers made practice nuclear bombing runs against Russia and a ramming incident almost happened between a Russian destroyer and a British naval vessel.

Finally, in December 2021 itself, US and Ukraine foreign ministers signed the US–Ukraine Charter of Strategic Partnership that was said to be guided by the 2008 Bucharest Summit (where the idea of including Georgia and Ukraine in NATO was first mooted). By end-Dec 2021, Ukraine was a de facto member of NATO for all practical purposes and Russia was apprehending an attack on the separatist held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. Some 60,000 Ukrainian troops were massed against this Donbas region. That is why Russia had begun mobilizing its forces on the Ukrainian border in a massive exercise of compellence deigned to seek written guarantees that Ukraine would not join NATO and no offensive weapons would be deployed in 14 East European countries that had joined NATO. (In December 2021 itself, Putin had written to President Joe Biden clearly seeking these written guarantees).

To be credible, any such compellence exercise has to be structured for a seamless transition to actual kinetic operations. When that finally happened on 24 February 2022, the level of combat had clearly to shift from hybrid warfare to full-fledged conventional military operations with a clear option to cross the tactical nuclear threshold if USA or other NATO countries intervened. The continuation of the hybrid war mindset after onset of full scale military operations was, in hindsight, a clear miscalculation. This highlights the tension between the Gerasimov Hybrid War Doctrine and the traditional Russian way of war. This mismatch between the two mindsets has characterized this conflict. In trying to win the information war you cannot afford to lose or impede the outcome of the ground war.

Force Restraint

From the very outset of this war, the Russian campaign has been characterised by a surprising degree of restraint that flies in the face of the traditional Russian way of war. This has always relied on mass and scale – especially in the use of suppressive fires. From the purely military point of view massive suppressive fires were badly needed to neutralise huge numbers of Javelin anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and Stinger shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that had been liberally supplied to Ukraine. Most military analysts were, therefore, surprised to find a near total absence of the Russian Air Force (VKS) for extended and extensive bombing campaigns. Even more surprising was the near total absence of large scale artillery and multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) fire assaults on cities and built up areas – especially in the initial stages of the war.

The Russian first phase SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) campaign was confined to just one single day. Contrast this with the US 40-day air campaign in Iraq and the 80-day air interdiction campaign by the US and NATO in Yugoslavia. Given troops to task calculations, the overall Russian force level deployed was far too less to cater for the reduction/ isolation of some 15 or more cities, unless use of heavy fire power was envisaged. Besides, there was a near total absence of Russian cutting edge equipment like T-14 Alamty tanks and even Active Protection Systems (APS) on the T-72 and T-90 tanks employed (despite the dense anti-tank environment they had to operate in). Like the Egyptians had done in 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Russians seemed to prefer to operate under the area denial umbrella of their Triumf S- 400 missiles deployed in Belarus and Russia proper. Though the S- 400s have worked quite well, this denied the Russian troops the heavy air support they could easily have counted on – given the air power asymmetry between the two sides.

So what explains this baffling and most uncharacteristic force usage restraint by the Russians?

Cultural Factors and Intelligence Failure

There is a widespread belief that Putin was misled by his intelligence (FSB) to seriously under estimate the degree of resistance that the Ukrainian armed forces would put up. It was mentioned that, perhaps, accurate intelligence was available but senior FSB officers lacked the moral courage to put it up to Putin. They only tried to reinforce his dominant perception that, like in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine itself in 2014, the opposition would fold up and surrender without a fight. There is indeed some truth in this premise. The Russians went in for just a one-day air campaign and even as the 41 Combined Arms Army was heading for Kiev from the Belarus border, an air assault formation (perhaps elements of a Guards airborne division) captured the Antonov Hostamel airport (just 23 kms from Kiev) in a brilliant coup de main operation. Military experts now expected them to hold this airhead till link up by the land-based tank columns moving in from Belarus. Given the 150 kms they had to cover, this could have been done in two or three days. To everyone’s surprise the airborne forces left the air base and charged up to Kiev, the capital, even as Putin demanded that Ukraine surrender. The Ukrainian’s put up stiff resistance and recaptured the vacated Hostomel air base. The airborne forces almost walked into a trap as it were. No operation can be premised on the expectation that the enemy will just surrender. There does seem to have been a major intelligence failure of humanint or even a deliberate trap.

Most Russian military officers I have spoken to have stressed that this nostalgic perception of people to people relations was not just confined to President Putin but was a widespread cultural blind spot in the entire Russian military. Many Russians and even people of Belarus have relations in Ukraine and Kiev indeed was once a important centre of Russian culture. As such, there was a clear cut and widespread desire to restrict force usage against kindred people. This cultural constraint cum Intelligence error tended to make military planning clearly subjective in the initial phase of the conflict. The Indians and Pakistanis too were once one people culturally and linguistically. Yet they have, since1947, fought four major wars and one long hybrid war in J&K. This has been characterised by particular viciousness on Pakistan’s part.

DETAILED ANALYSIS – CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Phase One – Coercive Deployment

The Russian command level HQ at Varyinch (80kms from Donbas) seemed to be the controlling HQ for this operation. Tanks, missile launchers and artillery were moved from the far-eastern military districts of Siberia to raise two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs are equivalent of Indian corps). These were the 4th and 20th CAAs. Of Russia’s 12 CAAs, some 11 were deployed around Ukraine. Another estimate felt that out of some 170 Battalion Tactical Groups some 87 were used against Ukraine. In numerical terms this amounted to some 1,50,000 troops that were subsequently raised up to 1, 90,000.in terms of troops to task analysis, if encirclement/capture of 10-15 Ukrainian cities was involved, this force level was clearly inadequate. It could only make sense if it intended to use heavy air power and suppressive artillery fire power to carry out this task and compensate for low force levels.

The 41st CAA was sent for a 10-day exercise to Belarus. This positioned it to strike directly at Kiev. After termination of the exercise it was retained there itself. The Ukrainian forces were organized into 14 armoured, airborne and mechanized brigades and had mobilised a large territorial militia and also called up reservists. The defender, thus, clearly outnumbered the attackers but the Russians had an overwhelming technological edge.

In December 2021, President Putin had written a letter to President Joe Biden demanding written guarantees for non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO. This caused a flurry of diplomatic activity in Europe. However, the dominant perception in USA and Europe seemed to be that Russia was bluffing and this force posturing was just a coercive military deployment to compel NATO to negotiate a new security architecture in Europe. The Ukrainians themselves were most nonchalant about the Russian deployment and dismissed it as bluff and bluster to Indian students who took their advice and did not evacuate in time. With modern satellite surveillance each and every tank, gun and truck could be picked up with ease. No force concentration can be hidden in this day and age. What can be kept secret is the intention. Was the force just posturing or would it really strike? It must be said that the Russians were able to keep this secret well and Russian maskirovka (deception) operations were highly successful in keeping the world guessing.

Putin gave ample chance for a diplomatic solution till the very end. This delayed the offensive and caused it to run into the spring thaw, which generates slush and mud and impedes cross country manoeuvre. As part of information operations the Americans tried to leak Russian military plans in the media and announced 16 February as the D Day. This, perhaps, forced Russia to delay the operation. It was finally launched a week later on 24 February with a near formal declaration of war (a special operation) to destroy Ukraine’s military potential and de-Nazify the country. Russia officially recognized the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states and cited their full liberation as the primary territorial objective. It must be noted that from 2014 onwards the Ukrainians had deployed some 60,000 of their best troops in this region and attacking them directly would have amounted to a rather costly frontal attack on a very live line of contact. Hence, any Russian operation would have to advance along multiple thrust lines that would tie down and divide Ukrainian forces and mask the main objective. So, was Kiev then a deception operation as subsequently claimed? This merits further analysis. However, after the initial surprise, the Russian forces quickly readjusted to the changed scenario and now carried out their operations with far greater deliberation and with due caution. They changed their overall operational design from rapid manoeuvre to set piece siege operations and increasingly greater use of suppressive fires.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)

As stated, the Americans had carried out a 40-day air campaign in Iraq for SEAD and interdiction of enemy communications and infrastructure including destruction of Republican Guards armoured reserves. In Yugoslavia, the air campaign had extended for over 80 days. Hence, most military observers were baffled when the Russian Air Force finished its SEAD campaign in a single day. The Russian Air Force (VKS) used MiG-29 and MiG-35 fighters as also SU-27 and SU-30s along with SU-25SM fighter bombers. Given that Ukrainians had extensively deployed Stinger shoulder-fired SAMs, bulk of attacks would have had to be from mid- to high-altitudes (to stay out of the shoulder-fired SAM envelope). This would necessitate use of PGMs for ground attack.

It is not known what percentage of munitions employed were PGMs or just plain gravity bombs, which can be quite inaccurate. The bulk of damage, however, was done by the 9K720 Iskander short range ballistic missiles (200 miles range). These were equipped with decoys to degrade enemy air defences and the Ukrainian S-300, Tor and Buk SAMs failed to intercept any of these. The Kalibr and Klub cruise missiles were also used extensively. Russians claimed to have struck 11 enemy airfields, destroyed 18 radars and a number of S-300 missile batteries on this first day itself. In hindsight, these claims appear exaggerated and the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) seems to have been flawed.

Many Ukrainian fighters escaped by moving out to western Ukraine and some are said to have flown out to Romania before the Russian attack. Many S-300 batteries also were dispersed initially. They survived and were active much later in the course of the fighting. The Russians seemed to have relied heavily on the area denial capability of their S-400 and S-500 Triumf missile systems. From Belarus these downed a Ukrainian SU-27 fighter at a range of 150 kms over Kiev, setting a world record for the distance of engagement. The impression one gets is that like the Egyptian Army in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Russians were more inclined to rely upon the Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) capability of their Triumph missile systems. These were apparently quite effective as is proved by their ability to protect a 65 km long convoy of assault tanks and other vehicles for days on the outskirts of Kiev. But this also ruled out much air support by the Russian air force due to closure of air space. This was badly needed to suppress the swarms of Javelin ATGMs and the Stingers. These kept taking pot shots throughout the campaign. The Ukrainians were advised by the Americans to ambush rear/ logistics echelons and they appear to have taken their toll. The road axes were not protected adequately due to a paucity of infantry. Amazingly, the Russian air force was largely absent from the skies over Ukraine, after the initial day’s SEAD attacks.

The Russia-Ukraine War (Part 2) click here

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“My view is that it’s going to be very hard for anyone to buy major weapon systems from Moscow in the coming months and years, given sweeping financial sanctions that the administration, with the support of Congress has levelled…I would guess that India is one of those countries worried about that,” Lu said, as mentioned in a report by news agency ANI.

India is one of the largest importers of Russian arms. India recently cancelled orders for MiG-29 fighter aircraft, helicopters and anti-tank weapons, he said, further adding that the sanctions might motivate other countries to follow suit, the news agency reported.

Lu’s comments came after India was criticised by both Republicans and Democrats for abstaining from voting at the UN to rebuke Russia’s invasion. India was among 35 nations to abstain.

The diplomat said that the Biden administration is yet to decide on applying sanctions on India under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). He said that India is a “really important security partner” and that the US values the partnership.

Lu also said that the US is trying to urge India to take a ‘clear position’ on the Russia-Ukraine war. The diplomat said that India’s position arises from two things – to be able to leave the possibility of a diplomatic resolution open, and the 18,000 students still stuck in Ukraine, as mentioned in the report.

Even without a clear position, Lu said, some evolution can be seen such as India’s humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and its call to all states to abide by the UN Charter to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states.

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The United States is continuing to talk to India about the risks of sanctions for its acquisition of the S-400 missile system from Russia under the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), but has not made a determination “with regard to this transaction”, the State department said on 27 January 2022.

Speaking at a regular press briefing, the State department spokesperson Ned Price said, “I think it shines a spotlight on the destabilising role that Russia is playing not only in the region, but potentially beyond as well. When it comes to CAATSA sanctions, you’ve heard me say before we haven’t made a determination with regard to this transaction, but it’s something we continue to discuss with the Government of India, given the risk of sanctions for this particular transaction under CAATSA.”

Price added that whether it was India or any other country, the US continued to “urge all countries to avoid major new transactions for Russian weapon systems”. When asked if the US had a timeline on the decision on CAATSA, Price said, “I don’t have a timeline to offer, but these are issues that we continue to discuss with our partners in India.”

S-400 Deal and Sanctions Act

CAATSA came into force in 2017, at a time when the political mood in Washington DC was hostile to Russia for its actions in Ukraine, Syria and alleged interference in the 2016 US presidential elections. The Act seeks to deter countries which engage with Russia, especially in the realm of defence purchases, through punitive measures. Under the Act, sanctions were imposed on Turkey — a NATO ally — for its acquisition of the S-400 system from Russia.

India has a long-standing defence relationship with Russia — and has pursued its acquisition of the S-400 missile system.

Turkey, India and China have purchased the S-400 systems but only companies from Turkey and China have been sanctioned under CAATSA, a US domestic law introduced during the Trump era, India has so far not been acted against.

India’s Position

India had signed a $ 5 billion deal in October 2018 with Russia to buy five units of the S-400 air defence missile systems though the US administration had warned that such a move may attract sanctions. But in recent times, US Senators have also started flagging India’s purchase of naval warships from Russia.

Despite strong objections from the US and threat of sanctions from the Biden Administration, India has refused to make any changes in its decision and is going ahead with the purchase of the missile defence system.

Interestingly, S-400 is already being deployed in India and the second one is likely to be deployed by March, with the remaining three likely to arrive by September.

Asked about the possibility of US sanctions for buying the S-400 missile systems, in November 2021, MEA spokesperson Arindam Baghci said, “India and the US have a comprehensive global strategic partnership and India has a special and privileged strategic partnership with Russia. We also pursue an independent foreign policy. This applies to our defence acquisition and supplies which are guided by our national security interests.”

Balanced Approach

US President Joe Biden’s nominee for coordinator for sanctions policy James O’Brien has hinted at balance in US approach on India’s requirements for Russian S-400 missile defence systems, which are being deployed here, vis-a-vis Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Caatsa).

O’Brien was asked at his confirmation hearing on Wednesday if the US experience with Turkey provided any warning or lessons on how to proceed with India. The US had imposed sanctions on Turkey over the procurement of S-400 missile systems.

O’Brien said it was difficult to compare the two situations, with a NATO ally that is breaking with legacy defence procurement systems, and then with India, a partner of growing importance, but that has legacy ties with Russia.

At the hearing US Republican senator Todd Young batted for granting Caatsa waiver to India. “I believe they are very different circumstances, and, of course, different security partnerships – but how do you believe we should think about the possibility of sanctioning our friends and not just threats?” Young asked O’Brien.

On his part Young said India was currently taking delivery of the Russian S-400 system and was also in the process of acquiring new frigate ships from Russia. “Both are important systems for the Indians,” he said, adding, “India is a vital ally in our competition against China, and thus, I believe we should resist taking any actions that might drive them away from us and the Quad. I am therefore strongly supportive of waiving CAATSA sanctions against India, given our shared foreign policy interests.”

“As most here know, the Indians have a lot of legacy systems from previous decades, and they are interoperable with the Russians’ systems. And the Indians seek to defend their land border from Chinese incursions and defend the Indian Ocean from an increasingly adventurous and lawless blue ocean navy in the People’s Liberation Army,” he said.

In October last year, two powerful US Senators – Mark Warner of the Democratic Party and John Cornyn of the Republican Party – had urged Biden not to impose provisions of CAATSA against India for buying the S-400 missile system, arguing that it was in America’s national security interest.

“We strongly encourage you to grant a CAATSA waiver to India for its planned purchase of the S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile system. In cases where granting a waiver would advance the national security interests of the US, this waiver authority, as written into the law by Congress, allows the President additional discretion in applying sanctions,” they wrote in a letter to Biden.

Both Warner, Chairman of the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Cornyn, Senate Minority Whip for the Grand Old Party (GOP), are co-chairs of the Senate India caucus.

When it comes to the crunch, New Delhi may not need the helping hand of the two co-chairs of the India Caucus in the US Senate as External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said in 2019, “I am reasonably convinced of the powers of my persuasion. It would be my hope that people understand why this transaction is important for us.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, in December 2021, that the S-400 missile defence deal between India and Russia has a very important meaning for India’s defence capability and it is being implemented despite the US attempting to “undermine” the cooperation.

Comments

Most observers of the India-US relationship in Washington believe the US is likely to recognise India’s defence imperatives with regard to China, and waive off sanctions. But the renewed tensions over Ukraine have created a strong bipartisan mood in Washington against Russian actions, and added to India’s challenge in balancing ties. New Delhi issued a statement on 28 January hoping for a peaceful resolution of the situation in Ukraine.

Commenting on the broader challenge for India as US-Russia tensions deepen, Ashley J Tellis, the Tata chair for strategic studies at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and among the foremost experts on Asian geopolitics in the US, said, “There are already anxieties in the Congress about India, including vis a vis its relationship with Russia. If Delhi feels compelled to be mildly sympathetic to Russia, or even excessively neutral, it will not find a receptive audience for its position in Washington DC. India is admittedly in a hard place.”

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At UN Security Council, India has abstained on two resolutions on Ukraine in the 15-nation UN Security Council and one in the 193-member UN General Assembly.

In its first statement on the crisis between Russia and the West led by the US over Ukraine, India called for a “peaceful resolution” of the situation through “sustained diplomatic efforts” for “long-term peace and stability” in the region and beyond.

India maintained neutrality during the Russian takeover of Crimea in 2014. Alongside 57 nations, India had abstained from the UN Resolution in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea.

The Indian decision to stay neutral has no doubt irked the US, which is seeking to muster global support for its actions. The US has still to announce its decision on sanctions against India for procuring the S-400 missile system from Russia. It continues to keep the sword dangling.

With key strategic partners on both sides, India could not afford any hasty moves hurting its vital stakes.

Almost 60 per cent of India’s military supplies are Russian manufactured, which means it cannot afford to alienate Moscow, particularly at a time when Indian and Chinese troops continue to be in a stand-off on the eastern border.

India has close defence ties with Ukraine. Ukraine is currently involved in upgrading India’s AN-32 fleet as also providing gas turbine engines for naval vessels.

At the same time, the US and Europe, which are pushing back against Russia over Ukraine, are both important partners from India’s strategic calculus. Many American platforms have been used for reconnaissance and surveillance along the India-China border. Winter clothing for 50,000 troops has been sourced from these western strategic partners.

Another concern for Delhi is the small Indian community in Ukraine, of which 18,000 are students in medical colleges.

Imposition of sanctions on Russia will be a headache as Indian procurement of defence equipment and spares continue, apart from other economic activities. Russia is the world’s third largest producer of oil and second largest of natural gas. Most of its supplies are sent to Europe through oil pipelines, some transiting through Ukraine. Currently it supplies one third of Europe’s natural gas and one fourth of its oil. In case of escalation, these would be impacted, enhancing oil prices.

While India has been increasing its parleys with the US and entering into various pacts and alliances with it, Russia has been cementing its ties with China in a bid to be able to better counter US aggressiveness, should the need for doing so arise. For India, the China threat is perceived to be managed well through a strengthening alliance with the US.

Ties between India and Russia would have to navigate through the tortuous ways of the present scenario, seemingly tempestuous dynamics of international politics.

The primary objective of the China-Russia alignment is and will be undermining American power. The US is essential to anchor any effort to balance China. Without this anchor, there is little hope that China’s domination over Asia can be countered. Anything that diminishes the US strengthens China and vice-versa. Russian interests are thus directly contradictory to India’s because the weakening of the American power that Russia desires will strengthen China, much to India’s detriment.

Formal diplomatic positions with China have not shown much difference. Even on the Quad, India still appears the laggard — it refused to even name Quad in public until after the 2020 Galwan clash.

A China-dominated Asian order, which will be the consequence of Moscow’s efforts to undermine the US, can hardly be conducive to India’s strategic autonomy.

All in all, Indian involvement in any form would not yield any positive result. Neutrality is the best option for the current.

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The trickiest, officials say, is the $950-million contract for delivery of four advanced Talwar class frigates for the Indian Navy that was inked in 2018. The warships are designed to operate with a Ukrainian power plant, with no alternative option available.

India had to pull through a diplomatic coup of sorts in 2019 when it managed to convince Ukraine to supply engines for the first two ships that are being made in Russia, despite the Crimea crisis. These Zorya Mashproekt RPC gas turbine engines have been delivered to the Kaliningrad shipyard and are being integrated on the warships.

Deals under threat
• Project 11356: $950-m deal to supply four frigates to the Indian Navy
• Two being built in Russia. Gas turbine engines are Ukranian
• S-400: Delivery of first regiment has taken place
• Prolonged crisis could impact future deliveries
• JV with Russia: Brahmos-Russian venture recently bagged export order from the Philippines JV for production of AK

Closure of Any Project Unlikely

However, two additional ships are to be made at the Goa Shipyard with Russian assistance and power plants for them are yet to be delivered. There are concerns that uncertainty of supplies from Ukraine could adversely impact the project.

India has also received the first regiment of the S-400 air defence system from Russia but the delivery of four more is still hanging in the balance. There are no indications yet of any delay from the Russian side on the deliveries but a prolonged crisis in Ukraine is being seen as a matter of concern. In addition, US sanctions on India for the purchase under its CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) regime is now a distinct possibility. Till now, India had avoided the sanctions that have been imposed on Turkey and China in the past.

The sanctions will not lead to the closure of any projects as India is determined to go ahead with its Russian partnership but they cause delays in payments and procedural difficulties that take time to resolve. India and Russia have managed to evolve a process of payments for military systems that bypasses all US influenced banking controls. A significant part of these payments are being made through the Rupee-Rouble route.

Other Indian projects that can come under the scanner are the two joint ventures with Russia to manufacture missiles and assault rifles. The Brahmos project is jointly owned by the two nations and has recently won an export order to the Philippines, with more on the horizon. The other joint venture to produce Kalashnikov AK 203 assault rifles in India is yet to fully take off as production has not yet commenced in Amethi, where the factory has to be set up.

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