The Perils of Ignoring History
The image of a US Chinook helicopter lifting off from the US Embassy roof in Kabul, juxtaposed with an absolutely similar scene at the fall of Saigon went viral on social media, evoking collective déjà vu of the pell-mell American withdrawal from Vietnam. A more eerie parallel to the American intervention in Afghanistan though, is the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1839-42. The lessons of history were there to be learned – or ignored.
The outcome of both the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the British invasion in 1839 was the same – a return to status quo ante. In 1842, the British had no choice but to escort Amir Dost Mohammad back to the throne. In 2020, the Americans – after two decades of Operation Enduring Freedom and its follow-on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, that left nearly 2,500 US and 1,000 coalition troops dead, apart from nearly 4,000 ‘contractors’ – sent tacit signals of their weariness to the Taliban with the commencement of the Doha talks, culminating in the current triumphant return of the very Taliban whom they had driven out from Kabul in 2001.
In both cases, the interventionist great power had sought regime change by installing a more acceptable administration, only to admit defeat by allowing back the ones they threw out in the first place.
Lessons of the First Anglo-Afghan War 1839-42
The US declared a Global War of Terror when Al-Qaeda hit mainland USA with the horrific 9/11 strikes on the Twin Towers leaving over 3,000 dead and even the Pentagon building hit. They identified Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as the haven from which Al-Qaeda operated, under the protection of the Taliban, and decided to immediately strike at the root of the problem by driving out the Taliban from Afghanistan. In 1839, the British reason was fear of Amir Dost Mohammad cozying up to Tzarist Russia, raising the spectre of a Russian march – through a friendly Afghanistan – into India. Dost Muhammad had to go.
The first phases of both the Nineteenth Century war and Op Enduring Freedom went off similarly, with forces invading Afghanistan and taking Kabul, the erstwhile rulers fleeing. Regime change was effected, the British installing Shah Shuja back on the throne of Kabul in 1839, and the Americans overseeing a US-friendly Hamid Karzai become President in 2004.
Maintenance of Aim and Overall Strategy
The main difference between Op Enduring Freedom and the First Anglo-Afghan War is that the British never aimed to physically hold the country, directly or indirectly, unlike the Americans. Despite active operations of nearly 14 years, and subsequent nurturing of the Afghan Security Forces and state for another six, American-led coalition’s domination of the countryside proved impossible. Preponderance of Special Operations Forces with short rotation cycles meant there were never enough regular troops in the country to hold all ground. The British, on the other hand, despite severe blows to imperial pride such as the massacre of the entire British column retreating from Kabul in January 1842, kept their campaigns much shorter. The desired end-point was an Afghanistan unified under a ruler subservient to the British, with a British Resident and his small force garrisoned in the capital to keep a watchful eye on things. The British, thus, had a definite aim and a kind of time line; the Americans lost sight of a clear aim – war on terror – and stayed back to hand hold a fractious Afghan government and help build infrastructure. Inexplicably, President Biden flatly denied this aim in his address of August 17, when he said, “Our mission in Afghanistan was never supposed to have been nation-building… Our only vital national interest in Afghanistan remains today what it has always been: preventing a terrorist attack on the American homeland.” Given the relative absence of terror attacks on American soil, President Trump during his tenure declared ‘mission accomplished’, ‘time to head home’, with the commencement of the Doha talks with the Taliban, hitherto anathema to the US. President Biden merely ensured continuity of declared American policy.
The Joker-in-the-Pack
Adding immensely to America’s woes was joker-in-the-pack – Pakistan – ostensibly a staunch ally of the US, but actually a safe haven for Taliban to lick their wounds, re-group and make fresh forays into Afghanistan. Nothing brought out the duplicity of Pakistan more pointedly than the fact that the United States’ enemy Number One – Osama bin Laden – was finally located in Pakistan, safely ensconced within a stone’s throw of their Military Academy at Abbottabad! Yet, Pakistan remained ‘indispensible’ to the Coalition as the only land access to Afghanistan. America found itself between a rock and a hard place. Thus, an important Clauzewitzian tactical principle ‘cut off the enemy’s line of retreat’ could never be adhered to. In guerrilla warfare, in particular, this is a sure-fire recipe for disaster.
End of the Current Round in Afghanistan
The end of the current round of the Afghan Conflict begs the question – Why now? The late Rudolph Rummel’s insightful writings on end of conflicts seem to have the answer and are worth quoting at length. He stated, “Once international conflict is initiated, what ends it? In general, Conflict Behavior ends when a new balance of powers has been determined… (when) a balance is achieved, then conflict ends.” He further goes on to say, “Except in the rare case of the use of force in international conflict to completely overcome another’s will, therefore, a new balance of powers is a psychological equilibrium in the minds of the participants. It usually is not a relative inventory of military hardware and personnel alone… Rather, a new balance of power is a mutual willingness to accept the outcome as a result of the mutually perceived interests, capabilities and wills, and because of the expectation of the costs of further conflict.” And Afghanistan bore the brunt of costs of this round – casualties amongst Afghans have been estimated at 1,10,000 Afghan security personnel and civilians and over 50,000 Taliban.
What Lessons Does History Hold?
Afghanistan is a prisoner of geography, forever caught in a ‘Great Game’ between superpowers. This time, Afghanistan’s giant neighbours China and Russia are jockeying for positions of influence – covertly and overtly – in order to fill the vacuum left by the departing Americans. Pakistan gleefully waits in the wings, feeling it has finally achieved its cherished dream of strategic depth.
The outcomes of the three Anglo-Afghan Wars in 90 years are instructive. Nearly four decades of relative stability ensued after the First Afghan War of 1839-42 till Dost Mohammad’s grandson Amir Yakub Khan found himself dethroned and exiled to India (in Dehra Dun and Mussoorie, just like his grandfather!) as a consequence of the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878-80. The Treaty of Gandamak of 1878 acknowledging British paramountcy in foreign affairs (signed by Yakub Khan, leading to a revolt against him) was ratified by his successor, putting an end to that round of the great game between Tzarist Russia and Britain. It was after this war that in 1893 the Durand Line was drawn, leading to the creation of the North West Frontier Province, dividing the Pashtun population between British India and Afghanistan, sowing the seeds of perpetual strife. Afghanistan remained neutral during the First World War, despite its borders being denuded of British Indian Army presence due to deployment overseas. Thereafter, political instability in Afghanistan led to Amanullah seizing the throne and invading British India. The short, sharp Third Afghan War of May-June 1919 ended predictably in military victory for the British but got the Afghans what they wanted – freedom from British overlordship in foreign affairs and, thus, Independence. With Tzarist Russia in the throes of a revolution, the threat to British India was perceived as diminished, and the British finally gave in.
In all these wars, one constant emerged – no outside super power has been able to impose a government on Afghanistan which does not have the consensual approval of that country’s disparate tribes – a fact that Soviet Russia too realised after immense pain. Some sociological and economic factors unique to Afghanistan: adherence to strict Islamic injunctions; insularity despite sitting on the Silk and Spice trade routes; widespread economic deprivation giving them the historical role of marauders; large illicit cash flows to the warlords as Afghanistan accounts for nearly three-fourths of opium cultivation in the world; demographic anomaly of a larger number of Pashtuns on the either side of the Durand line, among others, need to be understood before an appropriate stance towards Afghanistan is formulated.
Afghanistan has not always been steeped in violence and terror. Zahir Shah, the last king of Afghanistan who ruled for 40 years from 1933-1973, showed that a relatively benign constitutional monarchy could adapt to tribal ways, religion and democracy. He successfully walked a tightrope not only between tribal pulls but also the super powers, made Afghanistan a democratic state and tried to modernise his country’s institutions – though even he had coins carrying the inscription “Al Mutawakkil’ala Allah Muhammad Zhahir Shah” (“The leaner on God, Muhammad Zhahir Shah”), recognising the depth of Islamic influence on Afghan society.
Will Taliban 2.0 finally end the violence that has dogged Afghanistan since Zahir Shah’s ouster in 1973? Will they turn over a new leaf and abjure jihad? Will the new Great Powers let Afghanistan take control of its own destiny or will 2021 mark the beginning of yet another ‘Great Game’ and further blood-letting? Time alone will tell – though history has left pointers for those who study them.
