The Indian Army’s Field Artillery Rationalisation Programme (FARP) was approved in 1999 to equip 169 artillery regiments with over 2,800 155 mm guns by 2027. One artillery regiment is equipped with 18 guns. Cost estimates are in the $8-10 billion bracket. The programme, involving the acquisition of 1,580 towed, 100 self-propelled, 814 mounted and 145 ultra-light howitzers, is under implementation and will take decades for fruition.
Adrift for two decades, India’s artillery modernisation plan appears finally falling into place. In 2018, the Indian Army started inducting the M777A2 ultra-light howitzers and the K-9 Vajra tracked self-propelled guns. Both these guns are in the 155 mm/52 calibre class and the Indian Army’s first new artillery inductions since the infamous Bofors deal in 1986.
The Dhanush, an upgrade of the Bofors FH-77B by the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), too has provided some cheer. The Army is buying 145 M777s, 100 K-9 Vajras, and has committed an order for 114 Dhanush guns after receiving the first six.
Lesson from Our Military History
In the 1965 war with Pakistan, India had a total of 628 artillery pieces against Pakistan’s 552 tubes. This small numerical advantage was largely neutralised by the fact that a fair amount of Indian artillery was deployed against China. This left Pakistan with a slight overall edge. The major edge that Pakistan had in firepower, however, was caused by the generous American allocation of medium and heavy artillery guns and howitzers. Thus, Pakistan had a total of 174x155mm and 155mm guns/8 inch howitzers to India’s 112 medium and heavy guns (5.5 inch howitzers and one regiment of 7.2 inch howitzers). Of these 112, some 30-40 per cent were deployed against China. As such, Pakistan had a marked preponderance of artillery – especially medium and heavy artillery. This had a major impact on the outcome of the various battles in the 1965 War – especially in the Chhamb, Sialkot and Lahore sectors. Let us analyse this in detail.
Chhamb Sector. Pakistan’s 7th Infantry Division that launched the offensive on Chhamb was allocated two regiments of Patton tanks and the 4 Corps Artillery Brigade, which had three medium regiments, one field regiment and a heavy battery each of 155mm guns and 8 inch gun-howitzers. Pakistan’s 7 Division itself had 2×field regiments. Thus, Pakistan had 20 fire units (11 of them medium and heavy) against just four with India (a lone field regiment and a troop of mediums). The Pakistani medium guns just simply destroyed the sole Indian field regiment and blasted a path for the Pakistani tanks, which almost reached the Akhnur bridge. It was only India’s 1 Corps counter-offensive in Sialkot that forced Pakistan to pull back the formidable 4 Corps Artillery Brigade and one tank regiment out of Chhamb. This recoil forced a halt on the Pakistani advance to Akhnur.
Sialkot Sector. Pakistan’s 6th Armoured Division was located there with 6 armoured regiments. The Indian 1 Armoured Division attacked with 5 tank regiments. Pakistan threw in its tank regiments one by one and suffered heavily. Its 11 Cavalry Regiment was wiped out by our Centurions. In panic, Pakistan withdrew the 4 Corps Artillery Brigade and one regiment from Chhamb. The medium and heavy guns now stopped the Indian advance before Chawinda. In fact, the Pakistani medium guns destroyed more tanks than the Pakistani armoured regiments could. The preponderance of medium guns heavily affected the outcome of the battle. It finally stopped the Indian 1 Corps advance well short of Sialkot.
Lahore Sector. On the first day of the war itself (6 September) an Indian battalion had crossed the Ichhogil Canal. Had India’s 1st Armoured Division been allocated to this sector, as Gen Harbaksh Singh wanted, we could have encircled Lahore. Pakistan’s artillery played a major role in slowing down the Indian advance to a painful slog that just managed to lean on to the Icchogil Canal by the end of the war. Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division counter-offensive, to get behind our two attacking corps, was trapped in the flooded fields of Asal Uttar and decimated by a combination of tanks and artillery. The value of medium guns was evident.
Indo-Pak War 1971. In the 1971 War, India had a clear edge in Artillery – especially in the East and it proved decisive. Pakistan had misused US aid given for cyclone relief to make concrete bunkers in Bangladesh. To neutralise these, additional medium artillery regiments were allocated to Eastern Command. In addition, 80 close air support (CAS) sorties per day were provided by the Indian Air Force (IAF) and these paved the way for a rapid advance in East Pakistan.
Kargil War 1999. Medium artillery once again proved to be a decisive and war-winning factor. Bofors medium guns and BM-21 Grad rocket regiments were pulled out from the Strike Corps to support our counter-attack in Kargil. 120 guns were deployed to support the attack on Tololing and proved to be the turning point. The norm set in this war was a 100 artillery tubes to support each battalion attack in the mountains. This won the war for us.
Mediumisation of the Artillery
No wonder, after the Kargil War, the Indian Army planned to rapidly rationalise the plethora of guns in its inventory and mediumize the artillery by standardising it around the 155/52mm calibre. Unfortunately, the ghost of Bofors has delayed this very vital artillery modernisation plan by over three decades. It was a disaster of monumental proportions. Only now, after a painful gap of 30 years, we have started inducting the American M-777 ultra light howitzers and the Dhanush locally made 155/45 cal medium guns along with the tracked 155/52 K- 9 Vajra of Korean origin. These have, at long last, started trickling in.
We need to standardize and rationalize the plethora of calibres and guns to the 155/52mm standard calibre. This one major step itself will give us a revolutionary overmatching capability over Pakistan in the West and serve to deter China in the North. This process was sabotaged by the Bofors scandal. This, along with the tragic draw down in our air power and squadron strength, ensured that for three decades India could not react or respond in any meaningful manner to Pakistan’s provocations and proxy war in Kashmir and its hybrid terror war all over Indian cities. We just had to patiently grin and bear it. The clear cut military modernization task for our government is, therefore, apparent and most urgent.
The Artillery Profile
Current Profile. India’s current artillery profile is a bewildering mish mash of various calibres and different artillery guns with the same calibre. Thus, India has:-
• 950 units of 130mm (M-46) Russian medium guns (some being upgraded to 155mm as the Sharang gun).
• 500 units of 122mm (Russian field guns).
• 1800 units of 105mm Indian Field Gun (IFG).
• 800 units of 105mm Indian Guns.
• 80 units of 105mm Abbot self-propelled (SP) guns.
• 110 units of 122mm Gvozdika (SP) guns.
• 410 units of 155mm FH-77 Bofors (now down to half).
• 150 units of 122mm Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers.
Proposed New Induction
The proposed new inductions are-
• 150 x 155mm K-9 Vajra SP tracked guns (of Korean origin).
• 145 x 155mm M777 Ultra Light Howitzers (ULH of US origin).
• 150 x 155/52 Advanced Artillery Towed Gun System (ATAGS) of Indian origin.
• 114 x 155/45 calibre Dhanush gun made by OFB.
This would cater for about 500-600 new guns of the 155mm calibre. The need is to induct almost some 3000 guns of the towed, truck mounted and tracked class.
Option Matrix
We need to ensure that we not only mediumise but also indigenise in a manner that gives a major boost to defense production in the private sector. The option matrix so far is:
Public Sector. The Dhanush was developed as a 155/45 cal from the design drawings of the FH-77 Bofors. This gun now developed by the Indian ordinance factories is 25-30 per cent superior in performance to the Bofors. The first six guns were handed over to the Indian Army in April 2019. It has done well in trials and has a range of 40 kms.
Private Sector. In 2013, DRDO started the development of the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS). Armament Research & Development Establishment (ARDE) was the lead design agency in a project ably partnered by the Bharat Forge, Tata Power and OFB. Bharat Forge’s Baba Kalyani had rendered yeoman service in this effort. Kalyani had purchased an entire Austrian 155mm gun factory and shipped it to India. With the companies inherent expertise in metallurgy it has resulted in the development of a radically advanced gun. In firing trials it touched ranges of 48kms and consistently fired beyond 47kms. It has a rate of fire of 6 rounds per minute. Compare this with the American gun of the same class, which has a range of 45 km and a rate of fire of 3 rounds per minute. Thus, India has come up with a world beater design.
Need for Sector Specific QRs. However, our military and civilian bureaucracy is far more concerned with the fine print of the GSQR. This gun, at nearly 20 tons, is said to be some 6 tons overweight. We are completely prepared to overlook the far superior performance parameters and demonstrably superior metallurgy of this gun in our obsession with the weight of this gun. How is the weight such a disqualifying factor? Most bridges in the plains and desert environment are class 70-capable of taking a 70-ton load of a tank transporter with a tank. In the mountains, our bridges can take 45-ton medium tanks. So this furore over 20 tons being a catastrophe is most uncalled for hogwash designed to somehow sabotage our Make in India project. Public sector behemoths are most uncomfortable with competition emerging from the private sector. And, if the 20-ton weight is such a major drawback, please first explain why we can always do away with the platform or try some other ways to bypass bureaucracy. In future, to avoid such bureaucratic bottlenecks, we should go for sector specific QRs. The critical factor is reliable metallurgy. We simply cannot afford to have barrels flowering on the battlefields and that is the key distinguishing parameter of the ATAGS.
Given this analysis, the obvious choice is to induct the ATAGS rapidly in much larger numbers. The defence minister, new chief of defence staff (CDS) and new Army chief must take the key command decision and circumvent the petty bureaucratic hurdles to the large scale induction of the ATAGS – an indigenous Indian gun produced in our private sector. It is the only major Indian success story of the private sector in the entire Make in India initiative. Why our bureaucracy should be so keen to kill it is mystifying.
Export Potential. India has desperately been trying to export its weapon systems to achieve economies of scale . If we wish to sell the ATAGS in the world market, the Indian Army will first have to induct it in large numbers that go beyond tokenism (a la Arjun). Let us reinforce success. Let us give due weightage to performance and reliability factors over staff quibbles. Let us launch a major drive to push this gun in the export market once our own requirements are met – that is the only way our Make in India drive will ever take off. It will generate many new jobs in India. Perfect should not become an enemy of the good.
Precision Guided Munitions. Krasnopol Russian precision Laser-guided shells were extensively used in the 1999 Kargil conflict and were useful against enemy bunkers and mortar positions. However, these had limitations. Hence, in 2019, emergency purchase was made of the M-982 American Excalibur Satellite/ GPS guided PGMs (artillery shells). These have a circular error of probability (CEP) of some 5 meters and have proved particularly effective against terror training camps and command and control targets as also counter-battery tasks. With 50 km plus ranges, these are a formidable weapons against such hybrid war targets.
Multi-barrel Rocket Launchers. India has some 150 units of Russian 122mm Grad MBRLs (range 20 kms), which have more than proved their worth in the 1971 and 1999 Kargil Wars as very effective area neutralization weapons. These are reaching obsolescence and are being replaced by the indigenous 214 mm Pinaka MBRLs, with ranges of 75 kms and plans to increase the range to 120 kms. In the time of extreme poverty of medium artillery, Pinakas were being used to replace medium guns. This is principally incorrect. We have also acquired the formidable Russian BM-30 Smerch MBRLs, which with their range of 70-90 kms and greater throw weight, can put the fear of God in any enemy.
New Mounted Gun. The Gun Carriage Factory, Jabalpur has developed a new truck-mounted gun system. Its range is 40 km. This gun can fire multiple rounds in a short duration. It was featured in Defense Expo of 2018. It is undergoing a series of tests. It will be manufactured in collaboration with the private sector.
Athos 2052 Howitzer. The Elbit-Bharat Forge bid for the Autonomous Towed Howitzer Ordnance System (ATHOS) is a long-range 155mm/52 caliber gun was found significantly lower than that of French Nexter, which offered the Trajan gun jointly with its Indian partner Larsen & Toubro. Elbit-Bharat Forge are said to have pulled their price below even that of the Dhanush 155 mm/42 calibre. While the requirement is for 1,580 towed guns, reports have suggested the possibility of the order being pruned to 400 imported guns.
