China’s Membership of UN Security Council
India rejected the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council – not once but twice – and today India is rejoicing election as a non-permanent member for a two-year term. The US, Russia, UK, France and China constitute the elite P5 or the five permanent members.
In August 1950, just three years after India became independent, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, India’s ambassador to the US, and prime minister’s Jawaharlal Nehru’s sister, wrote to Nehru from Washington: “One matter that is being cooked up in the State Department (the US equivalent of the Foreign Ministry) should be known to you. This is the unseating of China as a Permanent Member in the Security Council and of India being put in her place….Last night I heard from Marquis Childs, an influential columnist of Washington, that (John Foster) Dulles has asked him on behalf of the State Department to build up public opinion along these lines. I told him our attitude and advised him to go slow in the matter as it would not be received with any warmth in India.”
Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit was misleading the Americans by claiming that Indians would not be interested in permanent membership.
Nehru wrote back: “In your letter you mention that the State Department is trying to unseat China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in her place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to countenance it. That would be bad from every point of view. It would be a clear affront to China and it would mean some kind of a break between us and China. I suppose the State Department would not like that, but we have no intention of following that course. We shall go on pressing for China’s admission in the UN and the Security Council…..India because of many factors, is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council. But we are not going in at the cost of China.”
China’s Takeover of Tibet
Tibet was an independent country since 1912. It was a big buffer zone between India and China. But, India ignored Tibet’s request for weapons to strengthen it against the Chinese.
On October 25, 1950, Peking Radio announced that the process of “liberating” Tibet had begun. A large Chinese force crossed the Sino-Tibetan border on the east and began moving towards Lhasa.
Following the Chinese invasion of Tibet the Indian government addressed a note to China, asking it to solve the problem peacefully. The Chinese replied on October 30, that Tibet was an internal matter of China and no foreign interference would be tolerated.
Despite deputy prime minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s warning, Nehru did not entertain Lhasa Government’s requested to sponsor Tibet’s case before the United Nations. It was eventually tiny El Salvador that sponsored the pro-Tibet resolution at the UN.
Refusing to accept that China was working against India’s interests, Nehru continued to plead for the China’s admission to the United Nations.
1955 Soviet Offer
Soviet premier Nikolai Bulganin proposed, in 1955, India’s inclusion as the sixth member of the Security Council, during Nehru’s official visit. Nehru misread it and responded, “We feel that this should not be done till the question of China’s admission and possibly of others is first solved. I feel that we should first concentrate on getting China admitted.” Perhaps, he was thinking of getting Indonesia, Egypt and Yugoslavia admitted first.
Sarvepalli Gopal, Nehru’s biographer, confirms: “He rejected the Soviet offer to propose India as the sixth permanent member of the Security Council and insisted that priority be given to China’s admission to the United Nations.”
Patel warned about the dangers of supporting China at the UN in a note to the Prime Minister: “Outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into the UNO….In spite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism, perhaps mixed with a little hostility.”
Bandung Conference 1955
The Bandung Conference in 1955 created a positive image for China among Asian leaders and among Westerners. After the communists takeover of China, nearly all Asian countries were alarmed by its aggressive backing of communist movements in Asia. Nehru ensured that Asian countries became less hostile towards China through the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia.
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Indonesia were opposed to China being invited as the communist regime was not recognised. On Nehru’s assurance they relented.
At Bandung Chou En-lai assured the representatives of Thailand, Laos and Cambodia of the determination of his government not to interfere in their affairs. He declared China’s intent against war with the US, willingness to negotiate with the US on tensions in East Asia, particularly over Taiwan.
Occupation of Aksai Chin 1957
China stealthily occupied Aksai Chin and built a road through it in 1957. India did not challenge the Chinese or reclaim the lost Indian territory. Nehru told Parliament it was a bleak place where “not a blade of grass grows”. Famously, Mahavir Tyagi, member of Parliament said, “Nothing grows here, should it be cut off or given away to somebody else?” pointing to Nehru’s head.
Appeasing China Over Tibet
China has often resorted to diplomatic bullying to prevent the Dalai Lama from meeting with other global leaders. In October 2009, even the then US President Barack Obama decided not to meet him as it was believed that it would impact the US President’s upcoming China trip.
Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, the two areas that adjoin the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control, have recorded centuries-old transnational ties, including trade and religious, with Tibet. The Dalai Lama visits both the areas frequently as part of his religious duties. Whether the boundary would have been demarcated or not with India, the Chinese strategy to homogenise would have continued to view its borderlands or perceive areas across as a security threat.
Belief in China
India’s complacency and misjudgment in 1962 were not for want of warning signs from China. Indian leaders had apparently convinced themselves that the Chinese would not attack.
In the India-China interactions leading up to the 1962 China-India war, India had demonstrated friendliness without reciprocity and firmness without force. Despite deteriorating India-China relations in the late-1950s, neither Nehru nor Krishna Menon had contemplated a war between the two countries.
Krishna Menon had reassured Army chief Gen PN Thapar that the Chinese Deputy Premier, Chen Yi, had told him that China would never fight India over the border issue.
Nehru had explained in an interview aired just nine days before his death in 1964 that the Chinese acted the way they did principally as “they wanted the Asian world to realise that they are the top dog in Asia and that any person or any country in Asia should remember that”.
Neglect of the Armed Forces
Nehru perceived that the military was an unnecessary burden on a poor country like India. Post-1962 we were knocked back into our senses and much attention and expenses were showered to rapidly enhance our military capabilities. Had it not been for the 1962 war, the manner in which Pakistan was brought to its knees in 1971 would not have been possible. Even earlier the limited Chinese aggression was put down at Nathu La, Sikkim, in 1967.
Since then the threat emanating from China was either ignored or just wished away. The military has been used to combat and extinguish fires of insurgencies in the north and the east at a huge cost to its conventional warfare capabilities.
Nuclearisation of the subcontinent added to the perception that conventional militaries were becoming increasingly redundant. The possibility of conventional wars being fought among nuclear-armed adversaries appeared to be progressively more remote. In fact, the Kargil conflict of 1999 appeared to confirm these perceptions. Neither side was willing to escalate the conflict either in terms of space or the resources utilised.
Falling budgets, mandatory troop cuts and delays in getting much needed new weapons and equipment left large voids within the armed forces, making it increasingly dependent on obsolescent weapons and equipment. Combined with tampering with institutional processes, systematic lowering of the armed forces’ status became the norm. The military was battling against all odds.
The NDA government, since 2014, has tried to change and revitalise India’s international standing, brought in some traction in modernisation, but the military continued to see a downward spiral.
During the Modi government’s tenure robust retaliation against Pakistan’s interference in Jammu & Kashmir became the norm. But against China, the stand-off at Depasang plains and the Doklam standoff forced Modi to adopt an accommodating approach to woo the Chinese president Xi Jinping at the Wuhan informal summit and followed by the Mamallapuram summit.
Subsequently, with the abrogating the special status of Jammu & Kashmir in August 2019 without incident, Parliament proclaimed its intent to recover Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and also Aksai Chin from Chinese occupation. The Chinese did not take kindly to it. Xi Jinping probably made up his mind to teach India a lesson and bring Modi down a rung or two. The PLA’s actions to change the LAC in eastern Ladakh undertaken in April-June could have been undertaken with this objective.
India’s China Policy
Past mistakes have been responsible for the stand-offs in Depsang, Chumar and Doklam.
There has been an obsession concerning the threat from Pakistan, together with a degree of complacency vis-à-vis China. Nehru and defence minister Krishna Menon believed that the principal threat to India’s security came from Pakistan.
For five decades after 1962, India did not want to give Chinese troops an easy path if Beijing ever tried to repeat the brief 1962 border war and encroach into the territory India sees as its own. Hence, it followed a policy of neglecting border infrastructure.
It was in 1998, six months after taking charge as defence minister, George Fernandes called China as threat number one.
The interactions between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at Wuhan (April 2018) and Mamallapuram, Tamil Nadu (October 2019) further blind-sided those involved in foreign and security policy planning in New Delhi.
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Sequence of Events Post-Independence
1949: Chinese army entered Tibet. Prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru issued angry protest, deploring the “invasion” of Tibet.
1950: India declared McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh as its boundary.
1954: India categorically claimed Aksai Chin as part of its northern border and partially followed the Johnson-Ardagh Line of 1865.
1956: Chinese Claim Line (CCL) is proposed by Beijing.
1958: India discovered China had built a road over the plateau of Aksai Chin, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet.
1959: Tibetan armed uprising failed in Lhasa; Nehru rejected Chou En-lai’s letter in which China complained Indians were overstepping McMahon Line.
1960: China bizarrely expanded its claim on another 5,100 sq km of territory in eastern Ladakh.
1960: Chinese premier Chou En-lai offered to resolve the dispute on ‘present actualities’. China wanted status quo – India keeps NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) while China keeps Aksai Chin – the northeast edge of J&K. This was rejected by India.
Nov 1961: India launched “forward policy” to retain control over territory.
Oct-Nov 1962: India and China go to war.
1967: Nathu la skirmish, 400 Chinese and 65 Indian troops killed.
1975: Four Assam Rifles men killed after crossing the McMahon line at Tulung la in Arunachal Pradesh.
1986-87: Nine-month stand-off at Sum Drong Chu, Arunchal Pradesh. India launched Operation Falcon.
1988: Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s meeting with Deng Xiaoping resulted in another offer. China suggested resolution of Tawang tract. Rajiv Gandhi did not respond.
September 1993: Agreement signed on “maintenance of peace and tranquility along the LAC” under Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao.
1996: Talk of ‘not disturbing’ settled populations, and in November 1996 agreement signed on confidence-building measures in the military field along the LAC.
2003: Mechanism of Special Representatives set up.
2005: Agreement on “modalities for the implementation of confidence building measures (of 1996) in the military field along the LAC”.
2012: Establishment of a “working mechanism for consultation and coordination on India-China border affairs”.
2013: Border defence cooperation agreement signed in Beijing by Prime minister Manmohan Singh.
April 2013: India says Chinese troops establish a camp in the Daulat Beg Oldi sector, 10 km on their side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
2014: Prime minister Modi suggested demarcation of LAC on ground. China said let the special representatives (at present Ajit Doval and Wang Yi) resolve it.
September 2014: A standoff starts when India begins constructing a canal in the border village of Demchok. China protests and posts troops in the region leading to a faceoff. It ends after about three weeks when both sides agree to withdraw troops.
September 2015: Chinese and Indian troops face-off in the Burtse region of northern Ladakh after Indian troops dismantle a watchtower built by the Chinese.
June 2017: A military standoff occurs in the disputed territory of Doklam, near the Doka La pass along the Indian state of Sikkim and Bhutan border. China brings heavy road-building equipment to the Doklam region and begins constructing a road. This results in the Indian intervention of China’s road construction on June 18, two days after the construction begins.
August 2017: An incident occurs also at Pangong Tso or the Pangong Lake, a high-altitude lake of about 4,350 meters. Several soldiers on both sides sustain injuries. Indian media reports that around 72 Indian soldiers are injured in the confrontation and some sent to hospitals in Leh, Chandi Mandir, and Delhi.
May 5, 2020: Indian and Chinese soldiers clash at Pangong Tso, the lake that extends from Ladakh to the Tibetan Autonomous Region, China, with the LAC passing through it.
May 10, 2020: Faceoff at the Muguthang Valley in Sikkim. Several troops numbering 11 men are left slightly injured in the encounter, of which seven are Chinese soldiers and four Indian ones.
May 21, 2020: Chinese troops enter into the Galwan River valley in Ladakh region, citing objections to Indian road construction. The road under construction is said to branch off from the Darbuk–Shyok–Daulat Beg Oldi Road and lead into the Galwan valley.
May 24, 2020: Chinese camp at three places: Hot Springs, Patrolling Point 14, and Patrolling Point 15.
June 15, 2020: An Indian colonel and 19 soldiers killed in a physical fight that involved stones and batons with the Chinese troops at the Galwan Valley.
