INDIA-CHINA: Indian Troops Occupy Key Heights North of Pangong Tso

Preventive Operations to Counter Chinese Actions

Indian soldiers thwarted an attempt by Chinese troops to occupy some heights near the southern bank of Pangong Tso on the night of 29-30 August. The “provocative military movements” by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aimed at seizing the heights in the Chushul sector, broadly between Pangong Tso and Spanggur Gap, were physically blocked by the swift deployment of Indian troops in the region at an altitude of around 15,000-feet.

The Army said there were no violent clashes in the intervening night of 29-30 August, as were witnessed during the extended bloody skirmish in the Galwan Valley on 15 June. Other reports said there were physical scuffles between the rival soldiers during the incident. The Indian troops involved in the action included commandos from the covert Special Frontier Force (SFF), which recruits from among the Tibetans exiled in India.

If the Indian Army had not undertaken the pro-active military manoeuvre, it would have been presented with a fait accompli like on the northern bank of Pangong Tso, Gogra and Depsang areas, from where the PLA has refused to withdraw from what India considers its territory.

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There is also little doubt that the PLA attempts to open a new front on 29 August, in keeping with its strategy to push the LAC westwards, was sanctioned by the top Chinese politico-military hierarchy, much like the multiple intrusions deep into Indian territory in early-May.

Around 100 PLA soldiers, with equipment to set up camps, were also spotted below the ‘Black Top Hill’, which in turn led the Indian Army’s to respond in a “quid pro quo” manner. The PLA was obviously upset. It accused the Indian troops of “undermining” the consensus reached at the multi-level talks by “illegally” crossing the LAC to “seriously violate” China’s territorial sovereignty.

Renchin La

A critical mountain pass, Renchin La (called Reqin by China) is located close to Spanggur Gap, east of Chushul, along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This was occupied on the night of 30-31 August. Earlier, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China had attempted to change the status quo at the LAC two days earlier but was reportedly thwarted by the Indian Army.

The pass is located in the “grey zone” along the LAC, where perceptions of the LAC vary with both sides making counter-claims. It led to a sharp reaction from China. Renchin La is one of the 13 identified possible routes of military ingress into Ladakh from the Chinese side. These routes are natural gaps in mountains along the 826-km LAC in Ladakh.

The pass accords India a clear view of Spanggur Gap, Moldo Garrison of China, besides the southern bank of the Spanggur Tso.

These positions dominate the Chushul-Tsaka la-Dungti road on the Indian side and overlook the Rezang La, where the two countries fought a pitched battle in 1962.

The move, a clear counter to the PLA, expands the ongoing stalemate south of Pangong Tso. So far, everything was happening north of the lake.

Two Brigadier-level meetings (on August 31 and September 1) at Chushul ended in a stalemate. At the military meetings, it was conveyed that India had no intention of changing the LAC status, as was being attempted by the PLA.

Chinese Counter Action

The PLA reportedly moved its tanks from its base at Moldo and could have occupied any area of “grey zone” like they did at Finger-4 on the north bank of Pangong Tso.

Indian surveillance systems picked up the PLA movement and the concentration of troops and tanks at Moldo necessitated a move to occupy heights.

Provocation by PLA

Troops of both sides exchanged fisticuffs as some 400 PLA soldiers tried to alter status quo near ‘Black Top’ along LAC.

On 31 August, the PLA Western Theater Command accused India of “illegally crossing the line” on August 31 at two points — south bank of Pangong Lake and near Rezang La.

Since May, clashes have taken place at the Galwan valley and north bank of Pangong Tso, making this the first such incident south of Pangong Tso. The area between Thakung and moving southwards towards Chushul is sensitive as a road runs almost parallel to the LAC for several kilometres. Thakung is an Indian military base located on the LAC. Chushul is an important base located 50 km south of Thakung.

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A Ministry of Defence (MoD) statement said: “The PLA carried out provocative military movements to change the status quo (at the LAC). Indian troops pre-empted this activity on the southern bank of Pangong Tso and undertook measures to strengthen our positions and thwart Chinese intentions to unilaterally change the facts on the ground”.

Disengagement Incomplete

The first phase of disengagement undertaken in early July remains incomplete with disengagement completed at Galwan valley and Patrolling Point (PP) 15 in Gogra-Hot springs area. However, only limited disengagement has been undertaken at PP 17A in Gogra-Hot springs and it has barely begun at Pangong Tso. Chinese troops have only moved back from the base of Finger 4, the mountain spur, to Finger 5 but remain to occupy the ridgelines of Finger 4 where India’s claim extends till Finger 8, while it has always held till Finger 4.

Comments

Even if China vacates from Fingers 5-8 on the Northern Banks of Pangong Tso, we should not vacate the Chushul Heights, which give us tremendous tactical and strategic advantages to look into Chinese base at Moldo, dominate Spangur Gap and provide us a firm base for launching an offensive. More so, the heights in our occupation are on our own side of LAC.

In case we vacate the Chushul Heights the Chinese will come and occupy them. Throwing them out will require launching very costly assaults to retake then. 

In fact, Chinese incursions on the northern banks of Pangong Tso and PP 17A should be addressed in a similar way by occupying parallel heights in the vicinity to gain leverage over them.

On the northern bank of Pangong Tso, China has transgressed over 8 kms from behind Finger 8 to Finger 4. After some meetings it went back perfunctorily to Finger 5. It then claimed that the status quo ante had been restored. That is in keeping with its tactics of moving two steps forward and one step back. On insisting that they move back to the original location behind Finger 8, China asks us to vacate Finger 3 and threatens us with troops concentration in front of it.

The ridge on the south side of Pangong Tso dominates the Spangur Gap and also dominates the Chinese Moldo base. It also gives depth to the Chushul Bowl. The international boundary is about 15 kms to the east of our positions on Kailash Range. It is an excellent firm base in case we have to launch an offensive to reach the international border. It will also give us a road link to connect with his strategic National HW G-219 that links Tibet with Xinjiang. Hence under no circumstances, we should let go of our positions on the Kailash Range.