Troops Pulled Back In Pangong Tso Area
Chinese and Indian troops on the northern and southern shores of Pangong Tso began “synchronized and organized disengagement” in line with the consensus reached between Corps Commanders when they met on January 24.
According to the disengagement agreement, announced by the two countries, Chinese troops will move back to Finger 8 and Indian troops will pull back to the Dhan Singh Thapa post between Finger 2 and 3 of the northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake. Further, there would be a temporary moratorium on military activities, including patrolling to the traditional areas.
Defence Minister’s Statement
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh made a statement in the Rajya Sabha, on 11 February, about the “present situation in eastern Ladakh.” A statement was issued by the Chinese Defence Ministry a day before.
He said “I am happy to inform the House today that as a result of our well thought out approach and sustained talks with the Chinese side, we have now been able to reach an agreement on disengagement in the north and south bank of the Pangong Lake.”
As per the agreement, both sides will cease their forward deployments in a phased, coordinated and verified manner in these areas, he said.
The defence minister assured the House that India has not conceded anything while entering into the disengagement process, adding there are “some outstanding issues” with regard to deployment and patrolling at some other points along the LAC in eastern Ladakh.
Giving details of the pact, the Minister said, “The Chinese side will keep its troop presence in the North Bank area to east of Finger 8. Reciprocally, the Indian troops will be based at their permanent base at Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3,” he said.
“A similar action would be taken in the South Bank area by both sides. These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both north and south bank area will be removed,” Singh said.
He also informed the Elders that for the time being patrolling by both the armies in that area will not take place till the outstanding issues were addressed in the future military and diplomatic level parley.
“These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both North and South Bank area will be removed and the landforms will be restored. It has also been agreed to have a temporary moratorium on military activities by both sides in the North Bank, including patrolling to the traditional areas,” the defence minister said.
Based on this agreement action started from 10 February, he said, on the north and south bank. “It is expected that this will restore the situation to before the standoff of last year,” Singh said. Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake since April 2020 will be removed. Singh also mentioned that in the military and diplomatic discussions with China since last year, “we have told China that we want a solution to the issue on the basis of three principles:
• LAC should be accepted and respected by both the parties.
• Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.
• All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.
Also, for disengagement in the friction areas, he said, “India is of the view that the forward deployments of 2020 which are very close to each other should be pulled back and both the armies should return to their permanent and recognised posts”.
Chinese Statement
Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, had said in a written statement on Wednesday: “The Chinese and Indian frontline troops at the southern and northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake start synchronized and organized disengagement from February 10.”
“This move is in accordance with the consensus reached by both sides at the 9th round of China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting,” the Chinese statement said.
Importance of the Region
China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.
Further, it was on the south bank of the lake that Indian forces had gained strategic advantage by occupying certain peaks, in an action in late August 2020, outwitting the Chinese. Indian troops had positioned themselves on heights of Magar Hill, Mukhpari, Gurung Hill, Rezang La and Rechin La, which were unoccupied by either side earlier. Since then, the Chinese side had been particularly sensitive as these positions allowed India to not only dominate Spanggur Gap, which is a two-km wide valley that can be used to launch an offensive, as China had done in 1962, they also allow India a direct view of China’s Moldo Garrison.
Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub-sector. However, India had been demanding that any disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their April 2020 positions.
The PLA has vacated the features of Helmet and Black Top, South of Pangong Tso Lake, while the Indian Army has come down from the dominating features of Point 5167, Bump and Magar Hill that India seized at the beginning of August.
The disengagement agreement covers only the Pangong Tso Lake sector in Central Ladakh, but makes no mention of Depsang sector, near Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in Northern Ladakh, where PLA troops have crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and established themselves 15-18 kilometres inside territory that India has always claimed and patrolled. Since April, the PLA has blocked Indian troops from accessing Patrolling Points 10, 11, 12, 12A and 13 on the LAC.
The Indian Army regards Depsang as a critical sector, since controlling this would provide the PLA with a springboard to capture DBO, cut off India from the Karakoram Pass, and progress operations towards India’s vital Siachen Glacier sector.
While the start of disengagement involves the troops in contact on the front lines in Ladakh, there remain close to 100,000 troops from the PLA and the Indian Army that were deployed behind the front lines as reserves in case fighting broke out. It is likely that these would only be withdrawn after successful disengagement by the troops in contact.
Verification of Disengagement
The Indian Army used drones and high-resolution cameras to check and record dismantling of the Chinese infrastructure at the Pangong Tso Lake in Eastern Ladakh as part of the agreement for disengagement. The process at both northern and southern banks of the lake was completed by 20 February.
China had created a military garrison at Finger 7 where 13 jetties were stationed, long range guns were positioned, bunkers were constructed and permanent structures built to accommodate thousands of troops.
Field commanders of both sides met almost on a daily basis to take forward the disengagement process.
Lessons Learnt
India’s intelligence agencies and Armed Forces must remain geared for any adverse development and keep plans ready to prevent China from surprising us, be it occupation of any strategic feature along our Northern borders extending from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh or a repeat of a Galwan like situation proactively.
Back in July 1962, ‘partial’ withdrawal of Chinese troops from Ladakh was a treachery. Barely three months later, China invaded Indian territory.
Restoration of status quo ante on LAC will not only add to Indian Army and Modi government’s military credibility but also persuade President Xi Jinping to restrain his Western Theatre Commander to undertake any military misadventure in future.
China will continue to follow the strategy of engaging the Indian forces on the northern borders in controlled standoffs to create a major dilemma for a possible two-front confrontation and distribution of resources between land and maritime borders.
The Chinese would prefer to keep India engaged in small wars and engagements hampering India’s ambition of rising to the level of a world power from the regional power.
China may also employ hybrid warfare techniques to create internal turbulence in India. It may target India’s ethnic, regional and religious diversity. India must prepare itself against grey zone warfare.
India must continually exercise full strategic autonomy based upon its identified interests and diversify its partnerships while keeping China engaged.
The military has to be modernized through self-reliance and India’s economy has to rise to higher levels of growth.
National and political unity is required to neutralise the Chinese threat, strengthening hard and soft power, internal stability, mature politics, and national resolve.
