Afghanistan

The Taliban almost certainly will remain firmly in control of Afghanistan during the next year and continue to combat ISIS-Khorasan and anti-Taliban resistance groups, though these groups still conduct deadly attacks in country. The Taliban also continues to restrict al-Qa’ida and its affiliates’ activities in accordance with the Taliban’s perception of its Doha Agreement obligations, though some al-Qa’ida elements probably circumvent these restrictions to provide modest covert support to the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan militant group. Low-level Taliban members continue to kill or arrest former Afghan government and military personnel, but senior regime leaders probably are not directing this campaign.

The Taliban has made some progress toward gaining de facto recognition with regional partners, despite persistent concerns about the state of human rights, inclusive representation in government, and militancy in Afghanistan. Iran has met with the Taliban to discuss water rights and threats posed by terrorist groups, particularly ISIS-Khorasan and Jaysh al-Adl.

India is pursuing low-level engagement with the Taliban, focused on humanitarian assistance, countering terrorism, and enabling private sector growth.

• Russia is continuing to deepen its relationship with the Taliban, expressing its intent to formally recognize the government and cooperate against terrorism. In September 2024, the Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson emphasized Russian efforts to remove the Taliban from Russia’s list of terrorist groups and develop multilateral cooperation while blaming the West for instability in the country.

• In January 2024, China’s President Xi accepted the diplomatic credentials of a Taliban- appointed ambassador. The Taliban’s focus on improving internal security and reducing violence has enabled some foreign investments from China, including oil extraction and copper mining activities in Afghanistan.

India

Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s defense priorities will probably focus on demonstrating global leadership, countering China, and enhancing New Dehli’s military power. India views China as its primary adversary and Pakistan more an ancillary security problem to be managed, despite cross-border attacks in mid-May by both India’s and Pakistan’s militaries.

• Following a late April terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi conducted missile strikes on terrorism-related infrastructure facilities in Pakistan. The missile strike provoked multiple rounds of missile, drone, and loitering munition attacks, and heavy artillery fire, by both militaries from 7 to 10 May. As of 10 May, both militaries had agreed to a full ceasefire.

To counter Chinese influence and boost its global leadership role, India is giving priority to advancing its bilateral defense partnerships in the Indian Ocean region through exercises, training, arms sales, and information sharing. India also has increased trilateral engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and actively participates in multilateral fora such as the Quadrilateral, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN.

• In late October 2024, India and China reached an agreement to move forces away from the two remaining contested positions along the disputed Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. The disengagement did not resolve the longstanding dispute about border demarcation but reduced some tension still lingering from a 2020 incident when troops on both sides were killed in a clash along the Line of Actual Control.

India almost certainly will continue promoting its “Made in India” initiative this year to build its domestic defense industry, mitigate supply chain concerns, and modernize its military.

India continued to modernize its military in 2024, conducting a test of the nuclear-capable developmental Agni-I Prime MRBM and the Agni-V multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle while also commissioning its second nuclear-powered submarine to strengthen its nuclear triad and bolster its ability to deter adversaries.

India will maintain its relationship with Russia through 2025 because it views its ties to Russia as important for achieving its economic and defense objectives and sees value in the relationship as a means to offset deepening Russia-China relations. Under Modi, India has reduced its procurement of Russian-origin military equipment but still relies on Russian spare parts to maintain and sustain its large inventory of Russian-origin tanks and fighter aircraft that form the backbone of its military’s ability to counter perceived threats from China and Pakistan.

Pakistan

During the next year, the Pakistani military’s top priorities are likely to remain cross-border skirmishes with regional neighbors, rising attacks by Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and Baloch nationalist militants, counterterrorism efforts, and nuclear modernization. Despite Pakistan’s daily operations during the past year, militants killed more than 2,500 people in Pakistan in 2024.

• Pakistan regards India as an existential threat and will continue to pursue its military modernization effort, including the development of battlefield nuclear weapons, to offset India’s conventional military advantage.

• Pakistan is modernizing its nuclear arsenal and maintaining the security of its nuclear materials and nuclear command and control. Pakistan almost certainly procures WMD-applicable goods from foreign suppliers and intermediaries.

• Pakistan primarily is a recipient of China’s economic and military largesse, and Pakistani forces conduct multiple combined military exercises every year with China’s PLA, including a new air exercise completed in November 2024. Foreign materials and technology supporting Pakistan’s WMD programs are very likely acquired primarily from suppliers in China, and sometimes are transshipped through Hong Kong, Singapore, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. However, terrorist attacks targeting Chinese workers who support China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects has emerged as a point of friction between the countries; seven Chinese nationals were killed in Pakistan in 2024.

• Pakistan and Iran have taken steps, including high-level meetings, to deescalate tensions after the two countries conducted unilateral airstrikes on each other’s territory in January 2024 in response to cross-border terror attacks.

• In September 2024, Taliban and Pakistani border forces clashed near border posts, resulting in the death of eight Taliban fighters. In March 2025, Pakistan and the Afghanistan exchanged air and artillery strikes on each other’s territory, each citing alleged militant infrastructure as the targets.

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Key Highlights from DIA’s Worldwide Threat Assessment 2025

China’s Strategic Posture:

• Accelerated PLA modernization aims to enable a Taiwan takeover by force if needed.

•  Massive investments in nuclear, space, cyber, and disinformation capabilities.

• Expanding global basing and maritime presence from Cambodia to Africa.

Russia’s War Trajectory:

• Sustained war in Ukraine with incremental gains, high human and material costs.

• Increasing use of cyberattacks, space-based weapons, and destabilization operations across Europe and Africa.

Tech-Driven Threat Evolution: AI, space, cyber, biotech, and unmanned systems are reshaping global conflict and espionage strategies.

Rising Adversarial Coordination: China, Russia, Iran, and NorthKorea are intensifying bilateral military, tech, and diplomatic collaboration to counter U.S. influence.

Hybrid and Asymmetric Warfare: From Iranian proxy strikes to North Korean missile exports and cybercrime, non-traditional threats are expanding in complexity and reach.

Homeland Vulnerabilities: U.S. infrastructure faces growing threats from drones, fentanyl trafficking, cyberattacks, and potential terrorist infiltrations via the southern border.

Global Flashpoints: The Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, Red Sea, and Central Asia remain hotspots for escalation with direct implications for U.S. and allied interests.

Bottom line: The security landscape is defined by hybrid conflict, deepening adversarial ties, and accelerating technology disruption.

Strategic foresight and resilience are no longer optional they’re imperative.

The post GEOPOLITICS DIA’s Assessment – Security Situation in South Asia appeared first on IMR.

Pakistan military’s 2018 gamble to install the former Pakistan cricketer-turned politician, Imran Khan, flopped with the ousting of the former prime minister and his government in 2022. Along with the arrests of Imran Khan, his wife and several of his party workers, many serving military officers of various cadres were also interrogated and arrested on numerous charges.

Recently, on 12 August 2024, the former Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed was arrested by the Pakistan military. The Supreme Court ordered the arrest of the former chief. He was charged with misconduct, corruption and for abetting in political interference. Since then, court martial proceedings have been launched against him.

“Complying with the orders of Supreme Court of Pakistan . . . the process of Field General Court Martial has been initiated and Lt Gen Faiz Hameed (Retd) has been taken into military custody,” the Pakistan army stated. Since the conception of Pakistan, its military has been infamous for having influence over the country’s politics.

According to various reports presented against Hameed, there were allegations against him for allegedly harassing the owner of Islamabad’s ‘Top City’ housing scheme and society. Besides him, three other retired officers have been detained by the military in relation to Hameed’s case. But an important element to factor in, amidst all the said charges, is the undeniable close affiliation the former spy master has shared with the ousted prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan.

Khan has dismissed the charges against him as “frivolous and politically motivated,” even though he was forced to serve time in a jail for a year.

However, the appellate courts have since reversed, invalidated or suspended the charged convictions due to the lack of substantial evidence. But, the authorities in Islamabad seemed determine to file new cases against Khan in order to keep him in jail. Hence, the determination of the Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen Asim Munir to contain the political turbulence and to nail Imran Khan’s cronies should be no surprise with the arrest of his “top dog” spy master, Faiz Hameed.

The Former ISI Spy Chief, PMLN and the State

Lt Gen Faiz Hameed served as the 24th Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (DG ISI) from 2019 to 2021. He is known as the “India baiter” and Imran Khan’s affiliate.

It was reported that post-Taliban’s take over of Afghanistan in 2021, the chief had paid a visit to Kabul. The visits of the DG ISI had been clandestine in the past. However, it was not the case with his trip to Kabul. Several images of Lt Gen Faiz and Pakistan’s Ambassador Mansoor Ali Khan, having tea at Kabul’s Serena Hotel, surfaced on the social media. The purpose of Hameed’s visit was to seek “peace and stability” in Afghanistan and to get the first-hand account of the ground situation in Afghanistan. Despite the statements made by the former DG ISI, it was confirmed that the objective of his visit was to meet with the top Afghan leadership and certain foreign envoys in Kabul. Even though no official details were divulged at the time, it later came to light that the chief had brokered peace between the Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Baradar network.

The main promoter of Taliban had been Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, who was also in favour of the Haqqani Network when the fight to take over Kabul erupted between the warring factions. The ISI has been reported in the past to have utilized the Haqqani Network to orchestrate attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul as well as to sway the Sunni Pashtun force in a direction inclined to Pakistan. Additionally, under Hameed’s command’s, reports of the induction of Pakistan Army regulars in the anti-resistance operations against the Resistance Force, led by Commander Amrullah Saleh in Panjshir Valley, were conducted.

It was inferred, that Pakistan’s consistent aid to Taliban rose from their desire for a strategic depth in Afghanistan, while nurturing an outfit such as Taliban to act as ISI’s puppet to curb the possible terror threats, which it incurs from Tehreek-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). However, the tables have turned since then. The disillusionment of the Pakistani government of controlling the Afghan Taliban shattered with Taliban’s lackadaisical and undetermined effort in fostering a peace deal with TTP and Pakistan. The TTP later called off the ceasefire with Pakistan in 2022. The negotiations were carried out between a delegation led by Faiz Hameed and TTP leaders in Khost, Afghanistan. Under the negotiations, corps commanders of TTP, Muhammed Khan and Muslim Khan were released. Since then, TTP has ravaged Pakistan with their persistent attacks.

Besides the TTP threat, Pakistan was also hopeful with regards to the Pakistan-Afghan border areas, which even though are demarcated by the Durand Line, still remain as areas of dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghans view the border as an artificial entity and do not recognize the Durand line agreement, which Pakistan inherited post-1947. Afghanistan has claimed certain areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a part of their territory and views Pakistan as the illegal occupiers of their land. Hence, there have been several border skirmishes between the security forces of both nations. Pakistan’s relations with China and the presence of Chinese immigrants in the area have also served as reason for mistrust amongst the local habitants in these regions, who view the Chinese presence as a form of planned displacement of their communities to accommodate the Chinese, with exploitation of their land. Several attacks were orchestrated on Chinese citizens, who were assigned to Sino-Pakistan projects by various insurgents and militant outfits. Later on, at the behest of China, Pakistan decided to carry out a large scale military operation – Azm-i-Istehkam – to neutralize the threats especially around the Durand Line. This has resulted in rallies and ‘jirgas’ (tribal councils) being held in many cities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) due to the fear of mass displacement.

Additionally, the refoulement of Afghans back to their homeland from Pakistan has also sparked further tensions between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan government is of the view that many Afghan refugees may be sleeper cells or individuals involved in organized crimes. The inhibitions arising from the growing TTP threat and other offshoots remain to be a strong reason for Pakistan’s preventive course of action. Pakistan has blamed Kabul for being lenient in their approach towards the TTP and has blatantly made accusations of Taliban allowing the anti-Pakistan elements to carry out operations from Afghanistan, while also providing safe havens to them.

Furthermore, with Pakistan struggling economically, the decision for refoulement of undocumented Afghans has been considered prudent and imperative by Islamabad.

With the evolving political developments, dotted with several security and political threats erupting from Imran Khan’s PTI party opposing and clashing with the newly installed prime minister Shehbaaz Shariff’s PML-N, it was expected of the COAS Gen Aseem Munir to employ pre-emptive measures to wrest control over the state of affairs with the favoured political government installed by the military in power.

As a handpicked candidate of Imran Khan, Fiaz Hameed has been acknowledged for his involvement in Khan’s PTI party rioting across Pakistan on 9 May 9, 2023. This move was enough to upset Islamabad, given that PTI workers barged into and torched the official residence of the IV Corps commander in Lahore and also attempted to force themselves into the army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Further reports of Hameed providing counsel to Khan after taking premature retirement from the army, also suggested of his abetment in the May 9 riots in 2023, which has been regarded as an anarchy against the military institution.

Additionally, Nawaz Sharif also asserted that Gen Hameed had colluded with few generals and individuals from higher judiciary to impeach him from power in 2017.

In 2017, Hameed became infamous for orchestrating anti-blasphemy protests against the PML-N government by the far-Right group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan.

“The arrest of former ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed sends a clear signal to those still on the fence – there will be no compromise, no exceptions. Fall in line or face the consequences. The writing is on the wall,” stated Baqir Sajjad Syed, the national security correspondent of the influential Dawn newspaper.

Apart from various charges against Hameed, his personal swipe at the COAS Gen Munir for being a Shia in hopes of dismantling the Saudi-Pakistan relations and expecting the response to remove Munir or halt his appointment also, may have fanned the growing conflagration.

The Military Institution Always Wins in Pakistan After years of impunity, the reign of the former chief ended with the military usurping back its socio-economic and political control. The COAS, Gen Munir seems to have solidified his position with the removal of the puppet government set by the former COAS Gen Javed Qamar Bajwa. He has also carried out a witch hunt against the associates and close affiliates of Imran Khan. The arrest of Gen Bajwa’s former ISI spymaster also has been made into an example for those who would conspire against the current military regime. It would be no surprise if the security of the former COAS may also be under threat.

The post NEIGHBOURHOOD – Political Power Play in Pakistan appeared first on IMR.

Crux of the Matter and the Af-Pak Challenges

Since the Taliban take over of Afghanistan, there has been a certain change in the attitude of Taliban. Unlike what Pakistan had expected, the Taliban has moved away from being viewed as a puppet of ISI and Pakistani forces. It has remained vocal on its stance in regards to the Durand Line, discrediting Pakistan’s recognition of what the British Raj left behind as a demarcated area bestowed upon Pakistan as its territory.

Additionally, Pakistan’s request for assistance with the looming TTP threat availed no fruitful result as it is apparent that Taliban has chosen to lean towards its affiliate. Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja Asif excoriated the Taliban government in Kabul for its inaction against militants along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

In an interview with BBC Urdu, Asif stated that Pakistan also offered to grant Rs10 billion to relocate the militants towards the western border. He further reiterated that “It’s correct that we have been carrying out operations in Afghanistan, and we will continue to do so. We won’t serve them with cake and pastries. If attacked, we’ll attack back”.

He placed the stress on the element of surprise which the Pakistani forces hope to achieve in terms of their attack strategy which meant to proceed with the attacks without any prior warning to the Taliban government stating, “This would eliminate the element of surprise. Why should we tell them, ‘get ready, we are coming’?”

In response, the Taliban called the statement “irresponsible”, and forewarned Pakistan of “consequences” in case of cross-border attacks.

Following the deterioration of the Pak-Afghan relations, reports of Pakistani ISI colluding with the ISIS Khorasan (ISK) or Daesh Khorasan emerged. In one such report, a former TTP commander outlined the nature of the relationship between ISK and ISI, which was established through “Dabori Agreement” in the form of a quid pro quo approach. ISK gets the opportunity to infiltrate areas now easily accessible with the aid of ISI, the agreement also provides the necessary funds, logistics and arms required to carry out their assignments while Pakistan is able to achieve the deniability for the actions of ISK. ISI has been notably recognized for its cooperation and aid to Taliban prior to the US exit from Afghanistan in 2021. Due to this precedence, most jihadist groups would seek the opportunity to align with the ISI for consistent donorship and aid.

ISK is Taliban’s rival group, which upon the exit of the Afghan Taliban from the war theatre, has tried to gain complete authority and monopoly on Jihad in the Khorasan area while using Afghanistan as a launching pad for its operations. The Afghan Taliban, upon its return to power has carried out several operations to wipe ISK and its safe havens in Afghanistan. However, the ISK cadre has continued to retain its strength, if not multiply in numbers, by also attracting the soldiers, intelligence officers and cadres from the previous Ghani government, who were prosecuted or who stand the chance of being killed off by the Afghan interim government. ISK, on the other hand, has criticised Taliban for going soft in terms of Jihad and has also managed to successfully gain support amongst various jihadist groups, who also view the new persona of a politically functioning Taliban government as a deviation from Jihad.

The recent reports of ISK in cohorts with the ISI presents an expected obstacle for any sincere reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. To stretch the matter further, the possibility of the Pakistan military pushing the ISK cadre across the Durand Line under the cover of a retaliatory fire as a result of border skirmishes has certainly aggravated the situation.
Apart from the border skirmishes, the largest refoulement of the Afghans in Pakistan on the Pakistani claim of Afghans leading to the growing terrorism activity in the country, has also added more fuel to the fire of an already simmering Taliban sentiment.

Hence, given that the breakdown in relations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan has proved no fruition for either of them, the so called “good meeting” in Doha has become ends to the means.

In case of Pakistan, China has expressed its discontentment with Pakistan’s efforts at countering terrorism and protecting its citizens against the threats from insurgent groups and militant outfits such as the TTP, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Since majority of Chinese investments are in western Pakistan, especially along the border of Afghanistan, these projects are constantly susceptible to terror threats from many insurgent and militant groups who view the Chinese presence as a contiguous subjugation and marginalization of the local citizens. Pakistan’s approach to retain its ongoing ties with China at the cost of the Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun and minority interests, with constant crackdowns to hush the grievances, has not attained any brownie points for Pakistan. It was apparent that there was a foreseeable uptick in the militant cadre and the number of terrorist orchestrated activities which Pakistan undermined as minor threats.

Since the BLA claimed Dasu Dam attack in March 2024 on the Chinese citizens in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), several Chinese firms have suspended their operations until further notice. After the attacks, China demanded of Pakistan to initiate a large-scale counter terrorism operation against the militants, just as it had done in the past in form of operations Zarb-e-Azb and operation Radd-ul-Fassad.

On the Chinese demand, Pakistan’s government announced operation Azm-e-Istehkaam or “Resolve of durable stability” to “combat the menaces of extremism and terrorism in a comprehensive and decisive manner.”

The operation is essential to Pakistan’s interest which entailed to not only placate the Chinese worries to perpetuate the economic and defence aid to Pakistan, but also as an effort to curtail spread of the armed groups and anti-Pakistani insurgents. With Pakistan’s economy in a chaotic milieu, it is blisteringly taking measures to secure both foreign and domestic investments. However, due to the the lack of political stability and the disintegrating security issues, the probability of attracting domestic or foreign investors seems like a difficult task.

UAE-Taliban
It is apparent, the extended invitation to the representatives of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a well contemplated and premeditative move by Pakistan. Prior to Taliban’s visit to Doha, the Afghan delegation paid a visit to the UAE.

The UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan met with Taliban’s Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is a designated terrorist with a FBI placed bounty on his head. Even though several nations have not entirely acknowledged the Taliban government, the UAE government has indirectly provided the Taliban with an informal legitimate credibility by extending the invitation to discuss bilateral ties and regional stability. China, too, has tried to maintain relations with the Taliban fearing the spill over of the terrorism activities along its shared borders with Afghanistan and in an effort have kept their embassies open and accredited Taliban diplomats. Given Pakistan’s recent agenda to mollify China and furnish the funds for its large-scale operation Azm-e- Istehkam, the intent for the meeting in Doha was as expected for the success of the operation.

The question remains, to what extent Afghan Taliban would honour the Pakistani wishes to dispose its protected TTP assets in name of counter-terrorism, regardless of the probable compromise that may have been made to further individual interests between the two.

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The assessment noted that the US had taken steps to destroy or disable some of the equipment before it was left behind, but that much of it was still in working condition. The assessment also noted that the Taliban’s ability to use this equipment would depend on a number of factors, including their training and maintenance capabilities.

The assessment concluded that the US’s decision to leave behind so much equipment was a “significant miscalculation” that could have “serious consequences” for the region. The assessment also called for a review of the US’s policies on military assistance to ensure that such a mistake does not happen again.

The assessment has been criticized by some who argue that it does not go far enough in assessing the risks posed by the weapons and equipment left behind in Afghanistan. However, the assessment does provide a valuable overview of the situation and it is likely to be used by policymakers as they consider how to address the issue.

Arms in the Black Market

The Taliban in Afghanistan are selling the US arms on the black market. These weapons have been reported turning up in a number of countries, including Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia. They have also been reported being used by terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Haqqani Network.

In Pakistan, for example, there have been reports of Taliban-linked groups selling US-made weapons to militants in the country’s tribal areas. These weapons have been used by militants to carry out attacks against Pakistani security forces and civilians.

In Iran, there have been reports of Taliban-linked groups selling US-made weapons to Iranian proxies in the Middle East. These weapons have been used by Iranian proxies to carry out attacks against US forces and allies in the region.

In Central Asia, there have been reports of Taliban-linked groups selling US-made weapons to militants in the region. These weapons have been used by militants to carry out attacks against government forces and civilians.

The sale of US arms by the Taliban on the black market is a serious concern. These weapons could be used by terrorist groups to carry out attacks against US forces and allies, as well as civilians. The sale of these weapons also undermines the US’s efforts to combat terrorism in the region. The Taliban and other groups in Afghanistan have a well-established network of arms dealers, and it is difficult to track down these weapons once they have been sold.

The going black market rate of US arms left behind in Afghanistan varies depending on the type of weapon system and its condition. However, some general estimates can be made.

For example, a M4 rifle in good condition could sell for between $500 and $1,000 on the black market. An AK-47 rifle in good condition could sell for between $200 and $500. A Humvee in good condition could sell for between $50,000 and $100,000. A Black Hawk helicopter in good condition could sell for between $1 million and $2 million.

High Technology Systems

There is some concern that high-technology systems left behind in Afghanistan may have landed up in China or Russia. China and Russia are both major players in the global arms trade, and they have been known to purchase weapons from black market sources. If they were to acquire high-technology US systems, it would give them a significant advantage in terms of military capabilities.

The US government is also concerned that China and Russia could use their intelligence services to try to acquire high-technology US systems through other means, such as espionage.

Diversion of arms supplied in a conflict zone is not new. In Ukraine too, afms supplied by the USA and European allies have been diverted into the black market and it is difficult to estimate the scale of diversion. Some of the items that are believed to have been diverted include small arms and light weapons (SALW), ammunition, and night vision goggles.

For example, a Kalashnikov rifle in good condition could sell for between $200 and $500 on the black market. A Javelin anti-tank missile could sell for between $50,000 and $100,000. A night vision goggle in good condition could sell for between $1,000 and $2,000.

Establishing Accountability

As of yet, no one has been held accountable in the US for the large amount of weapon systems abandoned in Afghanistan. There have been calls for investigations and accountability, but no formal charges have been filed. The issue is likely to continue to be debated in the US for some time to come.

Some have argued that the US government should be held accountable for the weapons that were left behind, as they were ultimately responsible for the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Others have argued that the Afghan government should be held accountable, as they were responsible for the security of the weapons.

Here are some of the reasons why no one has been held accountable yet:

The US government has not yet released a full report on the withdrawal from Afghanistan, so it is not clear who was responsible for the decision to leave behind the weapons.

There is no clear legal basis for holding anyone accountable for the abandoned weapons. The US government has not been accused of any specific crime, and it is not clear that any laws were broken.

The US government is reluctant to open itself up to legal liability by investigating the abandoned weapons. If the government were to be found liable, it could be forced to pay damages to the Afghan government or other parties.

It is possible that the US government will eventually be held accountable for the abandoned weapons. However, it is also possible that the issue will be swept under the rug. Only time will tell what will happen.

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Weapon systems left behind by US forces in Afghanistan

Aircraft: 78 aircraft procured for the government of Afghanistan, including 60 Black Hawk helicopters, 18 A-29 Super Tucano attack planes, and 10 C-130 transport planes. These aircraft were demilitarized and rendered inoperable before the US military left.

Ground vehicles: Over 40,000 military vehicles, including 12,000 Humvees, 700 mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, and 200 tanks.

Small arms and light weapons: Over 300,000 weapons, including M4 rifles, M16 rifles, and AK-47 rifles.

Heavy weapons: 26,000 heavy weapons, including 105mm howitzers, 122mm howitzers, and 25mm machine guns.

Munitions: Over 1.5 million rounds of ammunition, including 7.62mm ammunition, 5.56mm ammunition, and 120mm mortar rounds.

Other equipment: Night vision goggles, biometric devices, and communications equipment.

It is important to note that the list above is not exhaustive. There may be other weapon systems that were left behind by US forces in Afghanistan.

The post Weapons Abandoned by US Forces in Afghanistan appeared first on IMR.

Consequently, the terror group is targeting Pakistan’s security forces with impunity and is in no mood to restart the peace negotiations anytime soon.

The recent spike in terror attacks is a major failure of Pakistan’s powerful military establishment. While the political leadership in Pakistan is facing criticism from different quarters, the security establishment should be blamed for the recent security turmoil in the country. The civilian government was not even included in peace negotiations with TTP and therefore had limited information on the outcome(s) of the dialogue, according to a report in Pakistan Tribune.

It is reported that former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Lieutenant General (Retd) Faiz Hameed single-handedly led negotiations with TTP and had possibly compromised on certain controversial demands of the terror group, according to Pak media reports

Therefore, it is not surprising that TTP felt emboldened and acted aggressively after its core demands were not ‘officially’ accepted by the Pakistan government. The security situation has worsened since General Asim Munir took over the charge as Pakistan’s new Chief of Army Staff (COAS) on November 29. Interestingly, TTP official announced the ending of a months-long ceasefire with the Pakistan government on November 28, expecting a hawkish policy from the new Army chief.

The terror group is mostly targeting security forces in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. According to the annual report of Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Pakistan witnessed as many as 376 terror attacks in 2022 and KP province experienced an exponential rise in violence whereby “the fatalities there went up by 108 per cent.”

Islamabad promised stability in the tribal areas after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. On the contrary, Pashtun areas are among the worst hit by the ‘new’ wave of militancy in Pakistan.

While TTP is largely operating in KPK province and Balochistan, it has conducted few attacks in Islamabad and Punjab as well in the last one year. On December 23, TTP militants detonated a car bomb in Pakistan’s capital, killing a police officer and injuring several others. Worryingly for the security establishment, there is a spike in TTP-led suicide attacks in Pakistan.

The recent Peshawar Mosque bombing was also a suicide attack. Reports suggest that the bomber was standing in the front row at the time of the explosion. The mosque is located inside a ‘highly fortified’ compound in Peshawar that included the headquarters of KPK police force and the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) offices. Last month, TTP militants seized a CTD police station in KPK’s Bannu district and took hostages to negotiate with the government authorities.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and General Syed Asim Munir visited Peshawar following the suicide bombing and reportedly held a meeting to discuss the law-and-order situation in KPK. Sharif stated that the capacity of the country’s anti-terrorism institutions and police would be enhanced and National Action Plan (NAP) would be “implemented comprehensively and with full force”.

Imran Khan also condemned the attack in a tweet: “It is imperative we improve our intelligence gathering & properly equip our police forces to combat the growing threat of terrorism.” Khan’s known ‘soft approach’ on the TTP issue and the PTI government’s lackadaisical attitude have been criticised for the deteriorating situation in KPK province.

Peshawar attack was the deadliest terrorist act since a suicide bombing at a Shia Mosque in Koocha Risaldar area during Friday prayers in March 2022, resulting in 58 deaths and 200 injuries. The investigation had revealed that the attacker was an ‘Afghan exile’ who trained with the Islamic State (IS) before carrying out the attack.

Frequent attacks target law enforcement agencies, but the recent Police Lines bombing is seen as a major escalation. Some analysts are predicting a new military operation against TTP after this attack as the political leadership, security establishment, and even the opposition leaders have failed to control the scourge of militancy in Pakistan.

Politically, Pakistan is completely paralyzed as the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) alliance government and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) are indulged in a ruthless battle to rule Islamabad. It is believed that the weakened economy and the persistent political instability present an opportunity for TTP and similar groups to increase pressure on the Pakistani state to fulfill their key demands. More importantly, Islamabad cannot continue to pressure the Afghan Taliban on TTP until its own house is not in order.

The post Why Pakistan’s security situation keeps worsening appeared first on IMR.

At a time when US President Joe Biden’s words put the spotlight on Pakistan as “the most dangerous nation in the world”, Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities are also occupying a position of significance and creating anxieties for various major global powers.

US President Biden at a Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Reception in Los Angeles (California), during which he berated both China and Russia said, “This is a guy (Xi Jinping) who understands what he wants but has an enormous, enormous array of problems. How do we handle that? How do we handle that relative to what’s going on in Russia? And what I think is maybe one of the most dangerous nations in the world: Pakistan. Nuclear weapons without any cohesion.”

Pakistan’s government, the Taliban, its various outfits in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and other jihadist groups inside Pakistan have created a worry over the nuclear weaponry falling into terrorist hands, reported Global Strat View.

Pakistan supports the Taliban covertly. The world believes that Pakistan’s nuclear program remains a threat of being stolen by terrorist organizations. Last year in August, after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghan soil, Afghanistan has quickly fallen into the Taliban’s extremist clutches.

The political upheaval in Afghanistan also has regional repercussions, especially for those in neighbouring Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s continued production of fissile material and subsequent weapons, as well as the potential deployment of more tactical nuclear weapons, only makes the increasing possibility of the misuse of these materials more glaring and plausible, reported Global Strat View.

A London-based Pakistjournalist Farooq Sulehria said, “The Talibanization of the Pakistan military is something we can’t overlook. What if there is an internal Taliban takeover of the nuclear assets?”

There has been multiple instance when experts and US Presidents have expressed their concerns over Pakistan’s nukes. During the time of the Obama administration, a Harvard nuclear expert, Graham Allison, stated, “When you map weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, all roads intersect in Pakistan.”

He said this while sitting on the US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.

Moreover, ex-US President Bill Clinton also had similar apprehension regarding Pakistan’s strides towards nuclear testing. Clinton, worried about the geopolitical threat of South Asia if Islamabad was to go ahead with its nuclear armament.

Clinton made all sorts of offers within his ambit. Whether it was a state dinner to billions of dollars in assistance to the country, Clinton tried to persuade the then-Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to put off the nuclear testing.

However, once Clinton was unable to succeed in getting his way, he publicly condemned Islamabad’s move. Clinton described the nuke tests “dangerously destabilizing.” Pakistan went ahead with its testing, and the US imposed crippling economic sanctions in retaliation.

Along the same lines, Generals Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with their high-ranking generals, claimed their awareness of the risks the Afghanistan move would pose for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its national security.

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The majority of the outlay, according to a report from the US Defence Department’s inspector general went into tactical ground vehicles like MRAPs and Humvees, which cost about $4.12 billion when the Islamic Emirate took control of Kabul on August 15, 2021.

“The DoD estimated that US-funded equipment valued at $7.12 billion was in the inventory of the former Afghan government when it collapsed, much of which has since been seized by the Taliban,” the report wrote. “This included military aircraft, ground vehicles, weapons, and other military equipment.”

The report also said that 316,260 small arms – including rifles, sniper rifles, pistols, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and howitzers – worth $511.8 million were under the care of the Afghan military at the time of its collapse, The New York Post reported.

Communications, explosive detection, night-vision and other surveillance equipment were also in the Kabul government’s inventory when the Taliban took over.

“The condition of these items was unknown, and the long-term operability of the vehicles was likely to deteriorate without US contractor maintenance,” the report elaborated. “The US military removed or destroyed nearly all major equipment used by US troops in Afghanistan throughout the drawdown period in 2021.”

Between 2005 and 2021, the Defence Department spent around $84 billion in security assistance to Afghan forces, with $18.6 billion going to buying weapons for the Afghan National Army, Afghan Air Force, Afghan National Police, and Afghan Special Security Forces.

Over those 16 years, the watchdog found, the US spent $612 million on 427,300 weapons “including 258,300 rifles, 6,300 sniper rifles, 64,300 pistols, 56,155 machine guns, 31,000 rocket propelled grenade launchers, and 224 howitzers,” Khaama Press reported.

The inspector general’s report comes amid Republican criticism of President Biden’s handling of the military pullout on its anniversary.

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The United States killed al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a strike in Afghanistan on 31 July, President Joe Biden announced, calling it a moment of justice for families of 2,977 people killed in September 11, 2001 terror attack. Biden said Zawahiri had been the mastermind behind or played a key role in attacks on the USS Cole and US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

It was the biggest blow to the militant group since its founder Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Zawahiri, an Egyptian surgeon who had a $25 million bounty on his head, helped coordinate the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people.

Zawahiri died after a US drone strike in the Afghan capital Kabul. US intelligence determined with “high confidence” through multiple intelligence streams that the man killed was Zawahiri. He was killed on the balcony of a “safe house” in Kabul that he shared with other members of his family. No other casualties occurred.

There were rumors of Zawahiri’s death several times in recent years, and he was long reported to have been in poor health.

In a statement, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed that a strike took place and strongly condemned it, calling it a violation of “international principles.”

His death raises questions about whether Zawahiri received sanctuary from the Taliban following their takeover of Kabul in August 2021. US officials said that senior Taliban officials were aware of his presence in the city and said the United States expected the Taliban to abide by an agreement not to allow al Qaeda fighters to re-establish themselves in the country.

The drone attack is the first known US strike inside Afghanistan since US troops and diplomats left the country in August 2021. The move may bolster the credibility of Washington’s assurances that the United States can still address threats from Afghanistan without a military presence in the country.

Zawahiri succeeded bin Laden as al Qaeda leader after years as its main organiser and strategist, but his lack of charisma and competition from rival militants Islamic State hobbled his ability to inspire spectacular attacks on the West.

Until the US announcement, Zawahiri had been rumoured variously to be in Pakistan’s tribal area or inside Afghanistan.

The senior US official said finding Zawahiri was the result of persistent counterterrorism work. The United States identified this year that Zawahiri’s wife, daughter and her children had relocated to a safe house in Kabul, then identified that Zawahiri was there as well.

With other senior al Qaeda members, Zawahiri is believed to have plotted the October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole naval vessel in Yemen which killed 17 US sailors and injured more than 30 others, the Rewards for Justice website said.

He was indicted in the United States for his role in the August 7, 1998, bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people and wounded more than 5,000 others.

Both bin Laden and Zawahiri eluded capture when US-led forces toppled Afghanistan’s Taliban government in late 2001 following the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States.

Operational Details

Speculation is rife that the United States may have used Hellfire R9X, a warhead-less missile, which is used in finely targeted attacks. The Hellfire R9X first appeared in 2017 when al-Qaeda senior leader Abu al-Khayr al-Masri was killed. What suggests the use of the missile is that pictures showed no signs of explosion. Over time, the missile has earned names like “flying ginsu,” after a famous 1980s television commercial for ostensibly Japanese kitchen knives, and “ninja bomb”.

In his address, Biden pointed out that there was no harm done to the family members of Zawahiri in the precision strike, and no civilians bore any injuries.

Pakistan

Zawahiri’s presence in a guest house in Kabul, reportedly owned by interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani’s close aide, became a subject of intense curiosity, given Sirajuddin’s chief patron — the Pakistan deep state.

Al Qaeda After al-Zawahiri

Not as charismatic as Osama bin Laden (OBL), Al Qaeda (AQ) chief Zawahiri remained in his shadows. After OBL’s killing in a US Navy Seal operation in Pakistan in 2011, few experts believed that Zawahiri could hold the network together. However, since 2011, the AQ network has grown across the world, especially in Syria, Mali, Somalia, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, disseminating its puritanical ideology, money and expertise to local militant groups. This happened despite the huge popularity of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria amongst radical Muslim youth. The ISIS had also set up a physical Caliphate — a long-cherished goal of international jihad espoused by the AQ.

Under Zawahiri, the AQ network seems to have changed its strategic direction and its branches currently operate more like independent insurgencies — such as through the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria and Al-Shabab in Somalia. The crucial question is whether the AQ, post-Zawahiri, will lose momentum or whether the collective core leadership that seems to have been quietly working post-OBL could provide a leader as well as offer continuity.

Successor to al- Zawahiri

The most obvious name being discussed to succeed Zawahiri was that of another Egyptian, Saif al-Adel, who was believed to be in charge of external operations. However, given regular reports of his connections “within” Iran, he may not be the “ideal face” to succeed Zawahiri. Some regional leaders, such as from Al Shabab, may be acceptable, given the recent series of “successes” of this branch. The oldest branch, the al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is the key source of chief ideologues of jihad, may be used to prop up a cleric as the next AQ Amir in order to lower the profile for some time while keeping the propaganda around the “martyrdom” of Zawahiri going.

Saif al-Adel is on the FBI’s list of most-wanted terrorists. The agency mentions on its website that al-Adel was born on April 11, though his birth year is either 1960 or 1963. He has used aliases like Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi, Seif Al Adel, Ibrahim Al-Madani. The FBI has announced a reward of $10 million for any information about him. Saif al-Adel is an Egyptian ex army officer and a founding member of Al Qaeda. He had joined the precursor terror group Maktab al-Khidmat in 1980s.

A second possible successor is Yezid Mebarek, known as Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, emir of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb since 2020. An Algerian citizen, Mebarek ran media operations for AQIM, using a 2013 video to call for global attacks against French interests after Paris sent troops to help quash a militant insurgency in Mali.

A third potential successor is Moroccan-born national Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi. He is wanted for questioning by the FBI in connection with his membership in Al-Qaeda. He studied software programming in Germany before moving to Afghanistan where he was selected to manage al Qaeda’s main media wing, said the FBI. The son-in-law of Zawahiri, he is a senior Al Qaeda leader.

Doha Agreement Violated

The Taliban had promised in the 2020 Doha Agreement on the terms of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan that they would not harbour al-Qaida members. Nearly a year after the US military’s chaotic pullout from Afghanistan, al-Zawahri’s killing raises questions about the involvement of Taliban leaders in sheltering a mastermind of the 9/11 terror attacks and one of America’s most-wanted fugitives.

The Taliban and the US are accusing each other of violating the agreement. But the real question is: Was the Taliban involved in providing intel on Zawahiri for some benefit that would show up in the future, or did intra-Taliban rivalry lead to cooperation against the Haqqani Network? There is a third scenario — of the Pakistan deep state having provided the intel to show the Taliban in a bad light and curry favour with the US, especially in order to deal with the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has caused much violence against Pakistan forces.

Since the Haqqani Network has been mediating talks between the TTP and the Pakistan army, the strike has surely cast doubts about the safety of the TTP leaders who visit Kabul for meetings. Given the links between the Haqqanis and the Pakistani deep state, it is unlikely that the TTP would continue talks, which in any case have not prevented attacks on the Pakistani forces. The TTP has already started accusing the Pakistan army of providing a base to the US for the drone strike. Thus, much more violence is expected in the Af-Pak region in the coming weeks and months.

Zawahiri and India

In 2014, the AQ launched the Al Qaeda In Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the outfit’s South Asia branch. The inaugural video carried an old clip of OBL and a message of Zawahiri appointing a relatively unknown Indian radical Asim Umar, who had fled to Pakistan decades ago. In recent times, the group has posted many videos focused on India, especially on Kashmir. Some of these clips have featured Zawahiri. With his elimination, as well as that of Umar and a few “known” Pakistani faces of the AQIS earlier, the propaganda against India is likely to lose momentum for now. However, since the AQIS is an Af-Pak-based group, it may rebuild itself with support from the Pakistan deep state.

Comments

New Delhi had evacuated its envoy to Afghanistan, Rudrendra Tandon, and 175 other officials posted in the Embassy of India in Kabul on August 17, 2021 – just two days after President Ashraf Ghani’s government collapsed in the wake of a swift military campaign by the Taliban. India had also evacuated its officials posted in its consulates in other cities in Afghanistan weeks before the country was taken over by the Taliban.

New Delhi sent a delegation of officials, led by its senior diplomat J P Singh, to Kabul, in early August, to oversee the delivery operations of India’s humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.

New Delhi, however, has been having back-channel contacts with the Taliban over the past few years as it had anticipated that the Sunni Islamist militia could eventually return to the governance structure in Kabul after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, thus giving its mentor Pakistan a strategic edge against India.

India over the past few months also sent food and medicines to Afghanistan as humanitarian assistance, which was distributed through the UN agencies.

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IS-K has claimed responsibility for a string of high-profile attacks in Pakistan, underscoring the growing threat it poses to the predominately Muslim nation of some 220 million people.

In the deadliest attack, an IS-K suicide bomber blew himself up inside a Shiite mosque in the northwestern city of Peshawar on March 4, killing at least 64 people and wounding scores of others. It was the most lethal attack in Pakistan in nearly four years.

Since it first emerged in 2015, Islamic State’s local affiliate in Afghanistan has focused its violent campaign within that country, fighting against Afghan and foreign forces as well as the Taliban, a rival militant group.

Experts believe IS-K militants have moved from their bases in Afghanistan and established cells in major Pakistani cities, RFE/RL reported.

The IS-K assaults have provoked fear and alarm in Pakistan, which has also witnessed a dramatic surge in attacks by the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a rival extremist group that has close ties with the Afghan Taliban.

IS-K has already carried out five attacks this year. On March 8, IS-K claimed responsibility for a roadside bomb that killed five members of the security forces and wounded 28 people others in southwestern Pakistan.

The growing attacks prompted Moazzam Jah Ansari, the police chief in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to declare IS-K a “bigger threat to peace and security in the province compared to the TTP”.

Many IS-K fighters are former members of the TTP, which was thrown into disarray and driven out of its bases in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal belt by a massive military offensive in 2014.

But the TTP soon found itself fighting turf wars with the Afghan Taliban. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the rivalry has intensified.

The Afghan militants have waged a nationwide hunt for IS-K members and even targeted the country’s small Salafi minority to curb alleged support for the group from among its members.

Underscoring the rivalry, the Afghan Taliban condemned IS-K’s deadly attack in Peshawar. The TTP, meanwhile, said that such attacks do not align with its jihad, or holy war, in Pakistan.

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In his report released, on 3 February, on ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, the secretary general said the “best way” to promote stability and future international support was for the Taliban to avoid the isolation that characterised its previous experience in power.

“The Taliban are showing efforts to present itself as a caretaker government. The movement, however, has yet to form governing structures that reflect the country’s ethnic, political and geographic diversity and include women. Efforts are constrained by the lack of resources and capacity, as well as an ideology that clashes in many ways with international norms of governance,” he said.

The report added that Afghanistan was experiencing a massive economic contraction. “The best way to promote stability and future international support is for the Taliban to avoid the isolation that characterised its previous experience in power,” Guterres said.

Al Qaeda Still Present

In another report “The 29th edition of the UNSC’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team” the United Nations Security Council said that terror group al-Qaeda’s Indian subcontinent affiliate has retained a presence in at least six provinces of Afghanistan and has approximately 200-400 fighters, including Indian nationals.

The report, which was released, on 7 February, was prepared by a UNSC group that monitors counter-terrorism sanctions targeting al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

“[Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent] retains a presence in Afghanistan, in the provinces of Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Paktika and Zabul, where the group fought alongside the Taliban against the ousted government. AQIS is estimated to have between 200 and 400 fighters, mainly from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Pakistan,” it said.

The 22-page report, signed by UNSC Committee Chair and Norwegian national Trine Heimerback, also stated that contrary to media reports, Aslam Farooqi, former leader of the Islamic State faction Islamic State — Khorasan Province (ISKP), and alleged mastermind of the March 2020 terror attack on a gurdwara in Kabul, had “escaped” from an Afghanistan prison and “subsequently rejoined the group in a senior capacity”.

Terror Groups Have More Freedom Now

“There are no recent signs that the Taliban has taken steps to limit the activities of foreign terrorist fighters in the country. On the contrary, terrorist groups enjoy greater freedom there than at any time in recent history. However, Member States have not reported significant new movements of foreign terrorist fighters to Afghanistan,” the report said. “Primary kinetic threat” in the eyes of the Taliban, contextualising some of the conflicting reporting on ISKP attacks in Afghanistan and the alleged killing of Farooqi. The Uyghur extremist group East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) has also backed the Taliban government, the report added.

Islamic State Gaining Ground in West Africa

The report also broadened its focus beyond Afghanistan to track terrorist activity and developments on a global scale, with West Africa representing a particular region of concern where the Islamic State is gaining ground, and Southeast Asia a “bright spot” with ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates suffering defeats. In conflict zones like Iraq, ISIS “has evolved into a primarily rural insurgency” while al-Qaeda allies and affiliates continue to control northwestern Syria.

“Both Indonesia and the Philippines reported significant gains in countering threats from ISIL and Al-Qaida affiliates in the South-East Asia region, leading to an overall decline in terrorist activity and some optimism that the operational capability of the groups may be significantly degraded,” the report revealed, adding that lone-wolf attacks are still an ongoing risk.

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