Joe Biden’s took over as the 46th President of the United States on 20 January 2021. The same day, prime minister Narendra Modi tweeted, “I look forward to working with him to strengthen India-US strategic partnership…The India-US partnership is based on shared values. We have a substantial and multifaceted bilateral agenda, growing economic engagement and vibrant people to people linkages. Committed to working with President Biden to take the India-US partnership to even greater heights.”
The Biden presidency will have to deal with the most important strategic challenge of the times – the belligerence of China. The appointment of an Indo-Pacific coordinator signals the continued commitment of the new administration to managing China’s ambitions and investing in regional partnerships in Asia – including with India. But this will be accompanied by Washington’s need to keep up a working relationship with Beijing. Given the relatively bipartisan support for the relationship with India, New Delhi should not be overly concerned about the tactical ebbs and flows in Washington’s policy – for the strategic convergence between the two is unmistakable.
Despite concerns that may be expressed about what has come to be seen as India’s democratic backsliding, Biden is likely to invest in the India partnership across the realm of defence, economy, technology, and climate – and perhaps even make a trip to India in the first half of his term.
Biden’s Core Team
While Biden’s nominees to head the state and defence departments and the CIA are all well-known individuals, their depositions before Senate committees a day before the inauguration give an insight into the new administration’s thinking.
Secretary of State nominee Anthony Blinken listed the most pressing challenges as rising nationalism, receding democracy, growing rivalry from “China, and Russia and other authoritarian states, mounting a threat to a stable and open international system”. He also noted “a technological revolution” was reshaping our lives. If the US doesn’t lead, he said, “there can be only two outcomes: another nation will step in or none will, and chaos shall ensue”.
On specifics, Blinken argued the US must defeat Covid-19, out-compete China and take the lead in tackling climate change.
Blinken also singled out democracy and human rights as central to the Biden administration’s global outreach. Thus overall, while India would be happy with the tone and tenor on China, though what the new China containment strategy will be is still unclear.
The defence secretary-designate, Gen. Lloyd Austin (Retd), talked about India’s near western neighbourhood. While he reiterated the US resolve to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, he qualified it, as Trump avoided doing, by saying safeguarding the gains in women’s rights, etc, must be a precondition to a final settlement. On Pakistan, he seemed to regress to old formulations like underscoring its importance to Afghan peace and regional stability.
The new approach to foreign policy was articulated most consistently over the last year and more by Jake Sullivan, one of Biden’s closest associates, who has been designated as the new national security adviser. A report issued by Washington’s Carnegie Endowment for International Peace last fall, which was co-authored by Sullivan, gives some insights into the new thinking.
The report points to the overreach of American foreign policy in recent decades and proposes a “less ambitious” foreign policy. The Carnegie report notes that “There is no evidence America’s middle class will rally behind efforts aimed at restoring US primacy in a unipolar world, escalating a new Cold War with China, or waging a cosmic struggle between the world’s democracies and authoritarian governments.”
Biden’s team took charge with the recognition that the expansive globalist ambitions of the American foreign policy establishment have lost much domestic political support.
Biden’s Immediate Actions
For a start, Biden’s priorities were focused on managing the raging COVID-19 pandemic which has claimed 400,000 lives in the US, an economic crisis and a deeply polarised society and politics as was witnessed during the siege of the US Capitol in January.
President Biden’s 17 acts of rolling back prominent Trump policies on the very first day could send some awkward signals about the way the new administration may view the outcome of the last four years of US policies.
Biden’s first actions as president were sharply aimed at sweeping aside former President Donald Trump’s pandemic response, reversing his environmental agenda, tearing down his anti-immigration policies, bolstering the teetering economic recovery and restoring federal efforts to promote diversity.
Immediately after taking over, Biden executive order that will eventually provide relief and citizenship to migrants who have no legal documents would benefit five lakh Indian beneficiaries.
Most expect a return to the pre-Trump era with the US playing a more active role in world dynamics. Secretary of State nominee Anthony Blinken said that India had been a “bipartisan success story” of successive administrations, and Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin has also been batting for stronger Indo-US ties. Biden himself is a vocal proponent of friendly ties with India and has been a familiar face in New Delhi since his days as the Vice-President under Barack Obama.
India will continue to keep a close watch on Biden and his State Department nominees who might raise human rights concerns, after the comparatively less intrusive Trump administration.
China Policy
Social dynamics of the American society and the weakening US economy could prevent Biden from playing any hard options against China on issues such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. The Biden administration has displayed a bold intent by refusing to be intimidated by China over Taiwan – the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt was sent to the South China Sea to promote ‘freedom of the seas’.
It is unlikely that Biden will dilute the high status that Trump accorded to India in his strategic calculus for the Indo Pacific in the containment of China. Convergence of Indo-US interests has not been disturbed by Trump’s exit.
Indo-Pacific Policy
On its way out of power, the Trump administration, on 13 January, declassified a Indo-Pacific policy it evolved and shaped during its time in office to reveal broad and tough measures to contain China, including “accelerating India’s rise,” through diplomatic, military, and intelligence support.
Broad outlines of the policy were always known, but the decision to reveal it in detail in the turbulent waning days of the Trump dispensation even though the declassification was scheduled for 2042, came as a surprise even amid the toxic pathology between Washington and Beijing over the origins of the coronavirus pandemic.
Public disclosure of the policy will put pressure on the incoming Biden dispensation to stay on course with an evolving US-China-India policy that has progressively gotten tougher on Beijing.
The ten-page document, revealed during heightened tensions between India and China amid a continuing border stand-off, states that enhanced US assistance and intelligence sharing should aid New Delhi in key areas of conflict with Beijing, including over border disputes and water rights.
It outlines the US decision to “offer support to #India – through diplomatic, military and intelligence channels to help address continental challenges such as border dispute with China and access to water, including the Brahmaputra and other rivers facing diversion by China.”
“A strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counter-balance to China,” the document states.
Outlining Washington’s desired outcomes, that policy seeks that “India’s preferred partner in security issues is the United States” and “India maintains the capacity to counter border provocations by China,” and “India remains pre-eminent in South Asia and takes the leading role in maintaining Indian Ocean Security.”
During its four years in office, the Trump administration’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific theater was vigorous, and the pandemic, which the Trump administration blames on China, appears to have accelerated it beyond its initial moves in 2018, when it renamed US Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command in a signal it was bringing New Delhi into the security loop.
The US is fully aware of this and of India’s significance in the Indo Pacific strategy. Biden is unlikely to slow down the momentum that the Quadrilateral of nations involving Japan, Australia, India and the US, has gathered towards realisation of shared concerns and formulation of strategic intent against an aggressive China.
Pakistan
During the Trump era, de-hyphenation of Pakistan from India became a reality. Ties between the US and Pakistan may take off once again. The new US defence secretary, in his confirmation hearing with the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed the need for engaging with the Pakistan military. Pakistan’s geostrategic location gives it out-of-proportion strategic stakes. Pakistan has moved closer to China but US-Pak mutual interests have not changed. The US needs Pakistan for its Afghanistan policy, which will contribute towards an eventual final withdrawal. On the other hand, Pakistan needs US support for its economy.
Middle East
The Middle East and Asia are the two foreign policy theatres which will test Biden. Biden has shown signs of reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and reconsidering sanctions. Bringing back Iran to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will involve a number of steps, including rebuilding the trust with the Iranian leadership that got severely hit after the decision taken by the Trump administration to withdraw from the nuclear deal which was followed by the 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani.
Though there is little scope for a complete revision in the overall Middle East strategy, a withdrawal of support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen is expected as the situation has caused a humanitarian crisis and embarrassment to the US. Facilitated by the Trump administration, the accords between Israel and Bahrain, and Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) carry some weight, but there is little expectation of a major breakthrough on thorny issues like Israel-Palestine.
India’s interests are primarily the opening of Iran’s energy supplies, the rights on development and usage of Chabahar, stability of the Gulf nations where the large Indian diaspora resides and a general absence of violence.
Russia
India’s immediate concern is to see that the S-400 air defence system deal with Russia goes through. It remains contentious in US eyes with no certainty about application of sanctions under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The US imposed sanctions on Turkey recently under the CAATSA for the purchase of S-400 missile defences from Russia.
Top American officials have been taking a “pragmatic view” on the issue. India cannot wish away overnight the fact that it has huge dependency on Russia. So whether the Biden administration imposes sanctions or not India has to build its capability. Ultimately India will take decisions based on its own strategic interests.
Delhi’s Expectations
New Delhi is looking at “five baskets” of engagement: Strategic, environment, energy and climate change, digital and IT, education and health care.
According to Evan Osnos’s biography of Biden, he was one of the key advocates of strengthening the Indo-US partnership, especially in strategic areas.
With about 2 lakh Indian students in the US and the Trump administration’s progressively hardening line on visas, Delhi will look towards easing of norms for those aspiring to study and work there.
The US and India see each other as key strategic partners and analysts expect the Indo-US relations to grow closer and become less strained. With the coalition against China likely to persist, America’s ties with India and other Pacific nations, including Japan and Australia, may experience a further boost.
The major policy changes India is hoping for are in terms of software exports, H1 visa policy, minimum compensation for engineers (via which Trump tried discouraging hiring Indian IT professionals). Bilateral trade between the two countries was at $88.75 billion in 2019-20. In 2019, the US was the largest goods export market (17% share) for India and, in terms of goods import supplier, it was the third largest. In April-September 2020, the US was the second biggest source of FDI for India. It’s likely that higher portfolio investments influenced by federal rates will flow into India.
With India focusing on becoming a manufacturing hub, there might be a rise in US funding influx and India would hopefully become the alternative choice.
Defence Cooperation
A day after US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke for the first time with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, on 29 January, Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby told reporters at a news conference, “The Secretary made it very clear that we’re going to remain committed to a strong US-India bilateral relationship.” During his conversation with Singh on Wednesday, Austin pledged to work collaboratively with India to sustain the progress in the bilateral defence relationship, the Pentagon said earlier.
“During the call, Secretary Austin emphasised the Department’s commitment to the US-India Major Defence Partnership, observing that it is built upon shared values and a common interest in ensuring the Indo-Pacific region remains free and open,” Kirby said.
The Indo-US defence ties have been on an upswing in the last few years and in June 2016, the US had designated India a “Major Defence Partner”.
The two countries have also inked key defence and security pacts over the past few years, including the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016 that allows their militaries use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies as well as provides for deeper cooperation.
The two sides have also signed COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) in 2018 that provides for interoperability between the two militaries and provides for sale of high end technology from the US to India.
Comments
The Trump years have seen two important developments in India-US relations. One is the sharpening tensions on trade and the other is the deepening defence and security cooperation. The Biden moment offers the opportunity for Delhi to overcome the bilateral differences on trade and elevate defence cooperation to a higher level.
The need to take the Indo-US security-defence relationship to the next level is apparent to sober thinkers in both nations but the obstacles to it are not insignificant. There is no guarantee that the US-India positive trajectory will continue.
An essay published earlier this month by Joshua T. White, a leading scholar with the Brookings Institution, details the concerns on the American side. President Joe Biden will have to deal with apprehensions about India’s fiscal limitations, its ties with Russia, its “ponderous response” to Chinese provocations on its border, and its “drift toward illiberal majoritarian politics”. In addition, writes White, the Biden administration will likely seek, for good reason, to rebalance the bilateral relationship away from a disproportionate focus on security issues in order to address a wider array of topics including global health, energy and climate change, and technology cooperation.
On the Indian domestic front, prime minister Narendra Modi will have to contend with the long-held view that Democratic administrations are prone to hyphenating India and Pakistan, do not walk the tough talk on China, indulge in rank identity politics which they expect other nations including their allies to emulate, and lecture New Delhi on human rights, liberalism and the environment without accounting for an Indian exceptionalism, which has been in the forefront of pushing back against communitarian discourses. These are the challenges that both countries have to overcome, respectively, if they are serious about containing the rise and rise of China.
