Brig ZA Khan is the author of “The Way it Was” – a raw, brutal account of the life of a Pakistan army officer. He was among nine brothers to have served in the Pakistan armed forces. He served in the Special Services Group during the traumatic events of the 1971 war and arrested Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman. He pulls no punches while describing the horror of war. He missed fighting in the Indo-Pak War 1965 but gave a thorough analysis of that war as well in his book. The Way it Was is available in India with Natraj Publishers, Dehra Dun.
While I was busy raising 38 Cavalry in Hyderabad I was called to Khairpur on October 16, where the 18 Division HQ were located. There the GOC Maj Gen BM Mustafa explained his concept of forthcoming operations to Lt Col Akram Hussain Syed and me, with his Colonel Staff Col Wajid Ali Shah present.
The General planned to defensively hold the front south of Rahimyar Khan and outflanking the Indian left flank seize Ramgarh and Jaisalmer; 38 Cavalry was to seize Ramgarh and 22 Cavalry was to neutralise the airfield at Jaisalmer; the GOC asked for our comments about the practicability of the plan from the armour point of view. Lt Col Akram Syed and I said that the plan would succeed if we made an approach march to the border on one night and undertook the cross border operations the next night and air cover was made available on the first day from dawn to dusk till Ramgarh and Jaisalmer had been secured. The general said he would make arrangements for the air cover, he cautioned that the plan was ‘top secret’ and was not to be discussed with anyone. In the first week of November, 38 Cavalry, less ‘A’ Squadron detached to 55 Brigade at Chor, concentrated at Manthar, about 25 miles on the road Sadiqabad-Rahimyar Khan.
A few days after the regiment concentrated, the COAS and Air Mshl Rahim, the PAF chief came to Rahimyar Khan, where the 18 Division plan was discussed and the PAF chief assured the required air support. A few days after the Rahimyar Khan meeting, the GOC inter-changed the roles of 22 Cavalry and 38 Cavalry because he anticipated a tank battle in the Ramgarh area for which 22 Cavalry was better suited.
I considered the operation. Jaisalmer was 120 miles from the rail head at Reti. I expected an engine breakdown every 15 miles and requested that 12 spare engines be provided with an EME team and a breakdown with a crane to change engines. The GOC agreed to make the necessary arrangements. The officers of 38 Cavalry carried out reconnaissance for counter penetration covering the approaches to Rahimyar Khan and Lt Col Akram Syed and I took our officers along the route that we were to take to the border – Reti-Khenju-Gabbar-Masitwari Bhit-border – without telling them that was the route that we were to follow in the forthcoming operations. About the middle of November, the news indicated that the attack on East Pakistan had begun and Indian aircraft started flying reconnaissance missions over Rahimyar Khan and Sadiqabad. With war imminent I decided to let my officers and the Risaldar Major know that the mission of 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion and mortar battery was to capture Jaisalmer and neutralise the airfield.
I explained how the mission was to be conducted and that each tank was to carry 200 gallons of petrol in drums. At the Division HQ, there was no preparations for the very imminent operations. On 1 December, Col Saeed Qadir came to investigate the seizing of tank engines and ordered the removal of tank engines and cleaning of oil sumps and filters. On 2nd December, I received orders to report to the Division HQ and there the GOC told me that operations would begin that evening, that 38 Cavalry, 1 Punjab and a mortar battery would follow 51 Brigade up to Laungewala and proceed to Jaisalmer to neutralise the airfield. The GOC told me that I was not to attend the Division orders but to organise my force.
I telephoned my regiment to stop the work of taking down tank engines and prepare for moving out. I next went to the AA&QMG and told him that I required 16,800 gallons of octane 80 petrol. The AA&QMG told me that he knew nothing about the requirement and had no petrol available. After a discussion with the Colonel Staff, the AA&QMG told me that the required petrol would be made available at Masitwari Bhit, 5 miles short of the border. It was obvious that the logistics of the operation had not been planned.
When the 18 Division ‘O’ group assembled, the PAF liaison officer, a wing commander, informed the ‘O’ Group that the PAF would not be able to support the operation because the Jacobabad airfield had not been activated. This announcement led the brigade commanders to ask the GOC to cancel or postpone the operation. The GOC then telephoned the CGS and discussed the lack of air. After the discussion, he informed the ‘O’ Group that his orders were to conduct the operation without air support in the ‘national interest’.
The brigade commanders then suggested that the GOC refuse to conduct the operation because it was very likely to fail. The GOC told the ‘O’ Group that he would conduct the operation because, if he did not, he would be labelled as a General who had lost his nerve. The plan made by Maj Gen BM Mustafa required an approach march of about sixty miles to the border, then a forty miles advance to Ramgarh by 51 Brigade of two battalions (the third battalion was a East Bengal battalion and had to be left out of the operations) and 22 Cavalry, by passing Laungewala, to position itself to counter any reaction from the Indian 12 Division, which was expected to be deployed facing Rahimyar Khan.
I was to command the 38 Cavalry task force consisting 38 Cavalry less squadron, 1 Punjab ex-206 Brigade and a mortar battery, and was to follow 51 Brigade till the metalled road to Jaisalmer, 20 miles inside India, and then continue to Jaisalmer. 206 Brigade, leaving one battalion on the Rahimyar Khan front (this front was held by Hur battalions), was to follow my force and secure Laungewala to form a firm base. After these orders were issued, 206 Brigade commander objected to 38 Cavalry being sent to Jaisalmer with mechanically unsound tanks. The GOC changed the plan and ordered 28 Baluch, the Divisional Reconnaissance & Support Battalion less a company and a mortar battery to neutralise the airfield and placed 38 Cavalry under command 51 Brigade.
I was informed about the change in the plan on the afternoon of 2 December. The orders received from GHQ differed from the plan that had been suggested, instead of making the approach march of 60 miles to border in one night and going across the border the next night, the GHQ order stated that the approach march was to start at 1530 hours on 3 December and the border had to be crossed at 2130 hours and the advance was to continue to Ramgarh and Jaisalmer, a total march of 120 miles in one night. On the evening of 2 December, I went to the 51 Brigade HQ. Lt Col Akram Syed was already there. He told me that the brigade commander was shaken and had lost his nerve. A little later, the brigade commander came to the tent, where the ‘O’ Group had assembled. He appeared shaken. The GSO-3 laid out the maps of the operational area. The maps covered our territory, but Indian territory was blank squares. The brigade had not collected the maps of the operational area from the Division HQ.
I placed my maps, which showed the terrain features on both sides of the border, on the table. From the ensuing discussion, it became apparent that the brigade commander’s mind had stopped working. Nothing was known about the Indian deployment, even the number of the Indian division was incorrectly said to be 11, whereas, it was 12. As the brigade commander hesitated, I told him that my guess was that an infantry battalion and a tank squadron would be protecting the Indian flank at Laungewala, that 51 Brigade with 22 Cavalry with an infantry battalion on tanks to move on the track Masitwari Bhit-Laungewala and by passing Laungewala continue to Ramgarh. 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion to follow and secure Laungewala or wait the arrival of 206 Brigade. No one objected and the brigade commander accepted the plan. When the ‘O’ Group dispersed, the artillery regiment commander asked me for my map saying that his maps were also without terrain features across the border. On 3 December, 38 Cavalry tanks moved on tracks for 25 miles and entrained at Sadiqabad and arrived at Reti railway station about, 30 miles from Sadiqabad at 1800 hours.
I went to Reti railway station at about 1730 hours and asked the station master at what time the tank train was to arrive, he surprised me by saying that he had no intimation of any tank train. I realised that the AA&QMG had not informed the railways about the movement. I then spoke to the railway movement controller at Sukkur and, after a lot of shouting and threatening, the controller agreed to move the train to Reti. At the Reti railway station, a goods train was standing at the tank unloading line. There was no ‘power’ available at Reti. We were arguing about this when the station master started going through the procedure of allowing a train to pass through. I made him stop the train and use its locomotive to move the goods train.
At about 9 o’clock, the tank train with 14 tanks, whose engines had been hurriedly refitted without cleaning the filters, arrived and were unloaded. We were running well behind the divisional planned schedule. From Reti, the tanks drove to Khenju along a canal bank. At Khenju, my second-in-command, Major Zia Uddin Javed, was waiting with petrol and the tanks were refuelled. From Khenju, the desert track started and the tanks in low gear ground their way to Gabbar 19 miles from the border. Thirteen out of fourteen tanks arrived at 0100 hours on 4 December. At Gabbar, I was surprised to find 22 Cavalry and the GOC, who told me that 22 and 38 Cavalry were the only troops which had arrived.
At 0400 hours, the GOC called off the operation for that day and both regiments dispersed. On 4 December, the Indian Air Force did not show up. On checking up, I found that the lorries carrying the petrol promised by the AA&QMG were stuck in the sand near Dharki. I sent a message to Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali Khan and he commandeered the EME battalion’s 6×6 vehicles and we refuelled. I looked for the tank that had broken down. It was a few miles from Khenju. The Tatra crane was bellied near Khenju. That put an end to my engine replacement plan. During the day, on the advice of the brigade commanders, the attack on the Jaisalmer airfield was abandoned and 1 Punjab reverted to 206 Brigade. Just before last light, a battery of 130 mm guns passed through Gabbar and 38 Baluch joined 22 Cavalry, mounted their tanks moved off towards the border.
At about 2100 hours, six tanks and the reconnaissance troop of 38 Cavalry reached Masitwari Bhit. 22 Cavalry was refuelling. Lt Col Akram Syed told me that Brig Tariq Mir was behaving very badly and had stated that he had no intention of going beyond Laungewala. I met Brig Tariq Mir and he told me that he intended not to go beyond Laungewala. At about 2300 hours, 51 Brigade moved off leaving the elements of 38 Cavalry, a platoon of a Punjab battalion of 206 Brigade, one lost FOO at Masitwari Bhit and Brig Jahanzeb Arbab joined us.
The operation, so far, was a movement fiasco. Civilian requisitioned 4×2 trucks could not negotiate the loose sand. 20 Frontier Force, a battalion of 206 Brigade, marched across the desert ‘to the sound of the guns’ when their vehicles failed to negotiate the desert. At about 0200 hours on 5 December, Brig Jahanzeb Arbab and I decided that no one else was likely to join us and we decided to follow 51 Brigade. I ordered 2nd Lt Javed Iqbal, with the reconnaissance troop, to lead, followed by the RHQ 38 Cavalry and six tanks under Major Javed Hussain.
About two miles after crossing the border I found 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal coming back, when I asked him where he was going he told me that all the vehicles of the reconnaissance troop had disappeared. I realised that the NCOs had hidden their vehicles (I court martialled them after the ceasefire).
Major Javed Hussain now took the lead and went 18 miles. Four tanks broke down leaving two runners and we had to halt, two miles short of Laungewala luckily on the highest ridge in the area. At about 0730 hours, explosions were heard from the direction of Laungewala and columns of smoke started rising. I and my adjutant drove towards the smoke columns in my Rover and, from a ridge overlooking the Laugewala-Jaisalmer metalled road, we saw five tanks of 22 Cavalry and an Indian tank burning. Four Hawker Hunters of the IAF were circling and after firing all their rockets, etc, they flew away.
A little later, a helicopter took off. Later, I learnt that the GOC had come to 51 Brigade as it was out of communication with the Division HQ and ordered Lt Col Akram Syed to capture Laungewala. I and my adjutant drove to the 51 Brigade HQ, I asked the brigade commander what the situation was and he said he did not know. I then drove to the base of the hill on which Laungewala was located. Two companies of 38 Baluch and a squadron of 22 Cavalry were formed up to attack. 22 Cavalry reached the rear of the Indian Laungewala defences at about 0200 hours. In the absence of the brigade commander, 22 Cavalry and 38 Baluch decided to attack and clear Laungewala before advancing to Ramgarh.
At 0700 hours, a squadron and two companies of infantry attacked and were engaged by anti-tank guns, machine guns and AMX tanks. One AMX was knocked out; then six Hawker Hunters appeared, knocked out five tanks of 22 Cavalry and the Baluchis went to the ground due to strafing.
Half an hour later, 22 Cavalry formed up again to attack and the IAF knocked out six tanks, at about 0900 hours. 22 Cavalry formed up again but, after a vehement and abusive argument the brigade commander overruled the attack. 22 Cavalry had cut off the roads Loganewal-Ramgarh, Laungewala-Tanot and the road to Jaisalmer. The brigade commander ordered the concentration of the regiment around the brigade HQ, re-opening the Indian communications to Laungewala. In subsequent air attacks, 22 Cavalry lost six more tanks bringing the day’s losses to 17 tanks, 10 killed and 17 wounded.
Four Hawker Hunters of the Indian Air Force circled Laungewala from 0700 hours to sunset and prevented any ground movement. 22 Cavalry fired all their 12.7mm anti-aircraft ammunition and also tried their 100 mm in the anti-aircraft role but could not hit any aircraft that were releasing rockets and firing their guns from about five thousand metres. After witnessing the pull back by 22 Cavalry, I returned to where my tanks were. There I found Brig Jahanzeb Arbab. I told him of the state of affairs at Laungewala and he asked me to accompany him to Laungewala.
We found 51 Brigade deployed astride the Laungewala-Jaisalmer road out of contact with the Indian troops. The 51 Brigade commander told us that an Indian brigade had linked up with Laungewala. While we were at the 51 Brigade HQ, a helicopter, flown by Capt (later lt gen) ‘Mac’ Maqbool of 12 Cavalry, landed with orders from the GOC ordering 51 Brigade to capture Laungewala and Ghotaru, a place about ten miles on the road to Jaisalmer. On receiving the orders Brig Tariq Mir announced that he would not comply with the orders as the Indians were too strong for the brigade to attack.
While we were witnessing the brigade commander’s refusal to obey the division commander’s orders, Indian aircraft again attacked and we all went into trenches, Brig Jahanzeb and I went to the same trench. There we discussed what we had seen and I told Brig Jahanzeb that it would be a shame to withdraw after coming 20 miles and convinced him to assume command as the senior brigadier. He hesitated and said I was creating trouble, but he agreed to assume control.
After the Indian aircraft departed, Brig Jahanzeb informed Brig Tariq Mir that 206 Brigade would attack Laungewala and he ordered Lt Col Shah, CO 28 Baluch Reconnaissance and Support Battalion, to advance along the road Laungewala-Jaisalmer and capture Ghotaru.
The CO 28 Baluch disappeared and explained after the ceasefire that he understood that he was to make a wide outflanking movement to Ghotaru by withdrawing to the Sadiqabad-Sukkur road. Brig Jahanzeb returned to the point where my tanks had stopped. His brigade had concentrated there. He made an attack plan setting the H-hour at 0300 hrs 6 December. He gave out his orders and told me to go and explain the plan to Brig Tariq Mir and ask him to mark the forming up place (FUP) and provide a squadron of 22 Cavalry to support the attack.
I reached the 51 Brigade area at about 1800 hours. I met Lt Col Akram Syed and explained the plan. He told me that Brig Tariq Mir had decided to withdraw across the border. I then went to 51 Brigade HQ and gave the requirements of 206 Brigade to the brigade commander, who said that he was withdrawing across the border and remained adamant about it. At about 1900 hours, the brigade started moving back. The withdrawing 51 Brigade and advancing 206 Brigade crossed each other on Kharo Tar, a high ridge line slightly ahead of where my tanks had stopped. Brig Jahanzeb decided to take up a defensive position on the ridge. At about 1130 hours the next day, the Indians made contact with tanks and infantry.
The GOC came and ordered 206 Brigade to regain the Laungewala-Jaisalmer road and 51 Brigade to prepare a depth position. Later, the GOC ordered a general withdrawal across the border and all ranks to fire small arms at the enemy aircraft. When I heard about this order, I drove to the Division HQ at Gabbar and met the GOC who confirmed his order. I told him that if there was a general withdrawal troops would not stop east of the Indus and if the order to fire small arms at the aircraft was not cancelled the troops would fire all their ammunition and run away. I asked the GOC to cancel both orders and order a fighting withdrawal with the two brigades withdrawing through each other. The GOC cancelled both his previous orders and adopted my suggestion.
By the morning of 7 December, 206 Brigade was firmly established on Kharo Tar. My Quartermaster, Capt Bhatti, kept us supplied with food, meethi roti and water from Sadiqabad and when a cry went up that 206 Brigade units were running out of ammunition, I made my Dodge Power Wagons available and ammunition was brought from Sadiqabad. 38 Cavalry squadron, left at Manthar because their engines could not be refitted when the division started its movement, moved into counter-penetration positions on the approaches to Rahimyar Khan. The GOC had complained that he was having a communication problem with 51 Brigade since the beginning of the operation. I told him I would see what the problem was.
I sent my command vehicle with my adjutant to 51 Brigade HQ to establish communications between the brigade and the division and when my command vehicle would move the communication would break. My signal JCO could not find the reason. After the ceasefire, an NCO disclosed that the brigade had kept its wireless set meant to communicate with division HQ, switched off. On the night 8/9 December, 206 Brigade withdrew from Kharo Tar through the position prepared by 51 Brigade. 38 Cavalry, after firing all the HE ammunition, destroyed its two broken down tanks and moved to Masitwari Bhit.
On 9 December, after taking over the front, Brig Tariq Mir reported that two enemy tank regiments were turning his flanks to cut off the brigade. 22 Cavalry was moved from Gabbar and were attacked by the IAF and lost another tank. The two Indian tank regiments were a figment of the brigade commander’s imagination.
A little distance from my regimental HQ, the divisional gun area was located. The IAF attacked the gun area and my HQ. A cannon shot made a hole in my leather jacket and a rocket hit the open cupola flap of my tank and broke the hinge. The gun area was defended with training guns of the Anti-Aircraft School, which fired single shots but kept the IAF away. On the night 11/12 December, the remnants of 38 Cavalry withdrew to Gabbar. On the morning of 12 December, when my second in command went to find out where the ‘forward defended localities’ (FDLs) were, I found Maj Gen BM Mustafa standing there. Someone whispered that the General had been sacked and Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan was in command of 18 Division.
I met the General and asked his GSO-2 (Intelligence) where the FDLs were. The General heard me and indicating the GSO-2 and himself he said that they were the FDLs and there was nothing forward of them. Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan, the new GOC, on assuming command the previous day, ordered a ‘general withdrawal’ – both brigades took off in the ‘Gabbar Gallop’ and some men were rounded up and brought back from the Punjab Regimental Centre at Mardan.
On the night of 12/13 December, I established my HQ at Khenju and collected all my broken down tanks and started engine replacement. On 16 December, ‘Tiger’ Niazi surrendered, two days later, to everyone’s surprise. We ceased firing. After Operation ‘Labbaik’ ended in fiasco everyone claimed that they were not privy to the operation, though 206 Brigade commander was removed from command for objecting to the operation.
The mission assigned to 18 Division was “Defend the area of responsibility in order to ensure the security of the main line of communications Karachi-Multan and be prepared to carry out the war into the enemy territory under favourable conditions.” This implied the guarding of 600 miles road and rail communications close to the border, 18 Division successfully carried out its mission.
It was a classical spoiling attack, which put the Indians off balance and the Division’s mission was achieved.
If the allegations about the Gabbar gallop are true, why is it that no officer was taken to task? Because the GOC Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan did not allow the general withdrawal to be disclosed to the Awan Committee.
How would you rate the various committee reports which studied the 1971 war like the Awan Committee, Akbar Committee and the Hamood Commission?
I was present when the Awan Committee investigated the 18 Division fiasco. The commanding officers and brigade commanders were divided into those who were allowed to speak and those who were ordered not to speak. I was in the “not” category. The effort was to cover up the shortcomings of Brig Tariq Mir and Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan’s “Gabbar gallop” with GHQ and Maj Gen BM Mustafa as handy scapegoats.
I have not seen the report but it must have been a farce. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report was prejudicial. It showed a lack of understanding of tactics and seemed to deliberately malign the performance of the army by its criticism of corps, division commanders and some brigade commanders. Examples are the criticism of Lt Gen Irshad and Maj Gen Zahid for tactical withdrawal and Maj Gen Mustafa for his spoiling attack. I am not aware of the contents of the Akbar Committee report.
