Since the US withdrawal in Afghanistan, the release of several prisoners from various correctional facilities across Afghanistan and Pakistan has unleashed a new threat. The threat emerged in the form of Taliban`s sworn enemy Islamic State – Khorasan (IS-K). Amidst the US departure from Afghanistan, IS-K claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing outside the Hamid Karzai international Airport at Kabul on August 26th. The attack claimed the lives of 170 Afghan civilians and 13 US military personnel. Following the heinous attack, the United States launched an airstrike and a drone strike on what the US Central Command called a “retaliatory attack” on IS-K members. The question remained if this was truly an answer to the behemoth which was born, through the situation created by the US and unleashed by Taliban in the Indian subcontinent.
Since the US evacuation, IS-K has claimed many attacks in Afghanistan. According to U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) an aggregate of 77 attacks were recorded, directly or indirectly claimed by or attributed to IS-K from January through April 2021. It was reported that ISIS was responsible for the deaths of at least 124 civilians during the first half of 2021, according to another UNAMA report. Some of the major attacks in first half of 2021 included:
• May 8th: A car bombing and two other explosions resulting in deaths of 85 people and casualties over 275 at Sayed ul Shuhada High School for girls. The targeted group was the Hazara, who were the attendees. According to U.S. intelligence, ISIS was responsible while Afghan President Ashraf Ghani held the Taliban responsible.
• June 8th: ISIS claimed another attack, ISK gunmen killed 11 men and injured 15 others at a camp near Shaikh Jalal village in northern Baghlan province.
• August 26th: ISIS carried out twin bombings outside Kabul airport that killed at least 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members as mentioned earlier.
• October 8th: IS-K claimed responsibility for an attack on a Shia Mosque in Kunduz province, killing more than 72 civilians.
• October 15th: This was followed by another attack on Bibi Fatima Mosque in Kandahar on Oct 15th. 63 civilians were killed and dozens were left injured during the Friday prayer.
The attacks on 8 and 15 October were claimed by IS-K and carefully planned, with the intention of garnering enough attention while targeting Shias in their homes and centres. ISK being a Sunni group has often reiterated their intention of killing the Shia and Hazara, whom they view as heretics. 10% of the population of Afghanistan is considered to be Shia Muslims, with many also a part of the Hazara community. It is no surprise the attack on Kandahar Mosque were meticulously planned and orchestrated to give a message to the Taliban, owing to the rivalry between the two groups. Kandahar is the second largest city in Afghanistan and also the spiritual birthplace of Taliban.
It is important to note that Taliban had always recognized the threat stemming from the IS-K towards the religious minorities and the ethnic groups in Afghanistan and has failed miserably at adequately preparing for the waves of terror it fore saw. A definite example can be recounted from August 2021 mentioned above. The Taliban officials had consulted with the elders of the Shia community and provided a protective escort on the occasion of Ashura, a Shia religious holiday. Despite the security, IS-K carried attacks erupted not only in the Taliban`s heart land, but the frequency of IS-K claimed attacks only grew since September 2021. Areas around Nangarhar and Kunar, where IS-K primary bases were established saw a flurry of attacks, including a complex attack on a military hospital in which a notable Taliban commander was killed.
Another looming threat emerges from the Afghan soldiers, spies and law enforcement officers who were trained by the US military but are being killed off in the witch hunt carried by Taliban. Left to die and with no means of survival, provides a great opportunity to be recruited by the IS-K.
ISK and Jihad in Khorasan
Jihadism in Khorasan can be attributed to many factors and origins. The Afghan jihad predominantly emerged as a retaliation of the Taliban emirate which was overthrown by a US-led operation in 2001. Since then, the Taliban strove to return to power, even if it required to coerce the previous Afghan governments to cede some of its power to the outfit. After 2001, Afghan jihad played a dominant role in the region of Khorasan, despite few outfits choosing to take part in it.
After 2014, the influence of the same Afghan jihad became undermined, as many factions were seen disputing and breaking away. Another significant “cause celebre” of Jihadism to further decline can be attributed to the Syrian war since 2011.
However, by the end of 2014, several groups started linking themselves to ISIS. Initially these groups identified themselves as separate identities. This notion soon changed in 2015, when the IS Central’s Chief spokesperson, Abu Muhammed Adnani announced the establishment of Wilayat Khorasan. After the establishment of the Wilayat, the IS-K teams started referring to themselves as Daesh or Daesh Khorasan or Khilafat Islami.
In the south of Afghanistan, a former Taliban leader and a Guantanamo Bay detainee, Mullah Abdul Raoof Khadim, swore his allegiance to ISIS. In the east, Hafiz Sayed Khan raised the black flag of ISIS. Since then, the group faced several heavy military attacks from the Afghan and coalition forces. This led to the death and capture of over “13,000 of its fighters, including five consecutive emirs, or top leaders”.
However, the group has been quite resilient and successful in substituting and replacing its manpower, while profiting in the opportunity of Taliban exiting the war theatre, since August, to expand its outreach. According to several IS-K interviews, IS-K currently operates in areas such as eastern and northern Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. It has already started to absorb many Taliban fighters; Baluchi insurgents and members of various outfits aggrieved with the Pakistani government or share the same ideology as itself or those who choose to seek profits or employment from the illicit dealings found in the region. Interestingly it is reported that IS-K has also succeeded in fostering relationships with outfits which previously worked with the Taliban, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and various others to name a few.
It is imperative to understand that part of the IS-K strategy was to use Afghanistan as a “spring board” for itself in the Khorasan region. Khorasan is a strategically located region with access to Central Asia and at the same time also one of the weakest regions in the area due to the least territorial control from its competitors. From the recent attacks in Kabul and Kunduz, it is becoming apparent that like its parent organization IS-Central, it has started implementing the “Blitzkreig” approach over the insurgent approach, which is to “concentrate force to achieve local superiority” and fastidiously destroy the enemies.
IS-K`s Aims
• Prominence in Khorasan: One of the immediate goals of IS-K was to embed itself in pockets of Khorasan. In the initial stage, at its most vulnerable, it failed at coexisting in the region as it was heavily laden with TTP, Taliban, the Afghan and the Pakistani groups. Their small numbers made it less viable to gain traction and prove their visibility to their recruits and donors who were seeking new experiments to fund. The IS-K propaganda was further subdued and their efforts at raising local taxes was banned, perhaps to avoid friction with Taliban and TTP. Given such a scenario, the outfit for a long time refrained from challenging any military force in the past.
• Shopping for Funding: In order to gain funding, the idea was to sell a jihadist cause, which would set well with the donors and present the outfit funds for its existence. In the past, the group promised radical Chinese Muslim groups that it planned to commence its operations in China. This was later linked to the funds which IS-K acquired from the private donors in the Arab Gulf for the very same project pitched to the Chinese Muslim groups. The familiarity with the Huis in Syria and Iraq prompted the IS central to conceive this project while viewing Han China as the new arena for waging jihad. The IS Central too, managed to build close relations with the Uyghurs of ETIM over the years and has succeeded in attracting many recruits from the Chinese Muslim communities. Even though China does not fall under IS-K’s territorial responsibility, the group continues to nurture the Chinese Muslims in Khorasan while utilizing the funds collected on behest of the community. The relation with the Huis is also strongly maintained despite the amicable relation IS-K shares with the Turkestan Islamic Party. It is evident, IS has been keen on Huis and intends to aid in the formation of a jihadist Hui movement in China.
• Retaliating for Syria: Retaliating against Iran gained an important premise compared to targeting the western targets for their intervention in Iraq and Syria. This philosophy applied to any affiliate of Iran. Russian assets in Afghanistan and Central Asia also served as targets and this provided IS-K to be useful to IS Central.
• Establishing safe havens for its fighters and forming an army: Setting up safe havens for its group was clearly imperative for ISK, in order to host its leaders from the central if required and for sustaining its existence from the growing repression it was to face from Taliban. In 2016, the ISK chiefs stated the plans to establish a primary safe haven in Kunar. In order to set their plan in motion the ISK fighters had tried to build a close rapport with the local communities and chiefs to use the area as a safe operating ground. IS-K, on the same line with its parent organization has constantly intended to develop facilities for organizing a centralized hybrid military force for quick deployment of well-trained fighters to out manoeuvre adversaries and disperse them when required.
• Garnering and mobilizing local support to dominate Jihad in Khorasan: Initially ISK had little to no support from the local communities except from specific jihadist groups and clerical networks. In order to increase its outreach, ISIS started par taking in local disputes, reinvigorating conflicts especially the sectarian ones, while attempting to lead any conflict which would help in overthrowing the previous Kabul government or any central Asian regimes.
It is clear that ISK intends to eventually over throw the Taliban regime and substitute it with its rule, as it has intended in Iraq and Syria. Its aspirations largely lay with the strategy laid by IS central. It has been effectively absorbing fighters from Taliban and various insurgent if not jihadist groups. This is also the primary reason why Tehran was not supportive of Kabul Taliban reconciliation, fearing it would only strengthen ISK. The IS-K strategy has remained coherent throughout the years, it aims at the maximizing pressure in areas where the resistance is weakest and polarizing violence IS-K’s aims to some extent have resonated with its parent organization the IS-Central, but have often seen fluctuating as well. Regardless of being called a franchise of the IS-Central, IS-K has on various occasions strategically established safe havens for its leaders and command centres, proving that it was more than a replicated clone of the IS- Central in form of anti-Shia campaign. Its efforts at Re-launching and expanding sectarian conflicts in Khorasan is a well-known IS-K strategy, which it continues to implement to create a social constituency for itself among a Sunni population and to implant itself in the political crevices of countries such as Iran, Pakistan and India as well. It poses a very high profile threat to India and will have to be watched closely.
