Review of Russia’s special operation in Ukraine

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President Vladimir Putin launched Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the early hours of February 24, 2022, describing it as a ‘special military operation’ with the aim to ‘demilitarise and de-Nazify Ukraine’ and stop the ‘genocide’ of ethnic Russians in eastern Donbas. Moscow-backed separatists had tried to break away from Kyiv’s control by setting up the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic and were opposed by groups like the Azov Regiment, rooted in far-right ideology. Putin also linked the invasion to checking NATO’s eastward expansion for gaining a ‘military foothold’ in Ukraine.

A refreshingly honest comment about this war came from the Pontiff in Rome. Pope Francis remarked that Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine was ‘perhaps somehow provoked’ as he recalled a conversation with a head of state who had mentioned to him that NATO was “barking at the gates of Russia”. The Pope also warned against what he said was a fairy-tale perception of the conflict as a battle of good versus evil.

There have been no serious attempts to curtail this conflict by the West by acknowledging Russian security concerns in its immediate neighbourhood. However, within NATO itself there are discordant voices coloured by dependence of some member countries on Russian energy exports. While direct talks between the Russian and Ukrainian Presidents have been suggested by India, among others, a few nations, including Turkey, had made offers of mediation.

Apart from death and destruction, this war has led to an acute food shortage in many countries as Ukraine and Russia are major exporters of foodgrains and the conflict has disrupted supply chains. Russia is also an exporter of energy to Europe and has cut oil and gas supplies in response to sanctions, fuelling inflation and increased cost of living.

The US, UK, European Union, Japan and Australia, among others, have all backed Kyiv with military aid worth billions of dollars. Many NATO allies have been at the forefront of efforts to arm Kyiv with weaponry for repelling Russia’s forces.

Russia’s main supporter is its neighbour and close ally, Belarus, whose territory was also used as a launch pad for the invasion and it is now providing considerable ammunition stocks for Russian forces. Many other countries, including China, India and Turkey, have avoided openly supporting either side.

At the commencement of the invasion, Russia deployed about 2,00,000 soldiers into Ukraine from the north, east and south. After the Russian advance faltered, its troops regrouped in Ukraine’s east and Putin recast the Kremlin’s goal as ‘the liberation of Donbas’. By September, Moscow had annexed four partly occupied territories — Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian forces, aided by western arms supplies, were busy staging counterattacks. By mid-November, they had recaptured the southern city of Kherson. Since then, both sides have been locked in bloody battles for the control of territory in the Donbas.

This year, the key determinant will be the fate of Russia’s spring offensive. About 50,000 of its newly mobilised troops are already at the front and another 2,50,000 are under training. The occupation of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions will continue, but a major Russian breakthrough is less likely. A continuation of current tactics, slow grinding of Ukrainian forces on limited fronts and a steady advance while targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure and heavy artillery and missile barrages in the rear, will mark this war of attrition.

Crossing over to the east side of the Dnipro river to pressure Russia’s vulnerable road and rail links into Crimea might be too demanding. But the possibility of Kyiv launching a surprise new offensive can never be ruled out.

For the Ukrainians, the strategically valuable direction is south, to Melitopol or Berdyansk, aiming to cut the Russian mainland corridor to Crimea. That would be a major Ukrainian victory, and that is exactly why the Russians are fortifying Melitopol.

A short and unstable ceasefire is the only other prospect. Putin has made it clear that he will not stop and Ukraine has asserted that it is fighting to recapture what has been lost, including the Crimea. This is an intense contest in political, economic, diplomatic and military domains. It is hard to escape the sense that as 2022 came to a close, an ‘iron curtain’ had once again been drawn across Europe, but this time from the West, aiming to contain Russia. Despite Russia’s sizeable budget deficit and other impacts of western sanctions, Moscow will probably have enough reserves and money to keep its war against Ukraine going. This does not mean the sanctions imposed by the West are not effective but only that it would be “naive to think that sanctions alone could end the war,” in the words of Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff.

The steady flow of arms and equipment through its western borders into Ukraine has greatly aided its war effort. However, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s desperate calls for fighter jets (about 200-odd F-16s) remain unheeded so far. The UK and Germany are providing a meagre squadron worth each of Challenger and Leopard 2 tanks and the US, while citing the extensive training and maintenance required, is expected to send about 30 M1 Abrams tanks. However, a missing element for offensive operations is air power which is unlikely to materialise anytime soon.

The visit of the US President to Kyiv was highly symbolic and came with the promise of providing ammunition and air defence radars as well as further sanctions on Russia, but it fell short of Zelenskyy’s wish list of weapon systems and aircraft. The Munich security conference was in much the same vein, with the UK baulking at directly supplying fighter jets.

As far as India is concerned, Prime Minister Modi’s advice to Putin, “Today’s era is not an era of war”, should be a pointer for Indian diplomacy to take the lead in resolving this conflict. New Delhi needs to reach out to the major players as a mediator. Its long-standing strategic ties with Russia, an ostensibly neutral stance with no ulterior motives unlike China, combined with its capabilities and capacities as the G20 president, make it ideally suited for this role. Ukraine Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba had stated as much in what was nothing short of a direct invitation. The Ukraine war offers our diplomacy an ideal opportunity to play the roles of a peacemaker and a dealmaker. (Lt Gen Pradeep Bali).