Sino-Indian Tussle Brings Them Together
As the centre of gravity of the global economy shifts from Europe to Asia, the Indian Ocean, which has long been considered as a backwater in global geopolitics, is emerging as the new theatre of strategic competition, world power and conflict. The Indian Ocean is assuming key importance in the emerging Asian geopolitical and geoeconomic scenario. This is reflected in the conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific construct, which conceives the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean as an interconnected geopolitical and geoeconomic space.
The strategic salience of the Indo-Pacific concept appears to stem from the fact that India has emerged as a central regional actor with growing strategic presence in Southeast and East Asia. The Indian Ocean’s growing strategic importance for the littorals and the major powers stems from the strategic position of its sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) which connect Africa, East Asia and the Persian Gulf with Europe and the Americas and also constitute the routes for passage of approximately one-third of international trade and half of the world’s crude oil resources.
Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR)
India’s strong focus on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) was particularly indicated by prime minister Narendra Modi’s visits to Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka, in March 2015, when he stated, “we seek a future for Indian Ocean that lives up to the name of SAGAR – Security and Growth for All in the Region.” Prime Minister Modi outlined a set of goals that included seeking “a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity to each other’s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime security issues; and increase in maritime cooperation.”
SAGAR signifies the economic and maritime security outreach of India’s Act East Policy. In the rapidly deteriorating security environment of the IOR with the emerging traditional and non-traditional threats and challenges, India’s expanding role in the SLOCs security as a net security provider has factored in its growing engagement with the navies of the major powers and the key littoral states for strengthening maritime security along the global routes of transit.
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The United States and Japan are increasingly engaging with India in joint maritime security exercises in the IOR as evident from the growing maritime security cooperation of the US Navy and Japanese Maritime Self Defence Forces (JMSDF) with the Indian Navy at the bilateral, trilateral level and multilateral levels. India’s strategic convergence with the United States and Japan in the Indian Ocean could be perceived particularly in the expanding trilateral maritime security cooperation as well as in the upgrading of the trilateral dialogue to summit level meeting in 2018. Amid the Sino-Indian tussle along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh the Indian Navy conducted joint naval exercises with the JMSDF in the IOR along the Malacca Straits in the Indian Ocean, which was followed by the Indo-US naval exercises in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI).
Joint Naval Exercices
At a time when both India and Japan are facing hostility from China, warships from the Indian Navy and Japanese Navy’s conducting joint exercise in the Malacca Straits is a significant development. Two naval ships each from the Indian Navy and the JMSDF participated in the joint naval drills. The Indo-US naval exercises in the ANI were conducted by eight Indian and American warships that undertook a freedom of passage exercise (PASSEX).
The Indian Navy’s maritime security cooperation with the US and Japanese navies in the IOR during China’s military encroachment in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh is symbolic. It signifies New Delhi’s balancing strategies vis-à-vis China’s muscle flexing manoeuvres in India’s north-eastern territory and its maritime neighbourhood. It also indicates that India is re-evaluating ANI’s role as a critical military base.
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The strategic advantage that the Andamans provide to India is the ability to exercise surveillance and monitor the world’s most strategic and trafficked Malacca Strait. The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) expanding footprint in the IOR, which is particularly evident from the growing presence of Chinese nuclear submarines, is a cause of security worries for New Delhi.
Japan is developing basic infrastructure such as reliable power and communications in the ANI and laying an optic fibre cable across the Bay of Bengal. Japan’s NEC Corporation has been contracted to install an undersea cable from Chennai to ANI. This will support India’s planned build-up of naval and air assets in the islands and possibly an undersea surveillance system to monitor submarines.
India’s security worries also stem from China’s ambitious Maritime Silk Route Initiative (MSRI) connectivity project. The MSRI is being interpreted as the reincarnation of the “String of Pearls” strategy. Beijing’s establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2017, seems to be the first step, in what is likely to become a network of Chinese bases, across the Indian Ocean. The military base in Djibouti provides China with a rudimentary power-projection, that is bolstered by its access to ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Chinese submarines have even docked at Sri Lankan and Pakistani ports. Thus, Beijing is focusing on acquiring naval facilities along the crucial choke points in the Indian Ocean to enhance its strategic presence in the region. These developments appear to have factored in India’s intent to bolster its maritime security cooperation with the US and Japan in the IOR.
For rapid naval modernisation, New Delhi is increasingly seeking cooperation from Japan and the US. For example, the Modi government is exploring the possibility of working with Japan in building submarines and has sought technology share from the US for India’s next aircraft carrier. India is also buying a range of American weaponry. New Delhi has procured eight Boeing P-81 aircrafts from the US and has started the acquisition process for six more aircrafts, which will give a boost to its maritime reconnaissance capabilities.
India’s maritime security cooperation with the United States in the ANI and its welcoming Japanese investments in boosting ANI’s infrastructure upgrade indicate that New Delhi perceives Washington and Tokyo as key strategic partners whom India is prepared to trust when it comes to its strategically sensitive regions. It needs to be noted that India-US-Japan trilateral maritime security cooperation received a new boost when in the 2014 Tokyo Declaration New Delhi and Tokyo agreed to hold regular maritime exercises, attaching importance to ‘continued participation’ of Japan in the Malabar exercises. It is significant to note that Japan’s participation in all the Malabar drills held in 2007, 2009 and 2014 was in the capacity of an invited observer. The October 2015 Malabar exercise marked a major turning point with Japan’s inclusion in the Malabar naval cooperation as a permanent participant. Apart from Malabar, the multilateral regional initiatives in the IOR as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) provide effective platform for the three states to bolster maritime security in the IOR in the domain of anti-piracy and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HA-DR).
In the changing security architecture in the IOR, a growing synergy from a political to a strategic focus could be noted in Indo-US-Japanese relations, given that both countries share core strategic interests, whether over their heavy dependence on West Asian oil, the safety of the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean region or the growing power disequilibrium in Asia. The extent to which India’s maritime security partnership with the United States and Japan is transformed will have a decisive impact on the political, economic and military balance of power in the post-COVID Asia.
