US President Donald Trump articulated multiple assertions regarding Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, notably underscoring its strategic significance, following his inauguration as the 47th president.

At its zenith under U.S. administration, Bagram Air Base accommodated roughly 10,000 military personnel. This encompassed personnel from the U.S. Armed troops and allied troops. The base underwent significant modernization during this period, incorporating two runways, numerous hangars, residential facilities, and a hospital equipped with advanced medical capabilities. It served as a crucial center for military operations in Afghanistan, significantly contributing to logistics, air support, and information collection.

Trump’s Statements Regarding Bagram

Trump consistently emphasized Bagram’s nearness to areas in China where nuclear armaments are produced. He contended that the U.S. ought to have maintained control of the base, not for Afghanistan, but to mitigate China’s influence.

He condemned the Biden administration for relinquishing Bagram during the U.S. pullout from Afghanistan in 2021. Trump asserted that this move enabled China to increase its influence in the region, despite the Taliban’s denial of any Chinese presence at the base.

Trump criticized the management of U.S. military equipment abandoned after the pullout, characterizing it as a substantial loss. He proposed that the U.S. ought to retrieve this equipment.

These assertions have ignited discussions over the practicality and consequences of reclaiming Bagram. Simultaneously, the Taliban’s formal reaction to Trump appears to be, “Approach and seize it if you are able.”

Essential Aspects of Bagram

Constructed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s amid the Cold War, Bagram became as a significant facility after the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Following the Soviet retreat and the dissolution of the USSR, the United States assumed control of Bagram in 2001, targeting Osama bin Laden and dismantling the Taliban regime.

Bagram, referred to as “Afghanistan’s Guantanamo,” contained a CIA holding facility for the interrogation of Al-Qaeda suspects.

In 2020, Trump brokered a troop pullout agreement with the Taliban, which included provisions for retaining control of Bagram. The Biden administration withdrew US soldiers. In 2021, the Taliban swiftly reasserted dominance over Afghanistan and Bagram.

Chronicle of Bagram Air Base

Located in Parwan Province, Afghanistan, Bagram was originally built by the Soviet Union in the 1950s during the Cold War. Bagram functioned as a significant military installation for the Soviets during their incursion into Afghanistan in the 1980s. Subsequent to the Soviet withdrawal, the base was utilized by multiple Afghan forces throughout the civil war of the 1990s.

Subsequent to the U.S.-led incursion into Afghanistan in 2001, Bagram emerged as the preeminent U.S. military installation in the nation. It functioned as a pivotal center for operations targeting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The base underwent modernization and expansion, incorporating two runways, hangars, residential facilities, and a hospital.

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In August 2021, when U.S. and NATO forces exited Afghanistan, the base was transferred to the Afghan National Army. Subsequently, it was seized by the Taliban upon their acquisition of power over the country.

Viability of Reacquiring Bagram

Experts have articulated divergent views regarding former U.S. President Donald Trump’s statements on reclaiming Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Trump contended that the station holds strategic significance, not only for Afghanistan but also for combating China’s influence, given its proximity to areas where China advances its nuclear weapons.

Analysts have expressed apprehensions over the viability of such an action. They indicate that the base is presently under Taliban control, which has refuted any Chinese involvement in the area. Moreover, specialists underscore the logistical and diplomatic obstacles associated with reinstating a U.S. presence at Bagram, particularly in light of the intricacies of the U.S.-Taliban relationship and the wider geopolitical ramifications.

The discussion highlights the overarching issue of how the U.S. ought to interact with Afghanistan and its neighboring countries in the post-withdrawal period.

Experts contend that reclaiming Bargam would necessitate considerable resources and might heighten tensions with both China and the Taliban. The Taliban, although refuting Trump’s assertions, have affirmed their influence over the base and characterized his words as “emotional” and rooted on ignorance.

Given the logistical problems and the possibility for huge military and financial expenditures, reclaiming Bagram is likely to result in a massive military operation in which US forces would get entangled in extended combat.

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Crux of the Matter and the Af-Pak Challenges

Since the Taliban take over of Afghanistan, there has been a certain change in the attitude of Taliban. Unlike what Pakistan had expected, the Taliban has moved away from being viewed as a puppet of ISI and Pakistani forces. It has remained vocal on its stance in regards to the Durand Line, discrediting Pakistan’s recognition of what the British Raj left behind as a demarcated area bestowed upon Pakistan as its territory.

Additionally, Pakistan’s request for assistance with the looming TTP threat availed no fruitful result as it is apparent that Taliban has chosen to lean towards its affiliate. Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja Asif excoriated the Taliban government in Kabul for its inaction against militants along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

In an interview with BBC Urdu, Asif stated that Pakistan also offered to grant Rs10 billion to relocate the militants towards the western border. He further reiterated that “It’s correct that we have been carrying out operations in Afghanistan, and we will continue to do so. We won’t serve them with cake and pastries. If attacked, we’ll attack back”.

He placed the stress on the element of surprise which the Pakistani forces hope to achieve in terms of their attack strategy which meant to proceed with the attacks without any prior warning to the Taliban government stating, “This would eliminate the element of surprise. Why should we tell them, ‘get ready, we are coming’?”

In response, the Taliban called the statement “irresponsible”, and forewarned Pakistan of “consequences” in case of cross-border attacks.

Following the deterioration of the Pak-Afghan relations, reports of Pakistani ISI colluding with the ISIS Khorasan (ISK) or Daesh Khorasan emerged. In one such report, a former TTP commander outlined the nature of the relationship between ISK and ISI, which was established through “Dabori Agreement” in the form of a quid pro quo approach. ISK gets the opportunity to infiltrate areas now easily accessible with the aid of ISI, the agreement also provides the necessary funds, logistics and arms required to carry out their assignments while Pakistan is able to achieve the deniability for the actions of ISK. ISI has been notably recognized for its cooperation and aid to Taliban prior to the US exit from Afghanistan in 2021. Due to this precedence, most jihadist groups would seek the opportunity to align with the ISI for consistent donorship and aid.

ISK is Taliban’s rival group, which upon the exit of the Afghan Taliban from the war theatre, has tried to gain complete authority and monopoly on Jihad in the Khorasan area while using Afghanistan as a launching pad for its operations. The Afghan Taliban, upon its return to power has carried out several operations to wipe ISK and its safe havens in Afghanistan. However, the ISK cadre has continued to retain its strength, if not multiply in numbers, by also attracting the soldiers, intelligence officers and cadres from the previous Ghani government, who were prosecuted or who stand the chance of being killed off by the Afghan interim government. ISK, on the other hand, has criticised Taliban for going soft in terms of Jihad and has also managed to successfully gain support amongst various jihadist groups, who also view the new persona of a politically functioning Taliban government as a deviation from Jihad.

The recent reports of ISK in cohorts with the ISI presents an expected obstacle for any sincere reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. To stretch the matter further, the possibility of the Pakistan military pushing the ISK cadre across the Durand Line under the cover of a retaliatory fire as a result of border skirmishes has certainly aggravated the situation.
Apart from the border skirmishes, the largest refoulement of the Afghans in Pakistan on the Pakistani claim of Afghans leading to the growing terrorism activity in the country, has also added more fuel to the fire of an already simmering Taliban sentiment.

Hence, given that the breakdown in relations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan has proved no fruition for either of them, the so called “good meeting” in Doha has become ends to the means.

In case of Pakistan, China has expressed its discontentment with Pakistan’s efforts at countering terrorism and protecting its citizens against the threats from insurgent groups and militant outfits such as the TTP, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Since majority of Chinese investments are in western Pakistan, especially along the border of Afghanistan, these projects are constantly susceptible to terror threats from many insurgent and militant groups who view the Chinese presence as a contiguous subjugation and marginalization of the local citizens. Pakistan’s approach to retain its ongoing ties with China at the cost of the Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun and minority interests, with constant crackdowns to hush the grievances, has not attained any brownie points for Pakistan. It was apparent that there was a foreseeable uptick in the militant cadre and the number of terrorist orchestrated activities which Pakistan undermined as minor threats.

Since the BLA claimed Dasu Dam attack in March 2024 on the Chinese citizens in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), several Chinese firms have suspended their operations until further notice. After the attacks, China demanded of Pakistan to initiate a large-scale counter terrorism operation against the militants, just as it had done in the past in form of operations Zarb-e-Azb and operation Radd-ul-Fassad.

On the Chinese demand, Pakistan’s government announced operation Azm-e-Istehkaam or “Resolve of durable stability” to “combat the menaces of extremism and terrorism in a comprehensive and decisive manner.”

The operation is essential to Pakistan’s interest which entailed to not only placate the Chinese worries to perpetuate the economic and defence aid to Pakistan, but also as an effort to curtail spread of the armed groups and anti-Pakistani insurgents. With Pakistan’s economy in a chaotic milieu, it is blisteringly taking measures to secure both foreign and domestic investments. However, due to the the lack of political stability and the disintegrating security issues, the probability of attracting domestic or foreign investors seems like a difficult task.

UAE-Taliban
It is apparent, the extended invitation to the representatives of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a well contemplated and premeditative move by Pakistan. Prior to Taliban’s visit to Doha, the Afghan delegation paid a visit to the UAE.

The UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan met with Taliban’s Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is a designated terrorist with a FBI placed bounty on his head. Even though several nations have not entirely acknowledged the Taliban government, the UAE government has indirectly provided the Taliban with an informal legitimate credibility by extending the invitation to discuss bilateral ties and regional stability. China, too, has tried to maintain relations with the Taliban fearing the spill over of the terrorism activities along its shared borders with Afghanistan and in an effort have kept their embassies open and accredited Taliban diplomats. Given Pakistan’s recent agenda to mollify China and furnish the funds for its large-scale operation Azm-e- Istehkam, the intent for the meeting in Doha was as expected for the success of the operation.

The question remains, to what extent Afghan Taliban would honour the Pakistani wishes to dispose its protected TTP assets in name of counter-terrorism, regardless of the probable compromise that may have been made to further individual interests between the two.

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The assessment noted that the US had taken steps to destroy or disable some of the equipment before it was left behind, but that much of it was still in working condition. The assessment also noted that the Taliban’s ability to use this equipment would depend on a number of factors, including their training and maintenance capabilities.

The assessment concluded that the US’s decision to leave behind so much equipment was a “significant miscalculation” that could have “serious consequences” for the region. The assessment also called for a review of the US’s policies on military assistance to ensure that such a mistake does not happen again.

The assessment has been criticized by some who argue that it does not go far enough in assessing the risks posed by the weapons and equipment left behind in Afghanistan. However, the assessment does provide a valuable overview of the situation and it is likely to be used by policymakers as they consider how to address the issue.

Arms in the Black Market

The Taliban in Afghanistan are selling the US arms on the black market. These weapons have been reported turning up in a number of countries, including Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia. They have also been reported being used by terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Haqqani Network.

In Pakistan, for example, there have been reports of Taliban-linked groups selling US-made weapons to militants in the country’s tribal areas. These weapons have been used by militants to carry out attacks against Pakistani security forces and civilians.

In Iran, there have been reports of Taliban-linked groups selling US-made weapons to Iranian proxies in the Middle East. These weapons have been used by Iranian proxies to carry out attacks against US forces and allies in the region.

In Central Asia, there have been reports of Taliban-linked groups selling US-made weapons to militants in the region. These weapons have been used by militants to carry out attacks against government forces and civilians.

The sale of US arms by the Taliban on the black market is a serious concern. These weapons could be used by terrorist groups to carry out attacks against US forces and allies, as well as civilians. The sale of these weapons also undermines the US’s efforts to combat terrorism in the region. The Taliban and other groups in Afghanistan have a well-established network of arms dealers, and it is difficult to track down these weapons once they have been sold.

The going black market rate of US arms left behind in Afghanistan varies depending on the type of weapon system and its condition. However, some general estimates can be made.

For example, a M4 rifle in good condition could sell for between $500 and $1,000 on the black market. An AK-47 rifle in good condition could sell for between $200 and $500. A Humvee in good condition could sell for between $50,000 and $100,000. A Black Hawk helicopter in good condition could sell for between $1 million and $2 million.

High Technology Systems

There is some concern that high-technology systems left behind in Afghanistan may have landed up in China or Russia. China and Russia are both major players in the global arms trade, and they have been known to purchase weapons from black market sources. If they were to acquire high-technology US systems, it would give them a significant advantage in terms of military capabilities.

The US government is also concerned that China and Russia could use their intelligence services to try to acquire high-technology US systems through other means, such as espionage.

Diversion of arms supplied in a conflict zone is not new. In Ukraine too, afms supplied by the USA and European allies have been diverted into the black market and it is difficult to estimate the scale of diversion. Some of the items that are believed to have been diverted include small arms and light weapons (SALW), ammunition, and night vision goggles.

For example, a Kalashnikov rifle in good condition could sell for between $200 and $500 on the black market. A Javelin anti-tank missile could sell for between $50,000 and $100,000. A night vision goggle in good condition could sell for between $1,000 and $2,000.

Establishing Accountability

As of yet, no one has been held accountable in the US for the large amount of weapon systems abandoned in Afghanistan. There have been calls for investigations and accountability, but no formal charges have been filed. The issue is likely to continue to be debated in the US for some time to come.

Some have argued that the US government should be held accountable for the weapons that were left behind, as they were ultimately responsible for the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Others have argued that the Afghan government should be held accountable, as they were responsible for the security of the weapons.

Here are some of the reasons why no one has been held accountable yet:

The US government has not yet released a full report on the withdrawal from Afghanistan, so it is not clear who was responsible for the decision to leave behind the weapons.

There is no clear legal basis for holding anyone accountable for the abandoned weapons. The US government has not been accused of any specific crime, and it is not clear that any laws were broken.

The US government is reluctant to open itself up to legal liability by investigating the abandoned weapons. If the government were to be found liable, it could be forced to pay damages to the Afghan government or other parties.

It is possible that the US government will eventually be held accountable for the abandoned weapons. However, it is also possible that the issue will be swept under the rug. Only time will tell what will happen.

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Weapon systems left behind by US forces in Afghanistan

Aircraft: 78 aircraft procured for the government of Afghanistan, including 60 Black Hawk helicopters, 18 A-29 Super Tucano attack planes, and 10 C-130 transport planes. These aircraft were demilitarized and rendered inoperable before the US military left.

Ground vehicles: Over 40,000 military vehicles, including 12,000 Humvees, 700 mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, and 200 tanks.

Small arms and light weapons: Over 300,000 weapons, including M4 rifles, M16 rifles, and AK-47 rifles.

Heavy weapons: 26,000 heavy weapons, including 105mm howitzers, 122mm howitzers, and 25mm machine guns.

Munitions: Over 1.5 million rounds of ammunition, including 7.62mm ammunition, 5.56mm ammunition, and 120mm mortar rounds.

Other equipment: Night vision goggles, biometric devices, and communications equipment.

It is important to note that the list above is not exhaustive. There may be other weapon systems that were left behind by US forces in Afghanistan.

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The United States killed al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a strike in Afghanistan on 31 July, President Joe Biden announced, calling it a moment of justice for families of 2,977 people killed in September 11, 2001 terror attack. Biden said Zawahiri had been the mastermind behind or played a key role in attacks on the USS Cole and US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

It was the biggest blow to the militant group since its founder Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Zawahiri, an Egyptian surgeon who had a $25 million bounty on his head, helped coordinate the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people.

Zawahiri died after a US drone strike in the Afghan capital Kabul. US intelligence determined with “high confidence” through multiple intelligence streams that the man killed was Zawahiri. He was killed on the balcony of a “safe house” in Kabul that he shared with other members of his family. No other casualties occurred.

There were rumors of Zawahiri’s death several times in recent years, and he was long reported to have been in poor health.

In a statement, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed that a strike took place and strongly condemned it, calling it a violation of “international principles.”

His death raises questions about whether Zawahiri received sanctuary from the Taliban following their takeover of Kabul in August 2021. US officials said that senior Taliban officials were aware of his presence in the city and said the United States expected the Taliban to abide by an agreement not to allow al Qaeda fighters to re-establish themselves in the country.

The drone attack is the first known US strike inside Afghanistan since US troops and diplomats left the country in August 2021. The move may bolster the credibility of Washington’s assurances that the United States can still address threats from Afghanistan without a military presence in the country.

Zawahiri succeeded bin Laden as al Qaeda leader after years as its main organiser and strategist, but his lack of charisma and competition from rival militants Islamic State hobbled his ability to inspire spectacular attacks on the West.

Until the US announcement, Zawahiri had been rumoured variously to be in Pakistan’s tribal area or inside Afghanistan.

The senior US official said finding Zawahiri was the result of persistent counterterrorism work. The United States identified this year that Zawahiri’s wife, daughter and her children had relocated to a safe house in Kabul, then identified that Zawahiri was there as well.

With other senior al Qaeda members, Zawahiri is believed to have plotted the October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole naval vessel in Yemen which killed 17 US sailors and injured more than 30 others, the Rewards for Justice website said.

He was indicted in the United States for his role in the August 7, 1998, bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people and wounded more than 5,000 others.

Both bin Laden and Zawahiri eluded capture when US-led forces toppled Afghanistan’s Taliban government in late 2001 following the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States.

Operational Details

Speculation is rife that the United States may have used Hellfire R9X, a warhead-less missile, which is used in finely targeted attacks. The Hellfire R9X first appeared in 2017 when al-Qaeda senior leader Abu al-Khayr al-Masri was killed. What suggests the use of the missile is that pictures showed no signs of explosion. Over time, the missile has earned names like “flying ginsu,” after a famous 1980s television commercial for ostensibly Japanese kitchen knives, and “ninja bomb”.

In his address, Biden pointed out that there was no harm done to the family members of Zawahiri in the precision strike, and no civilians bore any injuries.

Pakistan

Zawahiri’s presence in a guest house in Kabul, reportedly owned by interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani’s close aide, became a subject of intense curiosity, given Sirajuddin’s chief patron — the Pakistan deep state.

Al Qaeda After al-Zawahiri

Not as charismatic as Osama bin Laden (OBL), Al Qaeda (AQ) chief Zawahiri remained in his shadows. After OBL’s killing in a US Navy Seal operation in Pakistan in 2011, few experts believed that Zawahiri could hold the network together. However, since 2011, the AQ network has grown across the world, especially in Syria, Mali, Somalia, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, disseminating its puritanical ideology, money and expertise to local militant groups. This happened despite the huge popularity of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria amongst radical Muslim youth. The ISIS had also set up a physical Caliphate — a long-cherished goal of international jihad espoused by the AQ.

Under Zawahiri, the AQ network seems to have changed its strategic direction and its branches currently operate more like independent insurgencies — such as through the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria and Al-Shabab in Somalia. The crucial question is whether the AQ, post-Zawahiri, will lose momentum or whether the collective core leadership that seems to have been quietly working post-OBL could provide a leader as well as offer continuity.

Successor to al- Zawahiri

The most obvious name being discussed to succeed Zawahiri was that of another Egyptian, Saif al-Adel, who was believed to be in charge of external operations. However, given regular reports of his connections “within” Iran, he may not be the “ideal face” to succeed Zawahiri. Some regional leaders, such as from Al Shabab, may be acceptable, given the recent series of “successes” of this branch. The oldest branch, the al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is the key source of chief ideologues of jihad, may be used to prop up a cleric as the next AQ Amir in order to lower the profile for some time while keeping the propaganda around the “martyrdom” of Zawahiri going.

Saif al-Adel is on the FBI’s list of most-wanted terrorists. The agency mentions on its website that al-Adel was born on April 11, though his birth year is either 1960 or 1963. He has used aliases like Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi, Seif Al Adel, Ibrahim Al-Madani. The FBI has announced a reward of $10 million for any information about him. Saif al-Adel is an Egyptian ex army officer and a founding member of Al Qaeda. He had joined the precursor terror group Maktab al-Khidmat in 1980s.

A second possible successor is Yezid Mebarek, known as Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, emir of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb since 2020. An Algerian citizen, Mebarek ran media operations for AQIM, using a 2013 video to call for global attacks against French interests after Paris sent troops to help quash a militant insurgency in Mali.

A third potential successor is Moroccan-born national Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi. He is wanted for questioning by the FBI in connection with his membership in Al-Qaeda. He studied software programming in Germany before moving to Afghanistan where he was selected to manage al Qaeda’s main media wing, said the FBI. The son-in-law of Zawahiri, he is a senior Al Qaeda leader.

Doha Agreement Violated

The Taliban had promised in the 2020 Doha Agreement on the terms of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan that they would not harbour al-Qaida members. Nearly a year after the US military’s chaotic pullout from Afghanistan, al-Zawahri’s killing raises questions about the involvement of Taliban leaders in sheltering a mastermind of the 9/11 terror attacks and one of America’s most-wanted fugitives.

The Taliban and the US are accusing each other of violating the agreement. But the real question is: Was the Taliban involved in providing intel on Zawahiri for some benefit that would show up in the future, or did intra-Taliban rivalry lead to cooperation against the Haqqani Network? There is a third scenario — of the Pakistan deep state having provided the intel to show the Taliban in a bad light and curry favour with the US, especially in order to deal with the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has caused much violence against Pakistan forces.

Since the Haqqani Network has been mediating talks between the TTP and the Pakistan army, the strike has surely cast doubts about the safety of the TTP leaders who visit Kabul for meetings. Given the links between the Haqqanis and the Pakistani deep state, it is unlikely that the TTP would continue talks, which in any case have not prevented attacks on the Pakistani forces. The TTP has already started accusing the Pakistan army of providing a base to the US for the drone strike. Thus, much more violence is expected in the Af-Pak region in the coming weeks and months.

Zawahiri and India

In 2014, the AQ launched the Al Qaeda In Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the outfit’s South Asia branch. The inaugural video carried an old clip of OBL and a message of Zawahiri appointing a relatively unknown Indian radical Asim Umar, who had fled to Pakistan decades ago. In recent times, the group has posted many videos focused on India, especially on Kashmir. Some of these clips have featured Zawahiri. With his elimination, as well as that of Umar and a few “known” Pakistani faces of the AQIS earlier, the propaganda against India is likely to lose momentum for now. However, since the AQIS is an Af-Pak-based group, it may rebuild itself with support from the Pakistan deep state.

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New Delhi had evacuated its envoy to Afghanistan, Rudrendra Tandon, and 175 other officials posted in the Embassy of India in Kabul on August 17, 2021 – just two days after President Ashraf Ghani’s government collapsed in the wake of a swift military campaign by the Taliban. India had also evacuated its officials posted in its consulates in other cities in Afghanistan weeks before the country was taken over by the Taliban.

New Delhi sent a delegation of officials, led by its senior diplomat J P Singh, to Kabul, in early August, to oversee the delivery operations of India’s humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.

New Delhi, however, has been having back-channel contacts with the Taliban over the past few years as it had anticipated that the Sunni Islamist militia could eventually return to the governance structure in Kabul after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, thus giving its mentor Pakistan a strategic edge against India.

India over the past few months also sent food and medicines to Afghanistan as humanitarian assistance, which was distributed through the UN agencies.

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In his report released, on 3 February, on ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, the secretary general said the “best way” to promote stability and future international support was for the Taliban to avoid the isolation that characterised its previous experience in power.

“The Taliban are showing efforts to present itself as a caretaker government. The movement, however, has yet to form governing structures that reflect the country’s ethnic, political and geographic diversity and include women. Efforts are constrained by the lack of resources and capacity, as well as an ideology that clashes in many ways with international norms of governance,” he said.

The report added that Afghanistan was experiencing a massive economic contraction. “The best way to promote stability and future international support is for the Taliban to avoid the isolation that characterised its previous experience in power,” Guterres said.

Al Qaeda Still Present

In another report “The 29th edition of the UNSC’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team” the United Nations Security Council said that terror group al-Qaeda’s Indian subcontinent affiliate has retained a presence in at least six provinces of Afghanistan and has approximately 200-400 fighters, including Indian nationals.

The report, which was released, on 7 February, was prepared by a UNSC group that monitors counter-terrorism sanctions targeting al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

“[Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent] retains a presence in Afghanistan, in the provinces of Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Paktika and Zabul, where the group fought alongside the Taliban against the ousted government. AQIS is estimated to have between 200 and 400 fighters, mainly from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Pakistan,” it said.

The 22-page report, signed by UNSC Committee Chair and Norwegian national Trine Heimerback, also stated that contrary to media reports, Aslam Farooqi, former leader of the Islamic State faction Islamic State — Khorasan Province (ISKP), and alleged mastermind of the March 2020 terror attack on a gurdwara in Kabul, had “escaped” from an Afghanistan prison and “subsequently rejoined the group in a senior capacity”.

Terror Groups Have More Freedom Now

“There are no recent signs that the Taliban has taken steps to limit the activities of foreign terrorist fighters in the country. On the contrary, terrorist groups enjoy greater freedom there than at any time in recent history. However, Member States have not reported significant new movements of foreign terrorist fighters to Afghanistan,” the report said. “Primary kinetic threat” in the eyes of the Taliban, contextualising some of the conflicting reporting on ISKP attacks in Afghanistan and the alleged killing of Farooqi. The Uyghur extremist group East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) has also backed the Taliban government, the report added.

Islamic State Gaining Ground in West Africa

The report also broadened its focus beyond Afghanistan to track terrorist activity and developments on a global scale, with West Africa representing a particular region of concern where the Islamic State is gaining ground, and Southeast Asia a “bright spot” with ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates suffering defeats. In conflict zones like Iraq, ISIS “has evolved into a primarily rural insurgency” while al-Qaeda allies and affiliates continue to control northwestern Syria.

“Both Indonesia and the Philippines reported significant gains in countering threats from ISIL and Al-Qaida affiliates in the South-East Asia region, leading to an overall decline in terrorist activity and some optimism that the operational capability of the groups may be significantly degraded,” the report revealed, adding that lone-wolf attacks are still an ongoing risk.

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Since the US evacuation, IS-K has claimed many attacks in Afghanistan. According to U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) an aggregate of 77 attacks were recorded, directly or indirectly claimed by or attributed to IS-K from January through April 2021. It was reported that ISIS was responsible for the deaths of at least 124 civilians during the first half of 2021, according to another UNAMA report. Some of the major attacks in first half of 2021 included:

• May 8th: A car bombing and two other explosions resulting in deaths of 85 people and casualties over 275 at Sayed ul Shuhada High School for girls. The targeted group was the Hazara, who were the attendees. According to U.S. intelligence, ISIS was responsible while Afghan President Ashraf Ghani held the Taliban responsible.

• June 8th: ISIS claimed another attack, ISK gunmen killed 11 men and injured 15 others at a camp near Shaikh Jalal village in northern Baghlan province.

• August 26th: ISIS carried out twin bombings outside Kabul airport that killed at least 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members as mentioned earlier.

• October 8th: IS-K claimed responsibility for an attack on a Shia Mosque in Kunduz province, killing more than 72 civilians.

• October 15th: This was followed by another attack on Bibi Fatima Mosque in Kandahar on Oct 15th. 63 civilians were killed and dozens were left injured during the Friday prayer.

The attacks on 8 and 15 October were claimed by IS-K and carefully planned, with the intention of garnering enough attention while targeting Shias in their homes and centres. ISK being a Sunni group has often reiterated their intention of killing the Shia and Hazara, whom they view as heretics. 10% of the population of Afghanistan is considered to be Shia Muslims, with many also a part of the Hazara community. It is no surprise the attack on Kandahar Mosque were meticulously planned and orchestrated to give a message to the Taliban, owing to the rivalry between the two groups. Kandahar is the second largest city in Afghanistan and also the spiritual birthplace of Taliban.

It is important to note that Taliban had always recognized the threat stemming from the IS-K towards the religious minorities and the ethnic groups in Afghanistan and has failed miserably at adequately preparing for the waves of terror it fore saw. A definite example can be recounted from August 2021 mentioned above. The Taliban officials had consulted with the elders of the Shia community and provided a protective escort on the occasion of Ashura, a Shia religious holiday. Despite the security, IS-K carried attacks erupted not only in the Taliban`s heart land, but the frequency of IS-K claimed attacks only grew since September 2021. Areas around Nangarhar and Kunar, where IS-K primary bases were established saw a flurry of attacks, including a complex attack on a military hospital in which a notable Taliban commander was killed.

Another looming threat emerges from the Afghan soldiers, spies and law enforcement officers who were trained by the US military but are being killed off in the witch hunt carried by Taliban. Left to die and with no means of survival, provides a great opportunity to be recruited by the IS-K.

ISK and Jihad in Khorasan

Jihadism in Khorasan can be attributed to many factors and origins. The Afghan jihad predominantly emerged as a retaliation of the Taliban emirate which was overthrown by a US-led operation in 2001. Since then, the Taliban strove to return to power, even if it required to coerce the previous Afghan governments to cede some of its power to the outfit. After 2001, Afghan jihad played a dominant role in the region of Khorasan, despite few outfits choosing to take part in it.

 After 2014, the influence of the same Afghan jihad became undermined, as many factions were seen disputing and breaking away. Another significant “cause celebre” of Jihadism to further decline can be attributed to the Syrian war since 2011.

However, by the end of 2014, several groups started linking themselves to ISIS. Initially these groups identified themselves as separate identities. This notion soon changed in 2015, when the IS Central’s Chief spokesperson, Abu Muhammed Adnani announced the establishment of Wilayat Khorasan. After the establishment of the Wilayat, the IS-K teams started referring to themselves as Daesh or Daesh Khorasan or Khilafat Islami.

In the south of Afghanistan, a former Taliban leader and a Guantanamo Bay detainee, Mullah Abdul Raoof Khadim, swore his allegiance to ISIS. In the east, Hafiz Sayed Khan raised the black flag of ISIS. Since then, the group faced several heavy military attacks from the Afghan and coalition forces. This led to the death and capture of over “13,000 of its fighters, including five consecutive emirs, or top leaders”.

However, the group has been quite resilient and successful in substituting and replacing its manpower, while profiting in the opportunity of Taliban exiting the war theatre, since August, to expand its outreach. According to several IS-K interviews, IS-K currently operates in areas such as eastern and northern Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. It has already started to absorb many Taliban fighters; Baluchi insurgents and members of various outfits aggrieved with the Pakistani government or share the same ideology as itself or those who choose to seek profits or employment from the illicit dealings found in the region. Interestingly it is reported that IS-K has also succeeded in fostering relationships with outfits which previously worked with the Taliban, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and various others to name a few.

It is imperative to understand that part of the IS-K strategy was to use Afghanistan as a “spring board” for itself in the Khorasan region. Khorasan is a strategically located region with access to Central Asia and at the same time also one of the weakest regions in the area due to the least territorial control from its competitors. From the recent attacks in Kabul and Kunduz, it is becoming apparent that like its parent organization IS-Central, it has started implementing the “Blitzkreig” approach over the insurgent approach, which is to “concentrate force to achieve local superiority” and fastidiously destroy the enemies.

IS-K`s Aims

• Prominence in Khorasan: One of the immediate goals of IS-K was to embed itself in pockets of Khorasan. In the initial stage, at its most vulnerable, it failed at coexisting in the region as it was heavily laden with TTP, Taliban, the Afghan and the Pakistani groups. Their small numbers made it less viable to gain traction and prove their visibility to their recruits and donors who were seeking new experiments to fund. The IS-K propaganda was further subdued and their efforts at raising local taxes was banned, perhaps to avoid friction with Taliban and TTP. Given such a scenario, the outfit for a long time refrained from challenging any military force in the past.

• Shopping for Funding: In order to gain funding, the idea was to sell a jihadist cause, which would set well with the donors and present the outfit funds for its existence. In the past, the group promised radical Chinese Muslim groups that it planned to commence its operations in China. This was later linked to the funds which IS-K acquired from the private donors in the Arab Gulf for the very same project pitched to the Chinese Muslim groups. The familiarity with the Huis in Syria and Iraq prompted the IS central to conceive this project while viewing Han China as the new arena for waging jihad. The IS Central too, managed to build close relations with the Uyghurs of ETIM over the years and has succeeded in attracting many recruits from the Chinese Muslim communities. Even though China does not fall under IS-K’s territorial responsibility, the group continues to nurture the Chinese Muslims in Khorasan while utilizing the funds collected on behest of the community. The relation with the Huis is also strongly maintained despite the amicable relation IS-K shares with the Turkestan Islamic Party. It is evident, IS has been keen on Huis and intends to aid in the formation of a jihadist Hui movement in China.

• Retaliating for Syria: Retaliating against Iran gained an important premise compared to targeting the western targets for their intervention in Iraq and Syria. This philosophy applied to any affiliate of Iran. Russian assets in Afghanistan and Central Asia also served as targets and this provided IS-K to be useful to IS Central.

• Establishing safe havens for its fighters and forming an army: Setting up safe havens for its group was clearly imperative for ISK, in order to host its leaders from the central if required and for sustaining its existence from the growing repression it was to face from Taliban. In 2016, the ISK chiefs stated the plans to establish a primary safe haven in Kunar. In order to set their plan in motion the ISK fighters had tried to build a close rapport with the local communities and chiefs to use the area as a safe operating ground. IS-K, on the same line with its parent organization has constantly intended to develop facilities for organizing a centralized hybrid military force for quick deployment of well-trained fighters to out manoeuvre adversaries and disperse them when required.

• Garnering and mobilizing local support to dominate Jihad in Khorasan: Initially ISK had little to no support from the local communities except from specific jihadist groups and clerical networks. In order to increase its outreach, ISIS started par taking in local disputes, reinvigorating conflicts especially the sectarian ones, while attempting to lead any conflict which would help in overthrowing the previous Kabul government or any central Asian regimes.

It is clear that ISK intends to eventually over throw the Taliban regime and substitute it with its rule, as it has intended in Iraq and Syria. Its aspirations largely lay with the strategy laid by IS central. It has been effectively absorbing fighters from Taliban and various insurgent if not jihadist groups. This is also the primary reason why Tehran was not supportive of Kabul Taliban reconciliation, fearing it would only strengthen ISK. The IS-K strategy has remained coherent throughout the years, it aims at the maximizing pressure in areas where the resistance is weakest and polarizing violence IS-K’s aims to some extent have resonated with its parent organization the IS-Central, but have often seen fluctuating as well. Regardless of being called a franchise of the IS-Central, IS-K has on various occasions strategically established safe havens for its leaders and command centres, proving that it was more than a replicated clone of the IS- Central in form of anti-Shia campaign. Its efforts at Re-launching and expanding sectarian conflicts in Khorasan is a well-known IS-K strategy, which it continues to implement to create a social constituency for itself among a Sunni population and to implant itself in the political crevices of countries such as Iran, Pakistan and India as well. It poses a very high profile threat to India and will have to be watched closely.

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Moscow-hosted an international meeting to discuss the Afghan crisis with Taliban leaders and delegates from 10 countries, including China, Pakistan, Iran and India, on 20 October, in an effort to boost its influence across Central Asia. The talks came after Putin warned that Islamic State (IS) fighters were converging on Afghanistan.

The talks followed a G20 summit on Afghanistan — held on 12 October — to help the country avert a humanitarian catastrophe in the wake of the power shift there.

Russia’s Concerns

Russia is concerned about the impact of the Taliban seizing to power in Afghanistan in the wider region. Moscow has moved to engage the Taliban, but has stopped short of granting recognition to the group which is banned as a “terrorist” organisation in Russia. Unlike Western countries that rushed to evacuate diplomats following the fall of Kabul on August 15, Russia has kept its embassy there open.

A week before the meetimg, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that IS fighters were gathering in Afghanistan to spread into former Soviet republics and eventually Russia. Putin cautioned that around 2,000 fighters loyal to the “Islamic State” had gathered in northern Afghanistan, adding that their leaders planned to send them into neighboring Central Asian countries disguised as refugees.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made it clear in the run-up to the Moscow meeting that the discussions would not cover the issue of granting recognition to the Taliban, stressing the need for the group to live up to “expectations” on human rights.
Russia has lauded the efforts of Afghanistan’s Taliban government to improve the national security and political situation but stressed the need for the Islamist group to ensure inclusivity in its governance to achieve a stable peace in the war-torn country.

Lavrov said Moscow believes it’s time to mobilize global efforts to provide Kabul with effective financial, economic and humanitarian assistance to help prevent a humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan.

Lavrov emphasized the importance of respecting human rights and pursuing well-balanced social policies, adding that he discussed those issues with the Taliban before the talks. He added that Russia would dispatch a shipment of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and urged the international community to quickly mobilize resources to prevent a humanitarian crisis.
Russia says its diplomatic offensive to garner support for Kabul stems from concerns continued instability would encourage terrorist groups to threaten security of Afghanistan’s neighbors and the wider region.

Lavrov highlighted those fears while addressing the gathering in Moscow and urged the Taliban to deliver on their pledges of preventing terrorist groups from threatening Russia’s “friends and allies.”

Taliban’s Appeal

This was the Taliban’s most significant international meeting since seizing power over Afghanistan in mid-August. This was the first opportunity for the Taliban to get a hearing in order to get economic aid and international recognition that has eluded since they stormed into Kabul two months ago. Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi, while addressing the meeting, renewed a call for the global community to recognize the new government in Kabul and again demanded the United States unfreeze about $10 billon in Afghan central bank in foreign reserves.

The senior Taliban leader defended his interim government as “already inclusive” and said they would not accept any deal under pressure, according to the text of the speech Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid shared with media.

Washington Absent

The U.S. and other Western countries are working out how to engage with the Taliban without giving them the legitimacy they seek, while facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid to Afghans.
Washington also was invited to the talks in Moscow, but U.S. officials cited logistical reasons for not attending them. United States deputy secretary of the treasury, Adewale Adeyemo said the US Treasury was taking every step it could within its sanctions program to make clear to humanitarian groups that Washington wants to facilitate the flow of aid into Afghanistan.
Chinese officials renewed their resolve to work with the Taliban to help them deal with the economic and humanitarian challenges facing the country.

Charges Against Taliban

The Taliban’s resurgence has stirred international fears of a return to their hardline form of Islamist rule in the 1990s, when they hosted Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda movement and carried out egregious human rights violations, including public stonings and the marginalization of women at work and in schools.

The Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August after the United States and Western countries withdrew all their troops almost 20 years after the Islamist group was removed from power by the U.S.-led military invasion for harbouring al-Qaida planners of terrorist attacks on America.

The Taliban are under fire at home and internationally for reneging on some of their pledges to protect the rights of women and minorities.

The hardline group is also being accused of persecuting members of the ousted Afghan government, charges Taliban officials reject as unfounded and politically motivated propaganda.

Official Statement

Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Iran and five formerly Soviet Central Asian states joined the Taliban in calling for the UN to convene such a conference as soon as possible to help rebuild the country. They said it should take place “with the understanding, of course, that the main burden…should be borne by the forces whose military contingents have been present in this country over the past 20 years.”

At the end of discussions, a statement was issued saying: “Participating countries call on the current Afghan leadership to take further steps to improve governance and to form a truly inclusive government that adequately reflects the interests of all major ethno-political forces in the country.”

The statement also stressed the need for the Afghan leadership to “respect the rights of ethnic groups, women and children.”
While governments around the world, including Russia, have declined to give official recognition to the Taliban government, the communique recognized the “new reality” of their ascent to power.

India’s Role

India will play a key role in the coming days on the all-important question of according recognition to the Taliban, which now finds itself in a weaker position after blasts in mosques on two successive Fridays, in October, claimed about 150 lives.
The Taliban’s credibility as the sole guarantor of security in Afghanistan suffered a blow when three back-to-back bomb attacks at a famous mosque in its spiritual capital of Kandahar killed 47 persons. On 8 October, an explosion in a Kunduz mosque killed over 100 worshippers.

Senior Indian diplomats participated in talks with Taliban in Moscow, on 20 October, along with diplomats from Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran. India’s ambassador to Qatar, Deepak Mittal, had met Taliban representatives in Doha towards the end of August

India holds a view different from the other participants at the October 20 Moscow talks on providing humanitarian aid but is on the same page as Russia, Iran and China on persuading the Taliban to form an inclusive government and ensure there is no spillover of extremism to other countries.

The interaction of Indian diplomats with the Taliban can help the former take a view on removing their senior ministers from UN blacklisting. India is the chair of the UNSC’s sanctions committee till the end of next year.
After Kabul’s fall in August, India raised questions on the lack of inclusivity in the new Taliban regime, rights of minorities, women and children, and also voiced concern on terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.

In March 2021, Moscow hosted an international conference on Afghanistan in which Russia, United States, China and Pakistan released a joint statement, calling on the then-warring Afghan sides to reach a peace deal.

Comments

Russia’s initiative in hosting the talks is part of an effort to boost its influence in the region after the US pullout. Its main fear is the risk of instability in Central Asia, and possible migrant flows and Islamist militant activity directed from Afghanistan.
The concerns have intensified after a series of attacks by the Afghan affiliate of Islamic State — dubbed Islamic State in Khorasan Province after an ancient name for the region — on mosques and other targets that have killed hundreds of people.
Russia fought its own disastrous war in Afghanistan in the 1980s and has close military and political ties with former Soviet Central Asian republics that border Afghanistan.

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With the Taliban in power in Afghanistan, the Islamic State (IS) group has threatened to usher in another violent phase. There has been a sudden uptick in IS attacks since the Taliban takeover on 15 August.

Two deadly bombings have hit Kabul. One was outside the airport at the height of evacuations before the U.S. exit that killed 169 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members. Another deadly bombing, on 8 October, in the northern province of Kunduz killed 46 worshippers inside a mosque frequented by Shiites. The Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), the Afghanistan-based arm of the terrorist organisation, has claimed responsibility. Earlier, on October 3, a bomb targeted a memorial service being held for the mother of the Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, in a Kabul mosque, killing five. All these attacks suggest that the IS-K’s ability to strike has grown. Other deadly IS attacks have struck in the capital, Kabul, and provinces to the east and north, while smaller-scale attacks target Taliban fighters almost daily.

Now that the US and the international presence is mostly gone, the IS was going after the state, which is now the Taliban.

Hatred Towards Shiias

The IS’s doctrinal hatred towards the Shias is known. In Iraq and Syria, it systematically targeted Shias, who it calls “rejectionists” of faith, and used such attacks to mobilise the support of Sunni hardliners and trigger sectarian conflicts.

Long Rivalry

Both the Taliban and IS advocate rule by their radical interpretations of Islamic law. But there are key ideological differences that fuel their hatred of each other. The Taliban say they are creating an Islamic state in Afghanistan, within the borders of that country. The Taliban downplay IS’s capabilities and dismiss them as a fringe group with no mainstream appeal.
IS says it is the Islamic State, a global caliphate that it insists all Muslims must support. It is contemptuous of the Taliban’s nationalist goals and doesn’t recognize them as a pure Islamic movement. For similar reasons, IS has long been a staunch enemy of al-Qaida.

Both the Taliban and IS advocate particularly harsh versions of Islamic Shariah law and have used tactics like suicide bombers. But when it ruled territory in Syria and Iraq, IS was even more brutal and carried out more horrific punishments than the Taliban did.

IS emerged in Afghanistan in 2015 with the name Islamic State in Khorasan Province, at a time when the group was at its peak, controlling much of Iraq and Syria. It drew members from Afghan and Pakistani militants, including a wave of Taliban defectors.

The group initially found support among Afghanistan’s small Salafist movement in eastern Kunar and Nangarhar provinces. The Salafis had largely been marginalized by the Taliban, and by connecting with the rising IS, the Salafist movement found a means to establish military strength.
But IS’s brutal ways have since led some Salafi clerics to voice opposition. In the years after its emergence, IS was badly hurt by military setbacks at the hands of the Taliban and by U.S. airstrikes, before surging again the past year.

End Game

The IS’s immediate aim is to destabilize the Taliban and shatter the group’s image as a guardian of security.
For now, its strategy is slow and methodical. It is reaching out to tribes and other groups to recruit from their ranks while stamping out dissent among moderate Salafis and carrying out jailbreaks, assassinations, and attacks on Taliban personnel.
The Taliban are also strong and can uproot IS on their own, even without the backup of U.S. airstrikes that nearly eliminated IS. The IS — unlike the Taliban during their insurgency — do not have access to safe havens in Pakistan and Iran.
The Taliban have rejected cooperating with the U.S. against IS.

IS’s future trajectory in Afghanistan will depend largely on its ability to recruit more members and win over large segments of the population. Since their inception, they have been poaching Taliban members.

Comments

While both groups have used tactics of terror, the IS-K is a pan-Islamist jihadist outfit, while the Taliban are largely a Pashtun nationalist militancy. The rise of the IS-K poses multiple challenges to the Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan, which many in Afghanistan and Pakistan saw as a solution to the country’s security woes. On one side, their promise to provide security looks hollow. Afghanistan’s cities under the Taliban remain as insecure as they were under the previous Islamic Republic. On the other hand, even if the Taliban, under pressure from Afghanistan’s donors and the public, want to make some concessions on the many restrictions already imposed, they would come under pressure from the more extremist IS-K, which says the Taliban are not Islamic enough. For the people of Afghanistan, who are stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea, the war that started 40 years ago continues, no matter who is in power in Kabul.

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China is keeping a hawkish eye on the mineral resources in Afghanistan, especially on lithium and copper. Also, China wants to ensure the security of 60,000 Chinese present in Pakistan for the project linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Beijing Meet

Meanwhile, suggesting a willingness to cooperate, Wang Yi hosted a nine-member Taliban delegation, led by the head of the Afghan Taliban Political Commission, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, on July 28 in Tianjin. That the meeting preceding the Taliban victory must have been used to discuss a concrete roadmap for the Taliban. Praising them as “an important military and political force”, Wang Yi urged them to “make a clean break with all terrorist organisations, including the ETIM” and attack them resolutely and effectively. Replying, Baradar hoped for Chinese assistance in reconstruction efforts and assured the Taliban will “never allow any force to use the Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to China.” He apparently sidestepped specific mention of the ETIM.

Diplomatic Moves

Within days of the Taliban taking over Kabul, the Chinese foreign ministry said the current Taliban appeared more “clear-headed and rational” than they were when they were in power from 1996 to 2001. Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen told Chinese national broadcaster China CGTN TV that China cold play a big role in the “rebuilding, rehabilitation, reconstruction of Afghanistan.”

China hopes the Afghan Taliban can unite with other political parties and with all ethnic groups and build a political framework in keeping with national conditions that is broadly inclusive and will lay the foundation for enduring peace,” foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said after the Taliban took over.

Nervous About Instability

As one of six countries on its border, China has had years to engage inside Afghanistan. Now the landlocked country is even more unstable and without an external presence like U.S. and NATO troops to provide security guarantees.

It sees the success of a radical Islamist movement in Afghanistan as an inherent threat, leaving it even less likely to want to invest in the kind of infrastructure that might open up an already dangerous borderland even further.

Pakistan has deep ties with the Taliban and has long played the role of intermediary with Beijing. Whenever terrorist groups with links with the Taliban have targeted Chinese nationals and projects – in Pakistan, Beijing pressed Islamabad to find those responsible. China has never been fully confident that Pakistan had a real handle on these insurgent groups

China has all along opposed the various UN resolutions and pleas by several global powers to designate the JeM as a global terrorist organization. By implication, therefore, it can be said that China has been supportive of terror groups patronized by Pakistan for cross-border terrorism, targeting India in particular.

China wants to leverage its stranglehold over the Taliban leadership and control Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to remain a prime mover in the Afghanistan scheme of things.

Concerns About Xinjiang

Beijing is more concerned that terrorist insurgencies do not spill over into its Xinjiang province, where international human rights organizations and countries like the U.S. and U.K. say China is committing widespread abuses against the local Muslim Uyghur population. Beijing has consistently denied these claims.

Afghanistan could become a potential haven for the Uyghur extremist group, which could retaliate against the “widespread repression of Uyghurs.” Instances of Islamic extremist-linked violence have also occurred in other Muslim-dominated pockets in China, like the Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region and Yunnan.

Chinese intelligence is aware that Uyghurs have been trained at Al Qaeda training camps in northern Pakistan and Afghanistan and of their presence among the Taliban.

The Taliban’s Chechen, Uzbek, Tajik, Uyghur and other fighters are, however, motivated by jihad, adventure, power and cash. Their victory will attract many others from around the world. They are unlikely to agree to halt the bid to expand their Emirate. Chinese analysts are also apprehensive that China’s problems will increase as the US will now focus its attention on containing China and its rise.

Mineral Rich Country

Afghanistan is home to the world’s largest reserves of lithium – the key ingredient of the large-capacity lithium-ion batteries that are widely used in electric vehicles and the renewable energy industry. And since China dominates Lithium-Ion Battery Production worldwide, it may seek long-term a contract with the Taliban to develop Afghanistan’s massive untapped lithium reserves in return for mining rights and ownership arrangements.

Afghanistan is also rich in several other resources such as gold, oil, bauxite, rare earths, chromium, copper, natural gas, uranium, coal, iron ore, lead, zinc, gemstones, talc, sulphur, travertine, gypsum and marble.

But even though Chinese companies (and mining companies in general) have a higher-than-average tolerance for risk, few have made the decision to enter the market in the war-torn nation.

China has already been burned by failed investments in Afghanistan, most notably the copper project at Mes Aynak, which sits just 25 miles (40 kilometers) outside Kabul. The Taliban had made specific commitments not to attack the mine, but even then, China decided to discontinue its operations.

Belt and Road Projects

Afghanistan’s stability is key to protecting the approximately $60 billion in Belt and Road projects in neighboring Pakistan that provide an overland route to the Indian Ocean.

Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid, on 6 September, expressed that the group “desires” to join the CPEC. CPEC is a part of China’s most ambitious project ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, aimed at renewing the country’s historic trade routes in the coastal countries of south-east Asia. With CPEC, Beijing aims to expand its influence in Pakistan and across Central and South Asia in order to counter the influence of the United States and India.

China’s BRI could get more reach if it able to extend the initiative from Pakistan to Afghanistan, with a Peshawar-to-Kabul motorway. The road, which is already being discussed, would create a much shorter land route for faster and convenient access to markets in the Middle East for Chinese goods. A new route through Kabul would also render India’s reluctance to join BRI less consequential.

American Air Bases and Equipment

In what could have serious security implications for India, the Taliban could hand over the Bagram airbase to China and Kandahar base to Pakistan for operational purposes. America’s former envoy to the United Nations Nikki Haley told Fox News, on 1 September, “We need to watch China, because I think you are going to see China make a move for Bagram Air Force Base.”

While a team of aeronautical engineers of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had inspected all the five airbases in Afghanistan, including Kandahar, Bagram and Kabul, a delegation of Chinese leaders held a meeting with the Taliban top hierarchy to discuss various security-related issues, including the possible takeover of the Bagram military airfield, sources connected to the ongoing developments said.

The military hardware left behind in Afghanistan by the US could potentially lead to arms proliferation in entire Asia and beyond. Tanks and special vehicles left behind by the Americans in Afghanistan are already being shipped to countries like Pakistan and Iran.

The collusion between Pakistan and China could ultimately land the leftover American military hardware in the hands of Beijing which could reverse engineer the technology to upgrade its military. China could also exploit the detailed analysis of the American military technology for developing counter-technologies like radars and jammers to foil the operational edge of the American military hardware being used by the Indian Defence forces

Comments

The Chinese expect that Afghanistan could form an inclusive and broad-based government, adopting a foreign and domestic policy that is prudent and moderate so as to echo and meet the aspiration and shared will of the international community and its own people. Independent analysts, however, feel that such claims on part of China are mere rhetoric to keep the Taliban and Pakistan in good humour. In reality, Chinese plans are unpredictable and diabolical.

China does not indulge in charity. It is evident that China has already made a deal with the Taliban to extend critical strategic, military, financial, governance support and give Taliban the international authenticity it requires to operate freely. In return, the Taliban has to protect Chinese interests in the region, and allow free access for Chinese colonization of Afghanistan.

Supremacy in the region has a lot to do with controlling the geography of the region. China is going about its old tricks, with natural ease.

The Pakistan state is fully compromised and embedded with China, to work for Chinese strategic, military and political interests. China will use Pakistan to ensure the Taliban will not work against China’s interests and keep tabs on it.

China will exploit the unstable geography around India with its aim to be a global military super-power, sooner than later. China is making its nefarious moves to gain full geo-political control of the region, before taking its challenge to the West.

The Taliban will no doubt offer all kinds of assurances but no one knows how they will govern. Recognizing the group as the de facto political authority and engaging with them makes sense for China.

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As the Taliban cemented their total victory in Afghanistan, messages of conciliation came out from their leaders. One of their top leaders, Sher Mohammed Stanikzai, confirmed the Taliban’s commitment of not allowing their territory to be used against any country in the world. Specifically, he said they would not allow India and Pakistan to play out their rivalry in Afghanistan.

Taliban leaders Zabiullah Mujahid, Suhail Shaheen and Stanikzai spoke of their expectations that India would continue to maintain its ‘cultural, economic and trade ties’ with the new Emirate of Afghanistan and retain its invaluable ‘air freight corridor’ with it.

Under the circumstances, India is in no hurry to take a position on Taliban even if the US is looking for an excuse of a negotiated settlement to recognise the radicalised Sunni force. For the Indian government, the parameters of engaging the Taliban are based on its relationship with Pakistan and Pakistan-based Deobandi terrorist groups with India in their cross-hairs.

Strategic Implications

India does not share a border with Afghanistan, except in the Northern Areas under Pakistan’s occupation. A friendly Iran and hostile China and Pakistan share frontiers with Afghanistan. That explains India’s weak Afghan card.

India started talking to the Taliban only three years ago, when it became clear that they would play a part in a future political dispensation in Kabul.

But with America determined to quit, India has found it difficult to gain ground after nearly 20 years.

Deficiencies in India’s economic and diplomatic strategies have resulted in China gaining ground in its vicinity by attracting India’s neighbours — all members of SAARC, of which India is the largest country — to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In July 2020, Iran cancelled an Indian rail project, aimed at connecting the Chabahar port to Zahedan on its Afghan border. And last May, Tehran showed India the door in the Farzad gas project. In both cases, Iran accused India of delaying the projects.

America’s retreat leaves a power vacuum which the Taliban and their terrorist friends could exploit.

Indian Investments

India was the first country that Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership with, the only country that undertook perilous but ambitious projects such as a new Parliament building, the Zaranj-Delaram Highway, and the Chabahar port project in Iran, the infrastructure for transit trade. As a consequence, India by far is the one country that polled consistently highest among countries that Afghan people trusted.

India committed significant sums of money as part of the project of building modern Afghanistan. India was able to make a niche among Afghans with its humanitarian aid and $3 billion investments since 2001 for rebuilding a devastated country.

At the Afghanistan Conference in Geneva in 2020, India announced several fresh development commitments including the construction of the Shahtoot Dam in Kabul, as well as several restoration and community development projects.

Indian companies have invested on socio-economic overhead capital worth $3 billion. In 2015, the Prime Minister inaugurated the new Afghan Parliament house built at a cost of $90 million. A slew of ongoing projects including the Aga Khan heritage project to restore Bala Hissar Fort south of Kabul are raising concerns. India’s health infrastructure including Indira Gandhi Institute for Child Health and various clinics in several Afghan provinces are hanging in balance.

Thousands of Afghans are in India for work, training, re-skilling, education and medical treatment. Over 2,200 students of Afghan-origin studying in India on scholarship stare at an uncertain future.

Indians in Afghanistan have been an employment and revenue model for India. The Indian embassy in Kabul estimates that 1,710 Indians were employed in banks, hospitals, NGOs, telecom, IT, and universities. On the other hand, import restrictions may force India to seek alternative partners which may not be viable in the near future.

India’s business and trade also comprises the education sector, in which scores of Afghan students throng Indian universities and colleges. The Indian Survey of Higher Education (AISHE) claims that 4,504 student admissions from Afghanistan took place in 2019-20, the second highest flow of students from any country into India. With the current crisis, Afghan students have requested India to continue their course from within the campus and expedite the paperwork on a war footing.

Bilateral Trade

India may not be able to fund projects in Afghanistan, but it could, and should, promote trade which currently stands at around $1.5 billion. This will be a more sustainable way of helping the country. Though Chabahar is there, more could be gained if Islamabad removed its blockade of overland Indian exports to the country.

The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan will bear an adverse impact on India’s bilateral trade with it. Trade between the two nations amounted to $1.4 billion in 2020-21 and $1.52 billion in 2019-20. It has hit Afghan traders also. Their exports for now are thawed and restoration depends on how situations normalize. Afghans sell dry fruits like dried raisin, walnut, fig, pine nut, almond dried apricot, pistachios and medicinal herbs.

Prices of some commodities may also go up in the Indian markets due to uncertainty over bilateral trade and relations with Afghanistan. Exports from India stood at $826 million whereas imports amounted to $510 million in 2020-21. The not-so-large volume of trade may not look monetarily important but strategically, they help both the countries.

Connectivity

India’s significant contribution in its rebuilding and investments in Afghanistan too would be missed there. India had an ambitious plan with the initiative of International North-South Corridor spanning Iran, central Asia and Eurasia. It is supposed to emerge as a major connector with Modi’s concept linking the corridor to Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran rail link, now operational. It is also supposed to be linked to Chabahar and dedicated freight corridor having special economic zones on its fland being built by India. The Chabahar-Sistan-Baluchistan-Central Asia/Afghanistan route till recently was considered less risky than the high-risk provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. With the changing political scenario this too is likely to become a challenge.

It seems inconceivable and incomprehensible that the Government can choose to simply walk away from such capital invested and nurtured, regardless of the developments in Afghanistan, the domestic political considerations in India and geopolitical sensitivities of some neighbours. Therefore, it would be abdication of responsibility. The Government must instead consider all its options in remaining engaged with Afghanistan for its future and of the ordinary people of Afghanistan who boldly placed their faith in Indian leadership.

Extension of Terrorist Activities

There is a serious incoming internal security threat to India as the victorious Taliban will be the galvanizing force for the Ummah, leading to increased global radicalisation as witnessed when the so-called Islamic State captured Mosul in 2014. Today, the Taliban have become the beacon of political Islam and will attract followers from all over the world.

While the Taliban have traditionally maintained that they have no interest in Kashmir issue and has always rejected the Durand Line, India is waiting on whether the Sunni Islamist force, which draws inspiration from Wahhabism as Deoband does, cuts a deal with TTP in favour of Pakistan Army. TTP leader Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud has already made it clear that it will continue to fight Pakistan Army while thanking Haibatullah Akundzada for releasing their deputy leader Maulvi Faqir Mohammed from Bagram highest security prison. No less than 7,000 hardcore and most brutal terrorists were let go by the Taliban from Bagram prison and the US will have to answer for future terror attacks. It will become clear to India on Pakistan’s leverage on the Afghan Taliban if they try to get their Pakistan namesake on the peace table for Rawalpindi GHQ.

The other issue being watched by Indian counter-terrorism experts is the relationship between the Taliban and Bhawalpur based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) group, which has vowed to target India on Kashmir. One must remember that Jaish Emir Maulana Masood Azhar was taken directly to Emir-ul-Momeen Mullah Omar after he was freed by India in the 1999 IC-814 hijacking at Kandahar. The Taliban have no love lost for Ahle-Hadith Lashkar-e-Tayebba group and are now low on priority of the Pakistani ISI.

If Taliban have no overt interest in Kashmir, then they will not supply top of the line US made weapons, drones and military vehicles or provide terror training camps to Azhar gang in Afghanistan for targeting India. If India is targeted under the umbrella of Taliban despite their public and private assurances, then the next Balakot will be in Afghanistan.

Anas Haqqani, youngest son of the founder of the anti-India Haqqani network, Jalaludin Haqqani, told a news channel that Kashmir was beyond its jurisdiction. But Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen said they had the right to raise their voice for Muslims in Kashmir. Most major attacks against the Indian assets in Afghanistan have been executed by the Haqqanis, who were described by former US Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, as a veritable arm of the ISI. Some Taliban statements are in sync with Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s (also called Taliban Khan) who has described the Taliban victory as breaking the shackles of slavery. He has used a similar language to incite revolt in Kashmir. Neelam Irshad Sheikh, a leader from Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf party, has even said she hoped the Taliban will help us in Kashmir.

From the Indian perspective, rise of Taliban will not only pose an internal security challenge to the Modi government with large scale radicalisation as a first step, it will also embolden Pakistan based terrorist groups to attack India. Jaish has operated with the Taliban in Afghanistan but it was the ISI that forced Haqqani Network to help LeT cadre to attack Indian embassy and consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar in the past. Lashkar on its own has limited influence in Kunar province of Afghanistan

India Taliban Qatar Meet

Indian Ambassador to Qatar, Deepak Mittal met Taliban leader Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the Head of Taliban’s Political Office in Doha, on 31 August, at the request of the Taliban in Doha to discuss the “safety, security and early return of Indian nationals stranded in Afghanistan” among other things. This appears to be a shift from India’s ‘wait and watch’ policy, and rightly so. The policy has got its own set of limitations.

The meeting between Mittal and Stanekzai, the first time any contact has been made public, took place after prime minister Narendra Modi, noting the evolving situation in Afghanistan, directed that a high-level group comprising external affairs minister S Jaishankar, NSA Ajit Doval and senior officials focus on India’s immediate priorities.

The meeting in Doha followed Stanekzai’s statements over the previous three days. He said India is “very important for this subcontinent” and his group wants to continue Afghanistan’s “cultural”, “economic”, “political” and “trade ties” with India “like in the past.

India’s dilemma was understandable as it has historically abstained from providing legitimacy to the Taliban and had an appreciable degree of rapport with Ashraf Ghani government.

India’s Options

For India, a victim for decades of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, 9/11 was a marker. With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and in many the global war on terror no longer being the central focus of American attention, India will have to fight many of its battles alone — as it did before 9/11. Hopefully, the lessons of the need for making independent decisions and fighting “your own battles” will not be lost to decision-makers who had hoped that the US would not abandon the cause so soon.

Ironically, though, the emergence of the Islamic State and a reinvigorated Muslim Brotherhood has had the collateral effect of drawing the Gulf states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, concerned about the danger posed to their polities by these ideologies, closer to India. America’s draconian sanctions on Iran, including for its alleged terrorist activities, have adversely affected our strategic as well as energy interests in Iran.

As against all these negative realities, India-US counter-terrorism cooperation has productively expanded in important areas. The US recognition of the LeT, JeM, HuM as terrorist groups, and its references to “cross-border terrorism” have been diplomatically helpful, but this has not balanced the far larger unpunished space given to Pakistan despite its terrorist affiliations.

India supported “an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” peace and reconciliation process. But while other countries did not let this prevent their contacts with the Taliban in Doha and elsewhere, India followed it in letter and spirit. With the US out and Ashraf Ghani gone, there was no option except to withdraw all diplomatic presence, closing the embassy for all practical purposes.

India continues to “wait and watch” Afghan developments. While it does so, many new terms are being added to the Indian diplomatic lexicon by supporters of such an approach. These include “strategic patience” and not granting “legitimacy”. While some members of the Indian foreign policy and strategic community now seem willing to accept the need for open contact with the Taliban by the government, others are not willing to go so far.

The Taliban should first guarantee that they will not allow themselves to be used by Pakistan in any jihadi activity in our country. This would be a huge win for India, but it is also to be noted that the Taliban has no interest in Kashmir. In return for this guarantee, India must recognize the Taliban and establish full diplomatic relations with them.

It is in India’s interest to help the emergence of a stable Taliban regime. They have never sought to export their medieval version of Islam; their fault was in allowing others to use their territory to train terrorists. If they are committed to prevent this, the world would be ready to do business with them.

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