It is widely believed that Chinese actions in Eastern Ladakh and Sikkim was part of a well-ochestrated move to send a message to India, as indeed China’s neighbours. The Chinese move was multi-pronged to divert attention from the domestic economic crisis, Hong Kong and Taiwan, as also to engineer to paint India as a villain constantly at odds with Pakistan and more recently, Nepal. With China believing that India was catalyzing resentment against Beijing over poor handling of the pandemic that originated in Wuhan, the People’s Liberation Army’s )PLA) tactical play along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was also seen by its people as teaching a lesson to the “Gweilo Club” and its perceived proxies. The use of party tabloid Global Times to paint India as an aggressor in Sikkim and Ladakh was also designed to force India to reassess its strategy of perceived alignment with the US against China.
The sudden Chinese belligerence at the border coincided with India’s chance to assume a leadership role at the World Health Organization (WHO) by taking over as the chair of the WHO executive Board on 22 May. As the head of the 34-member executive board, the Indian nominee will have considerable weight in administrative decisions and policies of WHO. Some of these decisions are contentious, and loaded with geopolitical significance such as opening a probe into the origins of the pandemic and Taiwan’s participation in the 72nd session of the World Health Assembly on 20-28 May.
In the wake of the economic slowdown owing to the Covid-19 pandemic in China, paramount leader Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are facing one of the biggest crises since the party came to power in 1949. The challenges before the party and the leader were deliberated on 22-28 May at the National People’s Congress and a parallel Chinese People’s Consultative Conference, the most powerful political advisory body in the country. The move is already on to pre-emptively counter any dissatisfaction in handling the pandemic and the consequent surge in economic distress. While there was no political challenge to President Xi, who is also the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, it is the economic collapse that Beijing fears coupled with growing resentment against China, fuelling nationalism and the kindling of old Chinese fears against foreign threats.
While the NPC was called to deliberate on the next five-year development plan, the session also provided a platform to President Xi to respond both domestically and internationally to the pandemic. The expected message was conciliatory to the domestic audience, while the international assertion was to be robust and defiant.
Indian Moves Irked China
The Chinese government had taken offence to India’s new rule notified in early April that blocked Chinese companies from acquiring Indian firms without government approval. The decision to tilt the balance in favour of Indian companies did not go down too well with Beijing. As part of this exercise, the government decided that all procurement orders of Rs 200 crore or less could not go to foreign companies. The government’s hard push to the Make in India campaign raised concerns in Beijing that it could discourage cheap exports from China.
Earlier, in the wake of the abrogation of Article 370 and 35A on Jammu & Kashmir, there was a sudden outburst from Beijing over making Ladakh a Union Territory (UT). China described India’s move as “unacceptable”, undermining its “sovereignty” — even raised the issue at the UN Security Council. India dismissed China’s assertion, termed Ladakh’s new status as an “internal matter” having “no implication for India’s external boundaries or the LAC with China”.
The statement by prime minister Modi during the G20 video conference, on 26 March hosted by Saudi Arabia’s, was statesmanlike and avoided blaming China for the pandemic. However, of late, many in India have voiced their concerns against China for the pandemic echoing the many voices, the world over. China cannot afford India, with its growing power and voice in the world bodies, raising issues against China and, hence, the military pressure as part of strategic signaling. China realises that they will need India on its side as it stands isolated, the methodology applied is negative, and will backfire.
Frequent calls by Indians to integrate Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit- Baltistan as these territories rightfully belong to India, have caused concern in China no end since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is part of the ‘China Dream’, and CPEC which passes through POK connecting Gawadar is central to the BRI. China with huge investments will safeguard its interests, and hence the military coercion and strategic signaling.
Tactical Objectives
Ladakh and the boundary dispute was only to serve as a tactical ploy.
One potential cause and an impetus for past confrontations are the growing activities and infrastructure improvements being undertaken on both sides of the border. China wanted to stop India from building a road to Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) in the Galwan Valley, while the Indian troops wanted China’s PLA to vacate a post they claimed fell under Indian territory.
China has said India was “attempting to unilaterally change the status quo” on the LAC. The Durbuk-Shyok-DBO road was under construction for more than 15 years. As per protocol, local commanders kept informing each other about the construction activities. China never raised any objection against it. In fact, construction work on China’s side of the LAC has been of a much higher scale. It appears that current activities by China are meant to put pressure on India, and are not based on any perceived transgression by Indian troops.
India continues to construct and modernize over 60 “strategic roads” along the LAC, with an expected completion date of 2022. As India attempts to negate China’s substantial infrastructure advantage at the border, the opportunities for friction increase. Still, this doesn’t fully explain why tensions would flare at multiple noncontiguous points along the border in such a short time span.
The fact is after the construction of strategic Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road in eastern Ladakh and rapid construction of strategic roads in both the middle and eastern sector, it is China that is concerned about India’s military objectives.
Another viewpoint holds that the traditionally peaceful Galwan River has now become a hotspot because it is where the LAC is closest to the new road India has built along the Shyok River to DBO – the most remote and vulnerable area along the LAC in Ladakh.
Comments
India under prime minister Narendra Modi is no pushover. It is the third largest market after the US and ASEAN, and could even be the key to economic revival of China. Militarily, it serves neither the interest of China nor India to raise the red flag as there will be huge economic and political costs to such a move. Pakistan and Nepal don’t add up to cost-benefit analysis. And the Doklam stand-off message did not exactly work with Bhutan in 2017.
Even though the PLA is using a 1960 map released by then Premier Chou En Lai to present the cartographic expansion in Ladakh, there is little resemblance of the ground situation to either 1962 skirmishes or 1999 incursions in Kargil sector. The only coincidence is that President Xi may use the Ladakh military option to divert attention of his domestic audience, just as the then Chinese leader Mao Zedong used the 1962 skirmish to cover the massive Chinese famine due to failure of the Great Leap Forward revolution.
Areas Claimed by China
In all, China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of territory in India’s northeast, including the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh with its traditionally Buddhist population. India says China occupies 38,000 square kilometers of its territory in the Aksai Chin Plateau in the western Himalayas, including part of the Ladakh region.
Out of the 857 sq km long border in Ladakh only 368 sq km is the International Border, and the rest of the 489 sq km is the LAC. The two traditional disputed points included Trig Heights and Demchok. At eight points, the two sides have differing perceptions — Samar Lungpa 176 sq km, Depsang Plains 972, Hot Spring 38, Changlung 13, Kungkala-Phobrang 5, Sarjap 129, Spanguur 24, and Dhumtsele 25 sq km. But lately, China has raised two fresh dispute points at Pangong Tso 83 sq km and at Chumur where it claims 80 sq km. The old dispute sites were at the end point of Pangong Tso and at Chushul — the 1962 battle-site.
The Sirijap range on the northern bank of the lake remains most contested, from which several cliff spurs jut out — the “finger series” 1 to 8. India’s LAC claim line is at Finger-8, but the actual position is only up to Finger-4. The Chinese are asserting further west to claim 83 sq km here. The PLA has built a 4.5 km long road to prevent patrolling by Indian troops. The PLA’s road network from here extends to Huangyangtan base located near National Highway G219.
Further south in Demchok, China claims some 150 sq km. The PLA has built massive infrastructure on its side, moved armoured troops into ChardingNalla since 2009. Tibetan nomads pitch tents on Hemis Monastery’s land throughout 2018-2019.
In Chumur, China claims 80 sq km and probably wants a straight border from PT-4925 to PT-5318 to bring Tible Mane (stupa) area under its control. For India, holding of Chumur is critical for the safety of the Manali-Leh route. Remember, the PLA demanded removal of India’s fortified positions in Burtse (2013) and Demchok and Chumur (2014) for its retreat.
Overall, the pattern shows the PLA’s desperate design to snatch the lake at Lukung through a three-pronged strategy of attacking from Sirijap in the north, Chuchul in the south and through the lake water from middle. This is the key choke-point from where the Chinese can cut off Indian access to the entire flank of Chip Chap plains, Aksai Chin in the east and Shayok Valley to the north, which means that Indian control is pushed to the west of the Shyok river and south of the Indus river, forcing India to accept both rivers as natural boundaries. And once China gets control of the southern side of the Karakoram it can easily approach Siachen Glacier from the Depsang corridor and meet at Tashkurgan junction from where the CPEC crosses into Gilgit-Baltistan.
That would be disastrous for Indian defence, leaving the strategic Nubra vulnerable, possibly impacting even India’s hold over Siachen. China’s access to Changla-pass through Lukung and Tangtse would threaten the entire Indus Valley. It is quite possible that China is eyeing the waters of the Shyok, Galwan and Chang-Chenmo rivers, to divert them to the arid Aksai Chin and its Ali region.
Confidence Building Measures
There are a series of protocols to ensure that India and China both know the disputed sections of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The 3,488-km LAC running along the Himalayan ridgeline has several disputed points. The perception of where the LAC runs varies at certain places by several kilometres and troops of both countries patrol these disputed sections.
The non-disputed areas were a strict no-go. What China did at Galwan in eastern Ladakh in May 2020 was a situation that had not arisen since November 1962 — when India- China war ended. At Galwan, China encroached some 3-4 km on the Indian side of the LAC, and this stretch, incidentally, was not disputed by either side.
At the north bank of Pangong Tso — a 135-km lake — troops clashed, and two flag meetings yielded nothing. China wanted to keep India at least 8-10 km short of the present patrolling line.
Since 1993 — the year, incidentally, coincides with the economic rise of India and China — the two countries have had a few key agreements aimed at ensuring peace along the LAC. In September 1993, the “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas” was inked. Since then, a series of agreements were signed dictating the conduct of soldiers and authorised a high-powered committee with members of both sides to sort out matters.
Incidents at Galwan and Pangong Tso fly in the face of the 2005 protocol inked on “modalities for implementation of confidence-building measures in the military field along the LAC in the India-China border areas”. The mandate of the agreement is: “Neither side shall use force or threaten to use force against the other.” It also calls upon both sides to stop their activities (like patrols) in the disputed area and not advance any further. On coming face-to-face, troops unfurl a banner, asking the other to back off from the present position of patrolling. There are some 400-500 such banner drills done annually, but in the current stand-off the system has not worked.
The “Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs” was established in January 2012 after border talks between then NSA Shivshankar Menon and his Chinese counterpart Dai Bingguo, and is headed by joint secretary-level officials from both sides. It is tasked to “address issues and situations that may arise in the border areas that affect the maintenance of peace”.
The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement inked in 2013 says both sides have to inform about military exercise and flying of aircraft. The two sides agreed that they shall not follow or tail patrols of the other side in areas where there is no common understanding of the LAC. China is flying helicopters very close to the LAC, India responded by flying out a team of Sukhoi 30 MKI jets, and patrol parties have jostled, fought and exchanged fisticuffs.
