In the midst of concerns about tensions in the South China Sea where China continues to abuse the sovereign rights of other countries, international law was reaffirmed as the basis for determining sovereignty, sovereign rights and legitimate interests in maritime areas, during the retreat of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Vietnam in January. In an apparent reference to China, the statement called for countries to improve mutual trust “to exercise self-restraint in conducting activities and to avoid acts that may complicate the situation further.”
Beijing dismissed the proposal, preferring instead to send military forces to the South China Sea and exploit resources. In the recent past, Chinese fishing and coast guard vessels entered In-donesia’s North Natuna Sea Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), resulting in a diplomatic dispute, with Indonesia claiming it would never accept China’s nine-dash line, nor compromise with China. A number of Chinese vessels had previously been engaged in a conflict with Vietnamese au-thorities in the vicinity of an oil block within Vietnam’s EEZ.
Indonesia is not a claimant in South China Sea, but it opposes the portion of its Exclusive Eco-nomic Zone that originates from the Natuna Islands (which Indonesia considers significant not only for its protection but also for its economic development), but it “allegedly” also encroaches on China’s self-proclaimed Nine Dash Line.
Natuna Stand-off
“There is no territorial dispute between Indonesia and China,” was a frequently-heard slogan of Indonesian leaders for decades. That fails to recognise the persisting maritime dispute between them. In late December last year, several Chinese coast guard ships escorted more than three dozen Chinese fishing boats into the waters off Indonesia’s Natuna Islands, which was not only within China’s self-proclaimed’ nine-dash line’ but also Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone near the South China Sea’s Natuna Islands.
The latest incident follows the pattern of Chinese vessels operating in maritime regions that are contested by China with Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Conscious of this, Jakarta immediately summoned the Chinese ambassador and issued a formal diplomatic protest. Indonesia deployed five warships, and four F-16 jet fighters in the two-week conflict that followed at the far south end of the South China Sea. The response from Indonesia has been more about pushing the Chinese away without escalating tensions. Chinese coast guard vessels and Indonesian naval vessels were engaged in a confrontation for the first week of 2020, reminiscent of earlier standoffs between Chinese forces and those in the Philippines and Vietnam over the last decade.
China argued that the waters of Natuna had been their fishing grounds for decades, since the area lies within its self-proclaimed line of nine-dash.
Claims over Natuna
United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) maintains the authority of coastal states over their territorial waters of up to 12 nauti-cal miles from the baseline. A coastal state has sovereignty and absolute power at territorial sea over its maritime area, subsoil, and airspace. A coastal state may make claims for an EEZ in ma-ritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles to 200 nautical miles measured from coastal state baseline.
Indonesia, in particular the EEZ between the two states of the North Natuna Sea, is yet to fully resolve its maritime boundary with Vietnam. That creates a “gray area” in which affected States can exercise sovereign rights. Territorial confusion creates a’ blame game’ in which both states can assert sovereignty over the’ gray area.’ When Vietnam and Indonesia correctly settle territorial disputes in the North Natuna Sea including EEZ claims, the region is open to both nations’ claims. Indonesia is entitled to send its vessels to carry out naval patrols while Vietnam is al-lowed to carry out UNCLOS-approved activities in areas it considers part of its EEZ.
On the other hand, China does not recognize maritime areas in the vicinity of Natuna as its EEZ but within its’ nine-dash line’ as part of its traditional waters.’ That is why China claims it has the right to fish there. The’ nine-dash line’ was rejected by the Permanent Court of International Ar-bitration in 2016, which ruled the line was against the principle of UNCLOS in 1982.
China’s Strategic Calculations in Natuna
The southern limits of its expansive claims for hegemony in the South China Sea, demarcated by nine-dash line have never been fully defined. In light of the previous skirmishes with Indonesia , and the recent standoff, it is evident that China claims the region as part of its territorial waters. Clearly, there are different aspects to the issue that China might have considered while sparking off the dispute.
First, Beijing is now in a position to make better use of militarized outposts across the South China Sea and allow more routine and longer-lasting patrols of its claims to sovereignty. Indone-sia’s Natuna Islands are situated approximately 700 miles southwest of China’s Spratly outposts, well within the range of Chinese naval, coast guard aircraft and artificial island air force patrols.
China has been engaged in long-term negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to conclude a Code of Conduct in South China Sea. Strangely, though China’s maritime claims overlap with the exclusive economic zone of Indonesia, Jakarta has long maintained the position of not being officially a claimant in the ASEAN negotiations. The rationale behind that is, it does not consider the waters surrounding the Natuna Islands to be part of the South China Sea. As a non-claimant, Jakarta had little reason to collaborate with claimants Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines in pursuing a legally binding Code of Conduct by 2021. Yet recent tensions around the Natuna Islands may change the scenario. ASEAN’s chair in 2020, Vietnam, is already dealing with Vanguard Bank standoff with China. Hence, alienating another influential ASEAN member state could prove futile in future.
Conclusion
ASEAN countries have limited capability when it comes to challenging China. China has been building South China Sea as a springboard to project its naval power.
Vietnam already has a dispute with Indonesia over Natuna. Hence, it is unlikely that Vietnam would give any categorical focus to China- Indonesia dispute. This would imply, that the internal disputes itself within ASEAN countries is a weak link in the entire dispute and hence ASEAN is unlikely to come up with a joint response to Chinese coercive action anytime soon.
There are plenty of reasons to believe that an anti-China front might never emerge in ASEAN. The ASEAN countries gain major economic benefits from China and would not want a scenario where they have a political or military fall out with China.
Indonesia presently is focused on internal stability which depends on its rapid economic development supported by Chinese investment and support.
China too has resisted any coercive aggressive action. Recent policy changes in China have also given some signs of a willingness to pursue a peaceful resolution. If China believes it has a valid claim to fish in the claimed EEZ in Indonesia, it has shown restraint in its response to protests from Indonesia.
Clearly, Indonesia does not want this spat to escalate. Its response was subdued. This time, al-though military vessels and aircraft were deployed to the area, their actions were restrained.
Since illegal fishing is a persisting issue and the disputing countries clearly want to maintain re-straint. Hence, an agreement over fisheries could be thought of.
One more aspect to look out for is amidst the persisting multilaterals, mini laterals and hubs and spokes alliances in function in response to the persisting violation of freedom of navigation rules, it is important to understand how the prominent powers in the region who consistently emphasize on ASEAN centrality respond to the persisting security dilemma. Russia has just entered the game (for resource exploration in Philippines and Vietnam) in China’s self proclaimed waters. Also the fact that China and Russia are reviving their old friendship one has to study the real rationale of Russia’s initiative to factor in.
It is a fact that in Southeast Asia the claimant states of Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines do not possess the capacity or ability of China to demonstrate its territorial integr-ity in the South China Sea. Thus, these nations should put aside their differences towards China and reach a consensus on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. Apparently a careful bal-ance must be struck between assertion of power and tactful diplomacy between actors on all sides, because armed conflict is not desirable for any party involved.
