The Agnipath Scheme approved by the government and now under implementation has its serious flaws, which must be addressed.

Lessons from Ukraine

The ongoing war in Ukraine has some very pertinent lessons, which India must ingest and implement before it is too late. Simply put, 70 per cent of our high-tech equipment is of Russian origin, which has been put to the unforgiving test of combat. There is a dire need to retro-fit and re-design based on lessons learnt. The key lesson, however, is the unprecedented levels of lethality on the modern battlefield and the sheer scale of casualties that are staggering and unprecedented. We are almost back to the carnage and slaughter levels of World War I era. The Clausewitzian dictum of war, not just as an unrelenting contest of national wills but also of stamina and endurance, is back. This is the most inopportune time to downsize or reduce numbers (as we are doing in India). The world over, defence budgets are rising very fast and armed forces are adding not just new weapons and equipment but also increasing the size of their armed forces. This is the new era of not just high-tech but high-tech and Mass. Nations that want to win in such unrelenting wars will need to generate the mass that is required to prevail in such intense and long duration grinds of attrition. Wars will increasingly be a test of national will and stamina to stay the course. Both Russia and Ukraine are feverishly raising and training new formations even as they are locked in brutal combat. Downsizing a standing field force in such a dire scenario could well be an invitation to very severe problems in wartime.

High Tech and Mass. Today, the world is witnessing the sheer costs nations are willing to endure to attain their objectives and simply prevail in such hard fought slogs of attrition. Russia is not at all short of high-tech equipment. (We are buying most of ours from them). What Russia is painfully short of is manpower and its ill-effects are for the world to see as it recycles the same tiered and battered formations again and again and is constantly having to move its units and formations around to plug gaps. Russia attacked Ukraine with a force of just 1,50,000. Ukraine, in turn, mobilized fully and has fielded a force of 2,50,000. This has enabled it to regain the initiative because it can constantly open up new fronts. Manpower is not a drain on resources needed to buy high-tech equipment. It is a key resource without which no war can be won. India has no dearth of manpower. In fact, we have the largest and youngest population in the world. Yet we have been exhibiting an obsessive concern to down size and reduce our manpower, as if instead of being an asset, it was our biggest liability.

Historical Precedents

There are some underlying reasons and a history to this down-sizing urge – especially in the Indian Army. It goes back to 1990, when the Indian economy had come close to the point of collapse. The government of the day told the armed forces they simply had no money to give for our military modernsiation and we would have to wait till our GDP went up. In a desperate bid to raise money for the capital budget, then Army chief Gen VP Malik had come up with the idea of slashing the Revenue Budget by down-sizing. Desperate times call for desperate solutions, perhaps. Today, our economy is the fifth largest in the world. We had suppressed manpower by 50,000 men and were trying to cut another 50,000. That is the time the Kargil War intervened. We were forced to restore disbanded units and raise some 36 new Rashtriya Rifles battalions and new Sector and Force HQs (not to mention a new Corps HQ for Leh). In cost cutting and accounting exercises, we simply cannot afford to lose sight of our threat environment and need for retaining operational effectiveness. Accountant Generals cannot replace Generals in times of war.

The primary rationale for the launch the Agnipath scheme was the panic over the ballooning pension bill of the armed forces. This panic was not entirely unjustified. The combined salary bill of the armed forces today is Rs 1.08 lakh crores. The pension bill now surpasses it at a whopping Rs 1.12 lakh crores. Quite clearly, this level of outlay for pensions was unsustainable and something would have to be done about it. There was a proposal to apply the National Pension Scheme (NPS) to the armed forces, too, but this was deemed politically unacceptable. There was a far more viable Inverse Induction Model – wherein soldiers retiring from armed forces would automatically move on to the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and paramilitary forces (PMFs) or do a short stint and then migrate to CAPFs. This was the most logical option and one which the armed forces have been asking for decades. Unfortunately, the IPS lobby has been most unwilling to accept this for pure reasons of turf, empire building and institutional egos. The ostensible reason given is that they need young troopers. Considering that the age of retirement in the CAPFs is 58, this sounds a bit rich. Data indicates that the CAPFs so far took only 0.9% of retired soldiers in Groupp C posts and just 0.47% in Gp D posts. Thus, the most logical and desirable model which would have provided tactical skills and combat experience of the Army soldiers to the CAPFs, was never allowed to take off.

The Agnipath Scheme now adopted is a mish-mash of many models. Unfortunately, in trying to please all it has ended up pleasing almost nobody. The ostensible aims are rather noble. It is to infuse discipline into the Indian population at large. So far, each year 60,000 armed forces personnel used to retire and go back to the villages. If they and the National Cadet Corps (NCC) could not instill general discipline, I fail to see how 43,000 Agniveers every year (present intake) will make a greater difference? A great deal of concern is expressed about the second career of the Agniveers. Promises galore are being made but these would have to be fortified by an act of Parliament.

My basic question however, is about the first chosen career. How viable or attractive is it in comparative terms? A youth in a village – would he opt for the Police, CRPF or BSF, etc, where once in he can serve for 58 years or a most uncertain four year Tour of Duty in the Army? Four years is simply too short a period to integrate the Agniveers into the ethos and regimentation of an Army unit – especially where crew-served weapons are involved. There is also the danger of trained manpower being exploited by terrorists, gangsters or anti- national elements on release. We had faced this threat in the Punjab in the 1980s. Shabeg Singh was a former major general of the Army. If he and other boys could go astray then how can we be so sanguine that the Maoist or other groups will not exploit the Agniveers? Also, we need to consider the burden on the commanding officers at the unit level. If the CO is operationally committed on the Line of Control/ counter-terrorism operations/ Line of Actual Control, how does he train these Agniveers? By the time he does, they would be on their way out. Will a short-term inductee not be risk-averse? The Ukarine war has clearly highlighted the conscripts and short term inductees as the weakest link in the chain.

Cutting Manpower

The Agnipath scheme has been accompanied by a manpower cut of almost 1.5 lakhs in the Army. For two years no recruitment was done on the plea of Covid. Since 60,000 soldiers retire each year, it implies that the Army is short by minimum 1.5–2 lakhs already. Given the alarming level of rising threats from China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey and terrorists elsewhere, this almost sounds like a civilisational death wish. The Agnipath scheme is long term in impact. Financial gains will only be realized 15 year down the line when they would ostensibly have retired. So, no new weapons will come into the armed forces now as a result of this scheme. We still have to find resources to buy or produce the weapons in the here and now. Meanwhile, the existing manpower assets have also been slashed.

Ukraine Pointers

The Russia-Ukraine War has clearly highlighted the tremendous new lethality of the modern battlefield. The casualties to weapons, equipment and personnel have been of an unprecedented level, that is reminiscent of the slaughters of the First World War. Force preservation, reconstitution of battered units and casualty replacement are the worrying new dilemmas. Wars will no longer be short duration and high-intensity. The Ukraine War is already into its seventh month and the end is nowhere in sight. It is becoming a serious test of national stamina and endurance. Russia has no shortage of equipment. It is drastically short of manpower and its problems are acutely visible to the whole world. We have no dearth of manpower but are busy slashing and down-sizing when we need to be desperately creating new jobs for the rising youth-bulge in our population. The pattern of wars is inexorably shifting back to the levels of lethality of the two World Wars. The Indian Army was a regular standing army precisely structured to fight such intense wars. Now that we are returning to the era of such wars, we are busy destabilizing ourselves by creating unprecedented amounts of organizational turbulence. Why do we want to down size, get in short-term inductees as 50 per cent of the force, reduce 17 single service commands to just five Tri-Service ones, as also change our regimental model – and why do we want it done day before yesterday? We have a tried and tested armed forces, which have served us very well so far. An old military proverb says “don’t change horses mid-stream” before the battle.

What then is the way out? Two constructive suggestions – increase the colour service from four to seven years and retention from 25% to 50%. We will, thereby, make the army a viable career and return to the tried and tested model, which kept the Army young and won you the 1971 War!

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United States of America

The United States, which is the strongest military power in the world, recruits personnel for a four-year term during which time they are on “active” duty. Personnel serve another four years on “inactive” duty which means they can be recalled if the need arises. The usa.gov website says that after an individual has completed active duty time, he or she can either extend the contract or re-enlist if they want to continue serving. Soldiers are eligible for pension after they serve 20 years in the military. Those who opt out before are eligible for certain perks and allowances.

China

China has been downsizing its military’s human resources and adding more firepower to its strength.

The Chinese military is based on conscription which makes military service obligatory for all men aged above 18 years.

As per Chinese law, the term of service for conscripts is three years in the Army and four years in the Navy and the Air Force. For volunteers, the term of active service is eight years and no more than 12 years.

In recent years, China has been trying to reduce conscription and recruit more educated and technically proficient soldiers.

Russia

The Russian Army has historically used conscription to ensure they have reserves with military training, in case there is a need to mobilise for a major war.

Russia follows a hybrid contract and conscript model. Conscripts have a term of one year and are then put into reserve. All males aged 18 to 27 are subject to conscription for a year of military duty after an 8-month training period.

Russia has two conscription season every year – from 1 April until 15 July (spring) and between 1 October and 31 December (autumn). Men aged between 18 and 27, with no health issues or outstanding convictions could be called on to serve. However, failure to appear at the registration office is punishable by large fines and a two-year prison sentence.

Contract soldiers are given advanced training and deployed in strategic units. Despite conscription to create a reserve army, Russia has fallen short of men on the ground amid its war in Ukraine and has been reportedly hiring foreign fighters.

Israel

Conscription is a model Israel follows since its formation in 1948 to defend its territories from what was then a largely hostile neighbourhood. However, that is largely a “myth” now since Israel too has made a moved on from a conscription-based army to a leaner professional army as dynamics in the middle-east change.

The Ultra-orthodox and Arab Israelis are exempted from conscription. Arab citizens of Israel are allowed to enlist voluntarily.

Adult Israeli men must serve for 30 months and women for 24 months, unless they volunteer for a unit that requires additional service time. Afterwards they are put in a pool of reserves who can be called for service if required. 10 per cent of the conscripts are retained and given a contract for seven years. Those who serve a minimum of 12 years receive the benefits of a pension.

France

According to a SIPRI report of 2017, France has the largest armed forces in size in the European Union.

In 1996, President Jacques Chirac’s government announced the end of conscription and in 2001, conscription formally was ended.

Today, the youth of France joins the Armed Forces, called the Forces armées françaises, on a voluntary and contractual basis. The volunteer can sign a one-year contract, which can be extended to five years.

Soldiers are given training for three months and those who serve for over 19 years are eligible for state pension.

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The scheme has been accused of diluting the professionalism of the armed forces. They also feel that the process will result in mixed units, who will lack cohesion and hence regimentation, which will reduce their effectiveness. There is also the criticism that with the induction of women in all trades, a unit’s fighting efficiency and rigour will reduce.

The concept is new for the Indian armed forces, but similar schemes have been implemented in several other countries, without any adverse impacts.

The scheme has been evolved keeping in mind the phenomenal changes in society and technology, and to equip the organisation to be future ready. In a modern battle field everyone requires a younger workforce, tech-savvy or tech friendly armed force and a modern fighting soldier.

The future of warfare entails a lighter human footprint, but soldiers equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry, supported by cutting-edge technology to fight a war in a highly informationised environment. This recruitment reform would help in right sizing the armed forces provided it gets dovetailed into the imperatives of fifth generation warfare.

There is a desire among the youth, especially those in the border areas, to serve the country for a short duration, rather than settle for a service spanning about two decades.

In a Nutshell

Agniveers will go through 26 weeks of basic military training (the existing module is of 44 weeks), bear a distinct rank; and have on-the-job training in the unit. After the four-year engagement, they will go back to society. During the service, their uniform will have a distinct insignia. The armed forces should achieve a younger warrior profile without compromising on quality or capability. And, Agniveers should be looked after in terms of employment benefits and post-exit opportunities.

For the ranks below officers, the Agnipath Scheme is the equivalent of the short service scheme for officers The armed forces have a Short Service Commission (SSC) for officers for 10 to 14 years, which was necessitated as a cadre-management exercise. The SSC scheme has worked well and SSC officers have been fairly well employed in the civil world.

Agniveers will be selected from across the country. The selection process should improve homogeneity, national cohesion and integration.

Agniveers will be entitled to all medical facilities, leave, CSD facilities, honours and awards. They will have a fixed salary package, with annual increments. In addition, they will get the risk and hardship, dress, and travel allowances. Agniveers will be provided life insurance cover for their engagement period. They will also be entitled to compensation for disability. One-time ex-gratia will be paid in case of death on duty in addition to the insurance.

The tax-exempt ‘Seva Nidhi’ package and detailed skill-set certificate will be provided to Agniveers, for possible employment outside.

Significant Advantages

One significant advantage of this scheme would be the much lower age profile of the service. It will increase promotional avenues of the permanent cadre. The significant advantage for the young entrant will be early employment with significantly good emoluments and a 25 per cent chance of joining the permanent cadre. The Agniveers will acquire new skill sets, leadership and team-building capabilities.

It may not be possible to train or assign hi-tech jobs in this short period of engagement of Agniveers, but they will be used for many less technical jobs, including working on the aircraft and on ships. Those who become permanent employees will go through higher technical training. The armed forces have confirmed that their combat capability will not be affected by such enrolment.

Primarily, the scheme has been woven around the need for the national exchequer to save money, which can then be used for modernisation of the forces. India’s defence budget for 2022-23 is Rs 5.25 lakh crore, of which Rs 1.2 lakh crore is for pension component. As per reports, the “prospective life-term saving” in the cost of engagement of a jawan who leaves after 17 years of service with pension and other benefits, as compared to an Agniveer, will be Rs 11.5 crore. National defence budget management is essential. There has to be a much more significant percentage for Capital acquisitions. No major country has such adverse capital to revenue expenditure and pension bill ratios. It is hoped that the money saved would be used to focus more on the advancement of technology and military modernisation.

Countering Criticism

It is unfair to say that Agniveers will not have the desired status in the forces. They will be a key member of the team. Similarly, it will also give an opportunity for the youth to choose if they want to continue the armed forces career or switch to other options.

While there may not be assured side-stepping in paramilitary forces or in any other government organisation, help and guidance will be provided to soldiers for their employment, including in the private sector.

As regards professionalism, a cursory look at the list of gallantry award winners will indicate that most of them had service less than five years and there is no doubt that with better educational qualifications, it is feasible to abridge the existing training period.

As regards regimentation, there are mixed units in the army, which have in no way performed lesser than the ‘pure’ regiments. In any case, dedication is a factor of motivation and not of the number of years that one puts in.

The example of western countries indicates that the induction of women in no way reduces the efficiency, but in most cases enhances it. More significantly, the scheme would reduce the average age of the force thereby enhancing its youthful profile and fitness levels.

There is also an apprehension that this youthful population with military training could “create political militias”, if they cannot find suitable employment avenues. However, a young person aged 21-25 with a nationwide exposure and having led a disciplined life will have much better employability than any other youth from a similar background.

The Seva Nidhi funds will prepare them for self-employment. Of course, both the central government and the state governments as well as the society at large will need to provide an enabling environment for their absorption into other walks of life.

No Change in Regimental System

No change is being done to the Army’s regimental system under the ‘Agnipath’ scheme and the numbers of personnel to be recruited in the first year of its roll out would only make up three per cent of the armed forces. There were apprehensions that the ‘Agnipath’ scheme would change the composition of several regiments that recruit youths from specific regions as well as castes such as Rajputs, Jats and Sikhs.

On the criticism that the short-duration tenure of ‘Agniveers’ will harm the effectiveness of the armed forces, such a system exists in several countries, and hence, it is already “tested out and considered best practice for an agile army. Most armies across the world depend upon their youths and the new scheme will only bring about a right mix of “50 per cent-50 per cent” slowly in a very long run of youngsters and experienced personnel in the supervisory ranks.

China Case Study

Military reforms in China were the result of the Gulf War of 1990 and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995. The Chinese Communist Party leadership adopted a three-pronged approach by exponentially ramping up defence spending. It involved investing in new weaponry, enhancing anti-access area denial tactics, and establishing programmes to boost the Chinese defence industry. They brought in a fundamental change – integrated fighting force with first-rate naval and air capabilities. As the other services expanded, the army was shrunk to around 9,75,000 from an approximate three million in the mid-70s and the higher defence management paradigm was reorganised into theatre commands by February 2016.

Suggestions

In addition to the reservation provided for former Agniveers in CAPFs and other PSUs, both central government and state governments, there needs to be provisions to provide them with cheaper credit to start their own businesses. Despite 5th and 6th Central Pay Commissions clearly recommending ex-servicemen’s induction into the CPOs, it has not been implemented by bureaucrats, who occupy the top echelons of CPOs and consider them their handmaidens. It is essential that at least 25 per cent of jobs in all CPOs be reserved for former Agniveers. This will provide CPOs with trained workforce, thereby reducing their training costs, and will ensure that no Agniveer remains unemployed and disgruntled after his ‘Tour of Duty’.

The Agnipath Scheme should be seen as a national project, rather than just a defence ministry initiative to cut costs. It must, therefore, not be allowed to fail due to bureaucratic machinations.

Among a slew of reforms that the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) recommended, one pertained to the recruitment practices of the armed forces. It stated, “the Army must be young and fit at all times. Therefore, instead of the present practice of having 17 years of colour service (as has been the policy since 1976), it would be advisable to reduce the colour service to a period of seven to ten years and, thereafter, release these officers and men for service here”.

In 2000, a Group of Ministers (GOM) endorsed the KRC’s recommendation stating that, “in order to ensure that the armed forces are at their fighting best at all times, there is a need to ensure a younger profile of the services. However, this is a highly complex matter. While the army desires a younger age profile, so do the central paramilitary forces (CPMFs)”. The Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security set up by the UPA government in 2011 also addressed this issue. Its report, however, is not public so far.

Keeping all aspects in mind, the colour service of jawans should be set at seven years, instead of four as incorporated in the Scheme.

The defence forces should absorb 50 per cent and release the balance to the civilian pool. Over the next 60 years, 13.8 lakh youth would be Agniveers, provided the 50 per cent absorption formulae is accepted.

The Agnipath scheme should be made an Act through legislation in Parliament with the proviso of being a pre-qualification for:

(i) Entry into all government and corporate jobs;

(ii) candidates for Assembly and Lok Sabha elections should be Agniveers as a prerequisite;

(iii) Ministry of Defence staff cadre.

Once the MoD stands dispensed with, 45% of the pension bill for civilians in the ministry, currently as part of the defence budget, will vanish, thereby resulting in national savings.

The post In Defence of the Agnipath Scheme appeared first on IMR.

The Union Cabinet took a historic decision approving an attractive recruitment scheme for Indian youth to serve in the Armed Forces for which a scheme has been introduced with the name Agnipath. The youth, in the age group of 17.5 years to 23 years (revised upper age limit) will be selected under the Agnipath and called Agniveers. With the announcement of this Agnipath Scheme, a window of opportunity has been opened for the youths to serve their nation for a period of four years.

Broad Objectives

The broad objectives of the Agnipath Scheme are:

•  To enhance the youthful profile of the Armed Forces so that they are at their fighting best at all times with increased risk-taking ability.

•  To imbibe the Armed Forces ethos, courage, commitment, and teamwork in the youth.

•  To provide abilities and qualities such as discipline, motivation, dynamism, and work skills so that youth remains as an asset.

•  To provide an opportunity to the youth who may be keen to serve the Nation in uniform for a short period of time.

•  To attract youth talent among the society to effectively exploit, adapt, and use emerging modern technologies with enhanced technical thresholds of intake while leveraging Technical institutions of the country.

The Scheme

The Key Features are:

• Opportunity to serve the nation as Agniveers through enrolment in the Forces.

•   Pan-India merit based recruitment.

•   Four years tenure.

•   Attractive monthly emoluments and handsome ‘Seva Nidhi’ package.

•   Opportunity to apply for enrolment in permanent cadre.

Based on merit and organisational requirement, up to 25% Agniveers selected through central, transparent, rigorous system after four years. The other 75 per cent will be released with benefits.

Agnipath scheme has a recruitment process for individuals below the rank of officer, with the goal of deploying fitter, younger troops on the front lines, many of whom will be on four-year contracts.

The Armed Forces will be recruiting 46,000 Agniveers in 2022 through Agnipath scheme. On completion of the four-year period, Aginveers will go to the society as a disciplined, dynamic, motivated, and skilled workforce for employment in other sectors to pursue their career in the job of their choice. During their four years in service, the recruits will be trained by the armed forces in the skills required.

Women will also be inducted into the armed forces under the new scheme. Officials, however, added that the recruitment of women under the scheme will depend on the needs of the respective services.

Conditions of Service

Eligibility. Age limit for applicants is 17.5 to 23 years.

Recruitment. Candidates will be enrolled under the respective Service Act for a service duration of four years including training period.

Selection. Selection will be done through a centralised, transparent and rigorous system. On enrolment in regular cadre, pay fixed as regular soldier. Pension as per extant regulations.

Screening Assessment. Centralised transparent screening, based on merit and demonstrated performance during service. Agniveers can apply on volunteer basis to enroll in the regular cadre.

Financial Package

Composite Annual Package. Firs year package – approx Rs 4.76 lakhs. Upgradation up to approx Rs 6.92 lakhs in the fourth year.

Allowances. Risk and hardship, ration, dress, travel allowances as applicable.

Seva Nidhi.

On completion of four years tenure all candidates will be entitled to ‘Seva Nidhi’.

•   30 per cent of monthly emoluments to be contributed by individuals.

•   Equal amount matched and contributed by the Government.

•   Corpus of approx Rs 11.71 lakhs after four years exempted from Income Tax.

Death Compensation.

•   Non-contributory life insurance cover of Rs 48 lakhs.

•   Additional ex-gratia of Rs 44 lakhs for death attributable to service.

•   Pay for unserved portion up to four years including ‘Seva Nidhi’ component.

Disability Compensation. Compensation based on percentage of disability laid down by medical authorities. One time ex-gratia of Rs 44/ 25/ 15 lakhs for 100%/ 75%/ 50% disability, respectively.

Incentives and Job Reservation

Incentives. The ministries of home affairs and defence announced concessions and incentives that will assist Agniveers in their further employment. PSUs under housing and petroleum ministries were working on hiring ‘Agniveers’ after their service in the armed forces. Shipping ministry announced 6 attractive service opportunities for Agniveers from Indian Navy for a smooth transition into Merchant Navy.

Reservation. The government has announced a 10% reservation for ‘Agniveers’ in central police forces & Assam Rifles with upper age relaxation. Defence Ministry also came up with a 10% quota in the Coast Guard, defence civilian posts and 16 defence PSUs, which include major ones like Hindustan Aeronautics, Bharat Electronics, as well as four shipyards and 41 ordnance factories.

The post The Agnipath Scheme appeared first on IMR.

Government’s Stand

In support of its argument, the government even argued that “troops are not yet mentally schooled to accept women officers in command of units” since they are “predominantly drawn from a rural background”. The statement says it all vis-à-vis Indian society. While modern age has established urban centres that may still follow practices of equality, rural settlements largely continue to exude deeply-rooted patriarchy. Though there have been exceptions to the norm in some states, patriarchy is still conveniently evident in general behaviour and parlance. That perhaps explain the government’s argument.

The rationale presented by the defence ministry to argue is that the military was not just a profession but a “way of life” that required sacrifices and commitment, which women officers would find a challenge “owing to their prolonged absence during pregnancy, motherhood and domestic obligations…” The government went on to argue that soldiers rely heavily on physical prowess in combat and that “inherent physiological differences between men and women” make it a challenge for women to command military units – even non-combat units. The argument against women also cites “minimal facilities for habitat and hygiene” in forward posts. Women, the government goes on to argue “have a negative impact on unit cohesion”.

The only persuasive logic that defence ministry deployed was that changing the terms of women officers’ service from short service commission (SSC) to PC, would militate against the findings of the Ajay Vikram Singh Committee that sought to create a leaner permanent cadre of officers, supplemented by an enhanced SSC cadre, which would serve a few years and then go home without competing for higher ranks. It was calculated that the PC: SSC ratio should be 1:1.1, in order to reduce the army’s worryingly pyramid-like promotion structure. Currently, that ratio is skewed at an unsustainable 3.98:1. The induction of hundreds of women officers from the SSC into the PC cadre will skew the promotion pyramid further.

Supreme Courts Observations

Noting that “the right to equality is a right to rationality”, the Supreme Court paved the way for women in command positions in the Army. The Court observed that an absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments would not comport with the guarantee of equality under Article 14. Implicit in the guarantee of equality is that where the action of the state does differentiate between two classes of persons, it does not differentiate them in an unreasonable or irrational manner. In this sense, even at its bare minimum, the right to equality is a right to rationality.

The bench said that the engagement of women officers in the Army has been an evolutionary process and the Union of India should have acted in accordance with the Delhi High Court judgment when there was no stay on it. There is no reason and justification for the Union of India not to act as per the Delhi High Court verdict. On September 2, 2011, the Supreme Court has clarified this aspect and said there is no stay on the high court verdict. Despite that, scant regard has been paid to the verdict of Delhi High Court and the order of Supreme Court as well.

Background

From 1991 onwards, women officers have received Short Service Commission (SSC) for a service period of 14 years in eight of the 10 services and PC in the Law and Education cadre. In September 2019, the government extended PC to the eight services too but restricted this to only women officers who had been commissioned from 2014 onwards. The order was effective from April 2020. A large number of women officers with SSC from earlier batches continued to serve in the Army beyond their contracted period pending final resolution of a legal case for PC. The Supreme Court has now given finality by granting PC to all women officers, irrespective of year of commission.

In its essence, the court has addressed a petition by a group of 332 women officers challenging the terms and conditions of service imposed arbitrarily by the defence ministry in 2006. In that, the government permitted women to serve for 14 years (as against just five years earlier), but denied them eligibility for PC, which would allow them to continue serving for 20 years, by when they would be eligible for a pension. The SC judgment now allows women officers to opt for PC, whichever stage of service they are at. It also removes the bar the government had imposed on women tenanting command appointments, allowing them to command military units.

Where does the problem lie?

Currently, women are being inducted in the Army through a short-service commission with a service period for up to 14 years. There are 1,653 women officers in the Army, 3.89 per cent of the total number of officers in the Army.

In the Army, first there are Combat Arms: Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, Armoured Corps and also Artillery. Women do not get commissioned into these.

This is followed by the Combat Support Arms: Signals, Engineers, Army Air Defence, Aviation and Intelligence. Women are commissioned in all five as these roles involve limited direct combat with the enemy.

Then comes the Services: Army Service Corps (ASC), Army Ordnance Corps (AOC) and the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME) who in conventional war serve in administrative support roles. Women are commissioned in all three as well.

There are also two other departments: Army Education Corps (AEC) and the Judge Advocate General’s Branch (JAG); Women are commissioned in both; in fact these are only two departments that, from 1992 onwards, have given PC to women officers.

The Army Medical Corps has been recruiting women since long. Although the channel of recruitment to this cadre has been totally different as compared to other cadres, women are already receiving PC in this cadre and also rise up to the ranks including Lieutenant General.

Earlier women were granted permanent commission in the Army’s medical, legal and educational branches. With Supreme Court’s judgment now they will be given PC in cadres to which they are commissioned.

Further, Government’s argument that only women officers with less than 14 years of service would be considered for PC and that those who had reached 20 years of service would be discharged with pension was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Court’s verdict opens the door for women joining the ranks of colonel and above in the Army Service Corps, Ordnance, Education Corps, Engineers, Signals, Intelligence and Engineering.

Comments

When we speak of equal opportunities, it is important that our understanding of the same cuts across a wide spectrum. If men can hold commanding positions, so should women. The practice of not allowing women to hold commanding positions in the army has perhaps reached its culmination with Supreme Court directive.

The apex court has done well to dismiss this deeply entrenched misogyny with the observation that this is a stereotypical and constitutionally flawed notion and that assumptions about women in the social context of marriage, family and society are not a constitutionally valid basis for denying equal opportunity to women officers.

Another argument that is made is that grant of PC or command appointments to women officers must be based on military needs and organisational requirements, not social considerations or pressure exerted by some groups. The Army, which is heavily deployed along the borders and in counter-insurgency operations, has a limited number of ‘sheltered’ or peace station postings. With more women PC officers occupying such positions, hard or field postings for male officers will be more prolonged.

The judgment has found merit in the argument that the army’s hierarchy must begin accepting women as equal colleagues. It has noted that, over the last 26 years, women officers of all ages and service profiles have been posted to sensitive places, including tough field areas, and that they have performed excellently for the most part. According to the court, women officers brought laurels to the country and won several gallantry and Sena medals as well as UN Peacekeeping awards for their contribution in armed forces. To cast aspersions on them on the basis of physiological features is wrong as it is based on fallacy, the Court said

This issue more often than not has been highlighted as an issue of equality but is rather an issue of similarity. Although there can be no universal solution to the issue because the fact remains that both male and female are not same or similar biologically. However, in terms of humanity, that is measuring in terms of human attributes, both are equal.

But the ongoing battle was more for PC and command positions, rather than combat roles. However, in support services, where women are already inducted, women may be granted equal training and pay as well as pension for providing the same amount of services with same professional competency as men.

An important functional issue is that of command opportunities. If women officers have to be placed in the same category as male officers with PC, with applicability of similar terms and conditions applicable to the latter, then their career management as PC officers has to be addressed. Thus far, under SSC, women officers were denied the requisite training and opportunity to assume command in the rank of Colonel which is the first “selection grade” rank. Male officers of this rank command units of respective Arms and Services but not all are given such opportunity; it is strictly through a stringent selection by a promotion board based upon confidential reports, record of service and qualifications. They are tested in command capability as Colonels and this makes them eligible for further selection for progression to higher ranks. The Indian Army, which is command oriented, tests its officers in command capability before any selection for promotion.

The Army may begin by assigning them command of peacetime establishments such as supply depots and then graduate to operational units. With regard to combat support arms, an experimental exercise must be done to ascertain command capability of selected women officers in both peace and field conditions under close supervision of senior male officers. These units have more manpower and bear operational risks of a higher order, which involves lives of soldiers. JAG and AEC departments where the criterion of testing is different have no such problems.

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The overall responsibility of thwarting an enemy air invasion will continue with IAF, while the Ground-based AD resources need better synergy. Integrating AD assets will assist in avoiding ‘fratricide’ during heightened security conditions. The incident of shooting down of a Mi-17 helicopter at Budgam on 27 February 2019, during the Balakot strike was an avoidable loss. Further, the shooting down of Ukranian passenger aircraft on a routine flight by Iranian forces, on 8 January, was also attributable to Iran’s Air Defence Command and Control problems. Even though transponders for Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) were installed onboard the aircraft and warships for target classification, this may not be a fool-proof method.

The AD Command is meant to integrate AD verticals of the three armed forces, while retaining the uniqueness of each Service to execute its own AD operational role in its own single service battle space. Each service has different assets to defend and must maintain weapons special to its requirements.

It makes sense to have a common AD command, since the common aim of all three armed forces is to defeat the air threat from the enemy. The enemy will not differentiate between the vulnerabilities or assets of one Service or the other.

Existing Tri-services Air Defence Effort

All the three Services – Indian Army, IAF and Navy so far have maintained their own AD resources to counter specific threat perceived by each, sometimes even having overlapping areas.

Indian Army has it’s ground-based Army Air Defence (AAD) Corps, responsible for the protection of air space for Army’s operations from enemy aircraft and missiles. Plans are afoot to upgrade the existing vintage AD equipment and to create a responsive AD for Army’s strike formations in plains and tactical AD in mountains. Also, the procurement and upgrades of AD guns and equipment are being pursued as part of the modernization of the army.

The IAF has been on a technology pursuit to get superior surface-to-air guided weapons (SAGW) and AD radars to bolster its operational capability, and to integrate all sensors, weapon systems and command and control structures to create an Integrated AD Command for its operations. Surface-to-air weapon systems are planned to be interfaced with IAF’s indigenous C4I system viz. Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) using Software Defined Radios (SDR). Integration of IACCS with surveillance network of civil aviation is also underway in a phased manner. Further, IAF also plans to deploy an Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) system to support AD and offensive strike missions over the tactical battle area and for this, one AEW&C aircraft was inducted in IAF in 2018.

To meet their immediate AD requirements, IAF has procured Israeli Spyder low level quick reaction missile (LLQRM) System, equipped with Python 5 and Derby missiles. This system is meant to provide AD against aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles and UAVs.

On the other hand, Indian Navy maintains its AD assets mainly on the sea platform, in the expected lines of its operational role. For detection of air targets including missiles, modern naval warships are fitted with advance phased array radars with specialized radar beams to search and track multiple aircraft and missiles simultaneously.

On naval ships, two SAM complexes in fore and aft configuration give complete 360-degree air engagement capability. Ships are also fitted with Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) like rapid-fire AK-630 systems for engaging air targets a couple of kilometres away. On the high seas, carrier-launched fighter jets provide the key AD cover to deter any battlespace air threat. All high-value naval units at sea are provided at least two layers of AD cover by other ships part of the formation.

AD Integration

An AD Command will have all AD resources of all three Services at its disposal and will seamlessly address the issue of resource allocation. The battle theatres can at times overlap especially among the Army and the Air Force. This leads to duplication of weapons procurement and excessive spending. Hence, AD Command can ensure appropriate resource allocation for its optimal utilization.

AD is intrinsically linked to every Service command with a prime responsibility to protect the nation from threat as large as nuclear threat to small ones such as drone incursions. In these situations, rather than seeking which Service’s resources will be more apt to nullify the threat, an integrated command will have at its disposal all available resources and its deploy the resources corresponding to the threat.

For the nation, the overall AD threat perception in military terms means evaluation of its ‘susceptibility and vulnerability’ against the enemy’s offensive capabilities. India routinely has skirmishes on its borders with nuclear-armed neighbours – Pakistan and China. These two hostile nations perpetually maintain a ‘minimum credible deterrence’ against India by strategic deployment of various ballistic and cruise missiles, both conventional and nuclear capable.

From assessing air threat perception to creating a common integrated air defence shield over land, sea and air, all factors have to be looked into by the office of the CDS. Any shortcoming in the concepts and doctrines document at this stage shall lead to irrecoverable damage and can be fatal for AD during hostilities.

Indigenization of AD Capability

India has an ambitious Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) for the development of the two-layered programme to defend vital assets against ballistic missile attacks. The capability was demonstrated in 2018 by intercepting two kinds of missiles – endo-atmospheric interceptor missile mission against long-range simulated targets and an exo-atmospheric interceptor missile (PDV04) tested against two-stage ship launched target missile.

Anti-satellite missile test (Mission Shakti) was completed in 2019 in which BMD interceptor missile engaged Indian target satellite in low earth orbit (LEO) in a ‘Hit to Kill’ mode. It gave India the capability to defend its assets in outer space and was significant against inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

The Quick Reaction Surface-to-Air Missile (QRSAM), a system capable of engaging multiple targets at ranges of up to 30 km is under development. An Indigenous AD Fire Control Radar (ADFCR) ‘Atulya’ with its associated anti-aircraft guns for point air defence system at short and very short ranges. And, Indian Army is indigenizing an AD Tactical Control Radar (ADTCR) as a successor to existing Indian Doppler Radar (INDRA) and P19 radars.

Control & Reporting

The prime responsibility of the AD of the national air space lies with the Air Force. That does not mean that the Air Force can go it alone. The execution of its function depends on the type of threats being faced and in what way to respond. The main responsibility of the AD Command would now be to provide a structure to the command & control (C&C) of AD. The C&C of AD, ie, the AD Control and Reporting System (ADCRS) exists with all the three Services. If a weak ADCRS operates even the best weapon system will operate sub optimally.

The ADCRS system is responsible for:

•             Surveillance of air space.

•             Detection of aerial threat.

•             Cancelling out duplication of inputs from multiple radars.

•             Identification of aerial vehicles into friend or foe.

•             Prioritization of air threat.

•             Selection of most suitable weapon to take  on the threat.

•             Designation of target in auto mode.

•             Successive firing from guns to missiles in a seamless manner.

•             Maintain minute to minute control of the air defence battle.

The IAF has an integrated C&C that rides on the Air Force Net (AFNET). It has national level linkages from national command (source) down to the weapons. The Army has its own AD C&C – Akash. The Navy too has one of its own called Trigun. The latter two work perfectly but unilaterally and, hence, there are serious voids. A proper integration of these three C&C systems is required.

Responsibilities

The AD Command will have multiple responsibilities, viz:

•             To wipe out voids in the AD C&C and shape it properly.

•             Ensure inputs on air threats are available from the three Services and other national agencies on a 24×7 basis and maintain updated data on air threat.

•             Prioritise multiple AD assets to be deployed for the defence of vulnerable assets identified by the three Services and also national strategic assets. The AD Command will have to steer each Service’s perspective into a national perspective.

•             AD Command will allocate weapons to each Service according to the vulnerabilities it deals with so that it can manage it better.

•             Optimize training value through optimal use of training resources with each Service and give training a national identity

•             Collaborate and coordinate with civil aviation authorities and resources for better effect.

Comments

There is a falacy that there is a turf war among the three Services and an integrated AD Command would bring them together. This is far from true. The three Services are very clear about each other’s domain of operations.

In a nut shell, an AD Command will help in integrating the hardware of the three Services, bring in economy in their procurement, prioritise their employment to effectively neutralise aerial threats, use the operational core competencies of each Service to report threats, bring in commonality of procedures, optimise training, prevent fratricide and brig in efficiencies on the battlefield. It is expected that CDS under its ambit shall be able to ensure exploitation of these S-400 complexes as part of an Air Defence Command.

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Inter-services issues and the reluctance of the three Services to let go of their respective turfs were some of the biggest hurdles in achieving greater jointmanship. The CDS will also be the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). Until now, the COSC chairmanship was held in rotation by the senior-most service chief. It is no secret that Service chiefs have a tendency to be driven by the interests of their own Service. The creation of the CDS is therefore seen as a significant reform in higher defence management.

The Need

The existing model for cross-service cooperation was weak, with each Service working in its own silo. The efforts for jointmantship in the military were proceeding slowly, resulting in duplication of efforts, wastage of resources and delay in decision making. The appointment of a CDS will address the fragmented approach of the forces and bring about synergy at a time when the nature of warfare is evolving swiftly.

The Service Chiefs

The three chiefs will continue to report to the defence minister. They will not report to the COS, although it is widely accepted that he will be a first among equals. The CDS will be the principal military adviser to the defence minister on tri-services matters. The three military chiefs will continue to advise the minister exclusively on issues concerning their respective services. While the CDS will be in charge of tri-services organisations, their military command will be under the chief of the duly notified service. However, tri-services agencies and commands related to cyber, space and special operations will be under the command of the CDS.

Long Term Goals

The CDS’ first task will be to lead the integration of the different services, who have operated in silos, have got embroiled in inter-services disputes, and have been reluctant to let go of their own institutional interests. The CDS will have to build trust between the three Services and then use that to push for greater integration and jointness in training, capabilities, acquisitions, operations and planning. The nature of threats has changes with the newer technologies; so has the nature of warfare where distinctions between land, air and waters, and now cyber, are blurred. Ensuring India’s forces are prepared is now the CDS’ job, along with that of the respective Service chiefs.

The CDS will be responsible for establishment of theatre/joint commands. Theaterisation refers to placing under a Theatre Commander, specific units of the army, the navy, and the air force. There is stiff resistance from the IAF to theaterisation, or setting up of integrated commands where the assets of all three defence arms will come under the operational control of a three-star officer from any of the three services, depending on the function assigned to that command. In another important role, he will assign inter-services prioritisation to capital acquisition proposals based on the anticipated budget at a time when the military is facing a funding crisis,

The Challenges

The idea of creating the CDS’ post is that India should not have a fragmented approach. The entire military power must to work in unison. The three Services should move simultaneously at the same pace.

The second core challenge for the CDS is to become an effective link between the Services and the civilian bureaucracy, for the relationship has been mired in distrust. Being housed within the ministry will help. The Services are resentful that those who lack expertise and experience take all the decisions, while sitting in South Block, and ignore genuine concerns of the armed personnel. The bureaucrats see many demands of the Services and the leadership as unreasonable, and believe that political control of the armed forces will inevitably mean administrative oversight. The CDS will have to mediate these relationships and ensure that all sides remain committed to the big picture – of making India secure, while the forces continue to operate under the democratic framework of civilian control.

The charter of the CDS, if implemented properly, will prepare the 15-lakh strong armed forces for the wars of the future. The CDS is mandated to ensure the Army, Navy and IAF, which often pull in different directions, truly integrate to slash wasteful expenditure amidst the ongoing severe fund crunch for military modernization because of the ballooning pay and pension bills.

Over 70 countries like the US, UK, France and Germany, among others, have a CDS-like post for integration in military planning and operations. In the US, for instance, the chairman of joint chiefs of staff is the highest-ranking military officer and principal military advisor to President. But chiefs of the combatant theatre commands, who handle different parts of the globe, also report directly to the political leadership.

This is needed because India currently has 17 single-Service commands (Army 7, IAF 7 and Navy 3), while there are only two tri-Service commands in the shape of the Andaman & Nicobar Command and the Strategic Forces Command to handle nuclear weapons. Theatre commands, where all the assets and manpower of the Army, Navy and Air Force are placed under one operational commander, are cost-effective, save resources and prepare forces for integrated operations.

The most far-reaching and consequential job allocated to the CDS will be the restructuring of 17 single-service military commands, which currently operate independently, into tri-service commands that include all the army, navy and air force components needed for combat operations.

“[CDS will facilitate] restructuring of military commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands,” said the government release.

For now, the CDS will only command the new cyber and space commands. “Tri-service agencies/organisations/commands related to cyber and space will be under the command of the CDS,” said the notification.

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CDS: Roles & Responsibilities

•             Act as the principal military adviser to the Raksha Mantri (RM) on tri-Service matters (Army, Navy & IAF chiefs will continue to advise the RM on matters concerning their forces).

•             Head a new Department of Military Affairs (will include the armed forces) within MoD.

•             Will also be the permanent chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, but will not exercise any military command (three Service chiefs will continue to have full operational control of their forces).

•             Will function as the military advisor to the PM-led Nuclear Command Authority.

•             Will administer all tri-Service organizations, with direct command over space & cyberspace agencies.

•             Facilitate restructuring of military commands to bring jointness in operations, including establishment of theatre commands.

•             Provide integrated inputs to relevant authorities. Will be member of Defence Acquisitions Council &Defence Planning Committee.

•             Assign inter-Service prioritization to arms procurements based on the anticipated budget.

•             Bring about reforms in the functioning of three Services by augmenting combat capabilities & reducing wasteful expenditure.

•             Bring jointness in operations, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs, maintenance etc of the 3 Services within 3 years of the first CDS assuming office.

•             Evaluate plans for ‘Out of Area Contingencies’ as well as other contingencies such as humanitarian assistance & disaster relief.

•             Implement 5-Year Defence Capital Acquisition Plans, and 2-Year roll-on annual acquisition plans (AAP), as a follow-up of Integrated Capability Development Plan (ICDP).

•             Integrate and rationalize international cooperation plans.

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Govt Creates Department of Military Affairs

The appointment of Gen Bipin Rawat as the first chief of defence staff (CDS) was accompanied with the notification of the creation of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) with Gen Rawat as the secretary of the department.

A day after the announcement, prime minister Narendra Modi tweeted, “Creation of the Department of Military Affairs with requisite military expertise and institutionalisation of the post of CDS is a momentous and comprehensive reform that will help our country face the ever-changing challenges of modern warfare.”

The DMA, having a mix of military and civilians, will deal with the three Services and HQ-Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), Territorial Army, works relating to Services and procurements, except capital acquisitions. The DMA will promote inter-service jointness in planning, integrated requirements, restructuring of military commands and indigenous equipment.

President Ram Nath Kovind approved changes in the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, and following this, the department was set up.

With the latest changes, the defence ministry will have five departments under it and these are the Department of Defence, the Department of Military Affairs, the Department of Defence Production, the Department Defence Research and Development, an order from the Department of Exservicemen said.

The Department of Military Affairs will have an integrated headquarters of the Defence Ministry comprising of the Army HQ, the Naval HQ, the Air HQ, the Defence Staff HQ and the Territorial Army.

The DMA will function parallel to the Department of Defence (DoD) headed by the defence secretary, and other departments. The CDS will be one secretary among equals of the other departments headed by bureaucrats. This downgrades the four-star rank in protocol, though the CDS will draw higher pay. Till now, Service Chiefs were ranked alongside the Cabinet Secretary, which was higher than the secretaries in the MoD, including the defence secretary.

The composition of the DMA has not been announced and will take time to form and function. It will, however, include the armed forces and an “appropriate mix of military and civilian officers at every level” in a bid to also bridge the festering civil-military divide.

The CDS will enjoy financial powers. This will be the first uniformed officer since 1950-when the armed forces were structured after Independence – to enjoy such powers.

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