Wing Loong I UAV at the 11th CIAA Exhibition in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province, 31 Oct 2016.
Wing Loong I UAV at the 11th CIAA Exhibition in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province, 31 Oct 2016.
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UAVs are the Champions of the New Form of Warfare

The days of the blitzkrieg are slowly setting into the twilight of military doctrine, while a new dawn of contactless battle is surely but steadily visible on the horizon. This is attributable to the growing doctrinal shift is achieving the end state by means other than war (MOTW) albeit under a nuclear umbrella, which limits the threshold of conflicts. This paradigm of contextualisation of war/ conflict itself warrants a closer examination.

The last known conventional mechanised operation was seen during the Gulf War code-named Operation Desert Storm in 1991. From a classical military perspective it was a war waged by an array of nations forming a coalition of forces from 35 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait arising from oil pricing and production disputes. The contours of the operation conformed to the traditional concepts of relentless airstrike exhorting shock and awe, mobilisation of multinational troops and build-up designed to hold the adversary followed by a predetermined combined arms outflanking mechanised offensive and finally consolidation leading to complete annihilation of the Iraqi forces.

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The next decade saw the proliferation of sub conventional conflict across the globe. Warring nations or radical groups resorted to a low cost option of engaging non state actors to pursue their political agenda hoping to achieve defined conflict termination, which seldom has been the case. While the cost has been disproportionately low in keeping the pot boiling, the incalculable sufferings and loss of human lives defies logic. Nonetheless determined governments have resorted to brute force and brought this menace under control. Sri Lanka Bosnia and Herzegovina are examples. However, closer home, cross border terrorism has found no tangible answer despite multiple strategies including a localised limited offensive and a cross border surgical strike. In fact, the activation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) by the eastern adversary using a combination of LAC transgression backed by a conventional build-up marks a strategic shift in the conflict continuum. The compulsions of ensuring territorial integrity, while restraining conflict escalation matrix, is indeed a complex border management challenge. Therefore, our response has also been equally measured yet aggressive and determined albeit limited in scope and depth just enough to facilitate strategic messaging. On the contrary, China’s actions resonates its policy of whittling the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) grand strategy to realize its national objective of “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Stemming from this ideology is the Chinese military strategy that ordains the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to defend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, even if it is at the cost of an expansionist protocol. In so doing, China has mastered the art of informationised, irregular warfare that largely conforms to the western concept of hybrid warfare, where soft power and covert operations play a predominant role.

Contactless War

Informationised warfare, or loosely coined Hybrid warfare, is being termed as sixth-generation warfare. This dialectical development occurs sequentially and in parallel at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. It deals with long-range, high-precision engagements that can be launched from weapon platforms on land, sea, air and space intimately intertwined with information, psychological and irregular warfare. It is designed to undermine the adversary’s gross national power (GNP) while simultaneously eroding the military potential, made possible by the revolution in military affairs (RMA) fuelled by rapid and intense technological breakthrough. This type of warfare is being called ‘contactless war’ besides the soft power. Sixth-generation warfare has three main objectives:

•             Defeating an opponent’s armed forces (in his own territory).

•             Destroying an opponent’s economic activity and potential.

•             Subverting or changing an opponent’s political system.

The growing influence of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) shall soon usher in the seventh-generation, where orchestration of the battle will be remote while precision engagement at the physical level will be by robotic unmanned entities – a replica of Star Wars.

Armed UAVs – the main stay of Contactless War

It is in this context that unmanned aerial systems (UAS) or drones have emerged as an undisputable champion of contactless warfare, be it traditional reconnaissance, target acquisition and tracking or precision engagement. If fact drones are unequivocally changing the character of warfare in strategy, action and perception across the continuum of conflict. The drone attack by Houthi rebels on Saudi Aramco oilfield on 14 September 2019 and the precision engagement by the United States on Baghdad International Airport eliminating Maj Gen QuassimSulaimani of Iran on 3 January 2020 are examples of future combat engagements. Thus, the era of armed drones is here to stay and it will find effective use in prosecution of the contactless warfare. On the contrary, its rapid proliferation among states and non-state actors and militant groups alike poses a new global challenge. Further miniaturisation and affordability make these excellent tools in their hands to execute destructive intent in a contactless manner.

Global Perspective

More than ten countries have conducted unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) or armed drone strikes: the United States, Israel, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Russia and the United Arab Emirates. But many other countries, including Saudi Arabia and China, among others, maintain armed drones in their arsenals. India is a prospective entrant to this elite club.

ALSO READ: India Revives Plan to Get MALE Armed Predator-B Drones

As per America’s World of Drones database, countries are sorted into three groups: those that use drones in combat, those that possess armed drones but have not used them in combat and those that are developing armed drones. In the American parlance, drone capabilities are classified according to the US Air Force (USAF) tier system. Mini and micro drones are not classified in the tier system.

•             Tier-I includes low altitude, low endurance drones like the Orbiter.

•             Tier-II is comprised of medium altitude, long endurance drones like the Reaper or the retired Predator.

•             Tier-III applies to high altitude, long endurance drones like the Global Hawk.

The United States and Israel are the biggest producers of drones followed by China. America’s leading combat drones are the MQ-9 Reaper and the Global Hawk. MQ-9 Reaper drone was used in the drone strike at Baghdad. Harop (or IAI Harpy 2), an Israeli drone is a loitering munition, developed by the MBT Division of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). It is an anti-radiation drone that can autonomously home in on radio emissions and strike the target by itself, being self-destructive. If a target is not engaged, the drone will return and land itself back at the base.

China is also a major drone manufacturer and specialises in developing the Cai Hong family of CH-4, CH-5 and CH-7 armed drones. The CH-7 is a stealth flying fixed wing UCAV similar to the X-47B, with a 22m wingspan and 10m length. It can fly at 920 km/h and at an altitude of 13,000m. Endurance is about 15 hours and its operational radius is 2,000 kilometres. It can carry anti-radiation missiles and standoff weapons. It can intercept radar signals and simultaneously detect, verify and monitor high-value targets, such as hostile command stations, missile launch sites and naval vessels and carry out strikes.

India, on the other hand, is one of the largest importers of drones internationally. According to a Business Insider report based on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data, India accounted for approximately 22.5 percent of drone imports between 1985-2017.

India’s Perspective

India’s UAV inventory in the armed forces consists of Searchers Mark-I and II followed by Heron – all from Israel. These are mere surveillance UAVs with an operating ceiling of 15,000ft. However, being susceptible to radar interception it warranted a higher ceiling. Accordingly, the Army acquired the Heron, which could operate at an altitude ceiling of 30,000ft. These acquisitions by the Army were followed suit by the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Navy, each with a service specific mandate and operational autonomy. However, the clamour is now for acquiring Harop armed UCAVs from Israel. While acquisitions have been the order of the day, indigenous development and manufacture have also been given the right impetus. DRDO has developed a series of drones in the medium altitude long endurance (MALE) category but their operational viability is yet to be established. Hence, under the present eastern Ladakh imbroglio, it is but natural to look towards foreign vendors. That notwithstanding, there are a few collaborative initiatives with Elbit and Rafael, both exponents in Israeli defence and aerospace. It is in this light that the government’s “atmanirbharta” drive is a welcome step in placing some category of drones in the negative list to boost home grown production. It is to be seen if the Indian drone manufacturing fraternity can rise up to the challenge to meet the desired expectations.

Employment in Indian Environment

UAVs are great force multipliers and are being effectively used in surveillance missions across our operational spectrum all along the IB LOC LAC and AGPL. Their operational efficacies in high altitude regions have been remarkable. In a conventional engagement these UAVs will provide target inputs for artillery and missiles engagement followed by post-strike damage assessment (PSDA). In addition, the concept of swarm drone attack against mechanised elements in the contact battle as well as seek-and-destroy missions against command and control centres in near real time will be a game changer. All this is possible due the very high resolution optics carried on board for precision engagements. Under these operational necessities the next logical step should be to weaponise these platforms for effective target destruction. Although literal action of modifying the existing drone fleet is desirable but may not be technically feasible due to the change in payload configurations. Hence, acquisition of Harop will soon fill this void. The employment envisages surveillance and destruction of selected targets by loitering missiles and PSDA. Harop –  a self destructive killer drone – is, in fact, a loitering missile capable of seeking targets and destroying them with pin-point accuracy having an operational range of 1000km and flight endurance of six hours. It can be launched against land- and sea-based targets from ground, sea and air. It will be an excellent counter to China’s CH-4, CH-5 and CH-7 UCAV platforms. Undoubtedly, armed drones will form the main stay of contactless war.

Tactical UAV Capability

UAVs are now an integral part of all operations across the spectrum of conflict. An organisational issue that needs immediate attention is the development of tactical UAV capability. As of now, all UAV capability rests at the directional level, whereas, there is an urgent need for mini UAVs to exploit fleeting opportunities at the tactical level. It is here that our indigenous commercial drone manufacturers have the requisite wherewithal in terms of range, endurance, thermal imaging, real time video transmission and autonomous capabilities. In fact, a fully autonomous drone only requires the way points to be assigned within a predetermined geofence. The drone can take off on its own, fly along the assigned waypoint, besides simultaneously tracking the way with real time transmission of video to the ground control station (GCS) and complete the given mission with very little manual intervention. It also has failsafe modes as well an auto return mode due to break in communication or low battery power, built into it.

Drones in the Current Face-off

The situation along the LAC is extremely volatile. Over the past 30 years, the PLA have nibbled into the LAC with impunity while the Indian Army has merely resorted to patrolling up to the patrolling points as defined by the China Study Group, which falls well short of Indian perception line. However, the recent conflagration has witnessed a paradigm shift in border management. The resolve to undo status quo and protect every inch of ground backed by a strong political will and effective diplomatic machinery has prompted the military to undertake bold actions as a quid pro quo in areas that can be exploited by the Chinese. The dilemma, therefore, is the trustworthiness or otherwise of the Chinese to undertake disengagement and de-escalation as decided by both sides and remain committed to it. Therefore, in the absence of any Chinese guarantee that the PLA will not reoccupy those positions in the event of its vacation by the Indian troops, the situation calls for firm deployment – almost permanent in nature.

In situations like these drones have a very significant role to play for all the obvious reasons. It necessitates the use of drones in areas all along the LAC with continuous high precision observation and contact surveillance of the strategic depth in tandem with quick response armed drones addressing key vital war sustaining installations. Such operations can be undertaken by drones flying well within our own territory. This should be followed by operational level visibility of avenues of approach in the immediate depth to thwart Chinese unforeseen build up of local reserves and, finally, resorting to tactical level observation and reconnaissance of the immediate vicinity. It is a task that will have to be undertaken 24×7 and, therefore, necessitates fast track drone procurement.

It can be stated with reasonable alacrity that armed drones are no more a force multiplier but a decisive combat influencer that facilitates low cost conflict management. It is a conflict changer, faster than anticipated and can enable countries to make highly credible threats against states and groups. The moot question is, could the mere threat of using an armed drone ever coerce an enemy to change their behaviour – without attacking them? Given the recent outcomes from drone attacks, the answer is yes. Armed drones are likely to offer coercion ‘windows of opportunity’ in a state of military intransigence. While the effect will be more pronounced between states that have armed drones vis-a-vis that do not, the same is perceived to be equally true for states that possess them. In fact, as confrontations grow longer and less conclusive, armed drones can enable states to sustain combat operations, making threats to remain relevant, i.e., ‘stay the course’ believable. The efficacy of this hypothesis is now gaining momentum by shifting focus on to next-generation drones, which are essentially unmanned fighter jets and armed helicopters that are currently under development. Thus, the dawn of contactless warfare is now a reality.

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