Reinforcing the Enduring Relevance of India’s Doctrine
During the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, the risks of nuclear weapon use or a nuclear accident at nuclear plants in Zaporizhzhia, occupied by Russia, and Kursk have been repeatedly highlighted. Russia has frequently threatened to use nuclear weapons, the latest instance being on February 24, 2026, when it accused the UK and France of helping Ukraine acquire nuclear capability and warned that such actions could trigger a confrontation between nuclear powers. Later, between 18 and 20 May 2026, Russia and Belarus conducted joint nuclear exercises involving missile units and strategic forces practicing nuclear weapon delivery and deployment. Such threats have emanated since the start of the conflict from various levels of the Russian government and military, including President Putin. Immediately after the invasion of Ukraine, Putin ordered Russia’s military on 27 February 2022 to put its deterrence forces, which include nuclear weapons, on “special alert.” On September 21 of the same year, he reiterated his threat to use all types of weapons, asserting that it was not a bluff. This clearly shows that his threats so far had not been taken seriously or lacked credibility, as they were driven by battlefield reversals and a shortage of military personnel in the invasion’s initial stages.
Russia’s nuclear threats reduced in 2023 when its military operations were achieving favourable results, another reason for their low credibility. However, nuclear rhetoric picked up again in 2024, including exercises simulating “theatre” or regional nuclear attacks, in contrast to “strategic” nuclear exercises simulating war with the US. Russian threats have been so frequent and unceasing that they no longer make headlines in Western media. Their recurrence has eroded credibility, rendering them ineffectual. These provocative articulations are assessed to be inconceivable, exaggerated, routine, discordant, and implausible.
The intent of these threats appears to be imposing restraint and influencing Western decisions. Russia has essentially reinforced two red lines for the West: first, the unacceptability of direct involvement and deployment of NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine; second, deterring and constraining the West from providing military aid to Ukraine, specifically offensive weapons platforms that could threaten Russian territory. In the first case, the US and NATO leaders have been extremely cautious and avoided direct resistance to Russia’s invasion. While military assistance was slow initially, it picked up gradually. The West has disregarded Russia’s warnings and provided Ukraine with weapon systems explicitly opposed by the Kremlin, including tanks, drones, and long-range missiles. On August 1, 2024, the first batch of long-awaited F-16 jets arrived in Ukraine, significantly bolstering its air force. Ukraine has since carried out aerial strikes deep into Russian territory, even hitting oil refineries in Siberia. Earlier, it forced Russia to scale down its Victory Day Parade on 9 May 2026 in Moscow due to security concerns. Despite its red lines being violated, Russia has avoided striking NATO territory. This reflects the continued effectiveness of strategic mutual nuclear deterrence among parties to the conflict.
Historically, the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by either side has not been taken seriously. During the Cold War, NATO planning envisaged immediate use of hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons in response to a conventional Soviet attack in Europe, to hedge against conventional asymmetry. Yet, nobody assigned a high probability to this option. Similarly, the Soviets remained largely hostile to the idea that nuclear war could be fought in a highly limited manner, such as small-scale battlefield exchanges for bargaining purposes.
India does not face a major nuclear threat from large nuclear powers—the US and Russia—or the medium-sized nuclear forces maintained by the UK and France. Its major adversaries are China and Pakistan. China is the first and only nuclear weapon state recognized under the NPT to have maintained an official NFU policy continuously since it first acquired nuclear weapons in 1964. Since then, it has shown no proclivity for nuclear blackmail or coercive diplomacy based on nuclear threats. While a full-blown war initiated by China to resolve the boundary issue is unlikely in the short term, limited conflict due to escalation of local issues on the LAC could occur, as seen in Eastern Ladakh in 2020. As long as nuclear capabilities remain, China’s intentions can change at any time.
Pakistan’s case is entirely different. It considers the threat from India existential and inimical to its very idea of nationhood. Its strategic thought process is based on proactive and pre-emptive actions. Nuclear weapons give Pakistan the confidence to face a larger neighbour with asymmetry in military, economic, and industrial capacity. It professes that nuclear weapons reduce the probability of conventional conflict. Accordingly, it has a declaratory doctrine of “first use,” and lately has been advocating “early use” as part of strategic signalling to India. It has also alluded to ambiguous territorial, infrastructure, and economic red lines. Ambiguity and irrationality reinforce the deterrence value of nuclear threats. Pakistan seeks to deter India at all levels of war—nuclear, conventional, and sub-conventional—while denying India the same equation. It has regularly resorted to nuclear sabre-rattling in past conflicts to influence Indian decision-makers, as demonstrated during the Kargil War, Operation Parakram, surgical strikes across the LC, the Balakot air strikes, and recently Operation Sindoor.
In contrast, India’s nuclear doctrine is based on the twin pillars of NFU and minimum credible deterrence, resulting in massive retaliation in response to a nuclear attack. India believes that nuclear weapons deter only nuclear war and are of strategic relevance, not for warfighting. Suggestions have been made in recent years to revise the doctrine, abandon NFU, and incorporate “first use.” The main arguments advanced include the complex regional security environment and technological advances that may degrade the potency of a second strike.
Deterrence is widely accepted as a psychological construct rather than an end in itself. It should inspire fear, where the perceived cost of deterrence breakdown outweighs the benefits of war as a dispute resolution instrument. Even if a nation declares NFU, no one will trust that it will remain committed to NFU if its vital interests are at stake. A degree of calculated ambiguity in a nuclear doctrine is essential for credibility. Restraints on nuclear war are mainly intellectual, ethical, and doctrinal. During the Cold War, the USSR could not have invaded Western Europe even if the US had a declaratory NFU policy. Importantly, it is against the national interest of responsible and status quo powers like India to weaken the nuclear threshold. Conventional attacks are largely considered within the rules of international behaviour in a jus ad bellum situation, such as punitive conventional retaliation by India in response to high-profile terrorist incidents. The possibility of escalation or total eruption makes it unlikely that either side could achieve decisive victory in a limited war by using nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, the existence of nuclear weapons cannot be downplayed, and they may be used in extreme cases by a nuclear-capable state. Threats to use nuclear weapons will continue to be made repeatedly to deter and influence adversary decision-making by playing mind games. Under the nuclear overhang, space for conventional operations exists, though its extent remains undefined and can be expanded by the side exercising escalation dominance. Moreover, deterrence is not static; it requires active escalation management throughout a crisis. Therefore, lessons from recent conflicts, particularly the Russia–Ukraine war, reinforce the enduring relevance, resilience, and credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine in maintaining strategic stability.
