Gunmen stormed a religious gathering of Afghanistan’s minority Sikhs in their place of worship in Har Rai Sahib gurdwara at Dharamshala, in the heart of the Afghan capital’s old city on 25 March. n mission.
All four suicide bombers, who attacked Dharamshala, were killed by Afghan security forces after nearly six hours of fighting. There were about 150 people inside the temple.
Even while the grieving Afghan Sikhs were cremating the victims , a bomb exploded nearby creating further scare in the area.
The massacre was the second ISIS attack on a religious minority in March; a gathering of the predominantly Shia Hazara ethnic minority was also attacked earlier this month, with more than 30 people killed.
Islamic State’s (IS) Amaq media claimed the Kabul gurudwara attack was a “revenge for the Muslims in Kashmir.” Indian security analysts believe that the sophistication of the well planned attack on the gurudwara had characteristics of a more evolved, well trained IS-K.
A spokesman for the Taliban, which signed a withdrawal deal with the US government, on 29 February, and is moving towards intra-Afghan talks, was quick to deny any responsibility in the killings.
Afghan and Western security agencies believed that the strike was ordered by Quetta Shura of Taliban at the behest of Pakistani deep state with the larger motive of driving out India from Afghanistan. The entire operation was code-named Blackstar by the Pakistan intelligence, which used the Haqqani network led by Taliban’s deputy commander Sirajuddin Haqqani and elements of LeT.
Sikhs in Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s tiny Sikh community is one of few religious minorities in the country, protected by law but frequently targeted by extremists and subject to discrimination. Thirty years ago it was 500,000 strong, but after decades of conflict and the rise of the Taliban – who ordered Sikhs to wear yellow armbands – many sought asylum in India and the community was thought to have been reduced to about 300 families.
In 2018 a convoy of Sikhs and Hindus travelling to meet the president, Ashraf Ghani, was targeted by an Islamic suicide bomber.
Pakistan’s Proxy ISKP
One of the terrorists killed by the Afghan security forces has been identified as Mohsin (with several aliases), 29, from Kerala. He was reportedly a school dropout who left for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) more than two years ago and found his way into Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K).
Pakistan’s involvement in Mohsin’s training was also apparent from the video that was released soon after the attack. It mimicked what is typically heard from terrorists in similar situations in Kashmir. He also spoke in Urdu, the language used by Pakistan for training and handling terrorists.
IS-K is a branch of ISIS. Khorasan is a historical region comprising the present territories of north-eastern Iran, much of Central Asia, parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. IS-K came into existence in 2015, with defectors from the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP). It is active in the border region of eastern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan.
In November 2019, after a two-month-long operation, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), supported by Popular Uprising Forces and the United States Air Force, killed 50 terrorists and more than 250 ISKP members surrendered. They were mostly Pakistani, Indian, Iranian, Jordanian, Kazakhs, Maldivians, Tajiks and Uzbeks.
IS-Khorasan, which attacked Kabul gurdwara, is led by 43-year-old Mawlawi Aslam Farooqi , an ex- Lashkar-e-(LeT) Taiba man. LeT is proscribed by the UN as a terrorist organisation and is linked to the Pakistani security establishment. It is a loose conglomerate of several jihadist tanzeem with differing targets and aims. The group’s relations with the Taliban, and with Pakistan, are critical elements in its still evolving identity.
Farooqi took charge of the IS-KP in April 2019, according to a report submitted to the UN Security Council in July 2019 by a UN committee that monitors Daesh (or Islamic State), al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The report said Farooqi (also spelt Faruqi), who had been previously in charge of IS-K operations in the Khyber region on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, was promoted to the leadership in place of Mawlawi Zia ul-Haq in April 2019.
Aslam Farooqi was arrested by Afghan authorities on 5 April. Pakistan was quick to ask Afghianistan to hand over Farooqi to it for anti-Pakistan activities in Afghanistan. A Pak Foreign Office statement said the Afghanistan ambassador to Pakistan was called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to convey Pakistan’s views with regard to the arrest of Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K) leader Farooqi, which was announced on April 5.
In his book The Islamic State in Kohrasan – Afghanistan, Pakistan and the new Central Asian Jihad, Antonio Giustozzi, a well known academic who has written extensively on the IS and Afghanistan, has provided a detailed account of the rise of Farooqi in IS-K. Giustozzi says Farooqi was chosen as the “governor of Khorasan” by the military shura of IS-K on May 22, 2018, a year earlier than what the UN report says. Two months later, in July 2018, IS-K claimed an attack on a convoy of Sikhs and Hindus in Jalalabad, in which 19 people were killed, 13 of them Sikhs.
Pakistan seems to be using IS-K to get a free-run against India’s interests intensify its proxy war against India. It is particularly helpful to Pakistan that IS-K has recruits from India among other countries.
In February 2020, Islamic State’s new digital magazine, Sawt-ul-Hind, (Voice of Hindustan), referred to the communal violence in northeast Delhi to incite Muslims in India, “Democracy is not going to save you…only Sharia implemented in its purity in the shade of Khilafah (the caliphate) can now save you.”
In a combined reference to the US-Taliban agreement and the Delhi riots, Al-Qaeda’s wing, Ghazwat-ul-Hind (Conquest of India) said, “these glorious times when the crusaders army in Khorasan have signed the final document of their defeat and in such a hopeful season when Indian Muslims have decided not to bear the atrocity and oppression of Hindu polytheist groups”, and that the jihadists in Kashmir will be energised by these events.
Haqqani Network
According to counter-terror analysts, the Haqqani network comprises mainly of Zardan tribe based in Nangarhar, Khost, Nuristan and Kunar provinces, which is in direct conflict with the miniscule Sikh community over land in Jalalabad and trade in Kabul.
On July 1, 2019, the Haqqani network targeted the Sikh community in Jalalabad as they came to meet President Ashraf Ghani during his visit to Nangarhar province. In both cases, the Islamic State was allowed to take credit for the attack.
Comments
The Taliban’s operational leadership is now in the hands of Sirajuddin Haqqani of the Haqqani group, which has been blamed for several attacks on Indian targets, including the 2008 Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul. The Taliban have denied having anything to do with the gurdwara attack, and Pakistan has condemned it strongly. Who, really, is the IS-K in Afghanistan is a question that security experts have been asking for some time now.
Some analysts were puzzled over why the LeT would target the Sikh community at a time when, according to these officials, Pakistan has gone out of its way to woo this Indian minority group, especially since mid-2018, through the Kartarpur Corridor initiative.
Pakistan is setting sights on forcing India out of Afghanistan post withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan. With Taliban, Haqqani network, LeT and JeM all under control of the Pakistani deep state, Afghanistan again will provide strategic space to its terrorist arm for controlling Kabul and hitting at Kashmir.
Some estimates indicate that since 2016, around 100 people from India, mostly from Kerala, have joined the ISIS. Some of them travelled to the Gulf, and from there into the folds of ISIS in Iraq-Syria, and Afghanistan.
It is, therefore, important that immediate measures must be taken to limit this new virus being unleashed by Pakistan-ISI. First, India needs to institute measures to keep a vigil on its workforce in the Gulf countries, to safeguard their men being recruited by ISIS and other terrorist groups. Second, India must be even more mindful for the need for social cohesion, as its politico-economic-religious fault lines are being exploited for propaganda and potential recruitment. Third, India must work together with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Central Asian Republics, to check the IS-K.
Intra-Afghan Talks in Trouble
Taliban will not take part in intra-Afghan talks until the Afghan government releases about 5,000 of their prisoners, it said on 2 March, presenting a partial end to the truce and a major possible barrier to ending the war. The statement came as a bombs went off during a football match the same day in Khost in eastern Afghanistan, killing three people and injuring 11 others.
The limited truce between the Taliban, US and Afghan forces preceded the signing of a landmark deal between the insurgents and Washington in Doha on 29 February. The agreement sets out a timetable for foreign forces to quit Afghanistan within 14 months, subject to Taliban security guarantees and a pledge by the insurgents to hold talks with the Kabul government. Under the accord, the two sides are committed to working towards the release of combat and political prisoners as a confidence-building measure.
Prisoners’ Release
The Taliban announced they would resume attacks against Afghan forces, a day after President Ashraf Ghani warned he was not committed to a key clause in the Doha deal involving the release of thousands of Taliban prisoners. The agreement calls for up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners to be freed in exchange for up to 1,000 Afghan government captives by March 10. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, not involved in the talks, has rejected that demand.
Ghani’s government was not part of the Doha accord, so while the agreement states that the “United States commits to completing this goal” of releasing the Taliban prisoners, it is unclear how that can happen if Kabul is on board. Any prisoner release is “not in the authority of the US, it is in the authority of the Afghan government,” Ghani said.
“It could be included in the agenda of the intra-Afghan talks, but cannot be a prerequisite for talks.” The Taliban had, until now, refused to negotiate with Ghani’s administration – which they considered a US puppet regime – but the withdrawal agreement hinges on Kabul and the insurgents reaching a separate peace deal through “intra-Afghan” negotiations.
The Taliban believe that the Americans have committed to securing the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for 1,000 Afghan soldiers held by the Taliban before any intra-Afghan negotiations commence. They have termed as unsatisfactory the phased release that Ghani has proposed viz 1,500 before the talks commence and the remaining 3,500 to be released in batches of 500 every two weeks after the start of direct talks between the Taliban and a negotiating team appointed by the Afghan government, and the further condition that prisoners released provide a written pledge not to return to fighting.
Iran’s Stand
Iran also dismissed the US-Taliban agreement saying that the US had no legal standing to sign an agreement with the Taliban in Afghanistan. “Iran welcomes any initiative that helps to secure stability and peace in Afghanistan, but that will only be possible through domestic talks and by taking into consideration the interest of Afghanistan’s neighbours,” Iran’s foreign ministry said.
It may be in America’s interest, and that of its allies, including principal regional ally India, to continue supporting the people of Afghanistan and their government with badly needed aid. This may help moderate the Taliban, who may now be expected to call the shots and dominate other political trends. Perhaps this will help keep Afghanistan on its version of the democratic track.
Funding
Funding of Afghan security will play a role in the success of the peace deal. The United States Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, governed by a US-Afghan agreement, pays for equipping and running Afghanistan’s security forces. The ASFF was about $4.9 billion annually, reduced to about $1 billion from the current $6.5 billion. The Trump administration the Taliban know that maintaining this level of funding till 2024 is not likely, particularly when there are no foreign troops present.
India can have a role to play in this if in the changed context it is able to persuade all Afghans, including the Taliban, that its friendship is for the people of Afghanistan and not any particular political dispensation. Only such an outlook on India’s part can keep Afghanistan out of Pakistan’s pernicious grip even when the Taliban are in command.
