China’s approach to cyber warfare extends into space as a critical element of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) overall military doctrine. The PLA’s Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) is responsible for integrating space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities to disrupt adversary space-based assets. Given that modern military operations rely heavily on satellites for command and control (C2), intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), navigation, and secure communications, China’s ability to infiltrate and disable enemy satellite networks presents a major strategic threat.
China employs a multi-pronged strategy to achieve cyber dominance in space. This includes cyberattacks designed to hack into enemy satellite control systems, intercept and alter data transmissions, and deploy malware that can degrade or manipulate satellite functionality or to enforce terminal orbital repositioning (TOR). By targeting the ground-based control infrastructure of satellites, the PLA can effectively disable or hijack enemy space assets without the need for kinetic destruction. Such cyberattacks allow for covert operations by the virtue of attribution that do not immediately trigger kinetic retaliation, making them highly effective for disrupting enemy operations before or during a conflict.
There have been multiple reports of Chinese cyber units conducting probing attacks on U.S. and allied space infrastructure, including commercial satellite networks used for military applications. The PLA’s cyber units specialize in penetrating satellite command networks, altering telemetry data, and injecting false signals to disrupt battlefield coordination. In a Taiwan or South China Sea contingency, these cyber capabilities would be used to blind enemy ISR satellites, delay missile early warning systems, and disrupt secure military communications.
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Another key strategy is China’s use of supply chain infiltration to embed vulnerabilities in satellite components and ground station infrastructure. By compromising hardware or software during the manufacturing process, China can maintain persistent access to adversary space assets, allowing for real-time intelligence collection or remote disabling during a conflict.
Electronic Jamming and Spoofing Operations
In addition to cyber warfare, the PLA has developed advanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities that can jam, degrade, or spoof satellite signals, impacting navigation, communications, and ISR capabilities. The PLA utilizes both ground-based and space-based EW systems to achieve these objectives, with dedicated electronic attack units capable of targeting GPS, SATCOM (satellite communications), and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites.
GPS jamming and spoofing operations are particularly critical in denying precision-guided weapons (PGWs) accurate targeting data, rendering them ineffective. China has developed high-powered jamming stations that can interfere with satellite signals over large operational areas, including the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. During a conflict Chinerse jammers could prevent enemy aircraft, ships, and ground forces from receiving accurate positioning data, significantly disrupting force coordination and targeting accuracy.conflict, these jammers could prevent enemy aircraft, ships, and ground forces from receiving accurate positioning data, significantly disrupting force coordination and targeting accuracy.
Spoofing, a more sophisticated technique, involves sending false GPS signals to deceive enemy navigation systems. This method can misdirect aircraft, drones, and missiles, leading them off-course or preventing them from acquiring targets. The PLA has conducted multiple tests in this domain, with evidence suggesting that Chinese forces have interfered with civilian and military GPS signals in contested areas as a proof of concept.
Beyond GPS, China’s electronic warfare units target satellite communications by jamming military and commercial SATCOM channels, effectively cutting off battlefield units from higher command structures. This capability is particularly critical in disrupting NATO and U.S. military reliance on satellite-based tactical data links (such as Link-16 and beyond-line-of-sight communications). In a large-scale conflict, China would likely deploy a combination of mobile ground-based jammers, airborne EW platforms, and space-based jamming payloads to deny adversary forces access to critical satellite communications.
Integration of Cyber-EW-Space Assets
China’s doctrine of integrated cyber-electronic-space warfare represents one of the most advanced strategic threats to modern military operations. The PLA does not treat cyber, electronic, and space warfare as separate domains but instead integrates them into a cohesive, multi-domain strategy aimed at achieving information superiority.
At the core of this strategy is the PLASSF, which unifies cyber, electronic, and space operations under a centralized command structure. This allows the PLA to coordinate cyberattacks, electronic jamming, and satellite disruptions simultaneously, maximizing their effectiveness. For example, during a Taiwan invasion scenario, PLA cyber units would first disable enemy satellite control systems, followed by electronic warfare teams jamming radar and communications, while PLA space assets conduct ISR and kinetic ASAT (anti-satellite) strikes to degrade enemy situational awareness.
The PLA also integrates its cyber-electronic-space operations with AI-driven warfare techniques, allowing for rapid decision-making and adaptive attacks against enemy networks. Machine learning algorithms analyze satellite and electronic warfare data in real time, allowing the PLA to adjust jamming frequencies, target vulnerable systems, and launch cyberattacks at optimal moments to maximize disruption.
Another key aspect of this integration is China’s deployment of co-orbital satellites equipped with electronic warfare payloads. These satellites can jam enemy ISR satellites, disrupt missile early warning systems, and even deploy directed-energy attacks against space assets. Unlike traditional ground-based jamming, which can be countered or localized, space-based EW assets provide China with global reach and persistent denial capabilities.
China’s space-based cyber and electronic warfare strategy represents a major challenge for modern military forces. The PLA’s ability to simultaneously launch cyberattacks, conduct electronic jamming, and disable enemy satellites ensures that adversaries face severe operational paralysis in a contested battlespace. As China continues to enhance its cyber-electronic-space integration, countermeasures must evolve rapidly to maintain strategic parity in this critical domain.
Courtesy Adib Enayati, Ph.D., Genesys Defense Special Intelligence and Warfare Studies Unit (GDSIWSU)
